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Preface
This book had its genesis in two observations: that democratisation has 
been the major political trend in Southern Africa since the end of apartheid 
and the termination of the Cold War (albeit an uneven democratisation that 
in some cases has even been reversed); and, that like many regions or sub-
regions, Southern Africa has embarked on a major project of multinational 
co-operation, including in the security field. 
These observations led to two questions, which is what this book is all 
about. The first was essentially about the relationship (if any) between the 
dynamics of democratisation and democratic practices (or lack of them) and 
national security perceptions and practices in Southern African states. The 
second was whether this has had any effect on approaches to the regional 
security project. 
We leave it to the reader to judge whether we have answered these 
questions, but a summary of the findings is attempted in the conclusion. 
The research project from which this book resulted was almost as much 
about process as findings. It was a project of the Southern African Defence 
and Security Management (SADSEM) Network, a grouping of tertiary 
institutions in ten countries that works on common research and capacity-
building programmes for the democratic management of defence and 
security in the region, both within and between states (see Appendix 2). 
The research was supported by a three-year grant from the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada. 
After common terms of reference had been agreed, three conceptual chapters 
were written: on democracy and security; on security co-operation in a 
comparative context; and on the background of conflict, co-operation and 
democratisation in the Southern African Development Centre (SADC). 
Next, country studies were commissioned. We initially hoped to cover 
all the 14 member states of SADC, but as the project advanced this was 
whittled down to 11. In particular, Angola and the DRC, which at the time 
the research was initiated were still involved in civil wars, proved difficult 
to accommodate in the research framework.1 In many Southern African 
countries, research into defence and security matters is still very sensitive 
and the researchers often had to tread delicately in seeking to knock on and 
open doors, but in most cases governments were co-operative. 
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Preface
Partly because the SADSEM Network is committed to developing indigenous 
capacities for researching and managing security, and partly because we are 
tired of being written about rather than writing about ourselves, in virtually 
all cases nationals of the countries concerned were commissioned to carry 
out the research. In some countries, small teams of researchers collaborated 
as part of the effort to build local capacities. A small team of international 
advisors also participated in the process.2 
The team of researchers met on three occasions to peer-review the outputs 
and to see whether a common picture was emerging. These meetings, in 
Maputo and Johannesburg, were supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
(FES), and were also made possible by core support to the SADSEM 
Network by Danida. As a further quality control measure, the project was 
externally evaluated in mid-term and on completion.3
At the final meeting, officials from governments and non-governmental 
organisations attended and were able to make inputs, along with the 
international advisory team. 
Further workshops were held in Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa, 
where lively discussions on the findings took place between academics, 
government officials and civil society representatives. Some policy 
recommenda tions were derived as a result, which were written up as a policy 
paper and disseminated through the region (see Appendix 1). 
This book is a product in a very real way of the whole SADSEM Network. 
The Network partners constituted a management committee and oversaw 
it from its beginnings as an idea to its completion. In this process many 
colleagues, both in Southern Africa and abroad, participated. We thank 
them all, as well as the main donors – IDRC which sponsored the research, 
Danida which provides core funding to SADSEM, and the FES which 
sponsored two of the formative workshops as well as the production of the 
book. Nevertheless, the editors alone are responsible for the final product. 
Gavin Cawthra, Andre du Pisani and Abillah Omari 
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1  Seychelles left SADC after the research had been commissioned but the chapter has nevertheless 
been retained; Madagascar joined later so was not covered; and a paper was not finalised for 
Malawi. 
2  Eboe Hutchful (Ghana), Robin Luckham (UK, and an honorary African), and Bjoern Moeller 
(Denmark, who participated in terms of a Danida-funded twinning agreement between the 
SADSEM Network and the Danish Institute for International Studies). 
3  The mid-term evaluation was carried out by Francis Kornegay (South Africa) and the final one 
by Balefi Tsie (Botswana) and Barry Munslow (UK). 
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Chapter 1:
Democratic Governance and Security:  
A Conceptual Exploration
Andre du Pisani
Democracy, like the state, is historically and socially constructed, and is a 
process rather than a single event or outcome. It is the outcome of historical 
struggles against arbitrary and authoritarian power, therefore different 
societies find themselves at different positions along a complex trajectory 
towards consolidating their democracies. Democracy mediates both political 
and civil society, for it has specific procedural implications for politics. By its 
very nature, it is contested. It tolerates peaceful dissent and disloyalty. For 
democracy to be legitimate, its institutions and practices need to be both apt 
and acceptable (Horowitz 1991: 32).
While democracy can be studied productively from both a normative and 
an empirical perspective, normative and empirical conceptions of democracy 
must remain connected to each other: what democracy is cannot be separated 
from what democracy should be.
Democracy is a political and social construct anchored on three key ideas. 
Following Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997: 8–24), these are: democracy as a value, 
a process, and a practice. These three ideas provide the very foundations of 
democracy as a universal concept and help to explain its appeal and institutional 
design in diverse historical and cultural contexts. These three domain ideas 
also provide the theoretical basis for exploring complex relationships among 
democracy, development, and human security.
Each of these ideas will now be briefly discussed.
Democracy as a value
For many authors and practitioners, democracy is above all a moral value or 
imperative. Perhaps it is true that in all human societies there is a need to improve 
the material conditions of life as well as to have a sense of freedom, whatever 
the real socio-economic and political conditions might be. Philosophically, it 
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has been argued that this deep and innate human need provides the lubricant 
for demands for a new social or political project. While class consciousness 
may indeed be a necessary condition for social and political transformation, it 
is clearly not a sufficient condition for it. Innate human impulses for democratic 
values, practices, and human agency also play their part.
Democracy as a moral value or virtue is widely linked to four other core 
virtues. These are liberty (freedom), human dignity, justice, and tolerance. It 
has to be emphasised, however, that democracy does not necessarily resolve 
the problems of justice, equality, and tolerance, e.g. would it be just to give 
everyone the same things, when people have neither the same needs nor the 
same merits? 
While it is widely recognised in the voluminous literature on democratic 
theory that majority rule is the best way, because it is visible, can be counted, 
and has strength to govern, it may also be the opinion of the least able – 
and sometimes of the least just. This raises questions of how the majority 
is qualified to pronounce on social and political choices. Questions of 
citizenship, a concept that is historically and legally tied to the apron strings 
of the state, also become important. In the West, as Falk (1995: 253) points 
out, ‘positive participation has been associated with the shift from the status 
of “subject” (slave, vassal, serf) to “citizen”.’ The modern media-shaped 
political life, however, 
threatens individuals with a new type of postmodern serfdom, 
in which elections, political campaigns, and political parties 
provide rituals without substance, a politics of sound bytes 
and manipulative images, reducing the citizen to a mechanical 
object to be controlled, rather than being the legitimating 
source of legitimate authority.
Falk (1995: 253), responding to the devaluation of the notion of citizenship, 
proposes the concept of ‘positive citizenship’ as extending beyond state/
society relations and involving all relationships of a participatory nature, i.e. 
institutions and practices that invoke authority. For Falk, ‘positive citizenship’ 
‘also draws on nonviolence and human rights as inspirational sources’. The 
greatest challenge is to ‘reconcile the territorial dimensions of citizenship 
with the temporal dimensions: acting in the present for the sake of the future, 
establishing zones of humane governance as building blocks’. 
Falk’s notion of positive citizenship resonates in the work of Held (1992) on 
‘cosmopolitan democracy’ and even, if one gives the imagination free reign, 
in the earlier Kantian notion of ‘cosmopolitan justice’.
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Rousseau’s concept of the ‘general will’ is certainly useful in this instance, 
but is of dubious value. There is nothing to guarantee that the general will is 
always just, so its validity cannot depend on it being just (unless one defines 
justice as the general will, but in that case, the circularity of the definition 
would obviously make the guarantee worthless, if not simply meaningless). 
All democrats know this. The law is the law, whether just or not, but it 
is therefore not the same as justice. This brings us to justice not as a fact 
(legality), but as a value (equality, equity) or, finally, as a virtue.
The democratic values of human worth and solidarity that are evident in the 
writings of numerous philosophers and theologians are values around which 
the concept of democracy has taken root in African societies too. Nzongola-
Ntalaja (1997: 11–12) comments succinctly:
In African societies, the individual is conceptualised as a vital 
force, whose existence transcends the temporal body in which 
the person is objectified in his or her earthly life. This is the 
essential or more fundamental difference between humans 
and other living species, including animals. Hence the 
necessity of respecting the originality and the particularity of 
each person, respect of the latter’s individuality or individual 
human worth. This is the foundation on which Africans, like 
peoples elsewhere, base the idea of the inviolability of the 
human person as well as his or her inalienable right to life and 
security. The security of people and their goods is one of the 
basic democratic principles recognised all over the world.
Owusu (1994: 132–33) makes a related point when he argues that African 
traditions provide a ‘vibrant strand’ for democracy to take root. In his 
analysis, ‘leadership norms’, often enshrined in oaths, songs and drum texts, 
maxims and proverbs, and prayers and ceremonies, as well as customary 
law that is based on the rights and duties of subjects and rulers, provide one 
foundation for constitutional democracy. The other foundations include the 
doctrine of the separation of powers and the democratic practices that render 
a constitutional democracy meaningful. 
While the intrinsic worth of the individual is universally recognised, that 
individual is considered as fully human only through his or her dialectical 
relationship to society. Human existence has meaning to the extent that it is 
lived in society. The value of solidarity is expressed and reinforced through 
family and kinship ties, ethnic identity, language, patriotism, and nationalism. 
Needless to say, these very values can be – and have been – exploited to 
produce anti-democratic outcomes such as ethnic and racial particularism, 
Democratic Governance and Security: A Conceptual Exploration
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neo-patrimonial rule and, in more corrosive cases, ethnic cleansing and 
genocide. 
Experience in Senegal and Botswana underscores the importance of struc-
tured and mediated participation of different social formations and ethnic 
groups (in the case of the former) to make political contestation less violent 
and more amenable to compromise than in some African countries. In 
Senegal, the mediators are the marabouts: leaders of the important Muslim 
brotherhoods. In Botswana, the political class has been largely continuous 
with traditional leaders, and political participation has been mediated by the 
chiefdoms to which voters owe allegiance (Picard 1987: 190). Hence, it is 
worth emphasising that democracy needs tolerance of diversity. Universal 
tolerance, however, would be both morally reprehensible and practically 
impossible, since it would negate some of the very conditions that tolerance 
and democracy would need to flower. 
This brings us to the second foundation of democracy: democracy as a social 
process.
Democracy as a social process
As a social construction, democracy is never complete or fully consolidated, 
but is a continuous social and political process of enlarging access to funda-
mental human rights and civil liberties for all. These fundamental human 
rights and liberties include, at least since the 1948 United Nations (UN) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the following:
•	 the fundamental right of the human person to life, dignity, and security;
•	 freedom of religion, assembly, expression, the press, and conscience;
•	 economic, social, and cultural rights – the idea of democracy as a means of 
satisfying and responding to basic human needs (social democracy); and
•	 the right to political self-determination.
Central to this democratic process is the idea that a ‘good’ political order is 
one in which the state is capable of meeting the existential, material, and 
spiritual needs of its citizens. In fact, as Horowitz (1991: 116–17) points out, 
democracy 
is fostered by the development of more generally autonomous 
social forces, of voluntary associations and interests, of a civil 
society that stands apart from the state, of forces that can 
balance each other in utilizing the future state machinery for 
political ends.
5
The limited (and in some cases, declining) capacity of some African states 
to ensure human security and to promote human development is often the 
principal reason for instability and conflict. It is, paradoxically, the failure 
of development that has given rise to demands for more democracy. It is 
hard, however, to conceive of democracy (in whatever form) in the absence 
of state capacity. Enhancing and protecting democratic rights together form 
the starting point for responding to the problems many African countries 
face. In this sense democracy, like human security, is an actualising concept. 
(The nexus between democracy as a social process and human security will 
be explored in a subsequent section of this chapter.)
Democracy as political practice
Democracy constitutes political practice. It refers to specific institutional 
habits and practices for organising and exercising public power in accordance 
with universal norms and principles. Liberal democracy is arguably the most 
procedural of all types of democracy.
Understood as such, democracy can be examined at two levels: firstly, at the 
level of the principles themselves, and of the institutions, procedures, and 
practices that apply them; and secondly, at the level of whether the institutions, 
procedures, and practices are compatible with universal democratic principles.
The following, informed by the writings of Ake (1996), Pateman (1970), Dahl 
(1989; 1991), and Cheru (2002), provides a list of some of the key universal 
principles of democratic governance:
•	 the idea that legitimate power or authority emanates from the people, who 
exercise it either directly through popular assembly or indirectly through 
elected assemblies, elected executives, or other modes of representation;
•	 the concept of the rule of law, which means that power should not be 
arbitrary, and that its exercise must be circumscribed by agreed rules that 
define its scope (limits) and modes of operation;
•	 the principle that leaders are chosen by and accountable to the people. 
The element of choice logically implies that democracy is government by 
the consent of the governed;
•	 the right of citizens to participate in the management of public affairs through 
a variety of means, such as free, transparent, and democratic elections; 
decentralised governmental structures; non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs); and community-based organisations. This implies participation 
through civil society formations as distinct from the state; and
•	 the right of citizens to change a government that no longer serves their 
interests, or the right to revolution. This right is qualified in the sense that 
it can be exercised against non-democratic regimes.
Democratic Governance and Security: A Conceptual Exploration
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Dahl (1991) adds to the above criteria five more. These include effective 
citizen participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding (on the part 
of citizens), popular control of the agenda, and the inclusion of adults.
While political institutions, cultures, and procedures vary greatly in Southern 
Africa, the test of their democratic worth remains the same: to establish 
whether they are consistent with these universal democratic principles. In 
this respect, Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997: 15), for example, argues: 
Neopatrimonialism, according to which the ruler is 
indistinguishable from the office he/she occupies, for example, 
pervades the entire system and erodes the formal institutions 
of government and any democratic content. Thus, even in 
states where democratic institutions and procedures are 
supposedly respected, the result is democratic formalism, or 
democracy in form rather than content.
The phenomenon of neo-patrimonialism has been widely researched by 
various scholars, among them Chazan et al. (1988), Clapham (1982), Jackson 
(1982), Joseph (1989), and Bratton and Van de Walle (1997). 
One of the many reasons why neo-patrimonialism is so prevalent in much of 
sub-Saharan Africa goes back to a core distinction that is often forgotten in 
new democracies, that between democratic politics and democratic institutions. 
The former, democratic politics, is about how politics is conducted within the 
frame of democratic values and practices. The latter, democratic institutions, 
refers to the presence or absence of public institutions such as legislatures, 
judiciaries, political parties, and regular elections – the institutional architec-
ture and more formal aspects of a democracy. 
Democracy as political practice requires an effective state, and appropriate 
legal and political institutions to secure people’s rights, safeguard their human 
security, and allow them to elect their own governments and make their 
own laws. The phenomenon of ‘weak/soft’ or ‘failed’ states, in Africa and 
elsewhere, substantively undermines the viability of democratic governance 
and by extension, the human security of these states’ citizens. Since human 
security has as two of its dimensions the safeguarding of human rights and 
meeting the basic needs of people, these are difficult to envisage in the 
context of ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states. 
As political practice and social process, democracy is characterised by, 
among other features, a recognition of the rule of law, constitutional limits 
on government, the meaningful decentralisation of power, and procedures 
7
for arriving at collective decisions that seek to ensure the participation of 
important social formations and their representatives in public affairs. For 
Cheru (2002: 40), the decentralisation of power and responsibility should 
apply at both the political and economic levels. 
At the political level, it concerns the form of representation and the practices 
for taking decisions at the local and regional levels. The political purpose of 
decentralisation is to provide meaningful ways for citizens to counter the 
monopoly of political decision making at the centre.
At the economic level, decentralisation not only concerns itself with the need 
for grassroots participation in development and budget deliberations, but 
should extend to addressing urban–rural divides and the skewed allocation 
of resources (both financial and human) between the centre and the regional 
and local state.
Competing understandings of democracy
Against these introductory remarks, several scholars, notably Ake (1994; 
1996; 2000), have attempted to distinguish among competing understandings 
of democracy. In his latest work, published posthumously, Ake (2000) draws 
a distinction between ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘social democracy’. The first 
he regards as ‘minimalist’: liberal democracy, for Ake, reflects the narrow 
interests of elites, privileges multi-party elections and democratic procedure, 
and has a belief in the supremacy of the constitution and the ‘democracy 
of Western governments and the Bretton Woods institutions’. For Ake, the 
neo-liberal economic project undermines human security. This is so for 
various reasons, among them that the emphasis on procedure and rules 
detracts from the social imperatives of democracy, while liberal democracy 
is essentially based on elite pacts to the exclusion of vulnerable groups such 
as women and minority groups. Social democracy, on the other hand, has a 
different template. It demands material betterment, equality, social justice, 
the upliftment of citizens, and concrete rights. Ake argues for democracy of 
the second type if African civilisations are to survive and prosper. 
In a somewhat differently constructed argument, Sandbrook (2000) offers 
a useful primer on a range of complex issues related to democratisation 
and market reforms in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. He is especially 
concerned with the possible role of state agencies and institutions in 
promoting economic development, political stability, and social inclusion. 
For Sandbrook, ‘getting the politics right’ is a necessary precondition 
for enhanced prosperity, extension of civil and political liberties, and the 
achievement of human security. He conceives of ‘democratic development’ 
Democratic Governance and Security: A Conceptual Exploration
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in terms of a ‘virtuous and self-reinforcing circle of civil and political rights, 
growing prosperity, and state renovation’. In his view, democratisation is, ‘at 
best’, only ‘one component of an effective preventive strategy’ (Sandbrook 
2000: 59). Democratic reforms are not sufficient on their own to trigger 
sustainable development. The challenge is more daunting: ‘closing the circle’ 
requires both the implementation of bureaucratic capacity building and 
effective conflict management institutions.
Diamond, writing in 1999, reminds us that it has become difficult to classify 
democracies in the current turbulent international system, as the conditions 
for making and consolidating democracy differ starkly from country to 
country and from region to region. He nonetheless distinguishes among 
three types of democracies. These are discussed briefly below.
Electoral democracy
This concept defines democracy as the regime in which governmental offices 
are filled as a consequence of contested elections, with the proviso that 
real contestation requires an opposition with some ‘non-trivial chance’ of 
winning office, and that the chief executive office and the legislative seats are 
filled by contested elections.
Depending on the political context and the nature of the electoral system 
used, the linkage between elections and electoral systems, on the one 
hand, and democratic governance, on the other, may be either positive or 
negative. Having said this, however, elections and electoral systems are key 
to democratic governance, although in themselves they are not a sufficient 
condition for democratic governance. The choice of electoral system is shaped 
by context and political history. Electoral system reform is an important 
requirement for deepening representation, legitimacy, and accountability. 
Contested, transparent elections as part of the architecture of democracy 
derive their meaning from democratic politics. 
Proportional representation (PR) as an electoral system has several 
advantages. In the analysis of Reynolds and Reilly (2002), these include a fair 
translation of votes into seats, enhanced access to representation by minority 
parties, improved gender representation, and a more inclusive and socially 
diverse list of candidates. The principal disadvantages of PR include unstable 
coalition government, providing a platform for extremist parties, and leaving 
little room for independent candidates.
The first-past-the-post system, too, has several advantages. The following 
are the most evident: the system provides a clear-cut choice to the electorate, 
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especially in a stable bi-party system; it favours broad-based parties; voters 
are given the opportunity to vote for candidates rather than for parties; and 
the system makes for strong constituency links between representatives 
and the electorate. The disadvantages include excluding minority parties, 
encouraging sectarian parties, and possibly excluding women.
Liberal democracy
Liberal democracy has the following principal institutional features:
•	 Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies in practice, as 
well as in constitutional theory, with elected officials.
•	 Executive power is constitutionally constrained by the relative autonomous 
power of other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, 
parliament, and other mechanisms of horizontal accountability).
•	 Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups, as well as historically 
disadvantaged majorities are not prohibited (legally or in practice) from 
expressing their interests in the political process or from speaking their 
language or practising their culture.
•	 Beyond parties and elections, citizens have multiple channels for 
expression and representation of their interests and values, including 
diverse, independent associations and movements, which they have the 
freedom to join.
•	 Individuals have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, 
speech, publication, assembly, demonstration, and petition. The rule of 
law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture, and 
undue interference in their personal lives, not only by the state, but also 
by organised non-state or anti-state forces.
The post-1989 period in particular has witnessed hybridised, sometimes 
inconsistent, constitutional engineering, with countries borrowing elements 
from different democratic constitutions. Moreover, many constitutional 
framers consulted foreign models and then proceeded to apply them to local 
conditions, sometimes with mixed success (Horowitz 2003: 16). 
Dahl (1971; 1989) prefers the word ‘polyarchy’ to democracy. His notion 
of polyarchy, however, contains key elements of a liberal democracy. 
These include consent on the upholding of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms, and contest and competition for positions of public authority, 
principally through transparent elections.
 
Acknowledging that Diamond’s classification of different types of democracies 
is based on ideal types, Ake (2000: 9) nonetheless believes that liberal 
democracy itself has atrophied in a ‘long process of devaluation during which 
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it lost much of its redeeming democratic elements’. In its classical, procedural 
understanding, liberal democracy can and does disempower marginal 
groups. It is inevitably socially less anchored than social or developmental 
democracy.
Pseudo democracies 
Pseudo democracies are Diamond’s (1999) third type. These ‘democracies’ 
tolerate alternative parties, which constitute at least some independent 
opposition to the governing party. This toleration is accompanied by more 
space for organisational pluralism and dissent in civil society than is the 
case in more repressive authoritarian regimes. Dominant party systems 
characterise such democracies. 
Pseudo democracy is also known as ‘facade’ or ‘virtual’ democracy: 
democracy with the institutional architecture but none of the substance and 
social dimensions of a democracy. 
Development democracies
Diamond (1999) argues that even liberal democracies fall short of democratic 
ideals. They have serious limitations in their guarantees of personal 
and associational freedom. Thus democracy should be understood as a 
‘developmental phenomenon’. Even when a country is above the threshold 
of an electoral (or even liberal) democracy, democratic institutions can 
be improved and deepened, or may need to be consolidated; political 
competition can be made fairer and more open; participation can become 
more inclusive; citizens’ knowledge, resources, and competence can grow; 
elected and appointed officials can be made more responsive and accountable; 
civil liberties can be better protected; and the rule of law can become more 
efficient and entrenched. 
More recently, with the tendency towards growing unilateralism on the 
part of the current United States administration, a new type of ‘democracy’ 
has emerged: ‘imposed democracy’, such as that being imposed on Iraq. 
The assumption, of course, is that the United States provides a model of 
democratic governance worthy of emulation by the rest of the world. (In 
parenthesis, the United States forgets its own history: democracy is always 
the outcome of concrete struggles against lack of freedom. It cannot be 
‘bought off the shelf’, or imposed from above or from the outside.)
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Democratic transition theory
Against the backdrop of the conceptual distinctions and argumentation 
introduced above, the inevitable question arises: When is a transition 
‘democratic’ and when is it not? For Huntington (1991: 9), ‘the critical point 
in the process of democratisation is the replacement of a government that was 
not chosen [freely and fairly] by one that is selected in a free, open, and fair 
election’. Bratton, who has been critical of democratic transition theory, since 
much of it has been based on the Latin American and Southern European 
experience (and more recently on Eastern and Central Europe), nevertheless 
believes that a country is held to have installed a democratic regime if, in a 
context of civil liberties, a competitive election is freely and fairly conducted 
and the election results are accepted by all contestants (Bratton and Van de 
Walle 1997).
Much of the literature has tended to define the subsequent consolidation 
phase of democratisation more comprehensively and in a more open-
ended fashion. Linz and Stepan (1996: 15), for example, characterise the 
consolidation phase as 
a period when the overwhelming majority of the people 
[come to] believe that any further political change must 
emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures 
... when all the actors [are] habituated to ... [conflict resolution 
by] established norms ... and violations of these norms are 
likely to be both ineffective and costly. 
They propose five key ‘mutually interconnected and reinforcing conditions’ 
that must be obtained for democratic consolidation to be achieved. These 
are: ‘a free and lively civil society; a relatively autonomous political society; 
prevalent observance of the rule of law; a state bureaucracy “that is usable by 
the new democratic government”; and an institutionalized economic society’ 
(Linz and Stepan 1996: 17).
Harbeson (1999: 42–43) argues that one of the limitations of much of the 
existing body of literature on democratisation is the ‘election-centric’ 
conception of the transition phases and the often unrealistic expectations 
that accompany this period. These expectations include
the presumptions that (1) democratic elections will ipso facto 
produce regime change from an incumbent authoritarian to 
a new, democratically inclined regime; (2) initial multiparty 
elections and/or regime change will ipso facto generate the 
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momentum necessary to produce subsequent, broader 
patterns of democratization; (3) this momentum will be 
sufficient to generate the means of fulfillment of tasks 
associated with the consolidation of democracy; (4) the initial 
multiparty elections taking place at the national level will lead 
to democratization processes at subnational levels; and (5) the 
polity will remain sufficiently stable to sustain transition and 
subsequent consolidation phases of democratization.
Time-series data for sub-Saharan Africa analysed by Bratton and Van de 
Walle (1997: 3–6) for the period 1988–94 shows that democratic transitions 
in Africa in this period were not linear. In their words, ‘peaks in key transition 
events were followed by descents towards new valleys’. One of these 
‘valleys’ has been a declining mean of civil liberties and a slide on the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) for 
some sub-Saharan African countries. Others, such as Namibia, South Africa, 
Malawi, Mozambique, and Eritrea (at least in the period 1991–98) could be 
cited as ‘positive cases’ of democratisation.
Acknowledging that the actual processes of transition to democracy differed 
in the various countries, Harbeson (1999: 43) boldly advances the proposition 
that 
African circumstances make it more likely that transitions 
will result in democratic progress to the extent that they 
commence with comprehensive multiparty agreements on the 
fundamental rules of the game, either through constitutional 
reform or by constitution-like pact making, than if they 
begin with initial multiparty elections in advance of such rule 
making. 
While useful, Harbeson’s proposition neither explains nor captures the 
specificity of particular transitions to democracy. Any theory of democratic 
transition needs to consider the specific circumstances and points of departure 
of individual countries. Luckham (2003: 9–10), for example, emphasises the 
importance of conceptualising new forms of conflict, produced by a ‘series 
of interacting historical trajectories’ that divert the ‘Third Wave’1 from its 
‘democratising course’. These ‘trajectories’ include, among others, ‘transitional 
democracies’, ‘lapsed or stalled democracies’, ‘states under reconstruction’, 
‘conflict-torn states’, and ‘failed or collapsed states’.
 
Such an approach would facilitate the incorporation of concrete African 
democratisation experiences into theories of democratic transition, which 
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have hitherto been heavily influenced by the experiences of Southern and 
Eastern–Central Europe, and of Latin America. One illustration of this 
consideration is the fact that recent democratic transitions in Africa have not 
been linear, have taken a relatively short time to effect, have been differently 
sequenced, and have been fashioned by a largely hostile global environment 
that demanded political transition, regime change, and economic reform to 
occur simultaneously (Hyslop 1999). 
Another consideration is that of the capacity of new and transitional 
democracies to come to terms with ethnicity. Ethnicity in itself is not necessarily 
a negative force in politics, but the way in which it is instrumentalised can 
cause conflict. For example, the preferential and exclusive treatment of 
different ethnic groups can release energy for ethnic mobilisation and 
destructive conflict, as happened in the cases of Rwanda and Burundi in 
the 1990s. If instrumentalised, ethnicity can culminate in a ‘captured state’ 
with one dominant ethnic group effectively controlling the state in its own 
interest. 
Democratic transitions in Southern Africa 
International and regional developments in the late 1980s resulted in Southern 
Africa experiencing a ‘wave’ of democratisation. This seemingly produced a 
broad acceptance, throughout much of the region, of the values and norms 
of multi-party democracy, regular transparent elections, constitutional rule, 
and adherence to human rights. Except for Swaziland, all Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) countries have held multi-party general 
elections since 1990, and most have held more than one (Matlosa 2000). This 
democratisation has been accompanied in most countries by the introduction 
of neo-liberal economic policies with their emphasis on market-led growth, 
privatisation, and commercialisation.
 
The expectation, held by many donors, international financial institutions 
(IFIs), and national policy-makers, was that liberal democracy would 
enhance human security. But has democracy brought stability and growth in 
its wake? If so, of what kind? For example, the region’s dominant economy, 
South Africa, has been experiencing ‘jobless growth’ and ongoing social 
conflict in the context of liberal democratisation (Marais 1998). In important 
respects, such as its environmental security, neo-liberal South Africa may 
have become ‘unsustainable’ (Bond 2000). Countries such as Mozambique 
and Namibia also experience corrosive forms of unequal development and 
poverty. This had led many analysts to question the premise that with the 
introduction of liberal democracy countries ‘stabilise’ and ‘develop’ (Held 
2000; Galtung 2000).
Democratic Governance and Security: A Conceptual Exploration
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Ake (2000: 30) points to one of the fallacies that inform the widely held 
view that liberal democracy necessarily produces economic development 
and enhances human security. It is simply this: Africa is democratising 
in an international context in which there is apparently no allowance 
made for the fact that liberal democracy has been socially and historically 
constructed in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. Similarly, little or no 
attempt ‘is made to separate the values and principles of liberal democracy 
from the particular historical practices which operationalise these values 
and principles in specific historical settings’. Contested understandings of 
what democratisation means, too, have resulted in a confusion of democratic 
processes and institutions with democratic outcomes.
In the heady 1990s, which breathed the air of a ‘peace and democratic dividend’, 
scholarly attention turned to the question of ‘democratic consolidation’ and 
its particular challenges. However, it is doubtful to what extent most states in 
Southern Africa may be considered to be consolidated or even consolidating 
democracies. In part, assessing the state of democratisation in the region 
depends on how democracy is defined and understood. Most countries 
have formal electoral democratic systems in place, but some lack entrenched 
and functioning mechanisms for protecting citizens’ human rights and 
civil liberties, decentralising authority to lower levels, addressing gender 
inequality, and maintaining the rule of law. In other countries, democratic 
politics may be the preserve of an elite, even if formal democracy exists, 
and hence democracy may not resonate with citizens. Furthermore, deep 
economic inequalities, abject poverty, and marginalisation of vulnerable 
groups may threaten democracy.
Luckham, Goertz, and Kaldor (2000: 21) have introduced the concept of 
‘democratic deficits’ in considering the quality of democracy in the ‘new and 
transitional democracies’. Such deficits may be found in formal constitutional 
political arrangements (democratic institutions) or in the substance of political 
practices (democratic politics). Deficits may concern issues of citizenship 
(e.g. the exclusion of certain groups), issues of the vertical accountability 
of rulers to citizens or horizontal accountability within governance systems 
and practices, or issues of international accountability (e.g. policy strictures 
imposed by IFIs).
In one of the most insightful offerings on the feasibility of democracy in 
Africa, Ake (2000) raises more fundamental concerns. By all indications, the 
‘established democracies’ are not able to offer the developing countries clear 
and meaningful standards of democratisation to relate to. This is because 
they themselves have 
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no clear and meaningful standard of democracy, a condition 
arising from the growing alienation of the practice of 
democracy from the Western ideology of democracy and 
the concerted effort by powerful interests to deradicalize 
democracy by offering a profusion of definitions which 
trivialize it (Ake 2000). 
The notion of ‘democratic deficits’ is arguably a more useful way of viewing 
Southern African countries than merely attempting to judge the extent to 
which they adhere to formal criteria, for it allows consideration not only of 
formal mechanisms, but also of the nature of political processes embedded in 
society and arising from political histories, as well as of the differential effects 
of globalisation on individual countries.
While recognising the introduction of electoral and liberal democracy in 
Southern Africa, one should not be blind to the democratic deficits and 
the stark socio-economic and gender inequalities that continue to exist 
throughout the region. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this has led to 
an improvement in either state security (‘narrow’ security) or human 
security (the wider security agenda), and whether this has been translated 
into regional common security. Human security can arguably be partially 
measured through the HDI, and the overall picture for Southern Africa since 
1990 has been one of decline in this regard.
State security, common security, and human security
For several decades, the predominance of the realist paradigm meant that 
security was subsumed under the rubric of power and the state. Tickner 
(1995: 176) comments succinctly: ‘conceptually, it was synonymous with the 
security of the state against external dangers, which was to be achieved by 
increasing military capabilities.’ This state-centric understanding of security 
was based on the assumption of a firm distinction between domestic ‘order’ 
and international ‘anarchy’, the latter being a ‘state of nature’ where war is 
an ever-present possibility.
Given the absence of an effective international authority to keep aggressive 
ambitions at bay, states must rely on their own capabilities for achieving 
security. As classical realists acknowledge, this often results in what they 
describe as a ‘security dilemma’: what one state might justify as legitimate 
security-enhancing actions are likely to be perceived by others as threatening. 
For realists, what stability and security does exist in such a context can be 
attributed to the balance of power. The balance of power, in turn, is based on 
military security alliances.
Democratic Governance and Security: A Conceptual Exploration
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These realist assumptions about the nature of the international system and the 
security-driven behaviour of states were partly vindicated by the behaviour 
of the former Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, and 
by state-sanctioned intervention in the affairs of other states. The escalation 
brought about as a consequence of the arms race between the United States 
and the former Soviet Union could indeed be viewed as a classic case of 
the security dilemma, yet the bipolarity produced a balance of power that 
assured a measure of global security and stability.
The notion of collective security, which continues to permeate thinking 
about security on the part of the UN (a notion that is still alive and well 
in SADC and the newly created African Union [AU]), sees only states as 
security objects. One could hardly enter into formalised guarantee systems, 
such as are involved in collective security, without having a functioning 
system of states. Similarly, the idea of common security, as advanced by the 
Palme Commission of 1982 and other proponents, remains essentially state-
centric. 
The concept of human security, on the other hand, refers to individual and 
societal security (Waever 1995; Buzan 1991; UN Commission on Human 
Security 2003). While this concept may be of recent origin, the ideas that inform 
it are far from new. For more than a century – at least since the founding of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross in the 1860s – a doctrine based 
on the security of individuals has been gathering force. Human security is the 
most recent formulation in a general broadening of the concept of security 
that has gained momentum over the past three decades.
The specific formulation is most commonly associated with the 1994 UNDP 
Human Development Report. The motivation behind the use of the phrase 
‘human security’ was to capture the so-called ‘peace dividend’ and direct it 
towards a more developmental agenda. The definition advanced in the report 
was extremely broad, encompassing economic security, food security, health 
security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and 
political security. Though extensively used in preparatory work for the 1995 
UN Social Summit in Copenhagen, the notion of human security was not 
reflected in the summit conclusions.
More recently, the excellent report of the UN Commission on Human Security 
(2003: 2) reminds the reader: 
Today’s flows of goods, services, finance, people and 
images spotlight the many interlinkages in the security of all 
people .... The security of one person, one community, one 
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nation rests on the decisions of many others – sometimes 
fortuitously, sometimes precariously.
Human security, as the UN Commission on Human Security (2003: 2, 4) 
puts it, ‘complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens 
human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of 
threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower them to act 
on their own behalf’.
The commission (2003: 4) advances the following definition of human 
security: ‘to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance 
human freedoms and human fulfilment’. Practically, this means 
protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive 
(widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes 
that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means 
creating political, social, environmental, economic, military 
and cultural systems that together give people the building 
blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. 
Human security: some key questions
The first question is: ‘Security for whom?’ The answer to this basic question 
is that human security is people-centred. Human security takes individuals 
and their communities, rather than territory, states, or governments, as its 
point of reference. It uses the effects on people as the criteria for assessing the 
success or failure of actions and policies. While not denying the importance 
of state security, human security complements the latter in specific respects, 
as will be shown later.
The second key question in respect of human security is: ‘Security from 
what?’ Human security addresses threats to the survival and safety of 
people from both military and non-military sources. The first category – 
military – includes, among others, intra-state war, small arms proliferation, 
communal-based violence, insurgency, rebel activity, and civil war. The 
second – non-military – can include serious human rights violations, famine, 
environmental degradation, violent crime, illicit drugs, economic collapse, 
infectious diseases, and natural disasters.
Human security highlights the complex interconnections among what were 
once deemed to be disparate issues (e.g. human rights violations, infectious 
diseases, mass displacement and migration, poverty, and sustainable develop-
ment), and acknowledges, as the UN Commission on Human Security (2003) 
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compellingly shows, that they cannot be treated in isolation. It recognises 
that many of the challenges to the survival and safety of people are global 
phenomena in their origins and their effects, and that they result in mutual 
vulnerability. The security of people is interdependent. 
Human security needs to be situated in relation to state or national security. 
A fundamental point of departure is to see it neither as an alternative to, nor 
divorced from, national or state security. From a human security perspective, 
the security of the state is not an end in itself: it is a means of providing 
security for people. Thus, human security complements state security in four 
important respects:
•	 Its concern is the individual and the community rather than the state.
•	 Menaces to people’s security include threats and conditions that have not 
always been classified as threats to state security.
•	 The range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone.
•	 Achieving human security includes not just protecting people, but also 
empowering people to fend for themselves (UN Commission on Human 
Security 2003: 4).
A further important question to ask is: ‘Where do human security and state 
security overlap?’ Inter-state war, generally recognised as the principal threat 
to state security, is also a prominent threat to human security. States with 
similarly strong, effective, and democratic characteristics enhance human 
security through their respect for human rights and their ability to meet 
basic human needs. The likelihood is greater that such states would foster 
international peace and security.
A further question that can help to situate human security in relation to state 
security is this: ‘How does a human security perspective affect approaches to 
state security?’ By assessing actions and policies on the basis of their effects 
at the level of the individual, a human security perspective challenges the 
legitimacy of some approaches to advancing state security, such as the use 
of land mines, destabilisation of contingent states, or broad-based economic 
sanctions.
In exploring the relationship between human and state security, one can 
ask: ‘Is state security a sufficient condition for human security?’ The answer 
to this important question is that where states are outwardly aggressive or 
inwardly repressive (e.g. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, apartheid South Africa, 
Israel), or where they are incapable of effective governance (Somalia, 
Sudan), they constitute a major source of human insecurity. The sad reality 
is that too often, state security has been used as a justification for actions 
and policies that have ultimately undermined rather than enhanced human 
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security. The security of states is increasingly insufficient to safeguard human 
security. 
At both the conceptual and practical level, additional questions can be posed. 
For example: Must human security concerns wait until state security has been 
assured? Is there a hierarchy of security concerns where the demands of the 
state inevitably take precedence over individuals? Could the advancement 
of human security actually threaten international peace and security by 
undermining the legal norm of non-intervention? While war inevitably 
results in human insecurity, human insecurity does not always result in war. 
Under what conditions does human insecurity cause violent conflict?
Human security and human development
Human security and human development together address freedom from 
fear and freedom from want. Human development is defined by UNDP as 
‘the process of widening the range of people’s choices’, while human security 
can be seen as the ability to pursue those choices in a safe environment.
But how do the two concepts interrelate? Since both take people as their 
principal point of reference, the two agendas are essentially complementary 
and mutually reinforcing. Human security is a necessary or enabling condition 
for human development, while promoting human development is a principal 
strategy for advancing human security. For example, eradicating malaria, 
currently responsible for 2 million deaths annually and affecting 300 to 500 
million people, will require alleviating widespread poverty in sub-Saharan 
Africa.
Galtung’s (1985) concept of ‘structural violence’ provides a possible conceptual 
link between human security and human development. Vulnerability and in-
security are experienced not only by people who live in extreme poverty, to 
paraphrase the recent report of the UN Commission on Human Security (2003). 
Human security is greatly diminished by food insecurity and lack of access 
to safe water and adequate sanitation. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is having 
a devastating impact on the most productive segments of the popula tion, 
resulting in profound changes in household composition. Major investments 
in education and skills training are being lost, and the number of households 
headed by women and children is increasing. Much of the burden falls on the 
more vulnerable section of the population – women and children.
 
While the alleviation of poverty is clearly a key concern of both human 
security and human development, one may wish to ask: ‘What does a human 
security perspective add to approaches to poverty alleviation already in 
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existence?’ A more challenging question then suggests itself: ‘How can key 
developmental concepts such as gender, participation, and empowerment 
be comprehensively and meaningfully integrated into a conceptualisation of 
human security?’
One useful attempt to integrate gender into the wider equation of human 
security has been the 2002 UN Study on Women, Peace and Security. This 
important study explores the impact of war on women and girls. In particular, 
the study shows that women suffer economic dislocation and lose their access 
to land, food, and water, all of which deepen their poverty. Another factor 
that has a clear gender dimension to it is HIV/AIDS. Women and young 
girls are especially at risk, while peacekeepers (who are predominantly male) 
sometimes play an active part in the transmission of the virus. 
Renewed interest in human security is not due to the emergence of ‘new’ 
conflicts and threats. Most of the challenges to the security and survival of 
people considered under the rubric of human security have been there for 
centuries. Due to globalisation, however, many threats to human security 
are increasingly transnational in their origins and their effects (particularly 
environmental concerns). Their intensity, too, is increasing. The post-
Cold War agenda has created the opportunity to draw attention to these 
challenges and to place them on the global agenda. Advances in information 
and communication technology have greatly facilitated more international 
attention on these challenges. The contribution of civil society to advancing 
the human security agenda, too, continues to grow. While the engagement of 
non-governmental actors has a long history, new and innovative partnerships 
with governmental actors are becoming increasingly common. Broadening 
the definition of security, a process of the past three or more decades, is 
resulting in a more integrated conceptualisation that provides the theoretical 
foundation for a more comprehensive and integrated security agenda. 
At the same time, however, one needs to sound a word of warning. A broad-
ened security agenda, while desirable, particularly in a developing context, 
holds potential dangers. One of these is the risk that ‘security services’ 
appropriate responsibility for development matters once they designate 
these as ‘security concerns’. This would inevitably collapse the development 
agenda into a security agenda.
Conceptually, it is important, as Waever (1995) and Buzan, Waever, and De 
Wilde (1998) have reminded us, that the concept of human security has as its 
primary referents the values and cultures of individuals, as well as how these 
relate to state security. Security is conceptually and practically different from 
development. 
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From theory to action
Enhancing the human security project requires co-operative, and often 
multilateral, responses, and approaches that are multi-sectoral emphasise 
preventive action and engage new partnerships. Human security is advanced 
through the protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law, democratic 
governance, sustainable human development, and the peaceful resolution 
of conflict. Many international treaties, agreements, and norms provide 
a foundation for human security: these include the Geneva Conventions, 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Charter of the 
UN. Notwithstanding these conventions, the UN is premised on collective 
security, which is state-based. 
Furthermore, approaches and targets to address many challenges to human 
security have been set out in the plans of action resulting from the series 
of UN World Conferences in recent years (Environment, Rio, 1992; Human 
Rights, Vienna, 1993; Population and Development, Cairo, 1994; Social 
Summit, Copenhagen, 1995; Women, Beijing, 1995; Habitat II, Istanbul, 1996; 
Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 2002; Millennium Goals, 2000/1). 
In the European context, the development strategy of the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Shaping the 21st Century’, contains 
key elements for building human security.
The security architecture of SADC, too, provides a foundation for enhancing 
human security at the regional level, but the original SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence, and Security, established in 1996, failed to move the sub-regional 
institution closer to a realisation of its core common security objectives. At the 
organisation’s August 2001 summit in Blantyre, however, SADC adopted a 
Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation and reached important 
decisions on integrating the SADC organ more closely into the institution’s 
other structures, and strengthening its accountability and operability. 
The protocol also lists various policy objectives. Most of these concentrate on 
collective security; collective defence; governance, democracy, and human 
rights (linked to human security); development of common foreign policy 
approaches in international forums; and building joint capacities in areas such 
as peacekeeping, disaster management, and co-ordination of humanitarian 
assistance (also aspects of human security).
A number of related protocols, such as the Protocol against Corruption and 
the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition, and Related Materials, 
embody similar principles, more particularly in the area of governance and 
collec tive security. A mechanism to deal with disputes arising between member 
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states is also to be established following the signing of the Protocol on Tribunals 
and the Rules of Procedure Thereof. Still, substantial work remains to be done 
before these principles can be fully internalised as part of SADC’s efforts to 
promote peace and human security actively (Baregu and Landsberg 2003).
Finally, at the continental level, mention has to be made of the New 
Partner ship for Africa’s Development and the AU. Both of these initiatives 
recognise a link, however complex, among democracy, human security, and 
development.
Conclusion
This exploratory chapter has examined the core ideas of democratic 
politics. These are democracy as a value, democracy as a social process, and 
democracy as political practice. Democracy is a process, and different states 
find themselves at various positions along a complex trajectory. There is also 
the ever-present risk of democratic reversal. Human security was defined 
as safety for people from violent and non-violent threats. This implies 
that human security is multidimensional and, like democracy and human 
development, actualising. However, democratisation does not in itself result 
in enhanced human security.
The chapter has also provided reasons for the renewed scholarly and 
political interest in the concept of human security and its relation to human 
development. In this respect, it has been argued that human security and 
human development together address freedom from fear and freedom from 
want. As both concepts take people as their principal point of reference, the 
two agendas are complementary and ultimately mutually reinforcing. It has 
also been argued that human security is neither an alternative to, nor divorced 
from, national or state security: it complements state security in important 
respects. From a human security perspective, however, the security of states 
is not an end in itself: it is a means of providing security for people.
Finally, giving operational import to human security will differ from context to 
context. In some cases it will involve affirming development targets and agendas 
already established; in others it will involve reinforcing or strengthening 
what has already been developed; and in others it will involve setting and 
developing new agendas or building state and governance capacity.
EnDnoTES
1 The term is taken from Huntington (1991). 
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Chapter 2:
Comparative Perspectives on Regional 
Security Co-operation among Developing 
Countries1
Gavin Cawthra
Regions (or sub-regions) can be defined in many different ways: through 
geographic propinquity or intensity of interactions, such as trade; through 
internal or external recognition and formal declaration as such; politically; 
historically; or culturally and in terms of ‘civilisational areas’. Some regions 
are even defined in terms of river basins or shared seas or mountain ranges. 
In general, however, since this chapter is about formal security co-operation, 
regions are defined politically and in the context of the global collective 
security system personified by the UN. 
Chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN is quite explicit about the security 
functions of regional organisations: ‘The Security Council shall, where 
appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement 
action under its authority’ (art. 53.1), and: ‘Members of the United Nations 
... shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes 
through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before 
referring them to the Security Council’ (art. 52.2). Regional organisations 
thus represent instances of first resort as far as the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts is concerned, but it is also underlined that different rules apply to 
the use of non-peaceful means: ‘No enforcement action shall be taken under 
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of 
the Security Council’ (art. 53.1).
The division of the world into regions is not as clear as the UN charter might 
have envisaged, however, and is further complicated by the development 
of sub-regional organisations, especially in Africa, where the regional 
organisation, the AU, is shadowed by a number of sub-regional organisations.2 
There are also large parts of the world where there are no effective regional or 
sub-regional organisations, and often these are the areas where they would 
appear to be most needed: the Middle East (with the exception of the Gulf 
Co-operation Council [GCC]) and North-East Asia, for example. 
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Nevertheless, there has been a palpable rise in political collaboration, eco-
nomic co-operation and integration, and security co-operation on a regional 
basis since the end of the Cold War. Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel (2000) have 
argued that the recent expansion is different in quality as well as quantity 
from the efforts that preceded it. The characteristics of the so-called ‘new 
regionalism’ are summarised as follows: 
•	 It is characterised by multidimensionalism or multifunctionalism, com bi-
ning economic, political, social, cultural, and security aspects, and thus 
going beyond the ‘traditional’ forms of free-trade regimes or security 
alliances.
•	 It is driven by a combination of economic or security imperatives, as well 
as by ecological and other developmental objectives.
•	 It involves not merely states, but a wide variety of institutions, organisations, 
and movements, and to some extent is driven from the bottom up.
•	 It is outward looking, or ‘open’, in that it seeks to integrate organisations’ 
member states into the global political economy rather than erecting tariff 
barriers.
•	 It varies widely in the extent of institutionalisation, with some organisations 
deliberately avoiding the construction of bureaucracies.
•	 It sometimes spans the divide between the developed and developing 
world, e.g. the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Fawcett 
and Hurrell 1995: 3–4; Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel 2000: xix–xx).
An absolute distinction cannot be made between old and new regionalisms. 
Some long-established organisations have taken on many of the features 
of the more recent ones, but it is nevertheless evident that the globalisation 
process has necessitated the construction of new types of inter-state 
organisations. 
Key issues
With this in mind, a number of old as well as new questions regarding the 
construction of regional organisations with security functions might be 
posed, which will inform this study. 
Multilateralism, globalisation, and regionalism
Debates on regionalism of the old type often revolved around the issue of 
whether regional organisations were building blocks for the construction of 
the global collective security system (the UN and attendant organisations), 
or stumbling blocks to that process. On the one hand, military alliances such 
as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact 
appeared to inhibit the building of a global collective security system, while 
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on the other, regional organisations such as the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) were given, and executed, an important peace maintenance 
role under chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 
Similarly, some argue that the new regionalism in developing countries may 
allow states to protect themselves and their people from the pernicious and 
inequitable effects of globalisation, while others argue that it simply speeds 
up the process of globalisation and facilitates the penetration of exploitative 
capitalism, and still others (President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, for 
instance) think it is the only way that developing countries can prosper 
in the current era. In relation to security, since the terrorist attacks in the 
United States of 11 September 2001, the UN collective security system has 
been placed under tremendous pressure by the rise of US militarism and 
the inclination of the Bush administration towards unilateralism. The role of 
regional organisations in this context will be highly contested. 
Economic, security, and political co-operation
Is regional collaboration best led by economic, political, or security con-
siderations? Is there a spillover effect, so that progress in one may lead to 
progress in another, as trust is built? Whatever the case, there is an undeniable 
tendency for regional organisations to move toward multifunctionality, and 
to link the various dimensions in what is hoped will be a relationship of 
synergy. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
is emblematic in this regard. Furthermore, is co-operation driven by mostly 
negative features (e.g. threat from a regional power, or the hegemonic power of 
a state) or mostly positive features (affection in the sense of shared values, or 
gain for mutual, mostly economic, benefits) (Baregu 2003: 21)?
Buzan’s (1991: 190) idea of a ‘security complex’, i.e. ‘a group of states whose 
primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national 
securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’, is a useful 
point of departure for any discussion of security co-operation. Of course, a 
security complex does not a region make, let alone a regional institution, 
but security interactions of this nature are bound to have a profound effect 
on regional organisation. Furthermore, as regions move toward higher 
degrees of institutionalisation and develop common values, a much closer 
correlation between security linkages and political co-operation emerges, for 
obvious reasons. This may eventually lead to the construction of a ‘security 
community’ (Deutsch 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998), where armed conflict 
between states has become inconceivable, e.g. in Scandinavia.
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Regional hegemonism
Is the presence of a regional hegemon, both able and willing to exercise its 
military and economic muscle, a desirable or even a necessary condition for 
the evolution of regional organisations? Neo-realists would tend to argue 
that it is; others regard this as a negative feature. The answer to this may be 
context-specific. It might also be the case that at different stages, or under 
certain conditions, hegemony may either accelerate or retard organisational 
development. Whatever the case, it is a critical issue in many regional 
organisations. 
What type of security collaboration? 
Security collaboration can take several different forms, each of which may 
require a different process of construction. These include: 
•	 military alliances such as NATO, in which states seek to combine their 
defence capabilities against a common external enemy;
•	 mutual assistance or mutual defence treaties, where states pledge to 
come to the assistance of any other member state in the event of it being 
attacked (and sometimes in the event of internal threats as well);
•	 non-aggression pacts, which are quite often linked to mutual assistance 
agreements; and
•	 common, collaborative, co-operative, or comprehensive security arrange-
ments, where member states agree to a set of ground rules governing 
relations among them (and sometimes also to internal practices), institute 
confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), and develop co-
operative approaches to security.
Which of these are the most useful and successful? Can they be combined? 
Issues related to institutionalisation
Should developing countries follow the European Union (EU) model of 
building an extensive array of institutions supported by a bureaucracy, or 
should a more flexible, less institutionalised approach be followed? Put 
another way, should regional organisations evolve as inter-state structures 
or as supra-national institutions? A related issue is that of multiple insti-
tutionalism: is it possible (or even desirable) to have more than one regional 
organisation with overlapping memberships (as in Europe)? This debate is 
closely related to that of how best to deal with hegemonic powers. 
As institutionalisation progresses, particularly in the security area, the 
issue of managing the periphery becomes more pressing. Certain forms of 
security co-operation can act as ‘force multipliers’, potentially threatening 
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neighbouring states and leading to counter-bloc formation. And successfully 
institutionalised organisations will inevitably create demands for new 
members, as with the EU.
Sovereignty and ‘non-interference in internal affairs’
While there have not yet been any examples in modern history where 
regional organisations have ended the sovereignty of member states, there is 
no doubt that they inevitably – as with any international regime – require that 
states agree to work within certain limits, which may become progressively 
restrictive as institutionalisation progresses. This is particularly the case 
in multifunctional organisations. Furthermore, states are naturally very 
concerned not to lose their ability to act independently in security matters. 
Under what conditions will states be willing to ‘trade’ some of their sovereign 
decision-making capacity for the benefits of inter-state co-operation?
While the principle of ‘non-interference in internal affairs’, entrenched in 
the UN Charter (although also potentially contradicted by the assertion of 
universal human rights), may have utility in terms of confidence building, 
in the long run it could be argued that it feeds instability, as it may result in 
tolerance of human rights violations, authoritarianism, and the like. Even 
more importantly, it demands the following question.
Regime security or human security?
Most of the organisations in this study are essentially state-driven projects, 
and in many cases the motivations for security co-operation appear to be 
driven by the mutual insecurities of state elites. They may have contributed 
to stability – essentially, maintenance of the status quo – and to the security 
of the regimes involved, but have they contributed to socio-economic 
development and to the security of their citizens – in other words, to human 
security?
Democratic values 
It can be asked whether regional security co-operation has merely shored 
up undemocratic regimes, or contributed to, and been built on the basis of, 
democratic values. This inevitably leads to a consideration of the arguments 
centred on the ‘democratic peace’ theory: if all countries in a region are 
democracies, can this lead to peaceful interactions and assist in building a 
security community? And is security organisation possible in contexts where 
democracies are not the norm? 
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This chapter will seek to answer all these questions by examining, in a 
selected way, the experience in the developing world of building regional 
organisations with security functions.
Latin America 
The emergence of regional security co-operation organisations in the Western 
Hemisphere has been overshadowed by the hegemony of the United 
States. Nevertheless, like Europe and Africa, the Americas have evolved a 
continental security structure and a number of sub-regional ones, as well as 
a major trading organisation, NAFTA, which also has a limited political and 
security role. Of the sub-regional organisations, the most successful is the 
Mercado Comun del Sur (Southern Cone Common Market – MERCOSUR), 
but others, notably the Organisation of East Caribbean States, have also 
played a security role. 
MERCOSUR
Like Africa, Latin America is littered with the corpses of failed sub-regional 
co-operation and integration organisations. But there is at least one recent 
success: MERCOSUR, launched in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay. The primary focus of MERCOSUR is on trade, and it has succeeded 
in substantially increasing inter-regional exports, but it has also increasingly 
taken on political and security functions. One of its first actions was to 
implement a nuclear weapons-free zone (a process that started with the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967); it has facilitated joint military exercises and joint 
meetings of chiefs of staff; and in 1999 it declared itself a ‘Zone of Peace’, 
and member states agreed to enhance co-operation and promote CSBMs. 
This process has been facilitated by the demilitarisation of the region, with 
all countries moving – albeit in different ways and at different speeds – to 
reduce military power and influence in domestic and foreign policy, and to 
cut defence spending substantially. 
MERCOSUR’s success comes despite its relatively low level of insti tution-
alisation. It has not sought to develop large supra-national institutions, and 
it has no standing security co-operation mechanism. This has created some 
problems. In the words of one commentator: ‘The absence of any community 
entity with any advisory or decision-making power gives rise to conflicting 
responses that must always be resolved a posteriori through political decisions, 
which are not always transparent’ (Pereira 1999: 20).
On the other hand, this lack of institutionalism has necessitated continuous 
and informal high-level contact, which has helped to build trust and has 
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allowed for flexibility. Heads of state and senior officials remain in regular 
contact with each other to discuss issues as they arise. 
MERCOSUR’s relative success has been attributed to a number of factors, 
including:
•	 the fact that the members are all relatively strong, well-established states 
with relatively efficient bureaucracies and policy management capacities 
(by developing-world standards, anyway);
•	 the small size of the organisation;
•	 shared values, chiefly a commitment to democracy following periods of 
military dictatorship;
•	 common economic interests and a commitment to opening up economies; 
and
•	 regular contacts and good personal relations between heads of state and 
senior officials (Cleary 2001: 92).
MERCOSUR emerged at a time when all the member states were undergoing 
processes of transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and there was a 
conviction – which is common in many new regional organisations – that 
democracy would provide a firm foundation for inter-state peace. This may not 
really be true, as the chapter’s conclusion argues, but an argument can certainly 
be made that MERCOSUR has assisted in stabilising and consolidating the 
democratic transitions in its member states. That the organisation is mostly 
concerned with trade, rather than politics or security, has not necessarily 
blunted its effectiveness in stabilising relations among states. 
Organisation of American States (OAS)
One of the oldest regional organisations in the world, and one of the few to 
bring together developed (United States, Canada) and developing countries 
(Latin America), the OAS has as its main feature the complete dominance of 
the United States. 
Multi-functional in nature and highly institutionalised, the OAS also has 
a mutual assistance function, through the 1947 Inter-American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance, better known as the Rio Pact, in terms of which 
members are required to assist another member under attack until the OAS 
or the UN Security Council can recommend a course of collective action. But 
this principle was steadily eroded by US military actions, and when Britain 
launched its fleet against Argentina in 1982 in order to reclaim the Falklands 
Islands/Islas Malvinas, and Argentina tried to invoke the treaty, the United 
States instead supported Britain. 
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Although the OAS is constituted as a regional security organisation under 
chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and it states its intention to work as part of 
the UN system, it can be argued that in practice it has allowed the United 
States to operate outside of the UN system in the Western Hemisphere, by 
using the OAS to legitimise its actions. And when the OAS has not suited 
its purposes, e.g. in its invasion of Grenada in 1983, the United States has 
simply acted unilaterally, without consulting the regional organisation at all. 
Despite the failures, efforts have been made since the early 1990s to revitalise 
the concept of mutual assistance, and a Permanent Hemispheric Security 
Commission was incorporated into the OAS’s institutions, ensuring that 
security – along with a commitment to democracy – was mainstreamed in 
the organisation. It has also developed mechanisms for preventing military 
coups, by establishing procedures for co-ordinated responses (Mills, Shelton, 
and White 2003: 10; Hurrell 1995: 265). 
Asia 
The security challenges facing Asian countries are as diverse and often as 
complex as the countries themselves, and have been compounded by the 
strategic ‘overlay’ of the Cold War and interventions by external powers. These 
factors, as well as the interpenetration of conflicts, have made it difficult for 
regional security co-operation to emerge. In North-East Asia, competition 
among the four major powers influencing the region (the United States, the 
Soviet Union, China, and Japan), as well as the conflicts over Taiwan and 
Korea, have in the past prevented the emergence of regional co-operation 
(Alagappa 1998: 109). In Central Asia, the overlay of the Cold War was the 
major security feature, and the new states that have emerged since then have 
not yet found their way towards substantive security co-operation, although 
there is some progress through the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
The most successful effort at regional co-operation has been in South-East 
Asia, and an effort has also been made in Indian-dominated South Asia. 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
There would seem to be little that would draw the countries of ASEAN 
together. Even the original members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand) were extremely diverse in size, culture, ethnic 
composition, colonial history, religion, and political system (military rule, 
authoritarian rule, and democracy), and the organisation’s diversity has 
increased as it has expanded to include countries such as Brunei, Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. But ASEAN is a classic case of states drawing 
together because of shared threat perceptions and common convictions 
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about how to counter the threat. All the founding states were faced with 
communist insurgencies and believed that their regimes were threatened. 
They also all believed that they could ‘buy’ their way out of domestic crisis 
through growth and economic development. ASEAN was essentially about 
regime survival at a time when Western-leaning states in the region were 
made profoundly insecure by domestic insurgencies, the Cultural Revolution 
in China, and the Vietnam War. 
Because of political sensitivities, the original members concerned themselves 
initially more with economic than political and security co-operation, even 
though security was one of the main motivations for collaboration (the 
predecessors of the EU and SADC took a similar course) (Than and Singh 
2001: 173).
As time has gone on, however, ASEAN has become quite institutional- 
ised and now involves itself in a wide range of issues, including security. 
That the original communist threat has largely evaporated has not led to the 
organisation’s demise; instead, the benefits of regional co-operation have 
become so evident that it is highly unlikely that there will be any turning 
back. But ASEAN’s weaknesses have all been exposed through its failure 
adequately to address the major challenges that have faced it in the past 
several years (Henderson 1999: 36–47). 
ASEAN’s weakness in dealing with these challenges stems from the same root 
that is often seen as the key to its relative success: the so-called ‘ASEAN way’. 
Essentially – and this stems in large part from the organisation’s diversity and 
the fact that it has always had non-democratic or semi-democratic member 
states – this practice may be summarised as follows:
•	 strict non-intervention in member states’ internal affairs (although 
informal, private discussions may take place);
•	 informal decision-making by consensus after (mostly) closed-door 
discussions;
•	 reliance on national institutions rather than building a strong central- 
ised bureaucracy; and
•	 ‘compartmentalising’, postponing, or simply ignoring difficult or divisive 
issues (Than and Singh 2001: 176–77; Bessho 1999: 48). 
There can be little doubt that in the first 20 years or so of its existence, 
these principles allowed ASEAN to emerge on the basis of a rather unlikely 
partnership of states and to create some stability in an otherwise turbulent 
region. However, since the end of the Cold War, and with the complex 
economic and political challenges facing ASEAN states, the organisation has 
been less successful. The principle of non-interference in particular has come 
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under pressure. Critics have argued that it has resulted in ASEAN in effect 
collaborating with massive human rights abuses, such as those perpetrated 
by the Indonesian regime in East Timor or the abuses of the Myanmar 
military rulers. 
Whatever the case, it is clear that the principle of non-interference is difficult 
to uphold and has proved inadequate for dealing with the more recent crises. 
ASEAN effectively began ‘interfering’ as long ago as 1997, when it delayed 
Cambodia’s admission for two years – under strong Western pressure – after 
the Hun Sen coup. If ASEAN is to prosper in the new century, it will need to 
find a way of balancing its traditional respect for sovereignty with effective 
intervention strategies for upholding human rights and promoting democratic 
practices: not easy when member regimes include paranoid military juntas 
such as that in Myanmar, or nominally communist regimes such as that in 
Vietnam, which cling tenaciously to the principle of ‘non-interference’.
In line with its informal, non-institutionalised approach, ASEAN has not 
developed comprehensive multilateral institutions to deal with security 
issues. Co-operation tends to take place bilaterally, and typically involves 
intelligence exchanges, exchanges between military staff colleges, joint 
military or policing exercises, and co-operation in fighting transnational 
crime such as narcotics. A complex web of security interactions has thus 
been established, contributing significantly to building confidence, especially 
among the longer-standing members (Than and Singh 2001: 178). A 
non-aggression regime has also been put in place through a number of 
treaties.
One of the most innovative security and political initiatives was the 
establishment in 1993 of the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), with the aim of 
enhancing ASEAN’s ability to deal as a bloc with strong external powers, and 
to build confidence in the region (and, unspoken, to rein in China, which was 
then aggressively pursuing territorial claims in the South China Sea). The 
ARF is very loosely modelled on the OSCE, and involves ASEAN member 
states and their major trading partners and regional actors – Australia, the 
EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United States, Canada, China, 
Russia, India, and Mongolia. 
South Asian Association for Regional Security (SAARC)
In part inspired by the success of ASEAN, SAARC was established in 1983 
with the aim of enhancing security in the South Asian region (India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives are members). However, 
it adopted the same approach as ASEAN – and many other regional 
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organisations – in that it concentrated on economic, social, and technical 
issues, even if its aim was to enhance security, and tried to avoid dealing with 
contentious and bilateral issues. This has not been easy, however, given the 
regional fears of Indian hegemony, and the long and apparently intractable 
conflict between India and Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, it has chalked up some successes, including a bilateral 
agreement between India and Pakistan not to attack each other’s nuclear 
facilities, a preferential trade agreement, and settlement of some complicated 
bilateral disputes (Alagappa 1998: 109). In general, however, SAARC has 
largely failed to break the mould of a zero-sum or relative-gain approach to 
security by South Asian states, and it has also been largely unsuccessful in 
promoting intra-regional trade. This is in large part because its activities have 
been overshadowed by the Indian–Pakistani conflict, in which it has been 
unable to play any major role, given the weakness of the other member states. 
The asymmetric nature of SAARC, coupled to a dyadic conflict, appears to 
have inhibited its development. 
Middle East 
The conflict-ridden Middle East (which straddles two continents and in 
its widest definition extends east–west from Morocco to Iran, and north–
south from Turkey to the Sudanese–Egyptian border, and takes in the 
Arabian peninsula) is the homeland of some of the world’s great religions 
and civilisations. One of these, the Arab civilisation, has given rise to the 
League of Arab States (Arab League), while two sub-regional organisations 
with security functions have emerged: the GCC and the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU), which is dealt with in the Africa section. For the rest, conflict 
formations and the penetration of great-power interests have prevented the 
emergence of substantive regional organisations. 
Gulf Co-operation Council
None of the GCC member states is a democracy – all are ruled by feudalistic 
royal families who govern with varying degrees of authoritarianism (Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman). As with 
so many regional organisations, it was a specific security threat that triggered 
co-operation: in this case the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its domestic 
overspills, and the subsequent Iran–Iraq War (Tow 1990: 45–48). 
The GCC is thus yet another example of states coming together on the basis 
of shared threat perceptions and regime insecurities. Again, however, the 
initial emphasis was on ‘economic security’, with military and other forms 
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of security co-operation being dealt with more quietly – in part to avoid the 
impression of military-bloc formation. 
Nevertheless, the GCC states have entered into a mutual defence pact, 
established a small multinational regional defence unit, carried out joint 
military exercises, and worked towards setting up a common air defence 
mechanism (Tripp 1995: 291–95). As such, the GCC is one of the most 
advanced examples of military co-operation among regional organisations 
in the developing world. But – typically of such pacts – when it has come 
to the crunch, with Iraqi and Iranian threats, the member states have been 
largely unable or unwilling to act. Instead, the GCC states have largely relied 
on external security guarantees, chiefly from the United States (Tripp 1995: 
302–3).
The GCC is also an example of a regional organisation dominated by one 
power, Saudi Arabia, the gross domestic product of which exceeds that of the 
others combined. Lawson (1999: 10) argues that this has provided stability 
– not so much because of Saudi dominance, but because the relative balance 
of power among the member countries has remained consistent over time. 
League of Arab States (Arab League)
Like the OAU, the Arab League is driven by an ideology of a shared identity 
and a common past and future; unlike the OAU, however, it is based not on 
a geographical framework, but on a ‘civilisational’ or ethnic commonality, 
although some of its 22 members – Sudan, for example – include sizeable 
populations that are not Arab.
One of the oldest regional organisations, it was formed in 1945 and its 
members entered into a collective defence agreement in 1950, through the 
Treaty for Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation, which typically states 
that an act of aggression against one member should be regarded as an attack 
on all (Al-Bab n.d.).
Much of the Arab League’s security focus has been on Israel (Palestine is a 
member state), and it has been fairly successful in keeping this issue alive, 
even if it has not always projected a common position (and felt obliged to 
expel Egypt after it signed the Camp David Accords). It has been far less 
successful in mediating disputes between member states, nor has it succeeded 
in presenting a common front against external interventions – it was unable, 
for example, to play a significant role in preventing the US-led attack on Iraq 
in March 2003. 
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Most of the ‘Arab world’ remains highly militarised and tensions among 
states are high. Just as in the OAU, political divisions centred on the national 
interests of states have proved more important in security terms than an 
assumed inclusive commonality: Arab states – like African ones – are very 
heterogeneous, and the differences among them are replicated by differences 
within them, thus inviting interventions and fomenting tensions (Farer 1993: 
173). The Arab League remains a weak organisation because ‘mutual distrust 
is high, both between regimes and their citizens and between regimes 
themselves’ (Aarts 1999: 207). 
Africa 
Africa appears at first glance to be far more developed than Asia or the 
Americas in terms of security co-operation, and far more logically organised, 
with an overarching regional organisation and – at least at present – a fairly 
neat division of sub-regional organisations with security functions more 
or less organised according to Africa’s five geographical divisions (North, 
Southern, East, West and Central). As in the Arab world, there is a strong 
inclination towards an inclusive African identity – despite the vast cultural, 
ethnic, and other diversities of the continent. 
But on closer inspection, it becomes clear that Africa’s ruling regimes are 
just as wedded to the concept of national sovereignty as regimes anywhere 
else in the world, that many regional organisations are weak or even empty 
shells, and that more than 30 attempts have been made at constructing 
regional organisations, often through grandiose plans, most of which have 
failed. Many of these have been overlapping, and development has been 
haphazard. Furthermore, a pattern of intervention by individual states 
or ad hoc coalitions has been established (Furley and May 2001). Most of 
the ‘civil wars’ that have plagued African states since independence have 
in fact involved other states. Seldom has a formal commitment – to ‘non-
interference in internal affairs’ – been more honoured in the breach than 
in the observance, and yet this fiction has been one of the longest-standing 
principles of African unity, and has only recently been revised. 
Nevertheless, commitment to regionalism remains probably stronger in 
Africa than anywhere else, except Europe, and it is the intention of Africa’s 
leaders that the new AU should rest on five or possibly more strong sub-
regional organisations, each with a security management system that to 
some extent mirrors that of the AU itself, and which in turn is based on 
and integrated with the UN system. The most obvious candidates for 
these ‘building blocks’ of continental security are the AMU, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic and Monetary 
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Community of Central African States/Communauté Économique et Monétaire 
de l’Afrique Centrale (ECCAS/CEMAC), the Inter-governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and SADC. It is to these 
seven organisations (with the exception of SADC) that the chapter now turns 
its attention: other overlapping organisations will continue to exist, but as 
time goes by they are likely to become less important in security management 
terms. It should be noted that other sub-regional organisations, notably 
the Manu River Union, have taken on security functions and developed 
institutions for security management. 
AMU
The AMU, the weakest of all the putative sub-regional building blocks of the 
AU’s security system, is moribund, and its presidential council has not met 
since 1994. Established in 1989 by all five Maghreb states – Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia – the AMU is a multifunctional organisation 
that deals with issues as diverse as sanitary standards and taxation, but the 
‘trigger’ for its formation, and one of its chief preoccupations, was the need 
to engage with the EU. It was also seen as a building block for Arab unity, a 
cause then being espoused (no longer) by President Gadaffi of Libya. 
The AMU has no functional security structures although, as in many regional 
organisations, member states have entered into a mutual defence pact. 
Political and security co-operation has been hampered by the dyadic conflict 
between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara. Some analysts argue 
that the problem with the AMU is that it is too small (whereas the Arab 
League is too big): when two member states disagree, the three others are 
too weak to intervene collectively. 
Whatever the case, it is clear that considerably more will need to be done 
if the AMU is to become one of the building blocks of the AU’s Peace and 
Security Council. But this will depend on the resolution of political divisions 
and on the mercurial will of Gadaffi. 
ECOWAS
In contrast, ECOWAS has the most sophisticated security management 
system in Africa, and the most experience in terms of peacekeeping and peace 
making. From the outset, ECOWAS, and what has come to be its security 
arm, the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), has been 
driven by the dominant sub-regional power, Nigeria. In some ways, like the 
OAS, ECOWAS/ECOMOG has been a fig leaf for what would otherwise be 
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unilateral Nigerian intervention in neighbouring conflicts, but in other ways 
it has emerged as a genuinely regional initiative.
As in many other regional organisations, ECOWAS member states have 
signed both a non-aggression treaty and a mutual military assistance treaty 
whereby an attack on one is deemed to be an attack on all, but the principal 
objective is described as regional economic integration. Since 1998 ECOMOG 
has been recognised as the peacekeeping arm of ECOWAS, and an elaborate 
security architecture has been erected to support it. Through a somewhat ad 
hoc succession of military interventions, coupled with ex ante formalisation 
and institutionalisation – always led by Nigeria – ECOWAS has evolved a 
sophisticated but functional system for security management. However, 
its strength – that it has been activated by a regional hegemon – is also its 
weakness: if Nigeria is unable or unwilling to act, then ECOWAS is fatally 
weakened, and this is compounded by anglophone–francophone divisions. 
Furthermore, it is deeply ironic that ECOWAS has intervened to ‘restore 
democracy’ in war-torn states when the leading power, Nigeria, itself was 
not a democracy. ECOWAS’s limitations have been made clear in its inability 
to act over the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, when Nigeria felt unable to help out. 
This may increasingly be the case, given the growing political tensions within 
Nigeria (Berman 2002: 38). 
ECCAS/CEMAC
Primarily an economic grouping, the 11-member ECCAS has recently taken on 
security functions and is envisaged as part of the AU’s security architecture. 
In 1999, the ECCAS summit decided to set up a Council for Peace and 
Security in Central Africa/Conseil de Paix et de Securité en Afrique Centrale, 
which includes a conflict monitoring unit as well as a putative Central African 
Multinational Force – a standby peacekeeping arrangement consisting of 
earmarked military and civilian contingents. The apparently mandatory 
mutual military assistance pact has also been signed. With assistance from 
external powers, some joint military exercises aimed at developing the 
regional peacekeeping capacity have been carried out.
However, ECCAS is a weak organisation, and formal structures seldom have 
any significant content (Berman and Sams 2000: 205–6). Member states do 
not agree on the relationship between the security and economic functions 
of the organisation, and a number of countries retain membership of other 
regional organisations as well (IPA 2002: 36). Considerable work will have to 
be done if ECCAS is be a substantive building block for continental security, 
and this will require political will. 
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IGAD
Originally a functional co-operation agreement focusing on drought and 
development issues, IGAD began to take on conflict resolution activities in 
the mid-1990s (notably the Sudan peace process) and is now developing 
more elaborate security arrangements. Bringing together Sudan, Somalia, 
Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, IGAD not only involves 
countries facing internal conflict, but also states that have been at war with 
each other. IGAD intends to establish a conflict early warning and response 
mechanism, but its capacities remain very limited. It has been unable to 
intervene significantly in the Eritrean–Ethiopian conflict or the Sudan 
conflict, for example, and commentators have remarked that ‘IGAD member 
states seem more willing to devote significant scarce resources to actively 
undermine their neighbours than to help bring about a sustainable peace’ 
(Berman and Sams 2000: 210). 
EAC and COMESA
The potential status of these two organisations as sub-regional building blocks 
within the AU’s emerging security architecture is somewhat unclear, as most 
of their member states are also members of other sub-regional organisations 
(mostly IGAD and SADC), and there is thus a high degree of overlap. 
The EAC is a resurrection of the earlier community of the same name, and 
involves the same three countries: Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. It has 
economic as well as security functions, and a memorandum of agreement 
has been signed among the defence forces of the three countries, which, 
among other things, provides for joint training, joint operations, and the 
sharing of intelligence; the organisation also aims to conclude a defence pact 
(Berman and Sams 2000: 200). 
COMESA, the largest sub-regional organisation, with 20 member states, 
was originally formed to promote economic co-operation through trade, and 
grew out of the Preferential Trade Area. But like so many such organisations, 
it has also taken on security functions in the belief that peace and security are 
essential for investment, trade, and development. COMESA member states 
have made a series of commitments to non-aggression, respect for human 
rights, the rule of law and democracy, the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
and so on. It has managed to establish a number of semi-autonomous and 
ad hoc arrangements to deal with regional conflicts (IPA 2002: 38). However, 
its main achievements have been in reducing trade barriers, and tensions 
have arisen among member states over trade imbalances and other issues, 
as well as the overlap with SADC, with some members leaving in order to 
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concentrate scarce resources on SADC instead. Its future as a sub-regional 
building block for African security thus remains uncertain. 
Conclusion
Far more research will have to be done if the complex questions posed at the 
beginning of this chapter are to be answered satisfactorily. In many cases, 
no clear patterns have emerged, and it appears that answers may have to 
be context-specific. Nevertheless, a few general points may be made on the 
basis of this brief and selective survey, and we thus return to the key issues 
posed at the beginning of this chapter. 
Multilateralism, globalisation, and regionalism
In virtually all cases, sub-regional organisations in the developing world 
appear to have acted more as building blocks for regional and global collective 
security than as stumbling blocks. This is seen perhaps most clearly in Africa, 
where a conscious effort has been made to construct a regional security 
mechanism on sub-regional organisations. However, it can also be seen – e.g. 
in relation to the OAS, with the United States, and possibly also in relation 
to Nigeria in the OAU/AU – that sub-regional or regional organisations may 
act as ‘fig leaves’ for unilateral interventions by hegemonic powers, to some 
extent thus undermining global collective security objectives. 
It is clear also that regional organisations are increasing in scope and extent as 
a direct response to globalisation. But the ‘new’ type of regionalism emerging 
is far more about opening up regions than closing them off. As such, these 
organisations can be seen both as a response to and providing further impetus 
for globalisation. Whether they serve to mitigate the exclusionary effects of 
uneven global development, however, is unclear. It could equally be argued 
that they serve to accelerate inequalities by servicing neo-liberal economics 
through their outward orientations. 
Economic, security, and political co-operation 
The vast majority of organisations surveyed started out with the stated aim 
of economic co-operation, but took on political and security co-operation 
tasks. In probably a majority of cases, however, the actual motivation for 
initiating the regional organisation was a shared regime threat perception, 
often triggered by a particular event or by a shared fear of a hegemonic or 
revisionist power, or by a common perception of domestic security threats. 
In quite a number of cases, economic co-operation was promoted in order 
to address the actual issue of regime threat perception, and this seems to be 
by far the most important driver in the initial stages of institution building. 
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But it need not remain so: some regional organisations have continued 
to thrive on the palpable benefits of multifunctional co-operation, even 
when the initial threat disappears. Such ‘spillover’ is a product of increased 
levels of inter-state communication. Moreover, as Waever has argued, as 
regional organisations progress towards security communities, interactions 
may become increasingly ‘desecuritised’; i.e. there may be ‘a progressive 
marginalisation of mutual security concerns in favour of other issues’ (Adler 
and Barnett 1998: 414–15, 432). 
Regional hegemonism 
This brief survey has shown that regional hegemons can play a critical role 
in promoting regional co-operation, either by utilising their military and 
other power to secure a type of peace (Nigeria in ECOWAS) or more subtly 
(Indonesia in ASEAN). At the same time, hegemonic powers weakened 
by internal divisions (Nigeria and Indonesia both) can slow the growth of 
regional organisations, and may also so distort relations within them that the 
organisations become hollow, as member states seek bilateral arrangements 
with the regional power. In other words, the benefits or drawbacks of 
regional hegemonism appear to be context-specific, and quite likely time-
specific as well. In the early period of regional formation, powerful states that 
can provide leadership and ‘a sense of purpose’ seem to play an important 
role (Adler and Barnett 1998).
In most of the organisations studied, hegemonic powers were present 
and, despite their sometimes negative roles, it seems that they can play 
an important part in the establishment of functional regional security 
organisations, although it is unlikely that they are a necessary or sufficient 
condition. A key driver in this seems to be the need to ‘embed’ hegemonism 
by constructing agreements that serve to rein in the regional power; of course, 
they may also serve to consolidate that power. 
Types of security co-operation
This study has reaffirmed a general truth about mutual assistance pacts: they 
don’t work. Political realities tend to take precedence over treaties when push 
comes to shove, and if a regional power is involved, its calculation of national 
interests is likely to override any pledges it might have made. There are few 
examples of successful defence alliances that have been put into operation in 
the developing world. 
Nevertheless, mutual assistance pacts seem to be vital to the process of 
institution building, as virtually all the organisations examined have developed 
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them, always in conjunction with non-aggression treaties. As confidence-
building measures, they are probably a necessary stage. However, the most 
effective form of co-operation seems to be collaborative security, moving on 
through time to common security. 
Issues related to institutionalisation 
Some organisations have been successfully built on the basis of informal 
interactions (‘loose’ organisations), while others have failed because they 
have not developed a high enough level of institutionalisation. Again, this 
probably varies over time. Informality may work for some years, but in due 
course some type of institutionalisation will be needed to take co-operation to 
a higher level. Institutionalisation – in the form of agreements or organisations 
– may also be required in situations where a hegemon is involved, in order to 
establish checks and balances and to rein in the dominant power, as argued 
above.
Size matters, but it is not clear how. Arguments have been put forward that 
small organisations, with, say, four or five members, cannot deal with conflicts 
between two members because the others are collectively too weak (AMU); 
alternatively, it is argued that small organisations can build confidence and 
common values (MERCOSUR), and that very large ones encompass too 
many political divergences to succeed (the Arab League or COMESA). What 
can probably be concluded with some certainty is that small organisations 
will not be able to withstand dyadic conflicts (SAARC and AMU). 
It would be expected that the type of security organisation would affect the 
challenge of the periphery, with military alliances posing a threat to non-
member neighbours and collaborative security regimes being much less 
threatening. This has not been empirically proven in this study, possibly 
because there are in practice few effective military alliances in the developing 
world, and mutual assistance pacts are usually ineffectual and seen to be so 
(see below). 
Many of the organisations studied here work on consensus, or at least 
pretend to do so. While this may slow down institutional progress, it also 
makes it much more difficult for countries to back out of agreements once 
they have been made. Furthermore, institutions seem to evolve on the basis 
of ‘sunk costs’ – as the effort put into regional organisations increases and 
the costs of extraction grow, stability seems to set in. 
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Sovereignty and ‘non-interference in internal affairs’
The principle of non-interference has been a stabilising and confidence-
building factor within some regional organisations at some (usually early) 
time. Often, however, especially in Africa, principle and practice have borne 
little relation to each other, and states that have signed up to such principles 
have blatantly violated them. 
There seems to come a time when progress toward regional co-operation 
or integration is hampered by an over-insistence on national sovereignty. 
Further development will come to depend on states being willing to cede 
some sovereignty in order to reap the greater benefits of co-operation. It is 
also evident that many issues remain unaddressed if the principle of non-
intervention is made into a shibboleth, and it can be a fig leaf for the tolerance 
of dictatorship and human rights abuses. 
However, if the principle of ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ is to be 
ditched in regional organisations, it is obviously desirable that some other 
principles are put in place to govern relations between states, especially in 
situations where there is a regional power. Such principles could typically 
be based on democratic and human rights norms, and opposition to non-
constitutional changes of government and military interference in governance 
(as in MERCOSUR). 
Regime security or human security?
This cursory survey has strongly suggested that the principal driver of regional 
security co-operation is shared regime threat perception (both internal and 
external) and a common interest among regimes – be they democratic or not 
– in supporting each other against sources of threat to internal and external 
security. As such, regional security co-operation in developing countries is 
clearly aimed at stability and regime security. 
However, as Adler and Barnett (1998: 37–48) argue, the mere presence of 
the increased communication and transactions among states and peoples 
required in building a regional organisation can become ‘the wellsprings of 
both mutual trust and collective identity’, even if these processes are initially 
elite-driven.
It is difficult to determine in a survey of this nature whether the regional 
organisations under consideration have contributed to human security and 
community and social development, and far more in-depth research will 
need to be carried out. Indeed, it is not clear what the measurements of 
human security are (do they approximate to the UNDP HDI?) or whether 
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it is possible to determine a contingent relationship between stability and 
human security. Again, this may vary over time. 
Democratic values
Our brief survey has shown that some organisations, albeit very weak 
ones (such as the Arab League), have been built on the basis of common 
‘civilisational’ values, while in others (such as MERCOSUR), a common 
commitment to democratic political values appears to have played an 
important role. However, other organisations (ASEAN, for example; possibly 
also ECOWAS) have survived, even thrived, despite very different political 
values and systems in member states. Common political values, as noted 
earlier, can be – probably have to be – constructed. Their development is a 
necessary process as part of the forward movement of security complexes 
to becoming security communities. As noted earlier, there is also evidence 
that a failure to move beyond ‘regime collaboration’ and to develop common 
democratic values probably puts a cap on the growth and utility of regional 
organisations. 
 
Regime collaboration and beyond
There seems to be strong evidence that incremental, functional co-operation 
on a widening range of issues can eventually lead to co-operation on grander 
issues such as security – this is probably, on the basis of empirical evidence, 
the more successful model. This is closely related to the debate about 
whether functional (usually economic) co-operation should precede security 
and political co-operation, or vice versa. As this chapter has concluded 
above, security is the most important motivator, but it may be expedient to 
concentrate on economic co-operation at first.
In virtually all the organisations studied, states have been the primary actors. 
It may be argued that this is entirely inappropriate (see, for example, Vale 
2003), but it is nevertheless the way it has happened. Time has not provided 
for an analysis on other forms of regional co-operation, e.g. among NGOs or 
social movements, nor whether there is a symbiotic or adversarial relationship 
between such collaboration and that of states. This is a necessary issue for 
further research. 
Although security-motivated ‘regime collaboration’ – with or without a 
hegemon, and whether the threat lies within or without – appears to have a 
stabilising effect on regional security complexes, and although such inter actions 
have a cumulative and ‘spillover’ effect, it is not clear that such collaboration 
contributes to ‘social gains’ in the sense of promoting democracy, human 
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rights, and human security, even if it usually leads on to other functional 
forms of co-operation. It is likely, furthermore, that in the current era of 
globali sation and the universalising claims (although sometimes also ex-
clusion ary effects) of political liberalism, the utility of ‘regime collaboration’ 
will be reduced in the quest for the construction of security communities. The 
relationship between outward-oriented ‘new regionalism’ and the evolution 
of human rights and democracy needs to be further explored. 
EnDnoTES
1 This chapter examines some of the conceptual issues related to the rise of regional inter-state co-
operation, in particular, in security and defence co-operation. It does not deal with organisations 
in the developed world, save to use them as examples, and it does not aim to be comprehensive 
with regard to the developing world.
2 In this chapter, the term ‘region’ is taken to include ‘sub-region’ unless otherwise specified. 
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Chapter 3
Southern African Security in Historical 
Perspective
Abillah H. omari and Paulino Macaringue
Southern Africa is a region defined and structured by a history of conflicts. 
Colonialism, anti-colonial resistance, apartheid, wars of liberation, Cold War 
rivalries, and destabilisation campaigns entered the historical lexicography 
for this region, testifying to the structural conflict that afflicted it until the 
1990s. Within this historical legacy, the region witnessed the formation of 
alliances and counter-alliances and was forced to consider a co-operation 
formula to resolve the endemic conflicts. SADC’s co-operation on politics, 
defence, and security is a child of this historical process and continues to bear 
the marks of the legacies of these conflicts (Macaringue 2004). 
This chapter highlights the salient features of the Southern African historical 
transformation from the 1970s to the present. It argues that the regional 
conflict paved the way for co-operation, but also that the many years of 
conflict have strengthened the national sovereignty of the region’s states, 
which may slow down forms of regional co-operation. The region was, for 
a long time, engaged in what has been called a ‘war of visions’ (Deng 1995; 
see also Khadigala 1994). This history has resulted in certain preferred modes 
of co-operation that have necessitated a slow and painful process towards 
institutionalised regional integration. Nevertheless, Southern Africa is now 
slowly moving towards a regional security regime that can ensure democratic 
governance and common security.
Conflict 
What is unique about Southern Africa is not the existence of conflict and 
co-operation at one and the same time, but essentially co-operation for 
conflict resolution. As this chapter will argue, this is unique, and has tended 
to influence other regional developments.
The traditional aspect of the conflict has been the colonial one, Africa being 
the last continent to be decolonised. Southern Africa has a special place in 
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history: the character of colonialism is different from most colonial situations, 
as it was a combination of classic and settler colonialism. There were also 
some differences within one type of colonialism, which complicated the 
process of decolonisation of the 1960s and beyond.
Within the classic set-up there was Portuguese, German, Belgian, and British 
colonialism. Angola and Mozambique were administered by Portugal, 
always an imperial anomaly in that Portugal was both the first European 
nation to colonise Africa and virtually the last to leave. While the British 
were decolonising Africa in the 1960s, Portugal maintained that its African 
colonies, like those of France, were part of the mother country (Gibson 
1972: 4; Isaacman 1988: 16). Portugal tried to isolate its colonies from the 
changes occurring elsewhere in Africa; under those circumstances, attempts 
to use persuasion and dialogue failed, and that made it clear to many 
that the Portuguese colonies would not have a negotiated or a peaceful 
transition to independence. Armed struggle therefore became the only way 
to liberate Portugal’s African colonies. The British had colonies in Lesotho, 
Swaziland, and Botswana. These countries were administered as typical 
colonies. Tanzania was a British mandated territory, as Namibia was to South 
Africa. Malawi, Zambia, and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe were also classic British 
colonies, which were forced into the Central African Federation in 1956, an 
arrangement that was heavily contested in Zambia and Malawi. Dissolution 
of the federation in 1964 paved the way for constitutional negotiations, 
which brought independence to Malawi and Zambia, but not to Rhodesia/
Zimbabwe. Constitutional developments in Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia, 
and later in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, enabled the British to grant 
independence peacefully. 
However, due to settler colonialism, which developed over time, Rhodesia/
Zimbabwe shifted away from the classic colonial trend. The white settlers in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe moved to disassociate themselves from the British 
colonial authorities, culminating in their unilateral declaration of inde pen dence 
(UDI) in 1965, which unleashed the armed liberation war in that country.
South Africa effectively made Namibia its colony, therefore defying the 
authority of the UN over the country. The problem in South Africa was 
racism, institutionalised as apartheid in 1948. 
Therefore, the colonial conflict in Southern Africa was partly resolved by 
the classic British colonies getting independence constitutionally, while in 
the settler and Portuguese colonies, liberation war became the only way 
to gain independence. The democratisation of apartheid South Africa was 
also achieved in part in that way. Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa were 
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in concert to perpetuate colonialism, white settlerism, and minority rule in 
Southern Africa. The three regimes were in direct conflict with the majority 
of people in their respective territories and also with the countries that had 
received independence earlier on. The magnitude of this conflict varied, 
as did the range of its active actors. The colonial and settler regimes were 
determined to fight the wars of liberation to the end. In all these cases, the 
colonial powers accepted negotiation as a basis for settlement only when 
pressure on them mounted or when there had been substantial changes that 
directly affected them, such as the coup in Portugal in 1974, itself a product 
of the colonial African wars.
The colonial conflict was not the only one in Southern Africa: from the 1970s 
to mid-1990s the region experienced both old and new forms of conflict. 
Wars of liberation, which were the remnants of the 1960s and 1970s, were 
intensified. The victories gained in Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe 
were superseded by internal conflicts. Destabilisation policies emanating 
from South Africa affected most majority-ruled states in Southern Africa at a 
time when they were experiencing declining economic performance, which 
necessitated structural adjustment programmes. The Namibian problem 
dragged on to 1990, and South Africa was not democratised until 1994.
By the mid-1980s the major conflict pattern in Southern Africa was between 
the majority-ruled states and the Republic of South Africa, manifested in 
apartheid in South Africa itself and the destabilisation by South Africa of 
those states opposed to its internal policies. The independent states treated 
apartheid and colonialism similarly. They condemned apartheid and sought the 
international isolation of the apartheid regime, and recognised and supported 
the liberation movements’ fight against apartheid. South Africa perceived the 
alliance between the liberation movements and the majority-ruled states as 
an onslaught against it, supported by international communism, and reacted 
in the form of a militaristic ‘Total Strategy’ supplemented by destabilisation.
There were also conflicts within each group of primary actors in the regional 
conflict, which shaped the behaviour of various actors towards conflict 
and co-operation. Examples exist in varying degrees, some catalysed by 
destabilisation, including the differences among the South African liberation 
movements, and also among the various movements in the then majority-
ruled countries – Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and even Zambia.1 An 
additional aspect of the regional conflict was the differences among the 
majority-ruled states regarding the nature of their co-operation, the way 
they treated the liberation movements, and their perception of the common 
enemy, apartheid South Africa. This has left a political legacy and influenced 
the conception of good governance and common security in the region. 
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Co-operation
When attempting to understand the intertwining of conflict and co-operation 
in Southern Africa, it should be emphasised that in some cases conflict 
catalysed co-operation, and sometimes co-operation caused certain types of 
conflict. Three major types of co-operation can be identified, namely bilateral, 
multilateral, and transnational co-operation, and these complemented each 
other over time. These categories are outlined here as a prelude to the history 
of the major actor in the area of co-operation and conflict in Southern Africa: 
the Front Line States (FLS) (Omari 1991b).
The general conflict patterns in Southern Africa made sustained bilateral 
relations possible, mostly in the political and diplomatic spheres. Personal 
relationships between the then presidents of Zambia and Tanzania, 
Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere, respectively, helped to forge political 
links between their countries in an effort to hasten the regional liberation 
process. The ad hoc summit system they practised in the 1960s developed 
into a number of regional groupings. They initiated a series of conferences of 
East and Central African countries, which became an informal organisation 
(CECAC) (Africa Research Bulletin 1966: A484). The two countries related 
to the various liberation movements in particular ways, which had some 
consequences for the regional patterns of the 1980s and beyond.2 One 
cannot ignore some bilateral ideological relations: the ongoing relations 
between Angola and Mozambique, Namibia and Angola, and Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe exemplify this.3
Bilateral economic relations have also been a feature: this co-operation 
provided an impetus for the current forms of regional integration. Crucial 
in this process during the 1960s through to the 1980s were Zambia and 
Tanzania. The hub for some joint economic ventures between these countries 
was the landlocked position of Zambia.4 Relations between Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique have also shown this feature, with Zimbabwe reliant on the 
Beira corridor for access to the sea. 
As an adjunct to the FLS, there was also some bilateral co-operation in 
defence and security matters well before the multilateral efforts of the 
present-day SADC. Several bilateral defence agreements were in place in the 
period under discussion (Omari 1991b). The nature of this co-operation has 
influenced the character of multilateral co-operation, as well as the resultant 
institutions. Most of such institutions in the region are loose, which reflects 
conflicting interests. These institutions were formed in the 1970s through 
to the 1990s: the FLS, the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC), the Preferential Trade Area, and COMESA. The 
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current existing security co-operation frameworks, including the Organ on 
Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation and the Mutual Defence Pact in 
SADC are a culmination of this long process.
Ironically, there was also some co-operation between the major adversaries 
in the regional conflict. Some of the majority-ruled states were forced by 
circumstances to co-operate with apartheid South Africa, as the economic 
realities of the regional political economy, centring on transportation infra-
structure, overtook political and diplomatic considerations. Among such 
efforts was the Constellation of Southern African States, which never got 
off the ground, and the Rand Monetary Area and Southern African Customs 
Union, both of which still exist. 
At the height of destabilisation, some majority-ruled states were forced 
into non-aggression treaties with apartheid South Africa in the mid-1980s, 
mostly notably the Nkomati Treaty between South Africa and Mozambique 
of March 1984. Similar non-aggression accords between South Africa and 
other majority-ruled states are known to have been signed and kept secret. 
Obviously, the signing of such treaties symbolised the end of an era – from the 
politics of confrontation to the new age of co-operation and accommodation, 
pre-dating the end of apartheid.
One may also cite some transnational relations that have endured over 
time, which have now been consolidated. Such relations have increasingly 
defined inter-state relations, becoming more regional than their inter-state 
counterparts. Apart from capital, technology, labour, and cultural exchanges, 
there have been the flow of people, informal (including illegal) trade and 
trafficking, and the activities of NGOs. Transnational relations of the past 
have now been consolidated, especially in the area of capital investment. 
What such relations did during the apartheid era was to undermine the 
isolation of the apartheid regime. 
Co-operation for conflict resolution
It was alluded to above that the basic tenets of the regional political history in 
the 1960s and beyond were the co-existence of conflict and co-operation, and 
regional co-operation for conflict resolution. That the FLS triumphed as the 
most important actor in co-operation for conflict resolution does not mean 
that it was the only one: it was the culmination of various attempts towards 
regional co-operation for conflict resolution. Unlike formally constituted 
alliances, the formation of the FLS was not a product of a negotiated inter-
governmental agreement. It evolved over time, arising out of specific needs 
of the 1970s, which reflected regional political, social, and economic needs. 
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There were thus some regional groupings before the formation of the FLS. 
Such groupings differed in size, focus, structure, and leadership, reflecting 
the general overview of African international relations at the time. Despite 
their differences, the groups preceding the FLS had similar objectives to this 
institution, namely, regional political and economic freedom. Thus the FLS 
had a long gestation period.
Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa/Pan African 
Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECA/
PAFMECSA)
Established in 1958, PAFMECA brought together the leaders of the nationalist 
movements in East and Central Africa (Cox 1964: 10). The founding conference 
approved the PAFMECA constitution and signed the Freedom Charter of 
the Peoples of East and Central Africa. The right to self-determination of 
the colonial peoples was upheld and a call to fight against apartheid was 
emphasised. The PAFMECA snowballed into a huge organisation in terms 
of membership (Cox 1964: 10–11). It changed its name to PAFMECSA to 
reflect its geographical growth and changed its constitution to accommodate 
independent countries. It was dissolved following the founding of the OAU 
in 1963. The founders of the FLS pointed out that PAFMECSA was suited 
to deal with classic colonialism, while in Southern Africa that problem was 
complicated by settlerism and apartheid (Cox 1964: 2–3).
CECAC
CECAC was initiated by Tanzania and Zambia to fill the vacuum left by the 
dissolution of PAFMECSA, which could not cater for the special needs of 
the region (Cox 1964: 3). Like the preceding PAFMECSA, CECAC grew in 
size and finally became ineffective. Despite its wide membership and friction 
with the OAU, CECAC is remembered for its Lusaka Manifesto (1969), 
which appeased the West and displeased the active liberation movements, 
as it attempted to balance negotiation and armed struggle as mechanisms 
for decolonisation. The OAU and the UN adopted the manifesto. However, 
that controversy was corrected by CECAC itself through the Mogadishu 
Declaration (1971), which upheld the virtues of armed struggle.
The Mulungushi Club
This was the most short-lived of all the groups pre-dating the FLS. Established 
in 1970, while CECAC was still in existence, it was dissolved in 1974, paving 
the way for the FLS. Formed among the leaders of Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania, 
and Zaire, the ‘club’ was more for the respective heads of state than an inter-
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state institution, and focused on the liberation of Southern Africa. It was 
formed in order to streamline the contradictory manifestos of CECAC, and 
also to follow up on resolutions.
The origins of the FLS can be found in the Mulungushi Club. Tanzania’s 
Nyerere and Zambia’s Kaunda formed the nucleus. Other founding presi-
dents were Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, 
Samora Machel, whose was then heading the transitional government in 
Mozambique, and Agostinho Neto, whose Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola was struggling to seize control in that country. Due to his ambiguous 
behaviour within the Mulungushi Club, President Mobutu of Zaire was 
excluded, signalling some realignment after the dissolution of the club.5 
Some key characteristics of regional security co-operation emerge from this 
history. Firstly, all the organisations preceding the FLS had loose structures, 
with neither headquarters nor secretariats. They were informal and operated 
mainly at head-of-state level. Secondly, the institutions for conflict resolution 
enjoyed some coexistence, i.e. with a new organisation being formed before 
the existing one was disbanded. And thirdly, there was a proliferation of such 
institutions in the region, all having similar objectives. Such characteristics 
were imbedded in the FLS, and were to become major features of the regional 
integration process.
The FLS
The dominant view is that the FLS was founded on the basis of the anti-
colonial conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (Omari 1991b).6 The ineffectiveness 
of the Mulungushi Club, especially with Mobutu in it, and also the politics 
of détente initiated by South Africa to find a settlement to the Rhodesian/
Zimbabwean problem, were the main catalysts. The coup d’etat in Portugal 
in April 1974 was also a contributory factor, as the new regime in Lisbon 
was forced to promise positive changes in Angola and Mozambique. Détente 
was conceived by South Africa in order to save itself, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, 
and South West Africa/Namibia from the effects of armed struggle, so South 
Africa extended a hand of goodwill and attempted to normalise relations with 
its hostile neighbours, thinking that it was in the interest of African leaders to 
co-operate with it in resolving the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe peacefully. 
South Africa was assuming the role of peacemaker, thus defending apartheid 
through its involvement in Southern Africa.
To respond to this offer, concerted efforts were needed among independent 
states so as to have co-ordinated responses and policies. Other leaders 
who were relevant and willing were therefore courted to join Kaunda and 
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Nyerere, which is how Khama and Machel came to join forces with them. 
In addition, within Rhodesia/Zimbabwe a possibility presented itself of an 
internal settlement, to exclude the externally based liberation movements, 
the Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU). Meanwhile, Britain had agreed to sponsor con sti-
tutional talks. Fundamental to what might have precipitated the estab lish ment 
of the FLS is, arguably, the necessity to co-ordinate the efforts to convince 
ZAPU and ZANU to form a united front. The actual origin of the FLS can 
be traced to attempts to achieve this: the ambivalent Patriotic Front between 
ZAPU and ZANU was thus formed in Dar es Salaam in September 1976.
Arising out of the colonial conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the FLS became 
one of the most important institutions in Southern Africa. However, it 
continued to operate in the same way as its predecessor organisations. It 
worked through a summit system, with no secretariat or headquarters, thus 
following the traditional tendency of avoiding written and signed charters 
and constitutions, as well as the formality enshrined in modern institutions 
(Omari 1991b). However, it was differentiated from its predecessors by its 
modus operandi. The FLS’s importance in the regional liberation process and 
in that of Zimbabwe in particular was that it was a credible institution. The 
OAU mandated the FLS to work for the liberation of Southern Africa on its 
behalf. The UN provided a similar mandate. In addition, the big powers with 
interests in the region, especially Britain and the United States, found it useful 
to work with the FLS. In short, the FLS carried more weight internationally 
in matters pertaining to the liberation of Southern Africa than any other 
institution of the same nature before and even after.
The other difference is that, in addition to the summit system, the FLS had 
a functional arm of the summit, the Defence Staff Committee, which later 
became the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which has 
endured to date. Focusing on liberation meant that the FLS had to play a 
major security role, and the ISDSC was its security mechanism, generating 
practical advice and recommendations for the summits. The ISDSC planned 
and discharged various operations in collaboration with the active liberation 
movements, including training, logistics, and transits and infiltration of 
freedom fighters. It also had a liaison role with the summit to which it was 
accountable, and with other organisations such as the Liberation Committee 
of the OAU.
It can be contended that the main factor behind the establishment of the FLS, 
i.e. the colonial conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, was also a factor leading to 
its decline. With the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the FLS began 
to wane, but remained crucial in co-ordinating support to the Namibian 
53
and South African liberation efforts and assistance to the governments of 
Mozambique and Angola. 
In 1980 the SADCC was formed as a precursor to the present-day SADC. 
The treaty establishing SADC in 1992 attempted to commit member states 
to peace and security, as well as economic development and integration. The 
unfortunate ambiguity that followed with the empowering of the ministers of 
economic planning and finance to form the Council of Ministers rather than 
the ministers of foreign affairs inherently caused the failure of the marriage 
of politics, defence, and security with economic development.
Anticipation of a new regional security regime
The onset of the 1990s brought mixed feelings to Southern Africa. The release 
from prison of the region’s political legend, Nelson Mandela; Namibia’s 
independence; and the provision of political space to opposition groups inside 
South Africa all showed the irreversibility of change in the region. Apartheid 
was coming to an end, and the regime’s last president vividly captured this 
by providing his vision of a new Southern Africa that would plan and work 
together (De Klerk 1991: 24). The vision provided some optimism that a new 
regional regime was in the making. But there were a number of unanswered 
questions:
•	 Would the end of colonial conflict signify the end of all conflict?
•	 Would the end of apartheid mean the beginning of a new regional security 
regime? 
•	 Would the rest of the region be able to tame post-apartheid South Africa?
•	 What would the peace dividend be?
•	 In reality, what type of security did SADC want to establish?
These and other questions dominated the Southern Africa of the early 1990s. 
They were genuine questions that had no easy answers. The end of the 
colonial conflict did not mean an end to all conflict. The legacies of the wars 
of liberation were raging on in Angola and Mozambique, and a new regional 
security regime was impossible to build when there were crises throughout 
the region. Pertinent among these was the crisis of governance in many 
countries, especially in Lesotho, which divided Southern Africa’s leaders. 
There were even uncertainties as to how the new South Africa would behave 
towards the rest of Southern Africa. Influenced by global changes under way 
at the time, these developments sent waves of pessimism over the region. It 
was a period of transition, which had to be adequately managed.
After Nelson Mandela was sworn in as president, it became clear that the 
new South Africa had decided to be an African country in Southern Africa. 
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It did not assume its alleged role of a regional superpower, thus quelling 
the fears among its neighbours of their inability to tame the leviathan. 
Symbolically, the new South Africa downgraded itself to become a regional 
member, just like the others. It thus joined apartheid’s long-time opponents, 
namely, SADC and the FLS. At the same time, South Africa had to manage 
its own difficult process of transition.
There were, however, some problems in the regional transition. One of these 
was the debate over the accommodation of FLS activities within SADC. 
The options consisted of the proposed transformation of the FLS to an 
independent Association of Southern African States (ASAS), or alternatively 
the establishment of a specialised body within SADC to deal with security. 
The latter argument won the day, and the Organ on Politics, Defence, and 
Security Co-operation (OPDSC) was established. 
While such a transformation was meant to build a new regional security 
regime, which was to support the momentum being built up on the economic 
front through SADC, there were some problems that watered down these 
achievements. The Angolan crisis was raging, a crisis of governance emerged 
in Lesotho, and there was a serious civil war in one of SADC’s new members 
– the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). As will be shown below, the 
debate on whether to intervene or not in Lesotho and the DRC may have 
slowed down the process of concretising a new regional security regime. The 
signing of the OPDSC protocol was delayed, probably due to this – and thus 
for a long time the region was without an appropriate mechanism through 
which to exercise democratic governance and common security.
The new regional security regime
It was observed above that one of the features characterising organisations 
pre-dating the FLS was personal relations among the leaders. This was 
symbolised by the Nyerere–Kaunda–Khama axis in the FLS. Organisations 
founded along these lines presuppose a low turnover in leadership, a feature 
notable during the one-party state era. However, a change of leadership in 
any one member country may cause ripples through the entire organisation. 
Although this has not happened in Southern Africa,7 the new leaders may 
not have the same priorities as the outgoing leaders. Personal relations 
among leaders went along with the preference for summitry, informality, 
and hesitancy with regard to strong secretariats.
This tendency points towards the reluctance of the summiteers to surrender 
part of their national sovereignties for the regional good. ‘High politics’ has 
been strong on the agenda. Organisations that avoid strong structures tend 
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to plan regionally and implement nationally, creating a gap between policy 
and implementation. This tradition was carried forward from the Mulungushi 
Club through the FLS, and its remnants are today found inside SADC. It 
would seem logical, however, that to have a regional security regime, states 
must share quite a number of common policies – relating to economic, 
defence, and security issues – that entail the erosion of a certain amount of 
national sovereignty.
Flexibility embedded in loosely structured organisations, as shown by the 
Southern African inter-state institutions, has had an impact on the nature 
of regional politics. In most cases, the independent states conferred an 
‘authentic movement’ status on liberation movements of their choice. In 
Southern Africa there were several liberation movements in each of the 
countries to be liberated. Depending on which movement finally assumed 
power, the inter-state relations that consequently followed were not so 
harmonious – again, depending on who supported whom.8 The levels of 
previous support for and solidarity with the liberation movements tended 
to determine the depth of regional integration. Under such circumstances it 
has been difficult to develop sound common regional policies to which every 
member may subscribe.
Of late, there has been a shift from one-party to multi-party systems. This 
has manifested itself as a crisis of governance in most states. Along with the 
remnants of the wars of liberation and a few military dictatorships (Omari 
with Swatuk 1995), internal strife has also been a feature, hampering the 
establishment of a sound footing for a regional security regime.
History, therefore, has dictated the present circumstances in Southern Africa 
as a region where there has been co-operation for conflict resolution. That 
type of co-operation necessitated the establishment of loose organisations 
in which member states came together for specific objectives, but without 
affecting their national core values and interests. When former enemies 
become friends, old fears and sensitivities are hard to overcome, hence 
the tendency towards ‘planning regionally, implementing nationally’. This 
may be different from experiences elsewhere in the world, where countries 
usually begin by functional co-operation in less sensitive issues that create 
confidence, and then move on to the sensitive areas of defence and security.
The oPDSC 
The SADC Treaty was signed in 1992, two years before apartheid came to 
an end. The establishment of SADC occurred in a changed security environ-
ment. The goal then was to establish a regional organisation for collective 
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security that best addressed the common threats in the region. The concept of 
security had changed dramatically and was perceived differently throughout 
the region. 
Political instability in the region is now associated with the difficulties of 
establishing and consolidating democratic systems and promoting stability, 
peace, and sustainable development. One challenge facing SADC has been 
the establishment of an appropriate and effective institutional framework for 
executing its new mandate. This has required the organisation to rethink 
security and adjust its mechanisms to deal with the new challenges, especially 
a new security agenda that favours the peaceful resolution of conflicts and 
prefers prevention rather than resolution. 
The debate from 1992 to 1996 was that some member states felt that bringing 
the old issues of the FLS and ISDSC within the SADC framework would 
divert the organisation’s attention from its main objective of economic 
development. Others felt that the new concept of security tended to view 
development as part and parcel of building common security in the region. 
They argued that much regional insecurity arose from the way resources 
and political space were distributed and shared. Accordingly, the issue of 
security was so important and sensitive that it could not be subordinated to 
the debate on economic development and handled by a bureaucracy that 
would be dependent on a secretariat often insensitive to such issues.
This line of argument led some SADC members to advance a proposal to 
create an association of states, ASAS, which would function independently 
of the SADC Secretariat and would report directly to the summit. However, 
other members argued that that would increase expenditure, as the proposal 
implied the creation of a new secretariat to deal with security affairs in a 
situation where SADC’s main sources of funding were extra-regional. 
These arguments, among others, led the heads of state and government to 
reject the ASAS proposal in August 1995 and direct that further consultations 
should take place between ministries of defence and security on new 
structures, terms of reference, and operational procedures. Consequently, 
the ministers proposed the establishment of the OPDSC in January 1996. 
The summit formally accepted the proposal in June of the same year, which 
provided a response to many issues regarding the rejected ASAS. The OPDSC 
would function at the summit level, operating independently of SADC 
structures. The chair would rotate annually among the troika (see below), 
and the OPDSC was allowed to create new structures, including technical 
committees, as it deemed necessary, while the ISDSC could continue to act 
as its secretariat. 
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However, there was no real consensus on the way the OPDSC should 
function. A troika system was introduced by the 1996 summit and was to 
comprise one chair and two vice chairpersons: the outgoing and incoming 
chairpersons. Some member states expressed their dissatisfaction that the 
OPDSC functioned outside the SADC framework. Efforts were made to 
overcome these differences, including a review and rationalisation of the 
SADC Programme of Action of 1997. The August 1997 summit in Malawi 
agreed to suspend the OPDSC and appoint a committee composed of 
Malawi, Mozambique, and Namibia to identify a suitable solution. 
Some members proposed that the OPDSC should be transformed into 
committees and work on an ad hoc basis; others suggested that it should 
be integrated into the SADC framework and be chaired by one of the vice 
chairpersons in the troika. And some believed that the OPDSC should 
operate on the basis of a specific protocol. Not even the Luanda summit of 
August 1998 came up with a solution. It was the Maputo summit of August 
1999 that directed the Council of Ministers to review the operation of all 
SADC institutions, including the OPDSC, and report back within six months. 
At a subsequent meeting of the ISDSC and ministers of foreign affairs in 
Swaziland in October 1999, it was recommended that the OPDSC should be 
part of SADC and should report to the SADC summit.
At its meeting in February 2000 in Mbabane, Swaziland, the Council of 
Ministers agreed on the terms of reference for a review of SADC operations. 
It also established the Review Committee comprising the troika plus one, 
i.e. Mozambique (chair), Namibia (deputy chair), South Africa (outgoing 
chair), and Zimbabwe (as chair of the OPDSC). The extraordinary summit 
in Windhoek, Namibia in March 2001 finally approved the report on the 
restructuring exercise.
The disagreements over the OPDSC were based on the core issue of how 
security should be viewed in the present era. It was a debate between the old 
thinking, of viewing security in strictly military terms, and the new one, of 
understanding security as an all-embracing concept. Some participants still 
continued to conceptualise security in terms of threat perception, which is 
consequently reactive rather than proactive. 
The dialogue between defence and security officials and their civilian think-
tank counterparts was yet to produce a consensus. The August 2001 summit 
in Blantyre, Malawi was important in that the Protocol on the OPDSC was 
finally signed, and it was ratified by the end of 2003. The consequences of 
this lengthy debate are obvious. Although the ISDSC has functioned since 
the establishment of the FLS, formal co-operation in the defence and security 
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area is still far behind the level achieved in the other sectors within SADC. 
It will take some time and additional effort before the region has in place 
a mechanism ready to respond to the pace, pressures, and fluctuations of 
regional demands. The region needs a multidisciplinary approach to the issue 
of defence and security, a common vision, and common policy and planning 
mechanisms. Organisational and operational problems have continued to 
afflict the OPDSC. One could argue that the troubles started back in 1992 
at the signing of the SADC Treaty. Instead of empowering a committee of 
foreign ministers to manage the affairs of SADC, the treaty identified the 
ministers of economic planning and finance to form the Council of Ministers, 
thus inherently marginalising issues of politics, defence, and security.
Since the 2001 Malawi summit, where the OPDSC was signed and the 
decision made to rotate the OPDSC chair annually, interesting developments 
have been taking place. The region has come to terms with reality by 
going beyond regional co-operation to focus on sectors that will enhance 
regional integration. A lot of work has been done on the SADC restructuring 
programme. The Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) is 
now functioning. This has completed the two legs of the OPDSC, namely the 
ISDSC and the ISPDC. But the efficiency of the two committees’ functioning 
is questionable, and the region surely has to rethink how all these processes 
are integrated across the SADC Secretariat. 
The Dar es Salaam summit of 2003 finally approved the Mutual Defence 
Pact that should operationalise the Protocol on the OPDSC. The Strategic 
Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) was also approved at that meeting. 
It is expected that SIPO, a strategic vision for the OPDSC, in conjunction 
with the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, would provide a 
road map through which SADC can achieve peace, stability, prosperity, and 
development. 
Challenges 
The SADC Protocol on the OPDSC, the Mutual Defence Pact, and SIPO 
come at a time when SADC is facing the challenges of placing itself within 
the transformed AU peace and security agenda. This is informed by the 
establishment of the AU Protocol on the Peace and Security Council, which 
provides for the establishment of the African Common Defence and Security 
Policy, African Standby Force (ASF), and Military Staff Committee. The 
materialisation of these brings added responsibility for SADC.
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The AU peace agenda foresees the regions as the building blocks for the 
creation of the ASF, by establishing regional brigades. By early 2005, the 
ISDSC had established a framework for a regional brigade under the ASF 
initiative, which is likely to become an important tool in the hands of the 
OPDSC. 
The core challenges in the exercise of building viable regional security 
architecture remain the following: 
• issues arising from the governance and management of security in a 
democratic society;
• the changing role of the defence and security establishments;
• the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-combatants;
• the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced people;
• the collection and control of illegal weapons;
• the reconstitution of state institutions;
• the promotion of national reconstruction; and
• the establishment of a favourable environment for the return of emigrated 
human capital.
The key argument is that security issues in SADC are no longer military in 
a conventional way: they are more political–military in their nature, causes, 
and consequences. The shift is that security in Southern Africa is no longer 
conceived against, but rather with other members.
Conclusions
Despite the sensitivity of defence and security issues, which need confidence 
to make them operational, the post-independence Southern African states 
opted to organise loosely to avoid enduring structures, most probably to 
maintain and safeguard their national sovereignties. Thus the four decades 
of regional co-operation have not provided the region with adequate lessons, 
techniques, and even mechanisms to co-operate on the less sensitive issue 
of economic development. It would seem that regional circumstances 
necessitated the reversal of the natural process of moving from economic to 
security co-operation.
Instead of being a confidence-building mechanism, the many years of 
co-operation for conflict resolution have been a drawback to meaningful 
regional co-operation. Co-operation for conflict resolution has not been a 
catalyst or a motivation for deepened regional integration, as it was basically 
conducted amid secrecy, enmity, and suspicions. It is only now that the 
region is discovering itself. And the models of co-operation adopted seem 
to be carefully chosen so as to ensure that they themselves constitute 
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confidence-building measures. So the loose forms and structures are meant 
to be piecemeal measures to enhance future deepened co-operation.
Southern Africa can hardly be termed a viable integrated regional political 
economy, nor a regional security regime. There is a notable absence of regional 
(common) policies – harmonised or otherwise. Governance is upheld, in 
most cases, not through fear of a regional reprimand, but through the political 
maturity of the citizens in individual countries. 
 
The region is thus caught between the traditional and modern, which is a 
serious transition trap. Democratic governance (see Du Pisani, this volume) 
and common security are the prerogatives of modernity, and if the regional 
states shy away from these features, then they will be rejected by the rest of 
the regional ‘commons’ – the regional citizens. Traditional garb has to be 
shed in order to achieve democratic governance and common security. This 
cannot be done in a short period of time. King (1986) has rightly observed 
that the age-long ‘African winter’ – consisting of poverty, drought, and war, 
all of which have to be first dealt with – continues to bite. It may take a long 
time for Southern Africa to match democratic governance with common 
security, the subject of this book.
EnDnoTES
1 A group called the Mushala gang ravaged Zambia for almost a decade.
2 Zambia supported Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, while Tanzania supported Robert Mugabe’s ZANU. 
This consequently affected Zambian–Zimbabwean relations in the early 1980s.
3 Angola and Mozambique related to each other from their similar colonial perspective and 
Marxist–Leninist socialist ideology. Angola was the rear base for Namibia’s liberation movement, 
SWAPO. After independence, Namibia intervened in the DRC, probably in support of Angola. 
4 This became important after UDI in Rhodesia (1965). A joint petroleum pipeline, highway, and 
railroad were built between Tanzania and Zambia, enabling the latter to utilise Dar es Salaam 
harbour.
5 Mobutu allied himself with Holden Roberto’s Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, thus 
disqualifying himself from membership of the FLS.
6 This was ascertained through the authors’ research in the region.
7 East Africa experienced this when Milton Obote of Uganda was overthrown in 1971, causing the 
collapse of the EAC less than a decade thereafter.
8 After independence, Zimbabwe was closer to Mozambique than it was to Zambia, reflecting 
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Since independence in 1966, Botswana has been a functioning liberal demo-
cracy, albeit dominated by one political party: the Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP). This party has pursued policies that have fostered a relatively 
high degree of social and economic development. 
The character of democracy in Botswana
Analysis of Botswana’s democratic credentials has largely been favourable, 
with an ‘African Miracle’ school (a term originally coined by Thumberg-
Hartland) being mainly positive if largely economistic in its approach.1 This 
group of scholars frequently invokes the question of whether Botswana 
is indeed ‘a model for success’? (Picard 1987). Indeed, the intriguing way 
Botswana has managed to uphold a broadly liberal democratic tradition 
since 1966 while incorporating aspects of its pre-colonial governance is quite 
unique in the region. Ever since independence, the post-colonial government 
has acknowledged the crucial part that pre-colonial structures such as 
the chiefs and the kgotla (local traditional assembly) could play in modern 
Botswana’s politics. Indeed, the kgotla has been deployed by the state as a 
forum where government policies are clarified for the people, and also where 
the people can voice their problems and concerns. This, combined with the 
more ‘modern’ aspects of an electoral representative democracy, has crafted 
a sustainable democratic culture in the country. Moreover, the installation 
of a woman kgosi kgolo (paramount chief) – Kgosi Mosadi Seboko of Balete 
– who also became chairperson of Ntlo ya Dikgosi (the House of Chiefs), 
is clear testimony of the softening of patriarchal tendencies, manifesting 
the reformation of bogosi (chieftainship) to become more inclusive and 
democratic.
However, while Botswana’s democratic development is routinely hailed as 
a ‘model’ for Africa, this developmental path has not been unproblematic 
and, in fact, has engendered inequalities, while the character of democratic 
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practice in the country – although qualitatively better than many of its 
neighbours’ – is at times somewhat problematic. 
Having said all this, the limitations of Botswana’s celebrated liberal democracy 
are noteworthy. Although it is true that the state has provided social services 
in the form of schools and clinics to the populace, and has exhibited features 
of the ‘developmental state’, major contradictions within the country’s 
political economy and the qualitative nature of its democracy mean that the 
country exhibits authoritarian liberalism. Like the East Asian developmental 
states of Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, etc., Botswana has combined 
high growth rates and visible ‘development’ with a structured autocracy. 
Political parties
The limitations on Botswana’s celebrated liberal democracy are noteworthy. 
Opposition parties are generally weak due to interminable intra-party 
faction fighting and internal splits. The fragmentation of opposition parties 
has meant that the ruling BDP has enjoyed dominant – if not wholly 
unchallenged – status since independence (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000; 
Molomo 2000a; Osei-Hwedie 2001). In addition, the country has feeble 
organisational structures and poor capacity to promote alternative policies. 
The failure of opposition parties to unite and the propensity of opposition 
leaders to pursue their personal agendas have denied the opposition the 
possibility of unseating the BDP from power. As a result, this has meant that 
Botswana is, and has been since 1966, a de facto predominant-party system. 
The incumbent BDP has won each and every election by a clear margin 
(Selolwane 2001). It is only really at the local level that the opposition has 
made some meaningful inroads into the BDP’s power base. In the past, the 
absence of a strong and vibrant opposition meant that BDP backbenchers 
effectively performed the role of the opposition in parliament – a serious 
indictment, indeed, of the opposition.
The BDP thus towers over the political scene in Botswana. The opposition 
suffers not only from poor leadership, but also from a lack of funds. In 
contrast, the BDP is wealthy and also enjoys the benefits of incumbency. 
Political party funding is not provided by the state, and as the incumbent 
party, the BDP is able to attract generous donations from various sources. 
Because of its predominance and the seemingly hopeless chance opposition 
parties have of unseating the BDP, alternative parties attract limited funding. 
As a result, during elections the BDP is comparatively advantaged with a 
financial strength and visibility unmatched by any of the other parties. It is 
the BDP that deploys advertisements, erects election billboards, and drives 
around in new vehicles – all contributing to a high and active level of visibility, 
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which the opposition manifestly does not achieve. In addition, the party is 
able to use its predominance in government to appoint additional members 
of parliament (MPs), the so-called ‘specially elected members’. 
In a country where the ruling party has been dominant for so long, the 
distinction between party and government interests is clearly blurred. The 
adoption of the National Vision 2016 by the BDP as the thrust of its election 
manifesto during the 2004 general elections is a case in point: BDP policy 
has become national policy. Botswana’s developmental state is strengthened 
by the party’s capacity to influence business opportunities, award contracts, 
and, importantly, operate in a largely non-transparent fashion through the 
control of access to vital data and information. The control of vital information 
on state-owned and controlled companies is bolstered by the relatively weak 
state of the media and civil society. 
The media
The fairness of the democratic system in a country is affirmed not only by 
what happens at the polling station on the day of elections, but by the broader 
milieu within which the political process plays itself out. In particular, access 
to information, freedom to campaign, and equal and fair access to the media 
are but a few crucial features in this regard. In Botswana, with the exception 
of small, localised private radio stations, such as Gabz FM, the electronic 
media is government controlled. The national radio station, Radio Botswana, 
is a government mouthpiece, and so is the only daily newspaper, the Daily 
News. Although opposition activities are covered, the overall perception of 
the contents of such media products is that the BDP government is given 
greater weight. Certainly, the government is perceived by the people to 
have an inordinate amount of influence over the press – in contrast to the 
opposition parties (see Leepile 1996). There are allegations to the effect that 
government blocks programmes that put it under the spotlight with a view 
to making it account to the public for its actions and policies. The most cited 
incident is its decision to stop the broadcasting of a call-in Radio Botswana 
programme known as ‘Masa a Sele’.2
There are, however, a number of private weekly papers that maintain 
considerable independence from the ruling party. It is these papers that have 
in the past exposed government corruption. Having said that, 
from independence up until the twilight of the 20th Century, 
the Botswana government has done little to promote or 
strengthen media freedom, diversity and expansion. It 
instead continues to thrive on restrictive media legislation, 
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bureaucratic red tape and unclear policies (Media Institute of 
Southern Africa n.d.). 
Civil society
In the past it has been argued that the autonomy of the state machinery has 
been largely facilitated in Botswana by the fact that civil society has been 
poorly developed and disorganised, and democratic input weak (Holm and 
Molutsi 1989). Threats to media independence and media surveillance of the 
government and elites are profoundly amplified in the context of a polity such 
as Botswana, where civil society is very weak (Holm, Molutsi, and Somolekae 
1996). However, it is now believed that civil society input to society has been 
contributed through dialogue with government (Maundeni 2004).
Comparatively speaking, civil society groups in Botswana are not as 
developed as in other African countries. This reality may be partly attributable 
to the political and economic stability that has prevailed since independence. 
Furthermore, the lack of any violent ‘struggle’ for independence and an 
essentially top-down traditional culture of acquiescence before one’s 
superiors may explain the relative weakness and disorganised nature of civil 
society. One argument has been that civil society in Botswana is readily co-
opted into state structures, lacks a strong grassroots base, and is prepared 
to work within the parameters deemed permissible by the state – and not 
beyond. However, that some leaders are co-opted into government may 
provide evidence that civil society is not weak but valuable.
The state apparatus in Botswana has been commonly deployed to promote 
political and economic goals that reflect the BDP leadership’s understanding 
of the limitations and opportunities presented by the national, regional, and 
international economies. At the same time, this has reified existing structures 
of power and privilege within the country. Having said that, a note of caution 
regarding criticism of Botswana’s democracy should be sounded. Though 
ruling for nearly 40 years, the BDP has not subverted the constitution; it has 
not outlawed opposition parties or declared the country a one-party state. 
There are no political prisoners. Despite the handicaps the media face, the 
press in the country is flourishing and critical. The material benefits accrued 
through diamond sales have been dispersed (albeit unevenly), and evidence 
exists that poverty levels are falling. The constitution does guarantee citizens 
free political activity and freedom of speech and association. However, there 
are clearly things in Botswana that could be done much better if it truly 
wishes to retain the label of a democratic ‘African miracle’. 
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Drivers of democratisation 
The primary drivers of democratisation are numerous and include political 
parties and civil society, including churches, the media, and academics. With 
regard to academics, the Democracy Research Project (DRP) has been an 
important player in the democratisation process in Botswana. Surveys have 
been carried out and their findings publicised in ways that have clarified 
issues involved in the democratisation process. The project is a non-partisan, 
multidisciplinary research group that derives its membership from the 
Faculties of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Botswana. 
The DRP has conducted surveys, opinion polls, and symposiums; in fact, 
opinion polls have been conducted during every election year since 1994.
Intra-party democracy 
Obviously political parties are also important players in the democratisation 
process. As primary agents of political mobilisation and voter education, 
they occupy an important space in the democratisation debate. Perhaps 
what is most pertinent is that they should not only be seen as facilitators of 
democracy at the national level, but should also ensure that there is intra-party 
democracy. Intra-party democracy is, without doubt, one of the hallmarks 
of liberal democratic practice.3 It manifests itself in the general workings of 
political parties: how various structures of the party relate, how office bearers 
of party committees are elected, the reporting lines within the party, and the 
conduct of primary elections, with this last factor being perhaps an important 
litmus test of the existence of intra-party democracy. These elections are 
mechanisms through which political parties choose candidates to contest 
elections on their ticket. The process was initiated by the ruling BDP in 1984, 
followed by the Botswana National Forum (BNF) in 1989. 
Primary elections within the BDP were initially limited to an electoral college 
that comprised designated office bearers within the party structures, and the 
rest of the party members were excluded from the process. Moreover, the 
party central committee could veto the appointment of candidates voted in 
by the electoral college. As political office became a more and more contested 
terrain, outcomes of primary elections became sources of serious disputes, 
which often led to resignations, defections, and expulsions.
Upon realising that the limited primary elections were not only undemocratic, 
but also divisive, the BDP adopted a new system, known as bulela ditswe 
(free for all), which was first tested in a by-election in 2002 and was fully 
implemented in the primary elections for the 2004 general election. In this 
new dispensation, aspirants for political office first apply to the party central 
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committee, which is empowered to vet the candidates, and only those that 
pass the screening process are allowed to contest the primary elections. 
Candidates who win the primary elections after the party vetting process 
become the party’s candidates for the constituency. Bulela ditswe has not only 
opened the floodgates for political competition, but has ensured that the 
party becomes vibrant and responsive to the aspirations of its membership. 
Yet its challenges have still to unfold.
Democratisation also manifests itself in disputes on political succession. 
This has been a factor within the ruling BDP and opposition parties. The 
jostling for political power among candidates for positions in the parties and 
candidates for the national echelons of the parties has opened the greater 
debate on political succession within parties, as well as the presidency of the 
country. What is most problematic is that although intra-party democracy is 
wanting, the country’s constitution does not provide for direct presidential 
elections. The presidential candidate of the majority party in parliament 
stands duly elected as president of the country.
The country’s constitution has also been amended to ensure automatic 
succession of the vice president to the presidency should that office fall vacant. 
In the past, if the president vacated office – as happened with the death of 
Seretse Khama – parliament elected a president from among the MPs to 
complete the remaining term of office, and the party would then choose its 
presidential candidate for the next election. During that time, aspirations to 
hold political office were not high, and Khama’s trusted deputy, Ketumile 
(Quett) Masire assumed office. Given the factional fights within the BDP, the 
constitution was amended to ensure that Festus Mogae, the current president 
of Botswana, would succeed Masire when he stepped down in 1998.
As is becoming increasingly clear, the tussle for control of the chairmanship 
of the BDP was actually a contest for succession to the presidency of the 
party, and ultimately of the country. President Mogae correctly read the 
lines of political battle and aligned himself with Ian Khama. Such political 
posturing was meant to ward off the impending challenge from P. H. K. 
Kedikilwe for the party presidency in 2004. In the same way that Masire 
handpicked Mogae to succeed him, Mogae has also handpicked Ian Khama 
to succeed him. 
Based on the above, developments across the political divide cause serious 
doubts about intra-party democracy. The lack of it is likely to lead to the 
erosion of democracy at the national level. The likelihood of Ian Khama 
assuming the presidency does not inspire confidence that democracy will 
be nurtured and strengthened, and there are fears that the country will slide 
67
into authoritarianism. Khama’s governance style; his reluctance to shed 
his military mantle; his insistence on flying an army helicopter despite the 
ombudsman’s report that he should not do so; his unsavoury remarks to 
fellow parliamentarians, calling them ‘vultures’ and ‘barking dogs’; and 
his inclination to flaunt established democratic structures all point to his 
authoritarian tendencies (Molomo 2000b: 100–6).
Democratising election administration
Democratising the administration of elections has also been a significant 
development. In 1984 the BNF took the government to court, claiming 
that there had been rigging in the Gaborone South constituency, where its 
president lost to the BDP vice president.
As a result of opposition pressure, the Office of the Supervisor of Elections 
ceased to be a department in the Office of the President and was established 
as an independent office. But the supervisor was still appointed by the 
president, and that did not satisfy the opposition alliance. The opposition 
questioned the impartiality of the supervisor of elections and called for the 
establishment of an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). In 1998, the 
Office of the Supervisor of Elections was abolished and the IEC established 
to run elections. Other electoral concessions included the lowering of the 
voting age from 21 to 18 years and recognition of an absentee ballot. Yet 
questions regarding the independence and operational autonomy of the IEC 
continue to be raised.
The media in democratisation
The private media constitute a pillar of the democratisation process in 
Botswana. Ethical questions are the central domain through which the 
media have participated in the process. The Botswana Gazette and Mmegi wa 
Dikgang have been central in publishing stories about scandals, most notably 
during the 1994 elections. One such scandal was the failure of prominent 
individuals in government to pay their debts to the National Development 
Bank, thereby creating a threat of retrenchments and possible closure. While 
corruption had not been a serious political issue before the 1994 elections, 
the media’s publication of corruption scandals was significant, and the press 
has also exposed mismanagement and other miscarriages of justice. In the 
case of allegations of corruption and mismanagement, such media reports 
struck at the heart of the ruling BDP and government, involving President 
Masire and a number of his senior government ministers. These incidents 
involved allegations of impropriety in parastatal organisations such as the 
Botswana Housing Corporation and the National Development Bank. 
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The state media have also introduced programmes that have opened up 
debate and deepened the democratisation process. Radio Botswana’s ‘Live 
Line’, ‘Round Table’, and ‘Maokaneng’ programmes and Btv’s ‘The Eye’ 
and ‘Mmualebe’ have contributed enormously by providing forums for 
discussing national, regional, and international issues. These programmes 
have brought government ministers and officials in contact with academics 
and other enlightened citizens in debates that allow a three-way flow of 
information. This has enhanced participatory democracy, a key aspect of the 
democratisation process.
 
Various players contribute to the democratisation process in Botswana. Some, 
such as the DRP, have concentrated on carrying out surveys on aspects of the 
political system and on holding workshops for local and national politicians 
and for civic organisations to disseminate their findings. Such findings 
have played the crucial role of sparking the democratisation process. Other 
players have concentrated on court cases in order to induce constitutional 
and political reforms on the part of the government. They have used legal 
means, and involved the High Court and the Court of Appeal to achieve 
reforms. Other democratising efforts, such as media publications on ethical 
issues, wrongdoing, and corruption among politicians and civil servants have 
targeted those who wield political power and have generated the emergence 
of important institutions such as the ombudsman and the Directorate on 
Corruption and Economic Crime. 
Botswana’s security concerns
Botswana’s security architecture is premised on the Tswana tradition 
of ntwakgolo ke ya molomo (the best way to resolve differences is through 
dialogue). By and large, Batswana are known to be a peace-loving people. 
However, the ethnic debate that was intended to make sections 77, 78, and 
79 of the Botswana constitution ethnically neutral, healthy as it was, indicated 
that Botswana is not as ethnically homogeneous as it is perceived to be, and 
is also premised on a false sense of stability. Botswana’s security threats are 
primarily national: the sustenance of peace for the people and the security 
of the state.
Botswana’s security concerns that determine its involvement in security co-
operation include both actual and potential threats, such as cross-border 
crime, illegal immigrants, refugees, small arms, and HIV/AIDS, all of which 
threaten national security. According to interviews with both the deputy 
commissioner of police and representatives of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, these problems are partly caused by the influx of political and 
economic refugees attracted by Botswana’s economic affluence.
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The end of the Cold War and, perhaps more profoundly, the demise of 
apartheid and its destabilisation campaign have led to the reconceptualisation 
of security in the Southern African region. With the decline of regional 
destabilisation, the redefinition of security became an important academic 
concern, especially for Botswana, which shares borders with four countries 
in the region. Inevitably, its defence policy has to take cognisance of this 
geopolitical reality. The Botswana Defence Force (BDF) was constituted by 
an act of parliament in 1977 and mandated to defend the country and carry 
out any duties as may be assigned to it by the president. 
Botswana’s defence policy was first conceived in 1977 out of a fragile sense of 
security emanating from attacks from Rhodesia. Following the institution of 
South Africa’s ‘Total Strategy’ (in response to a purported ‘Total Onslaught’) 
during the 1980s, which was geared towards the destabilisation of the region, 
the security of the people and state became the primary preoccupation. From 
the mid-1990s, Botswana enjoyed relative peace compared to other countries 
in the region. As a result of this peace dividend, many have wondered why 
Botswana continues to allocate about 14 per cent of its budget to defence. 
For instance, in 1996 the BDF was allocated BWP 209 million (USD 61.4 
million) or 11.4 per cent of the overall development budget. This budget 
allocation constituted 68.1 per cent of the total budget allocation of the 
Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration. However, while 
the commander of the BDF, Lieutenant-General Matshwenyego Fisher, 
recognises that Botswana enjoys relative peace and stability, he is of the view 
that the BDF should maintain a certain level of military readiness to meet 
challenges ranging from low-intensity to high-intensity conflict. He supports 
his argument with a quotation from Sullivan and Twomey (1994: 12):
We cannot know with precision the character of our future 
enemy, the weapons he will possess, or actions he will 
employ; but that does not relieve us of the responsibility to 
prepare carefully for the future. That preparation cannot be for 
a single, predetermined threat.
Military roles
Given the nature of some internal security challenges that are beyond 
the capacity of the police, the military is often asked to render assistance. 
Perhaps what limits the police is that the relevant act mandates them to 
protect internal law and order, and not, as it were, the survival of the state. 
The disintegration of the state, as was the case in Somalia, constitutes the 
greatest threat to any country. As a result, a strong military is believed to be 
necessary to deal with such a threat, if and when it occurs. 
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As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the prerogative, 
as mandated by the constitution, of deploying the BDF in other duties, as 
national security may determine. Under the umbrella of aid to civil authority, 
the BDF co-operates with the police on an operation called Kalola Matlho, 
which involves surveillance on matters of armed robbery, hijacking, and other 
related robberies. In this operation, more than 100 soldiers are attached to the 
serious crime squad of the police service Criminal Investigation Department. 
In addition, it is engaged in low-intensity operations, such as anti-poaching 
patrols. It is also deployed along the borders between Botswana and Zimbabwe 
to reinforce police operations to curb the movement of illegal immigrants. 
However, Fisher was quick to concede that some of these operations do 
compromise the professional integrity of career soldiers. First of all, the ethos 
of the police is different from that of the military. The police are trained to 
use minimum force, while soldiers are trained to use maximum force. Even 
though soldiers of the BDF are thoroughly briefed when they go into such 
operations, it is conceivable that their military training might lead them to 
take actions that are not consistent with the operation. Secondly, military 
personnel who do police-type jobs have to learn new skills, such as securing 
evidence and assisting with prosecution. But what is more daunting is how 
to appraise such personnel, i.e. should they be appraised by police or military 
standards? Moreover, upon completion of their task, how are they to be 
reintegrated into the BDF?
Defence policy
Botswana does not have a ministry of defence, and its security policy is 
developed in the Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration 
(MPAPA). It is perhaps with the development of the defence policy that one 
realises that political power is highly centralised in the Office of the President, 
and that policy is the prerogative of the president, cabinet, and senior officials 
in the MPAPA. In matters of BDF administration, the president relies on the 
Defence Council to superintend conditions of service, welfare, and career 
progression. 
The reality of Botswana’s defence policy is that there is no formalised structure 
by which it is formulated. Its formulation is ad hoc, centralised in the Office 
of the President, and largely a response to issues as they arise. Perhaps this is 
a reflection of the non-existence of a ministry of defence. In contrast to other 
countries in the region, in the 25 years’ existence of the BDF there has never 
been a defence review. Borrowing a leaf from other experiences, it appears 
that periodic defence reviews are important because they would develop a 
strategic vision for the BDF in terms of its development as a professional 
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entity that is ‘effective, affordable and accountable to the people’ (Mbabazi 
2002: 2). 
If Botswana were to embark on a defence review, such an exercise would 
address some of the vexing questions in the political system. Time and again 
the admission of women into the BDF is raised, but it is never adequately 
addressed. An excuse has always been given that there is not enough 
accommodation in the country’s barracks. Such a response sidesteps 
important issues of gender equality and the empowerment of women. 
However, the minister of presidential affairs and public administration 
recently announced that women would be admitted into the BDF during 
his term in office. Another pertinent question, given the size of Botswana’s 
population, the size of the BDF, and the need to create an effective defence 
system, is whether a reserve force is needed. More fundamental, however, 
is the perception that the BDF appropriates a disproportionate share of the 
national budget. As in many other years, when presenting the 2003 defence 
budget, the minister of finance and development planning had to defend the 
BDF budget, which is generally regarded as too high. Out of a total allocation 
of BWP 802 million for the Ministry of the State President, the BDF was 
allocated BWP 415 million – more than half of the allocation to that ministry, 
and about 14 per cent of the total budget allocation (Balise 2003: 15). 
A defence review would help Botswana in a number of ways. It would provide 
the government with a better appreciation of the nature and origins of 
‘security threats’, if any, and enable it to respond to them more effectively. A 
defence review would also streamline the operations of political instruments 
and other civil structures, which may compromise military professionalism 
and integrity. In addition, such a review would entail greater consultation, 
which would give a wider understanding of how security problems affect 
various groups in society. Such an exercise would also address broad public 
sector reforms and the location of the defence sector in the overall national 
context. It would address issues of the size of the defence force, the training 
and equipment it needs, and its welfare concerns. It would facilitate greater 
dialogue, legitimacy, and eventual ownership of the defence policy by the 
society at large. The results of such a review would be subject to discussion by 
cabinet, parliament, and the general public, and arising from such a debate, 
a white paper would be developed that would constitute a defence policy 
(Uganda Ministry of Defence 2002).
Botswana
72
Security and Democracy in Southern Africa
Botswana’s perception of SADC’s security concerns
As Botswana’s foreign minister has noted, 
regional security is a complex phenomenon, which is a 
derivative of interplay of various societal factors. It is an 
internationally accepted fact that respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, and adherence to principles of 
democracy and good governance enhance and bolster security 
(Merafhe 2000).
Botswana’s security policy is in part determined by its geopolitical situation. 
As a landlocked country, its sense of security is predicated on the security 
interests and goodwill of its neighbours (Molomo 2001: 5). This perception has 
clearly dictated many of the foreign, defence, and economic policies pursued 
by the Government of Botswana since independence. The key security issues 
faced by Botswana may be summarised into the following categories: cross-
border crime, refugees, illegal immigrants, HIV/AIDS, poverty, and small-
arms trafficking.
With regard to cross-border crime, the head of the sub-regional bureau of 
Interpol in Harare, Commissioner Frank Msutu has stated:
There are very clear relationships and interlinking factors 
between crime syndicates operating in Southern Africa. It is 
not a secret to law enforcement agencies in the region that 
the criminals in the region have better co-operation links than 
the police officers. They seem to know whom to contact at all 
times and budgetary constraints, foreign currency shortages, 
visa problems or governmental authority to travel do not 
control their movements (Gastow 2002: 1).
It is, therefore, not surprising that Botswana is concerned about the 
increasing cross-border crime occurring in the region. According to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cultural and linguistic similarities make it very 
easy for Batswana to co-operate in cross-border crime operations with South 
Africans. The Institute for Security Studies, located in Pretoria, has recently 
conducted a study in which police agencies in Southern Africa were asked to 
identify the three transnational organised criminal groups that constituted the 
most serious threat to their countries. The Botswana Police Service identified 
Zimbabweans as the top threat, South Africans as the second-biggest threat, 
and Zambians as the third-biggest threat (Gastow 2002: 1).
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Refugees are always a potential threat to the security of any country. Often 
the country from which the refugees fled has suspicions about the activities 
of the refugees within their host country. Botswana has tried to diffuse this 
problem by handing the problem of refugees to the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees. As a signatory of international conventions on people who flee 
their countries for political reasons, Botswana welcomes genuine refugees. 
However, asylum seekers constitute a security threat if they use the host 
country to attack or destabilise their home country. A case in point was 
Meshake Muyongo of the Caprivi Liberation Army crossing into Botswana 
with his armed men masquerading as refugees. However, Botswana has 
always maintained an open-door policy regarding refugees and always 
ensures that they are treated according to the international legal instruments 
that apply. For example, the Government of Botswana allowed the Namibian 
minister of foreign affairs to come and view the Namibian refugee camp on 
its border. Following bilateral discussions between the two countries, some 
of these refugees were given amnesty and repatriated to Namibia.
Refugees and illegal immigrants are a very serious threat to security within 
Botswana. Illegal immigrants are very difficult to keep track of because they 
cross the border at unauthorised points and also do not report their presence 
to the police. Often they are not only originators of crime, but also its victims. 
Many of the prisons in Botswana are filled with large populations of illegal 
immigrants. Illegal immigrants and refugees are also potential contributors 
to the problems of both poverty and HIV/AIDS: ‘the related phenomenon 
of illegal immigrants is a serious security threat to some of our countries, 
including Botswana … poor people will trek anywhere where they hope to 
find some food and shelter’ (Merafhe 2000).
HIV/AIDS has been perceived as a security threat to Botswana. Many have 
blamed the extensive spread of the disease in the country on the many people 
in transit through it. ‘AIDS is by far the most serious security threat to our 
region’ (Merafhe 2000). With an infection rate in the country of 25.3 per cent, 
which is among the highest in the world, government has a daunting challenge 
to combat it. Nevertheless, Batswana need to change their sexual behaviour of 
having multiple partners as a way of curbing the spread of the disease.
Poverty is also perceived to be a security risk in Botswana. According to 
Merafhe (2000), ‘[a]s a SADC government, our general view is that poverty 
is the greatest threat to our national and regional security. Prospects for 
external aggression on any of our member states at the moment appear to 
be remote.’ This view has been corroborated by Fisher, who pointed out that 
most of the conflicts in the world are internal (in the order of civil wars, 
religious wars, ethnic wars) and not externally driven.4 
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Again, if the region is facing drought, economic sanctions, or economic 
problems, then that also affects Botswana’s economy. Currently, it is estimated 
that 36 per cent of Botswana’s population is living below the poverty datum 
line. It is understandable that poverty exacerbates social divisions and 
therefore may be a source of conflict: ‘Forty per cent of Southern Africans 
live in absolute poverty … a hungry man is an angry man’ (Merafhe 2000). 
The small arms problem in Botswana is considered to be negligible compared 
to other countries in the region, according to the deputy police commissioner, 
Edwin Bantsu. There are 31,000 registered small arms in Botswana. Registration 
is restricted due to strict rules for issuing permits. In any given year, only 400 
new licenses are issued. However, Botswana has taken the issue of a small 
arms threat seriously, as witnessed by its creation of the Committee on Small 
Arms. The main aims of this committee are to look at potential problems 
and to focus on the transit of small arms through Botswana. This decision 
came after the creation of the SADC Working Group on Small Arms and 
a subsequent declaration in 1999, and following the first major conference 
in New York in 2000 of the UN Working Group on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons.
The relocation of Basarwa (‘bushmen’) from the Central Kalahari Game 
Reserve is also a security threat for Botswana. Following a campaign mounted 
by a British NGO, Survival International, Botswana’s diamonds have been 
dubbed blood or conflict diamonds. Botswana’s political stability and 
economic success derive from diamonds, and if they were to be boycotted 
by the international community, the country’s economic sparkle would fade. 
Botswana therefore needs to tread with great sensitivity and caution when 
addressing this matter.
As previously discussed, questions have been raised about Botswana’s 
defence budget: 
Why is Botswana embarking on a massive military build-up 
when the region appears to be moving towards peace? Lt. 
General Merafhe argues that it is not a contradiction that 
Botswana is engaging in military build-up when the region 
is moving towards peace. After all ... armies are built during 
peacetime (Molomo 2001: 6).
There are strong indications that Botswana finds it imperative to spend a 
large proportion of its budget on the country’s defence. However, in light 
of the security threats outlined above, it appears to be inconsistent with 
addressing the issues that threaten the country the most. For example, HIV/
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AIDS, poverty, and refugees are unlikely to be addressed through a strong 
military presence: 
While I am a strong proponent of the concept of state 
sovereignty in security matters, and will not blink an eye 
in protecting the interests of Botswana against external 
aggression, I am aware that that is only one side of the 
equation. There are other equally important security 
challenges such as abject poverty, inequitable socio-economic 
development, environmental degradation and ethnic/political 
intolerance (Merafhe 2000).
Botswana’s involvement in the region’s security co-operation 
practices
Botswana’s security concerns are best understood within the context of a 
redefined conception of security and the regional configuration, especially 
in Southern Africa. Post-independence security problems not only require 
regional security co-operation, but also a redefinition of security that focuses 
‘on internal rather than external threats’ (Shaw 1994: 392). They also include 
the defence of the incumbent government against threats, and the pursuit 
of democracy, sustainable economic development, social justice, and 
environmental protection (Shaw 1994; Swatuk and Omari 1997). 
The regional context is crucial because Botswana’s foreign policy is largely 
a response to its geopolitical situation, and partly determined by commit-
ments to a regional organisation. Since independence, Botswana has 
pursued a pragmatic foreign policy orientation towards neighbours. As a 
landlocked country, it places high priority on security in a bid to safeguard its 
territorial integrity, sovereignty, order, and peace, as well as good relations 
with neighbours to prevent spillage of problems. As a member of SADC, 
Botswana has to adhere to collective objectives. Southern Africa is striving 
to promote both good governance and economic development, but political 
and economic development is only possible when political order and stability 
prevail. Therefore, the aim of SADC members is to promote peace and security, 
because they realise that peace, security, and development are intertwined. 
The latter can only be achieved through collective action, preferably through 
a security regime such as the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security, and 
adherence to democratic principles (Osei-Hwedie 2002). 
Botswana’s involvement in regional security co-operation has evolved from 
the use of peaceful means, diplomacy, and negotiations to the use of force or 
military participation. But, in reality, a mixture of both has been the common 
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practice, depending on the nature of the security problem. Similarly, the 
nature of Botswana’s involvement in security co-operation has changed in 
accordance with the leadership’s preferences. The country’s first president, 
Seretse Khama, was preoccupied with the development of Botswana, 
and therefore emphasised economics in foreign relations, especially with 
neighbours such as South Africa, the country that was its biggest trading 
partner, the source of private investment in Botswana’s diamond mines, 
and the recipient of migrant labour. Thus, he avoided military confrontation. 
President Masire also emphasised development, but it was during his time 
that Botswana became involved in direct military intervention in regional 
affairs and peacekeeping activities. President Mogae is preoccupied with 
minimising the costs of participating in neighbouring countries’ conflicts, but 
sent the BDF to intervene in Lesotho. However, in spite of the reservations 
of its leaders, the government appreciates the need to participate in regional 
security co-operation due to its geopolitical situation and to promote the 
common principles of stability and prosperity that are the basis of security.
From 1970 to 1994, Botswana, as a member of the FLS, contributed to regional 
policy and co-ordinated collaborative efforts in the area of politics, peace, and 
security. Following the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, the FLS simultaneously 
used negotiations and armed struggle to assist liberation movements, with 
neighbouring states providing bases from which to launch attacks, training 
to combatants, and refuge to refugees. However, Botswana, mindful of its 
small size and lack of resources and capabilities at that time, refrained from 
giving material support to liberation movements. Instead, it preferred to 
provide verbal and diplomatic support, as well as asylum for refugees (Osei-
Hwedie 1998; 2002). The successful liberation of all Southern Africa testifies 
to the success of the FLS.
Botswana has, on several occasions, depended upon negotiations and 
diplomacy to promote security through good relations with neighbours. For 
example, the Botswanan–Namibian dispute over ownership of the shifting 
sands of the Sedudu island in the Chobe river was handled peacefully 
through discussions and, ultimately, through both countries’ acceptance of 
the decision of the International Court of Justice. Similarly, there have been 
threatening incidents with South Africa, which have been resolved amicably 
through talks between government officials, thereby preventing armed 
confrontation. Former President Masire is currently involved in mediating 
peace talks between contending parties in a bid to promote peace in the DRC. 
Botswana and other SADC members have refrained from public criticism and 
isolation of Zimbabwe in spite of pressure from Western powers. Instead, in 
spite of their disagreement with President Robert Mugabe’s land distribution 
programme and pressure from donors, they have opted for quiet diplomacy 
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to exert influence, which has dismally failed to register any positive results. 
Only President Mogae has criticised Mugabe recently. In addition, officials 
of Botswana and Zimbabwe have held consultations over allegations of 
mistreatment of their respective nationals, in spite of Zimbabwe’s recall of 
its high commissioner from Gaborone (Baraedi 2002; Letsididi 2002; Mmegi 
2002).
With the establishment of its army in 1977 and its acquisition of better 
equipment, Botswana became involved in military operations, both in the 
form of direct intervention and peacekeeping operations, to ensure its own 
security and that of its neighbours. In 1994, under the auspices of the then 
SADC troika, Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe intervened to quell 
political instability in Lesotho. The presidential troika forced King Letsie 
III to reinstate the democratically elected government of Prime Minister 
Mokhele. In 1998, Botswana and South Africa, as the allied forces of the 
SADC OPDSC and at the invitation of the Lesotho government, intervened 
again in Lesotho. In accordance with the SADC Protocol on Peace, Security, 
and Conflict Resolution, member states unanimously agreed to military 
intervention as the most appropriate response to the deteriorating political 
situation in Lesotho. The restoration of peace and security in Lesotho 
indicates the OPDSC’s success (Osei-Hwedie 2002).
Military capabilities have enabled Botswana to participate in peacekeeping 
activities. The BDF is renowned for its peacekeeping services, which it 
has handled with professionalism. Under the auspices of the UN, in 1993 
Botswana participated as a peacekeeping force and acted as a buffer to 
separate two Mozambique warring parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, during 
the cease-fire to secure peace and order. Botswana has also participated in 
peacekeeping operations beyond the region in Somalia and Sierra Leone.
Botswana has taken part in Southern African regional military training 
exercises. Moreover, it is also a member of the Joint Commission on Defence, 
Security, and Police with South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Namibia. The 
hotlines connecting the commanders of the armies allow for co-ordination and 
monitoring of the situation across borders. To date, the commission has been 
functioning very well; it also reviews the crime situation across borders.
 
To contain the problem of small arms in the region, the SADC Protocol on 
Firearms, Armaments and Related Materials recommended that the Southern 
African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) 
implement law and order matters. The SARPCCO, established in 1995, is 
responsible for controlling cross-border crime. It has three sub-committees 
dealing with training and legal matters, and the Permanent Co-ordinating 
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Committee of Heads of Criminal Investigation Departments. This committee 
has conducted joint operations very successfully, resulting in recovery of 
vehicles – mostly from Zambia, a few from Zimbabwe and one or two from 
Malawi. However, at first there was no trust among the members of the 
SARPCCO, until joint training on border control, intelligence gathering, 
and harmonisation of legal provisions regarding motor vehicle penalties was 
carried out, and this led to improved relations. In September 2002, ministers 
responsible for the police agreed on a plan on regional security, which will be 
implemented by the SARPCCO. 
Conclusion
Botswana has a functioning liberal democracy that has been remarkably 
stable since independence. The country has enjoyed a high degree of 
social and economic development and is generally regarded as a safe site 
for investment. However, it does have its problems, particularly regarding 
inequality, as well as the quality, at times, of its democratic practices. The 
failure of the opposition has meant that Botswana is, and has been since 1966, 
a de facto predominant-party system. Furthermore, the lack of internal party 
democracy, as well as the absence of direct presidential elections, present 
serious challenges for Botswana as a beacon of democracy. With regard to 
Botswana’s security concerns, the main issues centre on cross-border crime, 
illegal immigration, refugees (primarily from Zimbabwe), small arms, and 
HIV/AIDS. 
As a member of SADC, Botswana adheres to collective objectives, primarily 
good governance and economic development, which of course can only 
prevail if political order and stability also prevail. The nature of Botswana’s 
involvement in security co-operation has changed in accordance with 
emerging challenges. The democratic nature of the state means that Botswana 
is one of the few countries in the region where the issue of national security is 
frequently discussed, and although one should not exaggerate the effect such 
debates have on security policy, it is a fact that security policy in Botswana is 
a concern for a growing number of its citizens.
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EnDnoTES
1 See Thumberg-Hartland (1978); Picard (1985; 1987); Harvey and Lewis (1990); Danevad (1993); 
Stedman (1993); Dale (1995); Samatar (1999).
2 In an interview with The Monitor, the former minister of communications, science and 
technology, Boyce Sebetela, tried to clear his name on a number of accounts. Firstly, he denied 
that he personally stopped the broadcasting of the Radio Botswana programme ‘Masa a Sele’, 
arguing that as minister he was only implementing a government decision. He was also at a 
loss to explain why he was perceived as an ‘enemy of the press’ when he had opposed the 
‘draconian mass media bill’, which he thought was not in consonance with the constitution of 
Botswana and Vision 2016. He felt that the proposed bill would ‘erode press freedom’. On the 
liberalisation of the press, he maintained that the establishment of the National Broadcasting 
Board meant that the state-owned Radio Botswana would no longer be controlled by the 
minister of communications, science and technology.
3 The articulation of intra-party democracy also manifests itself in the election of office bearers 
for various party committees. The election of candidates to positions in the central committee, 
women’s wing, and youth wing in various parties has in recent years been highly contested. For 
the BDP, the contest for central committee elections held in Ghanzi in July 2003 was perhaps the 
mother of all battles within the party. For the opposition BNF, splits resulted in the formation 
of the Botswana Congress Party in 1998, which split up again following the central committee 
elections in Kanye in 2001, leading to the formation of the New Democratic Front. Perhaps what 
was most dramatic about the latest split was that Dr Kenneth Koma, the founder of the BNF 
and its mentor, left it to form the new party. The BDP, which over the years has been plagued by 
factional fights, went to the Ghanzi congress in July 2003 more polarised than ever – there was 
a noticeable rupture in the cohesion of the elite. Much as Vice President Ian Khama wanted to 
project himself as being above factionalism, and preached a message of party unity, he went to 
the Ghanzi congress as a leader of a faction that opposed the Kedikilwe faction. Needless to say, 
the Kedikilwe faction was defeated at that congress, but it remains to be seen whether Khama’s 
victory has led to an end to factions. What is clear is that the party is now under a new guard, 
which rode to power on the crest of the Seretse Khama legacy. 






Lesotho presents an interesting case study for an investigation of the interface 
between democracy and security, primarily because it is the only country in 
the Southern African region that has experienced military rule. Although a 
constitutional monarchy, the Kingdom of Lesotho experienced de facto one-
party authoritarian rule during the period 1970–86; military rule between 
1986 and 1993; and democratic rule from 1993 to date. The implications of 
all these trajectories of governance have been quite profound for security, as 
will be shown below. 
External context of democratisation
The external context for our understanding of the democracy–security nexus 
in Lesotho is extremely important. The Lesotho democracy and security 
landscape has been shaped and influenced to a great extent by both global 
and regional developments over which the small nation state has little (if 
any) control or leverage, much as it has been conditioned by endogenous 
development within the country itself (see Matlosa 1998a; 2001; Matlosa and 
Pule 2001). The major external developments are surely the end of the Cold 
War on a global scale in 1990, which coincided with negotiations to end white 
minority rule in South Africa. These epoch-making developments reshaped 
Lesotho’s democratic and security architecture in a number of ways. 
Firstly, Lesotho’s military dictatorship of the time could no longer feed on 
the Cold War ideological bipolarity and the threat of apartheid South Africa 
for its survival and razor-thin international credibility, but instead had to 
bow to democratic pressures which, in turn, led to a democratic election in 
1993. This election was a watershed political development, for it marked the 
return to a democratic path, even if it brought about a fragile democracy 
bedeviled by both violent and non-violent conflicts, and political instability. 
Secondly, given Lesotho’s overwhelming dependence on foreign aid, political 
conditionality weighed heavily on the military junta, adding more pressure 
for the regime to chart a democratisation path and allow the military elite to 
retire gracefully to the barracks, and in this regard, pressure was exerted by 
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the country’s major donors at the time, namely Germany, Sweden, Britain, 
and the United States (see Matlosa 2000). Thirdly, the West could no longer 
find strategic value in Lesotho after the end of the Cold War and the ending 
of apartheid in South Africa. 
The incoming government of national unity in South Africa was also eager 
to contribute to the normalisation or democratisation and demilitarisation of 
Lesotho politics, primarily for its own national security interests, and exhorted 
the military to relinquish power in favour of an elected civilian government. 
The 1993 election in Lesotho decisively reversed the culture of militarism, 
although pockets of violent conflict still remained as a painful reminder of 
the politics of militarisation. Developments in Namibia, Mozambique, and 
South Africa pointed to a region-wide transition away from authoritarian 
governance of both civilian and military varieties to a multi-party system of 
democratic governance to which the military junta could not turn a blind 
eye. It was obvious that this regional political sea change would leave no 
single country untouched, beginning with Zambia’s landmark election of 
1991 in which the ruling party, in power since independence, was turned 
out of office. All one-party and authoritarian regimes in Southern Africa, 
including the military junta in Lesotho, were in retreat from the wave of 
democratisation surging through the region. 
Internal context of democratisation
Lesotho is small, landlocked, and impoverished, with a population of about 
2.1 million people. It gained its political independence from Britain in 1966 
following about 100 years of colonial rule. The governance regime in Lesotho 
is basically a parliamentary constitutional monarchy in which the king, 
currently Letsie III, is the head of state, and the prime minister, currently 
Pakalitha Mosisili, is the head of government. 
However, this governance system does not have domestic roots in Lesotho, 
as it is essentially a replica of the British Westminster system. The Lesotho 
state is both in theory and practice a borrowed concept and entity framed 
according to the Westphalian notion of a state. Thus it remains a state in the 
making, structurally weak, dependent, fragile, and extremely vulnerable to 
external pressures. 
There has clearly been a pattern of authoritarian and de facto one-party rule in 
Lesotho. During some five years following political independence, the then 
ruling party – the Basotho National Party (BNP) – fearing electoral defeat, 
embarked on a period of authoritarian rule, relying solely upon repressive 
governance and the most horrendous abuse of the security establishment 
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to quell oppositional politics. It was interesting, though, that while it was 
assumed that a fairly strong bureaucratic–military authoritarianism had 
developed, that ostensibly had cemented firm links and a community of 
interests between the BNP political elite and the military elite, the two forces 
parted ways abruptly in the 1980s, culminating in a bloodless military coup in 
1986 that dislodged the BNP and saw the military assuming state power for 
about eight years. Thus civilian authoritarianism turned into an even more 
repressive military regime, which effectively banned political party activity. 
Following the eight-year period of military rule, prospects for the mountain 
kingdom to revert back to democratic rule and exercise civilian authority 
over the security establishment, while at the same time depoliticising and 
professionalising the security forces, were heralded by the return to civilian 
rule and the 1993 election, which was won overwhelmingly by the Basutoland 
Congress Party (BCP) over the by then discredited and disgruntled BNP. 
This was an election whose outcome was aptly described by many observers 
as the ‘righting of the wrongs’ for the BCP, since the BNP had snatched 
electoral victory from it by violent means in 1970. 
A fairly feeble and fledgling democratic experiment began, which was marked 
by conflicts between the state on one hand and the monarchy, the opposition 
BNP, and the security forces on the other (Matlosa 1998b; Matlosa and Pule 
2001), culminating in violence in 1998 that nearly precipitated a civil war. 
The crisis itself was precipitated by the May 1998 national election. Prior to 
the vote, the BCP had split into two factions, leading to the formation of a 
new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), which unexpectedly 
won 60 per cent of the national vote, but because of the first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) electoral system functioning at the time, gained all but one of the 
parliamentary seats. Defeated parties charged fraud, and the BNP used its 
connections in the security forces to foment a rebellion, culminating in an 
army mutiny led by junior officers on 11 September. On 22 and 23 September, 
at the invitation of the prime minister, and acting under the aegis of SADC, 
which had long been involved in trying to resolve the issue, South Africa and 
Botswana sent in military forces to restore order. In the process, 113 Basotho 
and 11 South Africans were killed, and parts of the capital, Maseru, were 
destroyed in riots and looting. 
This ushered in a new phase in the governance–security nexus. Deliberate 
efforts have been made since 1998 to nurture and consolidate Lesotho’s 
conflict-ridden democracy and bring the security forces firmly under civil 
authority. This has taken the form of reforms, primarily revolving around the 
electoral system, which was changed in 2002, and security sector reforms, 
which are still ongoing. 
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Democratic consolidation
Whereas Lesotho’s fledging democracy experienced turbulence and violent 
conflicts during the period 1993–98 following long years of authoritarian rule, 
commendable progress is now being made to nurture democracy, with the 
ultimate objective of democratic consolidation (Matlosa 2002a; Matlosa and 
Pule 2001). First and foremost, a violent major conflict in 1998, which nearly 
escalated into a civil war, was resolved through both military intervention 
by SADC states and political settlement involving belligerent forces in a 
dialogue mediated by South Africa (Matlosa 1999; Elklit 2002). The most 
innovative and constructive strategy aimed at political settlement through 
dialogue was the establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA). The 
IPA comprised two representatives for each of the 14 political parties that 
contested the 1998 election, including the ruling LCD.
The overall mandate of the IPA was as follows:
•	 the creation and promotion of conditions conducive to the holding of free 
and fair elections;
•	 the levelling of the playing field for all political parties and candidates that 
seek to participate in the elections;
•	 the elimination of any impediments to legitimate political activity;
•	 the elimination of victimisation of people on account of divergent political 
beliefs;
•	 the creation of conducive conditions for all political parties and candidates 
to canvass political support from voters freely, to organise and hold 
meetings, and to have access to all voters;
•	 the elimination of political patronage of any kind; and
•	 the creation of conditions for equal treatment of all political parties 
and candidates by all governmental institutions, and in particular by all 
government-owned media, prior to and during the elections (Kingdom of 
Lesotho 1998: 29).
Although the IPA encountered numerous difficulties in the execution of its 
mandate, due mainly to a multiplicity of conflicts between the structure and 
government, which in turn delayed the holding of general elections, it achieved 
its objectives in more ways than one. The most important achievements of 
the IPA were that:
•	 the structure created a viable forum for continued dialogue among 
belligerent parties;
•	 the political dialogue certainly facilitated the process of national healing, 
political reconciliation, and peace;
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•	 the structure proposed various policy measures that added value to the 
nurturing of democracy; and
•	 the structure played a pioneering role in the process of Lesotho’s electoral 
reform, which culminated in the replacement of the FPTP electoral system 
with the mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system, which was 
used in the elections of 2002 (Elklit 2002; Matlosa 2003a; 2003b). 
As Elklit (2002: 1) rightly observes:
on 25 May 2002 Lesotho became the first African country to 
test the MMP electoral model in a parliamentary election. 
The elections went well and the results produced by the new 
MMP system represent a significant political and democratic 
achievement. There can be no doubt that the experiences 
from this first national level application of this electoral 
system to African soil will be studied carefully in many 
quarters, including outside the mountain kingdom. 
Some countries that have this system in place thus far are Germany, New 
Zealand, Wales (for regional assemblies only), and Scotland (for regional 
assemblies). Unlike the earlier FPTP system, the new MMP system in 
Lesotho adopted a dual ballot system in which a voter casts two ballots: a 
constituency vote and a party vote. According to the IEC report, 
the constituency vote determines who will represent the 
constituency in the National Assembly. The party vote is used 
to elect candidates from party lists and compensates parties 
who have won fewer constituency seats than they would be 
entitled to under pure proportional representation, or who 
have won no constituency seats even though entitled to under 
proportionality (IEC 2002: 3). 
This system has many advantages, primarily because it attempts to combine 
the positive elements of both the FPTP and the proportional representation 
systems. In the 2002 elections, while the LCD won the large majority of 
constituency seats, the BNP, which did not win even a single constituency 
seat, received 21 compensatory seats in parliament. While almost all the 
previous elections had produced a parliament dominated by one party 
(especially the 1993 and 1998 elections), 2002 produced a clearly multi-party 
parliament. Thus, to a large extent, the introduction of the MMP system has 
addressed a major democratic deficit in Lesotho’s political landscape.
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However, the electoral reform process in Lesotho still faces critical challenges 
if political stability is to be assured. In any case, the electoral system, in and 
of itself, does not really provide a total panacea for Lesotho’s multifaceted 
political crisis. Major and far-reaching constitutional reforms are still required 
on various governance issues. Such reforms, of necessity, need to dovetail 
neatly into the security arena as well, and it is to this particular issue that the 
next section turns.
Democratisation and security sector reform
Hampered by ostensibly intractable conflicts for close to three decades, 
Lesotho today seems poised for some relative political stability, which 
surely augurs well for its democratisation project. Nowhere is this positive 
development so vividly demonstrated as in the current security sector 
reform process covering, among other things, the Lesotho Defence Force 
(LDF) and the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS). These organs of the 
security establishment had been thoroughly politicised by previous regimes, 
especially during the period 1970–93, with the sole purpose of turning them 
into mere political instruments of the ruling elite of the time.
LDF
A plethora of policy initiatives have been taken since 1994 to reform the LDF 
with a view to entrenching civil authority over the armed forces (Mothibe 
1998; 1999). The first major initiative was the establishment of the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) in August 1994, a vivid political expression of civil control of 
the military through both the executive and legislative arms of government. 
The ministry is headed by the prime minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, as minister 
of defence, and is managed generally by civilian staff, although army officers 
also form part of the staff complement. 
Through the efforts of the Defence Council, the MoD has developed a 
defence policy that aims to transform the LDF into an apolitical, accountable, 
capable, and affordable defence force. The establishment of the MoD itself 
represents another attempt by the executive authority to strengthen civil–
military relations. The MoD has the primary responsibility of administering, 
organising, and accounting for the activities and operations of the LDF. The 
overall operations of the MoD are governed by four main principles: 
•	 separation of military and civilian powers in order to restrain involvement 
of the army in partisan politics; 
•	 legality of all operations of the armed forces to ensure that their functions 
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•	 accountability of the LDF to the elected civilian authority through the 
MoD and parliament; and
•	 transparency of the activities and functions of the LDF through the 
provision of critical information on security and defence to the general 
public. 
The MoD’s mandate is confined mainly to administrative and executive 
functions, while all operational responsibilities of the armed forces still 
remain the sole responsibility of the LDF through the leadership of its 
commander. It does seem that there are expansive institutional mechanisms 
(including a policy framework) in place for ensuring stable civil–military 
relations and ensuring successful implementation of security sector reform in 
Lesotho. However, the major missing link in this institutional arrangement 
is effective parliamentary oversight of the armed forces and defence policy. 
The challenge lies in the reform of the parliamentary system in a way that 
provides room for the establishment of portfolio committees, among which 
must be a parliamentary portfolio committee on defence and security.
The second most important element of the security reform process in the 
LDF has to do with the adoption of a defence policy since 1995. The defence 
policy aims at developing a vision for the LDF and corroborates the mission 
of the MoD in terms of nurturing and consolidating the ongoing process of 
security sector reform. Within this overarching policy, the mission statement 
of the LDF is to contribute to the 
maintenance of the constitution and territorial integrity of 
the state. [The LDF] is committed to contributing to the 
stability, security, peace and progress of the country and its 
entire people. It shall always aim to enjoy the full support 
of the population and international respect as a result of its 
professionalism and high standards (Kingdom of Lesotho. 
Ministry of Defence 1998: 16). 
The defence policy will be augmented considerably by a strategic plan for 
the LDF. The strategic vision is that the LDF shall be a prepared, flexible, 
and affordable force, which renders a military service to the state and not 
individuals. The primary role is the successful protection of the territorial 
integrity of Lesotho.
Yet another area for security sector reform in Lesotho has to do with the 
resource endowment of the country and how scarce resources are allocated. 
The state of economic growth and development plays an important role in 
influencing civil–military relations. This is because the economy determines 
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the amount of resources that the executive authority is able to assign to the 
security forces. This is crucial for the defence budget, which often competes 
with other demands for the country’s scarce resources. Thus far, the defence 
budget has always ranked among the traditional top three in terms of size – 
namely, education, health, and defence. For the first time, the 2002 national 
budget relegated defence spending to fifth position in terms of prioritisation 
of resource allocation. 
Although Lesotho’s transition to civilian rule in 1993 was perceived by many 
as a positive development for the county’s democracy, tense relations between 
the executive arm of the state and the armed forces still linger. This tension 
bred the seeds of political instability that became more manifest during the 
1994 and 1998 political turmoil. Undoubtedly, these tense relations further 
undermined the impact of major efforts towards establishing stable civil–
military relations elaborated above. Following the 1993 election, the armed 
forces were unsure whether to work closely and collaborate with the new 
government, or to undermine the government in order to support the return 
of BNP rule. Perceptions within the forces were sharply divided on this thorny 
issue. As a result, the BNP took advantage of this to try to lure the army to its side 
in order to undermine the BCP government. The faction fighting in the armed 
forces in 1994, which invited external intervention by the Commonwealth, 
OAU, and SADC countries, was precisely about disagreement within the 
forces as to whether to accept or undermine the authority of the BCP.
At this time, the executive arm of government had not fully established civil 
supremacy over the armed forces. This became abundantly clear during post-
election violent conflict that engulfed the country. Although the primary 
protagonists in 1998 were the ruling party and opposition parties, the 
secondary players with a vested interest in the conflict were the monarchy 
and the security forces. Clearly, therefore, the armed forces were directly and 
indirectly involved in the 1998 conflict. Subsequently, a commission of inquiry 
was established in order to find out the causes of the conflict and identify 
the key players who propelled the civil strife. The three-person commission, 
known as the Leon Commission, comprised judges from South Africa and 
was headed by Justice Nigel Leon. It established beyond any shadow of a 
doubt that:
With regard to the role of the Lesotho Defence Force in 
the preservation and maintenance of law and order, the 
Commission found that a large number of soldiers not only 
failed lamentably to preserve law and order but contributed 
to the state of anarchy which prevailed at the relevant time 
(Leon Commission 2001: 5). 
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Further evidence abounds that suggests that the armed forces were again 
sharply divided into those supporting the opposition protest against the 
election outcome and thus sympathetic to opposition calls for the dissolution 
of the LCD government, and those supporting the outcome of the election 
and the authority of the LCD as a legally constituted government. It will be 
recalled that it was during this major conflict that Botswana and South Africa 
undertook a military intervention in Lesotho at the request of the Lesotho 
government. Part of the mission of this external military intervention was to 
neutralise the military’s involvement in this conflict and to seek a political 
solution. Following the political settlement of the violent conflict, a major 
restructuring of the armed forces is ongoing and this includes, among other 
things, downsizing of the forces and training of the officer corps in order to 
ensure both efficiency and professionalism. Technical assistance for security 
reforms in the armed forces has come from South Africa and, more recently, 
India.
LMPS
Pretty much like the military, the police force in Lesotho evolved in the 1960s 
as a highly politicised force primarily used as an instrument of coercion by 
the then ruling BNP to control or eliminate its political opponents. Given 
that during most of its tenure of office the BNP was anchored more upon 
the bullet than the ballot, the police force was used (or abused) mainly to 
reproduce de facto one-party rule and undermine any form of opposition to 
the government of the day. So it was that to all intents and purposes, the 
police, like the military, suffered a severe legitimacy crisis in the eyes of the 
general public, as the force was closely identified more with the BNP as a 
party than with a neutral government institution. 
The deliberate politicisation of the police by the BNP considerably diminished 
its professionalism and impartiality in discharging its law and order functions. 
Many of the brutalities and repressive measures of the BNP regime during 
the 1970s and 1980s were perpetrated through both the police and military 
forces. It should be emphasised, though, that this politicised role of the police 
and the military cannot be blamed squarely on the forces alone. Rather, the 
largest culprit in the politicisation of the forces and their lack of professionalism 
for that period was the government of the day.
The BCP, after its landslide 1993 election victory, inherited a highly 
politicised police force, and a critical challenge was how to reform the police 
force and subject it to civil authority, especially within the context of a new 
administration. This process was not easy, as the new government locked 
horns in a bitter conflict with the defence and police forces in the early days 
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of its administration. In 1994 the police demanded a salary increase from 
government and went on strike to pressurise the government to meet their 
demand. Under duress, the government acquiesced and granted a 50 per 
cent salary increase. The political pressure by the police dovetailed neatly 
with a similar demand by the military, which resulted in violent conflict 
between the military establishment and the government, as well as among 
factions inside the military itself. The 1994 political conflict in the police force 
resulted in the killing of about three police officers. The same violent conflict 
witnessed the most unfortunate intervention by King Letsie III, in a fairly 
partisan fashion, when he dissolved the BCP government and established 
a transitional council to run the affairs of the country. This move triggered 
internal dissent and protest, which in turn invited external actors, especially 
Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (the SADC troika), to intervene and 
reverse the king’s unilateral and partisan political move. 
Consequently, the BCP regime was reinstated a month later, in September 
1994, in a political settlement that resulted in the troika countries acting as 
guarantors of Lesotho’s fragile democracy. A year later, the LMPS once again 
suffered internal factionalism and faction fighting, due mainly to political 
differences on how best to deal with a national teachers’ strike organised by 
the Lesotho Teachers’ Trade Union. It was fairly clear by this time that internal 
wrangling within the force was a manifestation of the contradictions between 
the past culture of a politicised force under an authoritarian regime and the 
new culture of a professional service under a democratic order. The climax of 
the major problems that the BCP faced in its attempt to professionalise the 
police came in 1997, when a faction attempted a mutiny that was ultimately 
quelled through the intervention of the military. During the violent political 
conflict of 1998, political cracks within the police were clearly visible, and it 
was also clear that there was a wide gap between the police and the military; 
the two forces even exchanged fire as a result of differences on how best to 
bring about law and order. 
Three major initiatives towards the reform of the LMPS have been introduced: 
the 1997 white paper on police reform (Kingdom of Lesotho 1997), the 1998 
Police Service Act, and the five-year development plan for the LMPS for 
the period 1998–2003 (LMPS 1998). Whereas the 1998 act provides the legal 
framework for the reform programme, the development plan provides a 
programme of action for the implementation of reforms over a period of five 
years. 
The essence of the white paper is to build a professional police service able to 
discharge its law and order functions without political bias and in partnership 
with communities. It also aims to ensure that the service operates under the 
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principle of the supremacy of civil authority. In this regard, the mission of the 
LMPS is as follows:
To provide a high quality Police Service in Lesotho and in 
conjunction and consultation with the community, other 
organisations and agencies seek to promote the safety and 
security of the individual, reduce crime, disorder and fear and 
enhance confidence in the rule of law (Kingdom of Lesotho 
1997: 2).
At the heart of the white paper is the commitment to maintain an effective, 
efficient, and accountable police service, as well as to enhance internal 
discipline, and build confidence and trust between the police and the public. 
It emphasises democratic partnership between the police and the public in 
order to achieve three basic strategic goals: reduction of crime, improvement 
of service to the public, and efficient management of police resources 
(Kingdom of Lesotho 1997: 7).
The new approach to policing emphasises strategic planning wherein, among 
other things, the annual policing plan will set out key national priorities and 
objectives for policing each year. This plan is accessible to the public and will 
incorporate some views and opinions from the public. The plan is submitted 
to the minister of home affairs by the commissioner of police after public 
consul tations. The annual policing plan will be accompanied by regional and 
local plans, which elaborate the strategies for realising the key objectives of 
the overall plan. As in the case of the annual plan, regional and local action 
plans will be drawn up in close consultation and collaboration with the 
communities. On the basis of the implementation of the annual plan, the 
commissioner of police is expected to produce an annual report and submit it 
to the minister of home affairs at the end of each financial year. This approach 
strengthens the accountability of the police to both the civil authority and 
the public at large. On a longer-term basis, the LMPS developed a five-year 
development plan which, among other things, set out the nature and scope 
of the necessary reforms in the police force over the specified period. The 
white paper emphasises the operational autonomy and independence of the 
LMPS as follows:
the government intends to take the opportunity to clarify in 
law the independence of the police from political interference 
…. The Commissioner alone must have the direction 
and control of the Lesotho Mounted Police Service. No 
politician should be allowed to give the Commissioner or 
his officers instructions about particular police operations 
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…. Such instructions are incompatible with policing in a free 
democratic society (Kingdom of Lesotho 1997: 12–13).
The white paper then introduces a new participatory approach to the following 
critical areas of the policing service: police–community partnership, resource 
mobilisation and utilisation, new police management, and a new directorate 
of police.
The police–community partnership has already been discussed at length 
above. The white paper gives the commissioner of police greater latitude to 
determine, plan, and utilise resources required for policing through approval 
of the minister of home affairs – with minimal ‘external interference and 
bureaucratic delays’ (Kingdom of Lesotho 1997: 21). In respect of the new 
management approach, the police force is no longer considered strictly as a 
department of the Ministry of Home Affairs and subject to the bureaucratic 
red tape of the civil service. Rather, it is regarded as a special unit within 
the ministry, and this includes the establishment of a Police Negotiating 
Council through which staff interests are mediated and represented. In order 
to ensure implementation of the reforms suggested in the white paper, a 
new Directorate of Police has been established within the Ministry of Home 
Affairs. The directorate is basically the administrative arm of the ministry to 
ensure that the reforms do lead to an effective, efficient, and accountable 
service. Headed by the principal secretary and independent of the LMPS, it 
is thus another instrument for ensuring accountability. 
The white paper also prescribes that the LMPS should evolve the five-year 
development plan, which provides a framework for annual regional and 
national plans. To this end, the LMPS (1998) produced Beyond 2000: A 
Development Plan for the Lesotho Mounted Police Service, 1998–2003. The main 
thrust of the plan was to set out a clear framework for the professionalisation 
of the police force, focusing specifically on six key areas.
Firstly, the plan provides a strategic guideline for crime management. It sets 
out a crime management strategy that targets crime prevention. This will 
further facilitate smooth and efficient processing of crime cases. 
Secondly, the plan singles out the critical importance of police collaboration 
and partnership with communities. This partnership will help assist the 
LMPS to respond directly to changing needs of communities and provide a 
sense of community responsibility in crime prevention. This partnership is 
also crucial for the LMPS to develop clear strategies for community policing 
in the medium to long term. 
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Thirdly, another principle that undergirds the five-year plan is people manage-
ment, by which is meant human resource management in the LMPS, as well 
as a cost-effective deployment strategy for policing. This will also involve 
capacity building so that the LMPS is better able to discharge its core mandate, 
as well as manpower planning to establish appropriate force levels through 
right-sizing and cost containment, taking due cognisance of the country’s 
future policing needs. One of the most important components of this principle 
will be the civilianisation policy, which basically aims at gearing policing 
towards a firmer integration of civilian and police staff. 
Fourthly, improvement of the quality of police services is one of the most 
important cardinal pillars of the five-year development plan. This will aim at 
improving police–community relations; quality of service delivery in terms of 
crime prevention; effectiveness, efficiency, and professionalism; processing 
of crime cases by the responsible law enforcement and adjudication agencies; 
accountability to the executive and legislative arms of government; and giving 
the public high-quality deliverables from the LMPS. 
Fifthly, the plan aims at developing service-wide integrated information 
management. This will help enhance effective and efficient decision making 
and implementation of decisions and policies, as well as monitoring and 
evaluation of the progress made in undertaking reforms in the LMPS. This 
will entail, among other things, development of high-technology information 
systems for the LMPS, including computerisation of the services. 
Finally, the plan aims to help the LMPS manage its meagre resources 
effectively and efficiently. This will entail providing modern radio and tele-
communication systems, effective transport infrastructure, and appropriate 
offices and equipment, and improving utilisation of funds and accountability 
for all expenditure incurred. 
Considerable progress has been registered in terms of security sector reform 
in both the military and police forces in Lesotho, although more still remains 
to be done. The most critical challenge that still confronts the Lesotho 
government is how parliament monitors and oversees the roles and functions 
of the security establishment and, indeed, plays a key role in this process of 
security sector reform. 
Gender dimensions of democracy and security
Gender dimensions of democracy and security in Southern Africa in general, 
and Lesotho in particular, present one of the most daunting challenges for 
democratic consolidation today. These relate to power relations between 
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men and women insofar as policymaking and the construction of the legal 
and institutional framework for democratic governance and security are 
concerned. Existing literature points to a lot of work already done in terms 
of the participation of women in the public policymaking spheres of the 
governance machinery. We are, however, still ignorant about the degree of 
influence, authority, and power that women who get involved in key state 
organs have in order to drive the policymaking machine in a direction that 
further consolidates gender balance in governance. In other words, whereas 
we are more aware today of advances or obstacles in respect of women’s 
participation – in quantitative terms – in the political world, much more still 
remains to be done to unveil the exact influence, authority, and power that 
women in these state organs wield in order to drive a gender-sensitive agenda 
as part of the nurturing and consolidation of democratic governance. 
Broadly speaking, the debate on gender and democracy turns mainly on the 
level of participation of women in key organs of the state, in particular, the 
legislature, cabinet, judiciary, and security establishment. This section of the 
chapter focuses discussion mainly on women in parliament. 
The Southern African experience in respect of women empowerment in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms is a mixed bag. The SADC member states 
took a positive step in 1997 when they signed the Gender and Development 
Declaration in Blantyre, Malawi. The member states committed themselves 
individually and collectively to the following policy measures, among others:
•	 the achievement of equal gender representation in all key organs of 
the state, and a target of at least 30 per cent women in key political and 
decision-making structures by 2005;
•	 promoting women’s full access to and control over productive resources 
to reduce the level of poverty among women;
•	 repealing and reforming all laws, amending constitutions, and changing 
social practices which still subject women to discrimination; and
•	 taking urgent measures to prevent and deal with the increasing levels of 
violence against women and children (Molokomme 2002: 42).
The declaration was further reinforced by an addendum entitled ‘The 
prevention and eradication of violence against women and children’, adopted 
by SADC in 1998. 
The signing of protocols and declarations by the political elite in the SADC 
region is one thing, and translating those political commitments into reality 
through deliberate policy reform measures is quite another. Progress towards 
reaching the 30 per cent minimum target of women in key organs of the 
state, especially parliament, is not only mixed, but points to a quiet resistance 
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by male-dominated political institutions. Only a few SADC states – most 
prominently Mozambique and South Africa – have achieved this threshold. 
Namibia and Tanzania have come near to reaching the target, but progress 
in general has been disappointing. 
Following the 2002 Lesotho election, in which the MMP electoral system 
was used for the first time, 12 women formed part of the 120-person strong 
National Assembly. Despite the increase of parliamentary seats from 80 to 
120, after the 1998 political debacle, the number of women in the National 
Assembly remains low. However, the speaker of the National Assembly, 
Nthloi Motsamai, is a woman, and evidently her leadership role has 
injected some enthusiasm and commitment into parliament for the political 
empowerment of women.
The number of women has tended to be higher in the Senate relative to 
the National Assembly. Of the total of 33 members, there are 11 women 
(five of them appointed and six who are chiefs). Over the years, women 
have increased their participation in the institution of chieftainship. This 
participation, however, has been more by default than design, since women 
can only act as chiefs in circumstances where a male is unable to perform due 
to absence, youth, or incapacity, or where there is no male in direct line of 
descent (Letuka, Matashane, and Morolong 1997: 23). 
The relatively low levels of participation of women in government, politics, 
and the legislature can be explained in various ways. The most plausible 
explanations rotate around the political and legal content of the state system. 
African political systems are often marked by instability and violence. 
Given this and the zero-sum nature of the political game in Africa, plus the 
marginalisation of the gender question in political discourse, women have 
not been involved. The political sphere and the state system are perceived 
as male domains, while women are expected to participate in the economic 
sphere and the domestic realm of life. The legal systems in Africa also 
inhibit women's participation in politics and national legislatures both by 
design and by default. The patriarchal nature of the state system, perforce, 
excludes women, and according to Williams, ‘African states cannot behave 
in a manner different from the general characteristics of their society steeped 
in patriarchy and in a patrilineal stance despite the noises they make about 
democratising their societies’ (quoted in Motebang 1997: 57).
Lesotho and common security in Southern Africa
The size and geopolitical location of Lesotho to a considerable degree shapes 
and influences the country’s role and position in regional common security 
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efforts. Put much more explicitly, and rather provocatively, Lesotho’s small 
size, impoverishment, and landlocked situation have inhibited the country’s 
influence in the current efforts towards regional common security in SADC. 
It is worth noting, though, that Lesotho is an active member of SADC, 
participates meaningfully in all SADC activities, and was in fact the chair 
of the ISDSC in 2001, and the chair of the OPDSC in 2003–04. In a sense, 
therefore, Lesotho’s foreign policy in the region, though somewhat weak 
and reactive, does embrace the conviction of the political elite that national 
security today, under conditions of globalism and regionalism, is inextricably 
interwoven into regional security. In this regard, Lesotho definitely embraces 
the significance of a regional security institution such as the OPDSC. 
Despite near-paralysis of the OPDSC between 1996 and 2001, and the lack 
of a clear role for SADC on the security front (see Omari and Macaringue in 
this volume), South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe have been extensively 
and directly involved in containing Lesotho’s protracted, and often violent, 
conflicts, and today the three countries, together with Mozambique, remain 
the guarantors of Lesotho’s democratic governance. This development has 
naturally triggered an interesting debate in terms of its implications for 
Lesotho’s national security and sovereignty. 
One school of thought perceives the South African-led SADC interventions 
in Lesotho as premised on altruism aimed at ensuring Lesotho’s political 
stability and peace for the good of the SADC region as a whole. The second 
school posits that South African interventions in Lesotho are primarily 
predicated upon the former’s national security and strategic interests, rather 
than the quest for democratic governance in Lesotho as such. Whichever 
school of thought one follows, a key challenge facing Lesotho today in relation 
to regional security imperatives is precisely how best the leadership of the 
country can reposition this small and landlocked nation in the context of post-
apartheid South and Southern Africa. Lesotho needs much stronger bilateral 
co-operation arrangements with South Africa, without necessarily sacrificing 
its commitment to multilateral regional efforts towards regional common 
security. Although it has taken a painstakingly long time for the leadership 
of both countries to appreciate this stark reality, it is encouraging, and indeed 
commendable, that they established the Joint Bilateral Commission of Co-
operation in April 2001, the key objectives of which are to:
•	 guide the strategic partnership between the parties;
•	 promote mutually beneficial economic integration between the two 
countries, with the aim of closing the existing economic disparities;
•	 promote co-operation in the field of science and technology, with the aim 
of bridging the technological divide;
•	 cultivate and promote good governance, and beneficial social, cultural, 
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humanitarian, and political co-operation, and facilitate contact between 
the public and private sectors;
•	 maintain peace and security between the two countries and general 
stability in the Southern African region through collective action based on 
respect for democratic institutions, human rights, and the rule of law;
•	 co-operate with each other and harmonise the position of the two 
countries in addressing multilateral issues of common interest; and
•	 facilitate movement of people, goods, and services, taking into considera-
tion the unique geographic position of Lesotho.
In order to operationalise the commission and facilitate the realisation of the 
above objectives, working groups or clusters have been established, namely 
the economic, good governance, security and stability, and social clusters.
It is only fair to observe that slowly but surely positive steps are under way 
in the redefinition of Lesotho–South African relations, and only time will tell 
whether or not the two countries will reap mutually beneficial developments 
arising from the bilateral commission, especially in respect of democratic 
governance and security.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to tease out possible linkages between democracy 
and security in Lesotho. The first of the main findings and conclusions of this 
study are that insecurity and instability disrupt governance considerably. The 
policy challenge facing Lesotho, therefore, is to ensure a positive interface 
between its democratisation process and the maintenance of peace and 
security. 
Secondly, and flowing from the above, democratic governance, peace, and 
security are likely to lead to stability and meaningful development. Although 
this may seem like stating the obvious, it is worth emphasising that 
governance should not be perceived as an end in and of itself, but rather a 
means to an end. The ultimate end of democratic governance ought to be 
meaningful and people-centered development. The policy challenge for 
Lesotho is thus to chart a development vision anchored upon sustainable 
human development, predicated on a market-friendly and state-driven 
development path. 
Thirdly, although Lesotho’s historical record points to long periods of both 
civilian and military authoritarianism, recent developments are positive in 
terms of nurturing and consolidating democratic governance. The most 
encouraging and, indeed, commendable progress has been made in the 
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reform of the electoral system in order to deepen democratic governance, and 
security sector reform aimed at ensuring civil control and professionalisation 
of the security forces. Despite progress, major challenges still remain for 
Lesotho to reach a stage of democratic consolidation upon which sustainable 
peace and security can be firmly anchored. What the country needs to do 
now is consolidate the achievements thus far attained, while at the same 
time opening new arenas for deepening and broadening the democratic 
space, as well as promoting peace and security for the general welfare of the 
Basotho people. 
It is abundantly evident from the discussion in this chapter that the primary 
actors in Lesotho’s democratisation process include both external and 
internal forces. The key external actors are the bilateral and multilateral 
donor agencies and SADC, especially South Africa. The key domestic actors 
include the state, capital, labour, civil society organisations, and the churches. 
Policymaking on the issues of democratisation and security remains the 
domain of the executive branch of the state, overseen by the legislative 
branch, with a fairly minimal role for civil society organisations. Given that 
there is as yet no commonly shared vision or conception of national security, 
it may well be that the current efforts towards a national vision could bring 
about a positive change in this regard. What is encouraging, though, is that 
the democratic transition of the early 1990s has helped greatly in reducing 
tension among key actors regarding the conception of security. Thus, 
increasingly, the approach to security is bound to be much more consensual 






By one definition, Huntington’s (1991) criterion of two turnovers of elected 
government, Mauritius is the only consolidated democracy in Southern 
Africa. While this is a highly contested criterion, it is certainly true that, 
with Botswana, Mauritius is one of only two Southern African states that 
have sustained democratic politics and democratic institutions continuously 
since independence.1 It is also one of the wealthiest states in the region, 
and has the second-highest level of social development, as measured by the 
UNDP’s Human Development Index, after Seychelles (UNDP 2002: 150). 
And it has managed to achieve this despite – or perhaps because of – the 
most complex ethnic and religious mix of all countries in SADC and few 
natural resources. 
Evolution of democracy in Mauritius 
At independence from Britain in 1968, Mauritius displayed many of the 
characteristics of other newly independent African countries: poverty and 
high unemployment; ethnic cleavages (about half Hindus of South Asian 
origin, a quarter Creole, 16 per cent Muslims of South Asian origin, and a 
small minorities of Chinese and European – mostly French – origin); reliance 
on a single export commodity (sugar); and a shortage of skills and experience. 
Shortly before independence, ethnic communal riots had broken out on the 
island and British troops had to be brought in to restore order. Within three 
years of independence the ruling Mauritian Labour Party (MLP), responding 
to the rise of a radical opposition party, the Mauritian Militant Movement 
(MMM), and to ongoing ethnic tensions and militant workers’ strikes, 
had imposed a state of emergency, closed down opposition newspapers, 
imprisoned opposition leaders, and postponed elections (Lodge, Kadima, 
and Pottie 2002: 166). It looked like Mauritius was treading the well-worn 
path to authoritarianism. 
However, thanks in part to sagacious political leadership, a turn away from 
radicalism by the MMM, and in part to the nature of the country’s political 
system (of which more later), Mauritians were able to pull back from the 
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brink and set about consolidating their democracy. There have now been 
seven free and fair elections since independence, resulting in three democratic 
transfers of political power, and the country can by any standards be regarded 
as a consolidated democracy, with an independent press, a vibrant political 
culture, a wide diversity of political parties, an independent judiciary, an 
active parliament, and a variety of state institutions aimed at enhancing and 
protecting democratic rights. Some analysts attribute this in a large part to the 
‘design of democracy’ (Bastian and Luckham 2003) – the unique processes 
that have been put in place as a result of historic compromises crafted by a 
British commission (the Banwell Commission of 1966). 
Political processes
During the independence negotiations, the various ethnic groups were 
naturally agitating for electoral systems that they thought would most benefit 
their group: the dominant Hindu-based MLP, for example, wanted a large 
number of single-member first-past-the-post (FPTP) constituencies, thus 
ensuring that the widely and fairly evenly spread Hindu population would 
win virtually every seat, while Muslims demanded separate voter roles and 
reserved seats to ensure representation. 
After more than a decade of argument, the Banwell Commission settled on a 
Westminster model with important modifications. Instead of an FPTP system, 
it instituted a model in which three candidates with the most votes in each 
of 20 constituencies go to parliament. This has encouraged political parties 
to field multi-ethnic slates in each constituency in order to try to secure all 
three positions. Furthermore, all candidates are required to register their 
ethnic affiliation, and after the votes are counted, eight seats are allocated 
on an ethnically proportional basis to the ‘best losers’ (the candidates from 
specified ethnic groups who gained the most votes, but not sufficient to get 
into parliament) (Brautigam 1999: 145–46). 
Although some analysts have argued that this system has entrenched 
ethnicity, it has also encouraged multi-ethnic party slates and has made it 
difficult for one party to win outright, thus encouraging coalition building 
and compromise, and ensuring that minorities are represented in parlia-
ment. The system rewards parties or coalitions that field candidates from 
all communities. However, unlike proportional representation (PR) systems, 
it tends to exclude tiny parties, so that politics is usually dominated by two 
or three coalitions (although these are very fluid). It also tends to lead to 
landslide victories for successful multi-ethnic coalitions, thus promoting 
strong governments, but ones that are very vulnerable to alternative coalition 
building. The modified Westminster system is ‘parliamentary’ rather than 
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‘presidential’ in nature – the prime minister is elected by the majority party, 
while the president has mostly symbolic powers. This has also helped to 
promote inclusivity – indeed, in September 2003 the post of prime minister 
was ‘swopped’ between the two parties in the ruling coalition to honour an 
electoral pact (Mauritius News 2003).
There is thus a strong case to be made that the ‘design of democracy’ in 
Mauritius has contributed significantly to democratic consolidation – although 
it is by no means clear whether the model would work in conditions where 
the ethnic proportions were radically different. Like all Westminster-based 
systems, however, it suffers from the distorting effects of the FPTP system. In 
the 1987 election, for example, although only 1.7 per cent separated the two 
major electoral alliances, this was translated into a 36.6 per cent gap in terms 
of parliamentary seats (Lodge, Kadima, and Pottie 2002: 170). In January 
2002 a commission on constitutional and electoral reform put forward a 
number of sweeping recommendations, including moving to a system of PR 
at the national level and strengthening the powers of the president (in order 
to reduce the considerable powers of the prime minister). PR might radically 
alter the nature of politics, but it is unclear if it will be introduced, as the 
major parties fear its implications (Dassyne 2004; Morvan 2004). 
Democratic design cannot be the only factor behind Mauritius’s success, 
however, and analysts have put forward a number of other explanations, 
including: 
•	 high rates of economic growth, achieved through successful application 
of the ‘Asian Tiger’ model (export-oriented industrialisation using cheap 
labour and moving from protectionism to liberalisation). There is probably 
a symbiotic relationship between economic growth and democracy, with 
the one reinforcing the other (although there is considerable disagreement 
about cause and effect), and because democratisation is more likely to 
be successful when there is enough money to spread around, to take the 
sting out of distributive conflict; 
•	 political agency, in other words, the quality of political leaders and their 
willingness to sacrifice personal gain for the good of the country. This, 
like economic growth and perhaps also political stability, may in part 
be attributed to highly successful investment in education, which has 
taken priority since independence. A political culture of tolerance and 
compromise has been developed (Srebrnik 2002: 289); and 
•	 a political consensus around the social dimensions of democracy, with 
successive governments investing heavily in education and social welfare 
and being willing to subsidise basic foodstuffs, fertilisers, etc. (Brautigam 
1999: 156–57).
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No doubt many other factors can be identified, including ‘luck’, i.e. changes 
in the external environment over which Mauritius has had little control, but 
which have benefitted it enormously, such as rising prices of sugar shortly 
after independence, and the Lomé Convention and the US African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which have allowed Mauritius to export its 
textiles and other industrial products under very favourable tariff conditions. 
Whatever the case, it is clear that Mauritians have been able, on the whole, to 
exploit ‘virtuous’ relationships among democracy, social welfare, economic 
growth, and stability and security. 
But there have been many problems in the actual practice of democracy, not 
least the persistence of ethnic communalism and its periodic tendency to 
spill over into violence, and elite domination (Morvan 2004). 
Democratic practice 
Interest and participation in politics is high (in the last legislative elections, 
80 per cent of voters turned out) and political contestation has hardly ever 
spilt over into violence. Although volatile, and characterised by shifting 
alliances, electoral swings, and coalition decay, many of the parties have been 
in existence since – or before – independence and are led by experienced 
politicians (Lodge, Kadima, and Pottie 2002: 171). However, there is a strong 
ethnic flavour to politics, although it is not necessarily reflected directly 
in parties, despite efforts by some political parties to promote class-based 
politics. 
Minority groups have historically feared and resented perceived domination 
by Mauritians of Indian origin, and within the Indo-Mauritian community, 
Hindu–Muslim tensions have been a persistent concern. Radical electoral 
swings, brought about in part by the electoral system, cannot disguise the 
facts that Hindus dominate politics under the system of ‘democratic majority 
rule’, and that this is unlikely to change as long as Hindus make up more 
than half the population and other ethnic groups tend to be allocated roles as 
‘junior partners’ in any coalition. As Srebrnik (2002: 289) puts it:
For the past two decades, each election has been a 
competition between two Hindu-dominated coalitions, each 
vying to win support primarily from the Hindu majority. Even 
with the corrective of the ‘best loser’ system, Hindus have a 
guaranteed majority of seats in the National Assembly. 
However, for the first time, a non-Hindu, Paul Bérenger (of European 
origin), became prime minister in 2003 (albeit as a result of an intra-coalition 
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agreement), and while Hindus may naturally dominate by virtue of their 
numerical superiority, as noted above, the system encourages inter-ethnic 
coalition-building. 
More worrying, perhaps, are signs of growing marginalisation of the Creole 
minority, many of whom (especially those of predominately African origin) 
form the poorest communities in Mauritius, and of radicalisation of some 
elements of the Muslim population. In February 1999 a popular Creole 
‘seggae’ performer, Kaya, died in police custody, triggering four days of 
rioting in Port Louis and elsewhere, which resulted in the deaths of five 
demonstrators. Later that year, Muslim soccer fans rioted after their team 
had been defeated by a Creole one, and Muslim youths torched a Chinese 
gambling club, in which seven people died (Jaddoo 2002: 18; Srebrnik 2002: 
283). A fundamentalist Muslim party, Hizbullah, was launched in the mid-
1990s and continues to draw votes. These tensions may be exacerbated by 
growing unemployment and poverty, which especially affects the youth and 
Creoles, who tend to occupy the least-skilled positions. Mauritian labour is 
now relatively expensive, and thousands of jobs have been lost as companies 
have relocated elsewhere. Jobs have also been lost in the sugar industry, 
which faces an uncertain future (see below). This is only partly compensated 
for by Mauritian efforts to encourage high-technology industries, notably by 
building a ‘cyber city’.
national security 
Mauritius is unique among SADC states in that it has no defence force – 
indeed, it is one of the very few countries in the world that has managed 
without one.2 This is a reflection in part of the perceived lack of external 
security threats, and in part of domestic political calculations. 
External relations 
Since independence, Mauritius has sought to maintain strong links with the 
major Western powers, as well as with Africa (through its membership of 
the OAU/AU, SADC, and COMESA), and the countries of the Indian Ocean 
rim (Mauritius is a founder member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for 
Regional Co-operation). Given that half its population is of Indian descent, 
close ties have been retained with India, and increasingly with China (only 
3 per cent of the population is of Chinese origin, but they dominate retail 
commerce). Relations with India are sometimes a source of domestic tension, 
as some minority groups resent the close links, seen most starkly, perhaps, 
in the fact that the Mauritian prime minister’s chief security advisor was for 
many years a seconded Indian senior intelligence official. 
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Some strain has been put on relations with the former colonial power, Britain, 
over Mauritius’s claims to the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia, 
which was transferred from Mauritius to a new Indian Ocean Dependency by 
Britain shortly before independence. Subsequently, nearly 2,000 inhabitants 
were removed from the islands to allow for the construction of the US 
military base on Diego Garcia and were relocated, most to Mauritius and a 
minority to Seychelles. In November 2000 the British High Court of Justice 
ruled that the population removal had been unlawful, but applications by 
the Chagos islanders to obtain a right of return were refused in the British 
courts. The United States has strongly resisted any attempt to alter the status 
quo, as Diego Garcia is now a key base in the ‘war on terror’. India has lent 
its support to Mauritian claims to the archipelago as part of its efforts to build 
a strategic alliance with Mauritius, but Mauritian governments have tended 
to hold back from pressing these claims too hard, lest Mauritius alienates its 
major Western allies. Mauritius also lays claim to the French-held island of 
Tromelin, about 500 km to the north-west, but this is a very minor irritant 
in otherwise good relations with France, which remains the country’s main 
trading partner.
The post-11 September 2001 international security environment has put 
further pressure on Mauritius’s international relations, given its strategic 
position as an offshore banking centre (and hence potentially for money 
laundering) and the presence of small militant Islamic groups such as 
Hizbullah. Legislation to control terrorism, introduced in February 2002, 
proved to be divisive, as Muslims saw themselves as the main target. As a 
result, the president (a Muslim) resigned, and some Muslims accused the 
government of using the issue of terrorism to clamp down on civil rights. 
Generally, Mauritius has enjoyed a wide range of foreign interactions, which 
are mostly peaceful and constructive. It has managed to balance its interests 
in Asia, Africa, and the Indian Ocean rim with its need to maintain good 
relations with its major trading partners in Europe and elsewhere, and has 
played an active role in multinational and international organisations. 
However, growing strategic links with India may have unexpected domestic 
or international consequences in the long term, and the Chagos Islands issue 
remains a potential source of conflict. Like all small island states,3 Mauritius 
is also extremely vulnerable to international market shifts, and tariff and 
other legislative changes in its main trading partners (Jaddoo 2002: 4). In 
particular, it suffered in 2004 from the higher oil prices arising from the US-
led invasion of Iraq, and it faces substantial declines in revenue as a result of 
mooted EU reforms to reduce sugar prices, as Mauritius has long benefitted 
from preferential rates up to three times the global market rate. Mauritian 
sources estimate potential losses from EU sugar reforms of up to MUR 3 
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billion (USD 100 million) a year. With AGOA also up for future negotiation, 
Mauritius could be facing serious economic difficulties (BBC 2004; IRIN 
2004).
Mauritius does not perceive that it is at risk from external attack – hence the 
decision not to develop a defence force. Its complacency in this regard is also 
shown by its apparent unwillingness to enter into ‘treaties of guarantee’ with 
any of the major powers. 
Internal security 
As noted above, Mauritian democracy has been remarkably peaceful, given 
the potentially volatile ethnic and class composition of the population. 
However, the violent events of 1999 – although mild by African standards – 
served to remind Mauritians that social exclusion and religious tensions could 
potentially breed conflict. The violence was initially sparked by allegations 
of police torture, and Amnesty International has continued to report public 
complaints of police brutality (Amnesty International 2003). However, some 
steps have been taken to address this. 
Crime and corruption are also major internal security concerns. With its 
strategic position and modern offshore banking system, Mauritius has 
naturally attracted the attention of drugs cartels, money launderers, and – 
there is some evidence to suggest – also international terrorists, and this has 
had a corruptive effect. In the 1980s, three members of the legislative assembly 
were implicated in drug smuggling, and in 1988 and 1989 two attempts 
were made to assassinate the then prime minister, Sir Anerood Jugnauth, 
which were attributed to drug cartels. More recently, a series of corruption 
scandals have rocked the government. An Independent Commission against 
Corruption has been set up, but it remains to be seen how effective it will be 
(Mauritius News 2003).
To combat potential terrorism, and under US pressure, the government 
introduced new legislation in 2002, which included giving the authorities 
the right to extradite terrorist suspects to foreign states, denial of the right 
to political asylum, and incommunicado 36-hour detention without trial for 
suspected terrorists (Amnesty International 2003). As noted above, this was 
strongly opposed by some sections of the population.
Internal security is primarily the responsibility of the approximately 4,000-
strong Mauritius police, an intelligence agency known as the National 
Investigation Unit, and a paramilitary Special Mobile Force (SMF), while 
protection of the 1.8 million square kilometre maritime economic exclusion 
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zone is the responsibility of the small National Coast Guard (Library of 
Congress 2003). 
The SMF is to all intents and purposes an infantry battalion trained and 
equipped for conventional military operations, with a focus on internal 
security (Mauritius Police Force 2003; Jaddoo 2002: 9). Its motto is ‘We’ll do 
it, what is it?’, which presumably is meant to indicate that it will do whatever 
is required of it (it reports to the chief of police), but could also indicate that 
there is some uncertainty about its role. It is certainly not openly discussed 
in Mauritius that the SMF, with no conceivable external role, is essentially a 
counter-insurgency force that could be used to combat public disorder and 
prevent unconstitutional changes of government (it also has some disaster 
relief and socio-economic development roles).
Security policymaking
There being no ministries of police, intelligence, or defence, security policy is 
largely the preserve of the Office of the Prime Minister, as the prime minister is 
responsible, with the chief of police, for overseeing all security functions. This 
makes for a somewhat closed policy process, despite the active interrogation 
in parliament of major security issues, and its active role in legislation (e.g. 
over the 2002 terrorism bill). There are few public expressions of national 
security policy. The prime minister’s national security advisor, until recently a 
seconded Indian military or intelligence official, also plays an important role 
(Mauritius requested this secondment after the attempted assassinations of 
Prime Minister Jugnauth in the late 1980s). 
 
Mauritius in SADC
Despite its multifaceted foreign policy concerns, as a result of its history 
of colonialism and settlement, its position in the Indian Ocean, and its 
extensive global trade links, Mauritius has been a keen and active participant 
in the OAU/AU, COMESA, and SADC. It has from time to time offered 
its diplomatic services in resolving African conflicts, and it has played a 
leadership role, e.g. in the SARPCCO and by hosting meetings of SADC, 
and in August 2004 it took on the chair of SADC. It has also formed close 
political and trade relations with South Africa since 1994, supported reform 
of SADC and the AU, and played a leading role in the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development. 
Although it is considerably nearer to the African continent than it is to 
any other, Mauritius’s commitment to SADC and more broadly to Africa 
might appear to be counter-intuitive, given the Asian origins of most of its 
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population, the close relations between its Hindu elite and that of India, 
its global trade, and the almost complete lack of strategic threats from the 
African continent. Its turn towards Africa is perhaps better understood as 
a perception of opportunities rather than threats, and a recognition that in 
Africa Mauritius is a relatively bigger fish in a relatively smaller pond than it 
would be in Asia. In Africa it can ‘make its mark’, and it perceives growing 
trade opportunities as a ‘gateway to Africa’ (not to mention the enormous 
benefits it gains from AGOA). Nevertheless, it is evident that Mauritius has 
little objective interest in the security concerns of the continental members of 
SADC – war in the DRC or conflict in Zimbabwe, for example, is hardly likely 
to impact on Mauritius. 
With Seychelles having withdrawn from SADC (on the grounds that it cannot 
afford the fees), Mauritius and Madagascar are the only AU member states in 
the Indian Ocean that belong to SADC, making it difficult to envisage what 
sort of role Mauritius could play in the unfolding development of the AU’s 
and SADC’s security architecture – notably the proposed establishment of a 
regional rapid reaction capability. 
Mauritius is also a member of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), which 
draws together the five islands of the south-west Indian Ocean – Mauritius, 
Réunion (France), Seychelles, Comores, and Madagascar. Formed in 1982, 
the IOC has involved itself mainly in trade and economic issues. Although 
it has a political mandate, little has been done in the field of security, and 
the islands are all very different and separated by vast expanses of ocean. It 
seems unlikely that the IOC will take on security functions in the near future 
(European Centre for Development Policy Management/IOC 1998), leaving 
it somewhat unclear where the various island states of the AU fit in terms of 
the evolution of sub-regional security structures such as SADC. 
Conclusion: democracy and security 
While most – although not all – international relations scholars subscribe to the 
‘democratic peace’ thesis (that democracy leads to inter-state and, perhaps to 
a lesser extent, intra-state peace), and most development theorists determine 
a relationship between socio-economic development and democracy, 
issues of cause and effect are highly contested (see Cawthra, ‘Comparative 
perspectives on regional security co-operation among developing countries’, 
in this study). Is democracy a cause of economic growth, or vice versa? Is peace 
an output of democracy, or does peace create conditions in which democracy 
can thrive? Is peace a result of economic development, or vice versa? These 
questions are probably impossible to answer, and generalisations over time 
and place are always dangerous.
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What is clear, however, is that Mauritius has found itself in a ‘virtuous 
circle’ where socio-economic growth (with a social democratic component); 
democratic politics and institutions; and internal as well as external stability, 
security, and peace appear to have been contingent and self-reinforcing 
conditions. This has been helped by an electoral system that appears to have 
resulted in the need to build a political culture of tolerance based on building 
multi-ethnic coalitions, and has led to regular changes of government. It has 
also been helped by a relatively benign international political and trading 
environment, in which Mauritius has been able to develop relationships 
with a number of global and Indian Ocean powers, and by bilateral and 
multinational agreements that have assisted the country in diversifying and 
expanding its economy. While politics remains ethnically based and Hindu-
dominated, and there are growing social inequalities and exclusions, there 
still appears to be sufficient give and take in the system to accommodate 
all ethnic and social groups and classes. This may not always be the case, 
and the events of 1999 indicate that social tensions may erupt at any point, 
especially if economic growth slows, and unemployment and social exclusion 
increase. 
Nevertheless, Mauritius is fairly unique among SADC countries in that its 
political regime appears to be secure and unthreatened. From this position of 
strength, it has been able to engage constructively with the SADC common 
security project, and play a leading role in its reform, less from existential 
need than from a calculation of opportunities. 
EnDnoTES
1 South Africa could be included in this list post-1994.
2 Costa Rica and Panama are the best-known examples of states that have deliberately dispensed 
with their defence forces, while a number of mostly small island states have insufficient resources 
for armed forces. 
3 With a population in excess of one million, Mauritius technically falls outside this category, but it 






The vibrant and dynamic process of democratisation in Mozambique, 
despite its wide appraisal by the international community as having been 
successful, has strikingly demonstrated the feebleness of the celebrated ‘end 
of history’ thesis and has revealed the shortcomings of the triumph of the 
market economy. 
The democratisation process that Mozambique is undergoing is proving 
to be a complex one, characterised by deep feelings of uncertainty as a 
result of the intertwined nature of multilayered transitions. In a country 
ravaged by 16 years of war (1976–92) between the Frente de Libertação 
de Moçambique (FRELIMO) government and Resistencia Nacional 
Moçambicana (RENAMO) rebels, the drivers of democratisation are found 
at various levels. At the international level, the end of the Cold War meant 
that the sources of support to the belligerents would be strained and that a 
generalised discourse on liberalisation of the economy would be strengthened 
in a context of democratisation. From a regional perspective, the fall of the 
apartheid regime in neighbouring South Africa, which constituted the major 
cause of destabilisation in Southern Africa in the late 1970s and throughout 
the 1980s, was a real catalyst. Thus, the removal of the source for aggression 
in the region, and of the major source of support for RENAMO, as well as 
the related events of democratisation in South Africa and the independence 
of Namibia, generated positive stimuli for the establishment of democratic 
systems elsewhere in the region. On a national level, the exhaustion of the 
belligerents, the intense internal public demands for the end of the war, and 
declining state legitimacy constituted crucial factors for the Rome Peace 
Agreement that provided for the restructuring of the political system. 
The evolving situation from a centralised economy to a market economy 
(which started in 1987), the transformation from a one-party rule to a multi-
party system, and the change from war to peace became key determinants 
that shaped the democratisation process.
109
The economy: quo vadis social development?
The economic discourse in the immediate period after the war increasingly 
emphasised the need for privatisation, the attraction of foreign direct 
investment, and the attainment of a strong macro-economic balance, as 
essential requirements for a strong and vibrant economy. Massive injections 
of external aid in the past decade have contributed to the celebration of high 
growth rates, on average 8 to 9 per cent from 1995 to 2001 (UNDP 2002: iii), 
and increasing economic recuperation. These macro-economic benefits, 
commended over time by the International Monetary Fund, including the 
increasing ability of the country to repay its debts (as a result of its enrolment 
as a heavily indebted poor country) and to control the level of inflation, do 
not seem to be matched in the micro-economic arena, nor do they seem to 
have improved ordinary people’s daily lives. In any case, studies show that 
the trend in the economy is to recede. The Composed Indicator of Economic 
Activity in Mozambique shows that from 1991 until the end of 1995 the real 
economic activity of the country was boosted as a result of the end of the war, 
the relocation of people, the emergency rehabilitation processes, and the 
recovery of the normal activity of its enterprises. But the same did not hold 
from 1996 onwards. Even with a strong movement towards privatisation, 
which in turn swelled the numbers of the unemployed, the economy 
stagnated until 1999 and after that. The figures for foreign direct investment 
in 1999 amounted to USD 1.706 billion, against only USD 294 billion from 
national investment (Grobbelaar and Lalá 2003: 27). This reveals the 
weakness of national financial capacities, made worse by difficult access to 
credit with high interest rates, and thus leading to a situation in which the 
bulk of business activity is controlled by external capital (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2003: 10). 
 
It is revealing that the Mozambican political elite are reacting by associating 
themselves with major projects, transforming themselves into a business elite 
through partnerships they are allowed to make due to their decision-making 
power over investment and the economy. The same conditions for ‘self-
empowerment’ (!) are unfortunately not created at the level of medium and 
small enterprises, which are declining due to a low level of entrepreneurship 
trust (Ratilal 2002: 253) and are increasingly getting pushed into the 
informal sector, while the economy is mostly dominated by monopolies and 
oligopolies. 
Nonetheless, government policy priorities have been to reduce poverty, 
and, in order to achieve that, the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute 
Poverty, 2001–2005 (Republic of Mozambique 2001) was adopted in April 
2001, on the basis of the poverty reduction strategy paper developed in 
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conjunction with the World Bank. Available data shows that 69.4 per cent 
of the population lives beneath the poverty line (UN 2000: 16). The human 
poverty index of the south of the country is 39.8 per cent, while at the centre 
it is 60 per cent, and in the north 64.3 per cent, revealing that there is a long 
way to go in addressing inequalities (UNDP 2000: 32). However, the sectors 
of investment priority have been education and health, and data reveals 
that the human development indicators are, surprisingly, rising, despite 
the hardships of the economy and the impact of the 2000 floods. But the 
figures still remain among the lowest in the world, with the country rating 
a human development rank of 170 among 173 countries (UN/Republic of 
Mozambique 2002: 4). Also of extreme concern is the impact of HIV/AIDS, 
which is expected to reduce life expectancy from 50.3 years to 36.5 by 2010. 
The data presented above lead us to a panorama in which exclusionary ten-
dencies between Mozambicans and foreigners, as well as within Mozambican 
society, and regional differentiations will increase the overall level of mistrust 
in society. Despite the government’s commitment to poverty reduction and 
achievements in human development, the adoption of neo-liberal policies 
seems to have been accompanied by high levels of criminality and rampant 
corruption, contributing to the rise of human insecurity and, overall, pushing 
Mozambique in the direction of a more conflict-prone society.
Democratisation: the institutional framework
The democratisation process started with the adoption of a new constitution 
in 1990. This paved the way for multi-partyism and for the inclusion of 
different interests in the political system.1 The first elections were held in 
October 1994, with over 88 per cent participation by the population, leading 
to a parliament constituted of 44.8 per cent seats for RENAMO and 55.2 per 
cent for FRELIMO. This was followed by an extensive process of country-
wide consultation on various legislative matters (financed by the international 
community), and work towards the revision of the constitution, particularly 
to reduce presidential powers. Paradoxically, the major proponent of change 
– RENAMO – did not support the adoption of the constitution, as the second 
elections were approaching and its belief in victory led it to prefer to preserve 
the status quo. The first attempt to change constitutional rule into one more 
reflective of the general will of the country, while taking into account the 
concerns of minorities, was thus deemed to be a failure.
The country’s electoral system does not enable further political inclusiveness. 
The system of proportional representation, with a threshold of 5 per cent of 
votes at the national level to hold a seat in parliament, in reality has become a 
bipartisan one. An additional layer, where more pluralism could be tolerated, 
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is the decentralisation process. Through decentralisation, municipalities were 
instituted and local elections conducted. In 1998 the municipal elections 
took place with a low level of voter participation and amid a boycott by 
RENAMO.
The parliament, as the highest institution for governance oversight and for 
conflict resolution, is failing. Illustrative of this have been the developments 
since the second general election held in 1999, in which FRELIMO 
captured both the presidency and parliament, notwithstanding protests 
from RENAMO. After this, RENAMO almost rendered parliament non-
operational with its boycott throughout the year 2000. The mostly low level 
of education, preparation, and experience of members of parliament for 
parliamentary tasks detracts from their capacity to carry out their functions. 
This in turn results in a stronger executive with ever more legislative power, 
and limited public access to information. The fact that this is an emergent 
democracy with deficits in democratic practices implies that parliament will 
take a long time to develop.
 
The non-parliamentary opposition is active in the social arena, trying to 
lobby the government and the head of state on certain matters. Recognising 
its role, former president Joaquim Chissano encouraged an informal network 
through which it was consulted as regards the country’s major projects, such 
as in the pre-1999 constitutional revision, the land tenure discussion, or even 
Agenda 2025 (the project aimed at creating a national development vision for 
the country until 2025). This the government decided to leave in charge of a 
group of notable personalities from various religious, academic, political, and 
civil society organisations. 
Socio-political dynamics and governance performance
A decisive element of the trajectory that the democratisation process will take 
is how state policies generate, maintain, and reinforce their legitimacy. Since 
democratisation is also about people’s empowerment and their perception that 
the structures and institutions work towards the achievement of a common 
good, governance also comes into the picture. Mozambique’s capacity is very 
limited, with few people with higher education qualifications in the state 
apparatus, and with low salaries that lead to corruption throughout the state 
bureaucracy. Efforts to transform this situation are being made. However, this 
implies a reduction in jobs, in a society with very weak social welfare safety 
nets, and without correspondent improvement in the delivery of services. 
Although the education and health sectors are making progress, in the 
police, justice, and penal sectors the main deficits remain, contributing to 
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the decline of state legitimacy and increased feelings of insecurity. Problems 
are related to lack of police effectiveness in the face of rising criminality, 
and organised transnational crime and corruption, compounded by a lack 
of qualified personnel, inefficiency, and chronic delays in the resolution of 
cases. More strategically relevant is the lack of an integrated vision of the 
whole judicial sector, which clearly needs to work in a co-ordinated manner. 
Profiting from these weaknesses, criminal and corruption networks seem to 
have taken root in society. Political will towards change in this state of affairs 
needs to be high, and measures such as the dismissal of the attorney general 
and six of his senior staff related to fraud allegations (US State Department 
2001), although important, represent only ‘the tip of the iceberg’, since strong 
allegations exist that the major beneficiaries of these criminal networks are 
linked to the higher governmental and party structures. The controversial 
investigation and trial in November/December 2002 of the accused murderers 
of Carlos Cardoso, a journalist who uncovered a major corruption scandal in 
the banking sector and was murdered in November 1999, was seen as a key 
attempt to re-establish the dignity of the criminal justice system. Despite the 
openness of the trial to the media, the fairly competent way in which the 
process was handled by the judges, and the conviction of the accused, the 
perception that those ultimately responsible for the crime were not found or 
punished prevails in Mozambican society.
The media 
Crucial to the development of governance practices is the role of the media as 
a watchdog, but also as an actor engaging in the dissemination of information 
and constructive dialogue in society. Democratic pluralism has been helpful, 
and the Mozambican media has grown steadily, both in numbers and in its 
capacity to intervene in society. The media has been vibrant in raising debate 
about the most controversial economic and political aspects of Mozambican 
society and fostering a diversity of ideas. However, sometimes the debate 
degenerates into extremist positions that contribute to polarising society.
 
After the events referred to above, media professionals were constantly 
harassed and threatened when reporting on these and other corruption-
related events, but they kept an informative and challenging posture, not 
becoming intimidated. However, a major challenge still persists, which is that 
of improving the quality and depth of coverage, for which there are allegedly 
not many incentives due to meagre salaries and lack of adequate training 
(IRIN News 2002). Constraints on the impacts of the media are the high 
level of illiteracy and the limited circulation of newspapers in the rural areas, 
making the radio the most effective means of information. Nevertheless, 
overall the country seems to rate well in terms of press freedom, being one 
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of the few in Southern Africa with empowering legislation (Pereira, Davids, 
and Mattes 2002: 6).
Civil society 
A major positive development in the socio-political life of the country is the 
role played by movements from within civil society in deflecting tensions. 
These movements constantly appeal for and take initiatives to encourage 
dialogue when political crisis emerges or when political leaders make public 
suggestions using violent imagery. Also noticeable is the role of NGOs in 
coping with various socio-economic community activities and political issues 
such as civic education, which remain beyond the state’s limited capability. 
Despite the controversial financial and ideological nature of some of these 
NGOs, and some of them being regarded as defending external interests, 
the facts that they were able to organise themselves into a network, LINK, 
and that they have been working in a more co-ordinated way with the 
government are improving the level of trust. 
The role of religious institutions and traditional authorities in solving conflict 
at the community and local levels has been remarkable, with its multiplying 
effect on the wider societal process of reconciliation. Their recognition by the 
state after a decade of exclusion constitutes a new source of partnerships for 
the state and reinforces its legitimacy.
Notwithstanding the progress made by these three actors – civil society 
organisations, NGOs, and traditional authorities – a national survey shows 
that a gap exists between the interests of urban civil society and the majority 
of the rural-based population. The survey shows that NGOs partially face 
a problem of recognition, as people stressed that they rarely consult the 
communities; and that there are differing views concerning the attitude of 
traditional chiefs consulting their communities (UEM-CEP 2002: 41–43). 
national security: the context for change
The transition from war to peace constituted the ground on which changes 
would be pursued in the national security arena. The country was faced with 
the major challenge of reconciliation and the implication at the time that this 
should be underpinned by the armed forces retreating from their prominent 
role in the country’s affairs – a role held because of the war, not because they 
were out of the control of the political elite. The armed forces as the main 
instrument and actor of the war became the object of stigma and negativism 
from both society and the country’s major donors.
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Thus a major feature of the post-war period, rooted in the General Peace 
Agreement (GPA) (Republic of Mozambique 1993), was strong donor 
conditionality as regards the restructuring of the defence sector. Protocol IV 
established that the armed forces should not have more than 30,000 men, 
regardless of future threats that could arise. The fact that the major regional 
threat had disappeared led donors and some nationals to think that the 
armed forces did not have a strong role to play in peace time.
 
Priorities had to be set in relation to the reconstruction of the country, and 
combating poverty provided the discourse that would lead the way. The 
national elite was therefore left with very limited room to manoeuvre: the 
country needed massive injections of aid to stimulate economic take-off. 
Also, IFIs’ expectations of the country were high. A structural adjustment 
programme had been in place in Mozambique since 1987, but the war had 
not allowed for any progress. The IFIs were also very reluctant to see any 
role for the armed forces, and the prescription was to downsize and cut the 
latter’s budget, without any concern as to how the restructuring ought to 
be done. On the other hand, there was an extreme polarisation between 
the concepts of human security and state security and the notion that one 
could only be obtained at the expense of the other. This way of thinking 
prevailed in society, despite the fact that in the history of the country, the 
development of its armed forces had always been linked to the formation 
of the independent state, and during the struggle for liberation and in the 
immediate post-independence period, the armed forces had been seen as 
the guarantor of the nation and had organic ties with the people. This image 
was completely eroded when the armed forces stopped being able to offer 
protection to the people during the war, often relying on the latter’s food 
provisions in order to survive. 
Amid this environment and in the face of the fact that the armed forces, after 
the demobilisation of all troops, had to be rebuilt to comprise, on a 50-50 
basis, men from both the guerrilla forces and the government troops, the 
political elite reacted by adopting the argument that the army should be built, 
albeit with reduced numbers, into a highly professional and efficient force. 
However, the elite security concerns in the immediate post-war phase, in a 
situation where the country was nearly dispossessed of any sovereignty due to 
the strong presence of the UN, remained unaddressed. These concerns might 
have been aggravated by regional developments, with the negative impact of 
the results of the elections in Angola in September 1992, which returned to 
war. This factor fuelled insecurity, especially taking into account RENAMO’s 
threats to boycott the process throughout the period that led to elections in 
1994. With the state of affairs in the new armed forces – Forças Armadas de 
Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) – the decision was taken to transfer to the 
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police force the best of the operational commanders and soldiers from the 
former government troops who had decided to remain in the security forces, 
and the few operational weapons that existed at the time.
 
This short-term security concern moulded the framework that subsequently 
became the basis for the reshaping of the security sector. Despite this, there 
was already an acknowledgement of the need to concentrate on internal 
security, as the police had remained a marginal force throughout the war, 
and would now be faced with the task of providing a stable environment for 
the country, above all in order to attract foreign investment.
Constitutional and legislative provisions
The foundation of the new security sector is the constitution of 1990, 
which establishes the goals of national defence as being to defend national 
independence, preserve the country’s sovereignty and integrity, and 
guarantee the normal functioning of institutions and the security of citizens 
against any armed aggression (Republic of Mozambique 1990: art. 59). It 
determines that the armed forces respect the constitution and the nation as 
a basic principle of democratic control of the armed forces.
The constitution defines the president as the commander-in-chief of the 
armed and security forces (Republic of Mozambique 1990: art. 117.4), and 
invests him with the powers to declare a state of war and its termination, a 
curfew, or a state of emergency; to sign treaties; to declare general or partial 
mobilisation; to preside over the National Defence and Security Council; 
and to appoint, exonerate, or dismiss the chief of general staff, the police 
commander, the branch commanders of the armed forces, and other superior 
officers of the defence and security forces (Republic of Mozambique 1990: 
art. 122). In order to establish checks and balances, the National Assembly 
must sanction the declaration of a curfew and a state of emergency; ratify 
international treaties; and define defence and security policy, once presented 
by the National Defence and Security Council. It also oversees the defence 
and security budget. 
The establishment of the National Defence and Security Council (Republic 
of Mozambique 1990: art. 158) is also a positive factor, as it provides the 
president with a consultative organ to support him with informed and 
professional advice for decision making. The presence of representatives 
from all the security forces in the same organ, apart from providing accurate 
information about the situation on the ground, ensures that issues will be 
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However, from the time of the peace agreement in 1992 until the elections 
in 1994 there was no clear policy direction on the armed forces, apart from 
the GPA and its rather general provisions. Indeed, it was only in 1997 that 
further legislation was approved creating the pillars for the defence and 
security forces. The Defence and Security Act 17 of 1997 determines the main 
principles as being: prohibition of political affiliation; priority for prevention 
of and negotiated solutions to conflict; commitment towards peace; reversion 
to force only in cases of legitimate defence; and contributing to a peaceful 
and secure climate in the region, the continent, and internationally (Republic 
of Mozambique 1997a: art. 2).
The act also outlines the restructuring of the sector according to the new roles 
and missions that are now separately defined: an external orientation for the 
armed forces and an internal one for the police. In summary, the defence 
forces are responsible for the integrity of national territory and sovereignty, 
the liberty of the citizens, securing the means of the nation’s development, 
the protection and rescue of populations in case of calamities or accidents, 
participation in peacekeeping, and the maintenance of peace and respect for 
international law (Republic of Mozambique 1997a: art. 10).
Public order functions, on the other hand, include the assurance of public 
order and respect for the law, prevention and combating of crime, and border 
patrolling (Republic of Mozambique 1997a: art. 13). The act also covers the 
intelligence sector, and defines the State Security Agency’s responsibilities as 
the compilation, research, production, analysis, and evaluation of information 
to assure the security of the state. Additionally it refers to its roles of prevent ing 
acts against the constitution and the functioning of state organs, and combating 
espionage, sabotage, and terrorism (Republic of Mozambique 1997a: art. 15). 
The act is supposed to precede sector legislation from each of these areas, but 
the defence sector is the only one to have produced such legislation.
The positive aspects of these advances in legislation are considerable in 
the context of Mozambique, since the country had previously not had any 
legislation to guide the sector, as all orientation and command in the past 
had come exclusively from the commander-in-chief. 
Institutions
The new framework implied the creation of a MoD, detached from the 
military and as part of democratic oversight over the FADM. The FADM is 
thus subordinate in administrative and legal matters to the MoD. The minister 
of defence has to account for the sector, being responsible to parliament and 
the public for the performance of the armed forces. He/she is responsible 
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for chairing the Defence Council, which comprises the chief of general staff 
and the commanders of the three services (army, air force, and navy). The 
armed forces are left with the operational aspects, namely the preparation 
for and execution of their missions. As a new structure, in its civil role the 
MoD is still confronted with serious capacity-building challenges in terms of 
management, recruitment, and maintenance of skilled personnel. Also, its 
articulation with the FADM and especially with the general staff headquarters 
needs to be improved. The process of clarifying the dividing lines between 
the daily activities of the organs of the MoD and the departments of the 
general staff headquarters has taken a long time, perhaps revealing a need 
for a major revision of both structures and respective competencies.
The National Council for Defence and Security started convening only in 
2002, and that only because of the need to decide upon the participation of the 
FADM in the Burundi peace mission. This reveals that co-ordination among 
the institutions of the security sector is very weak, and that the discussions 
that should be evolving about improving the sector as a whole are dormant, 
or exist partially only between the head of state and the relevant minister.
The parliamentary committee for defence and public order constitutes only 
an embryonic organ for the further cultivation of accountability, since the 
average MP has to deal with the need to educate himself/herself about 
the functioning of a democracy, about parliament’s own role and general 
parliamentary procedures, and only then about the specific issue for which 
he/she is responsible. Those who work on this committee also have another 
disadvantage, which arises from the fact of the security sector being a closed 
area about which information is difficult to obtain. Notwithstanding these 
disadvantages, the committee generates caution in the executive, as the latter 
knows it can be called to account.
Probably the most significant achievement in restructuring is that the ruling 
party no longer controls the armed forces. They comprise an independent 
institution which, so far, has remained true to democratic rule, never 
attempting to reverse the constitutional order.
Developing a national security policy
There is no evidence of a major vulnerability, threat, and risk analysis having 
been consistently done in order to inform the policies on defence and security. 
The policies were conceived on the one hand because the sector institutions 
were performing in a legal vacuum, and on the other because there was a 
need for a framework in which to start restructuring the sector. The acts were 
drafted mostly with the support of foreign advisors. 
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The initiative for the laws came from the executive, in spite of the constitution 
empowering the parliament with that task. This shows the weakness of the 
parliament in terms of its main legislative task, but the positive contribution 
was that it refused to pass the Defence and Armed Forces Act 18 of 1997 
(Republic of Mozambique 1997b) before having a general policy on national 
defence and security. This, however, instead of being drafted through a wide 
consultative process involving all relevant state institutions, was left to the 
MoD. It would have been wiser to have involved the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, since the external missions assigned to the military are supposed to 
derive from political foreign policy objectives. In practice, it was probably 
counter-productive to wait for any contribution from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which is overstretched in terms of time and resources. Civil 
society made hardly any contribution to the act. The consultation process 
was very weak, and there was only one major seminar, organised by the 
MoD with the support of the African–American Institute, that allowed for 
discussion about security and defence in post-war Mozambique. It has to be 
recognised, however, that over time a culture of secrecy on security issues 
has been built in Mozambican society. Mozambican civil society, being itself 
under construction, either had a limited understanding of the issues or felt 
constrained. Its willingness to participate and debate defence-related issues 
was revealed to be limited, despite its necessary role as both a watchdog and 
as a contributor that could serve as a channel to express the needs and views 
of the people. 
Since then, it seems that not much has evolved within the policy formulation 
arena in the MoD. The Ad Hoc Working Group established in December 
1994, comprising representatives of the services and civil servants at the 
MoD, which prepared the draft of the acts on defence and security policy, 
defence and armed forces, and military conscription, seems to be in need of 
revitalisation. The group was apparently tasked with drafting the first-ever 
defence white paper, but so far this has not been completed. This is a necessary 
step, however. Once a proper threat analysis has been developed, there 
will be a basis on which to formulate the missing strategic defence concept 
(which once again should merit contributions from other ministries), so as 
to elaborate a military strategic concept and a strategic plan for institutional 
development for the MoD. 
Policy implementation and performance 
The concept of national security in the Defence and Security Act (Republic 
of Mozambique 1997a) was not widely contested. It has been the 
implementation process that has brought outrage from the general public, 
especially with regard to the incapacity of the police and the criminal justice 
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system to deal with daily criminality and organised crime. Indeed, the shape, 
training, and quality of information of the police have been questioned in the 
light of the mounting threats linked to the drug trade and trafficking, money 
laundering, trafficking of human body parts, smuggling of goods, vehicle 
theft and bank robberies, organisation of assassination groups, penetration 
of the state and business by criminal networks, obstruction of justice, and 
corruption by criminal networks. How these threats are to be dealt with, 
when, and with which resources is still to be clarified, as there is not yet an 
integrated criminal justice system and correspondent policy. Nonetheless, 
the Ministry of Interior has developed the Strategic Plan for the Police of the 
Republic of Mozambique, 2003–2012 (Republic of Mozambique 2003), which 
was approved by the Council of Ministers in May 2004. People involved 
in the process revealed concern for the order of priorities, as all the work 
done hinged on the missing public order act. There are, however, current 
reassurances that the latter is in the pipeline. On the other hand, the justice 
sector also produced an integrated strategic plan, which was approved in 
2002, but reveals only a minimal level of co-ordination between the police 
and the justice institutions concerning criminal justice.
Common to the process of policymaking is the fact that personnel are 
absorbed by daily tasks (which are in themselves emergencies, given the 
nature of the sector), and do not have time to complete the policy process. 
This is compounded by the fact that the intelligence sector has also not 
presented its act, leading to a reinforcement of the public image that the 
security sector remains a closed arena.2
Public discontent was also noticed in 2000 when major floods hit the country 
and the FADM did not have the capacity or organisation to intervene 
effectively, requiring massive support from neighbouring countries’ military 
forces to deal with the situation. This raised major questions about the 
general state of the defence and armed forces sector, and appeals were made 
for the government to provide minimal resources for the operability of the 
FADM, especially taking into account its new tasks such as disaster relief, 
peace-support operations, assistance in fishery protection, and coastal patrol. 
Although government programmes in the two post-war mandates said 
very little about defence issues, they did mention them. The problem was 
that no decisions followed as to the medium- and long-term composition, 
equipment, training, and deployment of the FADM, or about the resources it 
needed to perform its missions. 
Currently efforts are under way to implement the new organisational 
restructuring of the MoD, to finish the defence white paper, and to elaborate 
a strategic plan for the defence sector. Among other major projects are those 
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to improve conditions in the military academy and to prepare troops to 
participate in peace-support operations.
Mozambique in the SADC project
Due to its recent history of armed conflict, and successful achievement and 
maintenance of a peace agreement, other countries have seen Mozambique as 
a credible intermediary in conflict situations. Mozambique has been involved 
in the Burundi peace process, acted when the Comores crisis erupted, and 
participated in the easing of tensions in Madagascar and in connection with 
the Zimbabwean crisis, among others. Its devotion to the regional project 
originates from an historical legacy of strong engagement as an active 
member of the FLS. The country was also deeply involved in the creation of 
SADCC and in the latter’s transformation into SADC. Recently, Mozambique 
has been committed to the development of SADC’s OPDSC. The country 
held the OPDSC presidency in 2002–03 and engaged in furthering the 
institutionalisation of its structures, including the elaboration of SIPO. 
Mozambique has also taken an active part in the other mechanisms of SADC 
dealing with security issues, such as the SARPCCO, and has participated 
in regional peacekeeping exercises that took place in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, ‘Blue Hungwe’ (1997) and ‘Blue Crane’ (1999), respectively. 
Mozambique has also acceded to SADC’s Mutual Defence Pact, viewing it 
as a way of deterring major outbreaks of violent armed conflict in the region, 
despite an understanding of the need to improve procedures.3 A major 
question that could be raised is the extent to which Mozambique would be 
able to meet and maintain its commitments within the pact, should such 
need arise, since it possesses weak armed forces. Surprisingly, this does 
not seem to constitute a major problem for the government. Officials have 
indicated that Mozambique’s contribution does not necessarily have to entail 
the deployment of forces, but that it can be made from a political standpoint, 
or in areas such as communication and command. The pact should also be 
looked upon as an opportunity for the country to start reorganising its forces 
in order to meet regional commitments.4
The decision to participate in the AU mission to Burundi is an indication that 
the country feels the need to have the capacity to engage in peace missions. 
The fact that Mozambique went through such pacification and is undergoing 
a democratisation process in a peaceful way has prompted international and, 
especially, continental pressure for the country to be visibly represented in 
peace missions in order to share its experience and to encourage the mission 
recipient country. Nonetheless, from the point of view of sustainability, it was 
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questionable whether the country was really ready to engage in a mission 
such as the one in Burundi. Mozambique has previously sent observers to 
the DRC and had a small military police unit in East Timor, these being the 
only prior such engagements. The latter happened with the external logistical 
support of Portugal and, in the case of Burundi, this support came from the 
United Kingdom. The successful participation of the Mozambican contingent 
in the Burundi mission indicates that the country stands ready to engage its 
troops in similar missions, provided that financial and logistic support comes 
from external sources. 
Concerning the impact that a country’s domestic process of democratisation 
may have on its regional role, one senior Mozambican official argued that 
the strength of a country’s image is proportional to its internal political 
developments, including its institutional management capacity and the 
guarantee of the liberties of its citizens. These constitute major factors 
in a country’s credibility, especially as regards its involvement in conflict 
resolution.5 In his view, the fact that various countries, such as South Africa, 
Namibia, and Mozambique, are undergoing democratisation processes is a 
positive regional indicator. This supports the building up of the perception 
that it is impossible to escape such a process, thus helping to forge the need 
to create common values. However, situations such as that in Zimbabwe and 
the trends in Swaziland show that the positive impact is limited, insofar as 
each country is following its particular way within different understandings of 
democracy. Such analysis is helpful to explain resistance to the consolidation 
of SADC structures – as the state-building process is occurring simultaneously 
along the lines of contested democratisation transitions, governments are very 
wary of discussing domestic security issues. The outcome is a situation where 
either the countries do not want to be confronted with a regional discussion 
on their domestic situation, or they want to bring it to the forefront of the 
agenda to legitimise and attain regional support for a pre-determined cause, 
which is often linked to the maintenance of a certain elite in power.
Conclusion
Democratisation in Mozambique reveals a highly exclusionary process, both 
from the political and economic points of view. The way out of the creation 
of an extremely polarised society lies in increased pluralism and tolerance 
of competitive views and interests in order to develop a more integrated, 
equitable, and cohesive society.
The impact of democratisation upon national security perceptions led to a total 
reorganisation of the security sector, by conceding priority to public security 
imperatives. Also, democratisation required the introduction of new practices 
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for the oversight of the security forces by democratic institutions, although 
this needs to be strengthened, particularly as regards non-violent means of 
conflict management and resolution. The improvement of security sector 
management, the provision of adequate resources, and the enhancement of 
performance remain challenges, since security must be treated as a public 
good to be delivered to the people. This approach, embracing both state 
and human security, should be anchored in a national security policy. Its 
implementation, along with the consolidation of the practices of transparency 
and accountability, and the improvement of democratic control structures, 
will constitute a major achievement in the movement towards the democratic 
governance of the sector, so far embryonic.
The end of the internal war, the reformulated national security conception, 
and the historical commitment of the country towards integration in the 
region have led to the present situation where regional issues rate high on 
the country’s agenda. Mozambique is totally committed to the regional co-
operation goal, and its achievements during its presidency of the OPDSC 
demonstrated that it can assume a pivotal position, despite not being a 
regional power. The extent to which the country’s devotion to the regional 
agenda might be curtailed seems to be only a remote scenario, created either 
by a most unlikely halt of the internal democratisation process through 
a new armed conflict, or by a power change resulting in a less politically 
and technically capable government that is unable to deal with its regional 
counterparts. The changeover from the Chissano to the Guebuza regime at 
the end of 2004, however, suggested that this is also most unlikely and that, if 
anything, Mozambique’s ability to play a regional role is likely to increase. 
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Namibia has achieved a widely respected democratic political process 
following decades of apartheid oppression and military occupation. Repeated 
multi-party elections, good governance, a generally free media, respect for 
the constitution, and rule of law characterise 15 years of independence. 
On the human security side, Namibia has sustained modest economic 
growth with a strong spending bias toward human capital development 
in health and education. Extreme inequality and persistently high poverty 
and unemployment remain the most important challenges, complicated by 
very high levels of HIV infection, although good state and civil capacities are 
being brought to bear on these problems.
In respect of traditional state security issues, independent Namibia has had 
only brief encounters with violent threats to peace and security. The most 
serious problem involved the spill-over violence of Angola’s civil war in a 
portion of the far north-eastern border area. Namibia also sent troops to the 
DRC (August 1998–September 2001) in defence of an embattled government 
there. However, despite being situated in such a ‘bad security neighbourhood’, 
the country has been remarkably tranquil since independence.
Democratic contributions from the transition to independence
In many ways, Namibia epitomises a successful transition for African human 
and common security (Forrest 2000; Bauer 2001). Following a protracted 
armed struggle for independence that drew in several countries, and 
extensive cross-border violence, negotiations took place in 1988, leading to 
a Tripartite Agreement that allowed a peaceful transition to independence 
for one of Africa’s very last colonies. These negotiations directly involved 
the superpowers of the day, the immediate neighbouring countries that 
were part of the conflict, and the UN. However, the Namibian parties to the 
conflict were not included at this stage. These latter players had been part of 
the negotiations a decade earlier and became the grand architects of their 
own destinies after UN-supervised elections under UN Security Council 
Resolution 435, which took place in 1989.
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Except for an initial spasm of violence in which People’s Liberation Army 
of Namibia (PLAN) combatants were killed inside Namibia, the transition 
proceeded remarkably smoothly. Several thousand UN operatives serving in 
the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) oversaw the withdrawal of 
South African troops, the disarmament and demobilisation of PLAN fighters, 
the voluntary repatriation of Namibian exiles, the registration of voters, 
the electoral campaign, the conduct of the election itself, and the eventual 
transition to independence. 
The South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) – the UN General 
Assembly’s declared ‘sole authentic voice of the Namibian people’ – captured 
57 per cent of the vote from an incredible 96 per cent voter turnout in the 
seven-day-long voting for a 72-member Constituent Assembly. The South 
African-backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance gained 27 per cent, and five out 
of the many other smaller political parties split most of the rest. These seven 
parties drew up a democratic constitution that was adopted unanimously to 
govern the newly independent country. As with other ‘pacted’ transitions, 
Namibia’s elites were able to construct a consensus with the consent and co-
operation of a multitude of external forces. This process launched one of the 
most successful transitions in Africa and among all democratic transitions of 
the ‘Third Wave’. 
As a result of the election, Namibians, through their elected representatives 
in the Constituent Assembly, were able to construct a widely admired 
democratic constitution, adopt and pursue a policy of national reconciliation, 
merge the previously warring armies, and create a stable democratic political 
system that became one of Africa’s leading models according to a variety of 
standard criteria (Keulder 2003: 35).
Peace and stability
Namibia’s new dispensation combined several features that account for the 
widely acknowledged success. The end of the war and of apartheid were 
both a cause and a consequence of the transition. The commitment to 
democratic practices and a mixed economy created a common agenda for 
moving the society forward. The policy of national reconciliation created the 
political environment to begin afresh to build a more just society. Finally, the 
policies of affirmative action and inclusion guaranteed that the new society 
envisioned would be dramatically more inclusive than the apartheid past.
Among the most important accomplishments of the new government 
has been the ending of decades of military occupation by colonial troops. 
Even today, more than a decade later, especially in the northern regions, 
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Namibians continue to credit SWAPO with the end of the military violence 
of occupation, and some indicate that they would continue to support the 
ruling party for this reason alone.
The first democratic accomplishment was the writing and adoption of the 
constitution by unanimous consent in the Constituent Assembly. Following 
general principles that were negotiated more than a decade before, the 
assembly was able to complete its work in a matter of weeks. The results 
drew widespread praise from all quarters. The constitution blended various 
institutional elements from different democratic societies and entrenched 
guarantees of human and civil rights. 
One of the critical policies in helping to achieve this peaceful condition was 
that of national reconciliation. This policy had already been anticipated in 
meetings outside the country between SWAPO leaders and various internal 
elements of Namibian society. In particular, President Nujoma and many 
of his colleagues were instrumental in pushing the reconciliation agenda. 
During the first administration, opposition politicians were regularly included 
in deliberations and governing tasks (e.g. as the ombudsman and the auditor-
general, and in cabinet and other posts), and an important participatory 
pattern was established that underpins Namibian democracy.
In the early phase of the 435 process, South Africa’s last administrator-
general in the territory issued a general amnesty for all politically related 
offences up to 1990, thus legally neutralising the issue of past actions for all 
sides. Since SWAPO had its own problems with the very large number of its 
own members imprisoned and tortured in the dungeons of Lubango, Angola 
(Leys and Saul 1995), all sides seemed to have a stake in moving forward 
rather than revisiting the past. This reconciliation policy repeatedly aimed at 
preventing the country becoming bogged down in recriminations over the 
past, and gave momentum to the necessary development of the society as 
a whole.
Democratic assessment
With the end of the Cold War, certain choices were closed to Namibians 
(returning to the bush with diminished international support), while others 
became all but inevitable (acceding to democratic practices and adopting 
a mixed economy). SWAPO embraced the new challenge enthusiastically, 
with the support of many old and new international allies. Namibia has 
retained strong international support in the form of larger donor assistance 
than average for African countries, in the large number of foreign embassies 
(more than 40) and international agencies (more than 12) present in such a 
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small country, and in the leadership role that it has played in the numerous 
regional and international bodies where it is represented (more than 50 
budgeted international memberships).
Free and fair elections subsequent to 1989 demonstrated that Namibia was 
capable of running its own democracy and abiding by the rule of law. Indeed, 
free and fair elections have been a hallmark of Namibian democracy. After the 
1994 elections, in which the president was elected independently and SWAPO 
gained a free hand with over a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, 
a discernible change was evident, with less concern for the involvement of 
other political players in governance. Such a change in attitude was only 
partial, but saw the emergence of less tolerant forces and tendencies within 
the ruling party. However, the overall democratic project has remained intact, 
and some democratic practices, forces, and institutions have become more 
mature and embedded in the political system. No dramatic overhaul of the 
constitution has ensued from the ruling party’s two-thirds majority.
Among the highlights of institutional development is the increasing effec-
tiveness of parliament. Although the absolute dominance of cabinet in 
the National Assembly weakens its critical checking and balancing roles, 
committees have become important access points for the public and oversight 
centres for parliamentarians. These committees comprise opposition 
members and SWAPO backbenchers. The Public Accounts Committee is led 
by an opposition member, and has become very effective in bringing budget 
and spending issues to public and parliamentary attention. Namibia plays a 
very active role in international parliamentary bodies and seems interested 
in adopting best practices whenever it is feasible. The National Council, 
representing the 13 regions with constituency-elected councillors, has taken 
its oversight role seriously by becoming an effective check on cabinet. Several 
pieces of important legislation have been sent back for reworking or have 
been rejected outright by the council, which has developed a less partisan 
working style. 
Other constitutional and statutory bodies (auditor-general, Public Service 
Commission, Judicial Appointments Commission, Ombudsman’s Office, 
and the higher courts) have also developed effective oversight capacities. 
Government has acceded to the findings of these bodies when it is found to 
be at fault, which is an important measure of the rule of law for a democratic 
society. 
Civil society has several access points to influence policy beyond the ballot 
box, but has yet to regularise the practice. During the liberation struggle, civil 
society had been a strong ‘substitute opposition’ and it went into eclipse as 
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the new government assumed many of the functions and personnel from pre-
independence social opposition. Although people regularly express complaints 
through the radio call-in programmes, the most common public practice 
remains a pervasive self-censorship toward the ruling party, the military, and 
the national leadership, bordering on fear. Nevertheless, some sectors such 
as those concerned with legal rights, gender inclusion, and the environment 
do have strong and sustained inputs to the political system. Access to local 
government seems to be stronger than access at the national level at present. 
Hence it is hoped that the current extensive decentralisation exercise at the 
regional and local levels will increase public access and effectiveness.
Government does listen to the wider public, but many SWAPO leaders 
remain wedded to the liberation movement heritage of distrusting potential 
rivals. They seem to have an obsession with control, and to fear civil society 
becoming a ‘shadow opposition’ to the ruling party, especially in conjunction 
with external sources of support. In part, the strong support for the government 
of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe follows from these sentiments. Often, the 
inclusion of civil society is only pro forma or token, rather than substantive. 
One area in which SWAPO and other interests in society have clashed is that 
of media freedom. SWAPO publishes a newspaper of its own (Namibia Today), 
established and controls the government paper (New Era), and controls the 
Namibian Broadcasting Corporation, whose radio service reaches by far the 
largest audience. Nonetheless, it has had several confrontations with the 
media over disliked coverage. This is true for the independent media and 
government-owned press as well, but the daily press, owned by whites, 
has been especially subject to criticism, and to the banning of government 
advertisements and government-paid subscriptions. Such a policy does not 
seem to have intimidated or harmed the media up to this point. Despite the 
coverage biases of incumbency and control over government media, most 
Namibians have many opportunities to be well informed.
In sum, it seems that Namibia has made the necessary policy and performance 
adjustments to continue the process of ‘developing democracy’, in Diamond’s 
(1999) terms. Perhaps democracy is not yet consolidated in Namibia, but it 
has been sustained and advanced to some considerable degree of maturity. 
This has been greatly assisted by the generally prevailing peace and stability 
of the country since independence, the government’s adherence to the 
constitution, and the policies of reconciliation and inclusion.
This assessment of Namibia’s democratic performance is generally supported 
by international measures of various aspects of important democratic 
features and by the general level of social peace and satisfaction as measured 
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in opinion surveys. In its Human Development Report 2002, the UNDP (2002) 
has assembled some of these measures, as has the African Development 
Bank’s (2002) African Development Report 2001. One of the evaluations comes 
from the conservative Freedom House, which has regarded Namibia as 
‘free’ since independence, based on policy and performance on a number of 
issues that the organisation regards as important. In the area of civil liberties, 
Namibia has rated a 3, and on political rights it has fared even better, at 2 
(scores of 1, 2, and 3 are considered ‘free’, a designation achieved by only 
nine African countries). These scores have been consistent since 1991. In 
press freedom, Namibia rates a bit lower, due to the government’s attitude 
indicated above. 
On other measures, such as corruption, ‘voice and accountability’, law and 
order, government effectiveness, and gender inclusion, Namibia scores very 
positively – often second or third in Africa, often vying with its neighbours 
Botswana and South Africa (UNDP 2002). In sum, Namibia is consistently 
at or very near the top in Africa in measures of democratic performance. 
Furthermore, the country has done better than average in economic growth 
(achieving positive real per capita growth since independence, albeit modest 
compared to Botswana), and has stayed out of the debt traps and other 
financial difficulties that plague so many African countries.
This positive outcome can also be traced in the attitudes of the Namibian 
people. As measured in the Afrobarometer surveys, Namibians are among 
the most satisfied in the region – and in Africa – with the performance of 
government and trust in leaders. The most disturbing opinions among 
Namibians are related to the lack of general appreciation for democracy, 
and lack of strong opposition to anti-democratic actions. Keulder, an 
Afrobarometer researcher, claims Namibia seems to have a greater supply of 
democracy, from the constitution and the current political leadership, than 
there is a demand for it from the public. This is especially true of the main 
SWAPO base of support in the northern Oshivambo-speaking rural areas, 
and even more marked among rural Oshivambo-speaking youth. Higher 
education levels and more income are positively related to democratic values, 
which could mean improving conditions in the future due to Namibia’s high 
levels of education spending (over 20 per cent of the budget), high literacy 
rates (82 per cent), and relative economic success (Keulder 2002).
Additional deficits and challenges to democracy and stability include both 
economic and political issues. On the economic side, Namibia continues 
to have one of the most unequal distributions of income and wealth in the 
world. Specifically, a very large body of relatively uneducated and unskilled 
people remain unemployed. Although the younger unemployed are likely 
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to have more schooling, they are not appropriately trained for employment 
opportunities, especially given the high proportion of employed workers 
who have low-level skills. As in other developing and developed countries, 
unskilled work is not a high growth sector of the economy. Since indepen-
dence, unemployment has been a source of social unrest (though isolated), 
especially among youth and former combatants. This issue has regularly 
generated some of the largest public demonstrations and marches to State 
House to attract the symbolic attention of the president, to whom everyone 
looks for solutions.
On the political side, Namibia has passed through the succession stage of 
transferring peacefully from the first independence leader to the next, with 
the retirement at the end of 2004 of President Sam Nujoma. However, like 
its neighbours to the south and east, Namibia is not likely to see a change of 
governing party any time soon, which is taken as an indication of democratic 
consolidation and maturity by some political scientists. 
On the economic side, modest growth has failed to cut deeply into poverty and 
inequality. The modest growth rate in job creation from the private sector has 
put pressure on the government to grow its employment at an unsustainable 
rate. Inequitable distribution of land remains a major challenge, and there 
is some popular pressure on SWAPO to act on this issue. Thus far the land 
issue remains manageable under the current policy regime, though it will 
need increased resources and attention.
Despite success in extending education and primary healthcare, inequality 
remains a danger to peace and stability. This is especially true in terms of the 
crime and domestic violence that have accompanied Namibia’s independence 
transition. However, the government has sound economic policies in place and 
there are good growth prospects in the medium term, while the concentration 
of the poor in low-density rural areas, coupled with strong support for the 
ruling party, reduces the political risk of inequality and poverty. Nevertheless, 
as in most Southern African countries, food security is a vital issue for the rural 
poor. Climate changes or recurrent droughts frequently put many households 
at risk. In 2002–03, hundreds of thousands of people were on food assistance 
programmes as a result of both drought and flood. 
Finally, the impact of HIV/AIDS is an ever-present challenge to human and 
state security. Each sector of the economy must feel the impact – in education 
(teacher mortality and orphans in classes), in the workforce (shortages of 
key skills and high cost of replacements), and the general disruption of the 
society as people become ill and family life is threatened (ECA 2003: 49). 
The high point of the crisis is expected in the next few years, which gives 
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little time to make adjustments. Namibia has been a bit slow and late in 
rolling out the treatment phase of its response, but has the advantage (like 
Botswana) of good infrastructure and a small population that makes it more 
affordable. Namibia’s HIV/AIDS policy framework is well developed, giving 
some advantages in dealing with the pandemic.
Security legacies of colonial rule
Contrary to the assertion by Arlinghaus (1984: 17) that during the period of 
colonial rule in Africa the indigenous societies were largely demilitarised, 
some parts of Namibia under South African rule experienced the trauma of 
high militarisation. This reality is especially true for the area in and around 
the northern war zones, which experienced massive and prolonged direct 
military occupation. Apartheid military perceptions at times saw Namibia as 
a fifth province, and at others as a buffer against the African onslaught.
This state of militarisation was possible due to the various provisions of 
the South African Defence Act 44 of 1957, which tilted the scale of civil–
military relations in favour of the colonial military’s institutional interest. 
There were also other pieces of draconian security legislation, which bred a 
war psychology and whose application caused immeasurable hardship and 
suffering to ordinary Namibian citizens. These included the Terrorism Act 
83 of 1977, which provided the security apparatus with extensive powers, 
including arrest without a warrant, trial, or legal representation (Ruppel 
1987: 229; SWAPO Department of Information and Publicity 1987: 107).
As a result of the intensification of the war of liberation, the provisions of 
these laws were ruthlessly enforced by the colonial troops, who became active 
agents of coercion. This was manifested by the dusk-to-dawn curfews and the 
requirements that all persons above the age of 16 should carry identification 
documents at all times. Worse was the discretionary power given to the 
military arbitrarily to detain and interrogate a civilian accused of ‘subversive 
political activism’, as well as those suspected of concealing information on 
the whereabouts of PLAN combatants. Ruppel (1987: 227) described this 
state of affairs as the regime resorting to security laws to suppress legitimate 
opposition and ‘to make up with institutionalised violence for what it lacked 
in legitimacy’. This could hardly have been expected to lay the basis of 
democratic or civilised norms.
Security legacies of the liberation movement 
PLAN was established in 1966, based on a classic Maoist guerrilla army 
model (Brown 1995: 20). From its inception, PLAN was a political army that 
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was required to maintain strong party–army interpenetrations. This posed a 
number of challenges for the SWAPO leadership in their quest for asserting 
control over the army. Hence the system of political commissars was 
introduced: such officers were not only responsible for approving military 
plans, as well as other operational functions at each level of the organisation, 
but were also tasked with the building of an ideological army with civilian 
dominance.
Therefore, in addition to waging a war of attrition, during their missions into 
the country, the combatants also had the responsibility of mobilising civilian 
support for their cause. The latter, according to Brown (1995: 29), helped the 
operations of PLAN in many ways – for instance, ‘ammunition, grenades, 
mortars and landmines no longer had to be carried on human backs into 
northern Namibia, but could be loaded onto cattle or vehicles provided by 
business people’.
With the view of undermining the party through infiltration, the South 
African regime made various attempts at planting its agents both within 
the rank and file of the liberation movement membership and in the army. 
The pinch of these plants was felt by SWAPO from 1981, when both the 
PLAN command structure and the general SWAPO leadership came to 
the realisation that the enemy had extremely accurate knowledge of their 
movements and intentions. This led to the establishment within SWAPO of 
a specialised SWAPO Security Organisation (SSO) as the curator of internal 
party political order, with the absolute power to act against perceived threats 
to the party, as well as the ensuing identification of friends and foes of the 
party and its course. Given this high-profile and politicised security role, the 
organ quickly became an essential core of the liberation struggle, as it took 
on the mission of securing the party from both external and internal threats.
This culminated in the infamous and highly controversial spy drama, which 
was epitomised by the detention and systematic torture of hundreds of 
SWAPO members in prison camps in Angola in the 1980s, most notably 
at Lubango (Leys and Saul 1995: 6). This was, however, perpetuated not 
only for the strengthening of the party, but also to satisfy the preservation 
instincts of those constituting this security organ, and subsequently led to 
what Lamb (2000: 105) terms a severe civil–military imbalance in favour of 
SSO. Despite earlier insistence by the SWAPO political leadership that it 
had overall control of all military and political activities executed under the 
banner of the movement, the effective autonomy of the security organ was 
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Institutional restructuring in the post-colonial era
The implementation of Resolution 435 required prioritising an effective 
programme for the process of the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, 
and reintegration of ex-combatants, as initiated by UNTAG. Later, after 
independence, the new combined military was trained under an agreement 
with the British government, which supplied the British Military Assistance and 
Training Team (BMATT), thus giving additional professional reinforcement 
for civilian control. 
Although issues of defence mainly remained a direct prerogative of the various 
organs of the South African government in Pretoria and Cape Town throughout 
the period of South African colonial rule over Namibia, on the ground South 
Africa created a number of military and quasi-military structures in its fight to 
retain control over the territory. For example, the notorious Koevoet, a police 
counter-insurgency unit, was formed in 1977 (Brown 1995: 23). Another such 
structure was the South West Africa Territorial Force, which, according to 
Cawthra (1986: 201), was conceived by South African military planners with 
a long-term role in mind, in particular that it would provide opportunities 
for indoctrination of recruits, who would then constitute the nucleus for the 
armed forces in the post-independence dispensation. 
Of all these, only the South African Defence Force members were withdrawn 
back to South Africa. Therefore at independence Namibia was faced with 
the challenge of transforming and integrating security apparatuses that were 
inherited from the previous political dispensation, in order to bring them into 
line with the newly established political and constitutional order, although 
in practice only about 10 per cent of the Namibia Defence Force (NDF) came 
from the former military units allied to South Africa, the vast majority being 
from PLAN (Preston 1993).
Entrenching civil supremacy
As the defence and security establishments are entrusted with the responsi-
bility for executing the important functions of national defence and security, 
there is a need to define the parameters for managing relations between 
armed forces on the one hand, and the broader interest of society, as 
represented by those elected and/or appointed to hold public office, on the 
other. 
This reality provided the basis for civil supremacy, which requires the armed 
forces to exert their bureaucratic bargaining powers, while also requiring 
them to accept policy directives of elected political office bearers in general, 
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and in particular that of the office bearer entrusted with the defence functions 
(Lamb 2000: 100). These principles strengthened the liberation tradition and 
were reinforced by the BMATT just after independence, when the different 
armies were consolidated into a common national military, the NDF.
Civil supremacy principles in Namibia derive their legal basis from article 
1.2 of the constitution, which vests state power in the people and stipulates 
that this shall be exercised on their behalf by the democratic institutions of 
the state. These principles, together with other articles of the constitution, 
provide the mechanisms for effective subordination of the armed forces to 
civilian political control, by entrusting political office bearers with the overall 
policymaking prerogatives, including those relating to foreign and defence 
policies. 
Further delineation of the defence force’s professional competence, together 
with the limitations of its direct involvement in the political policymaking 
terrain, is provided for in the Defence Force Act 20 of 1990. The act 
distinctively allocates the respective institutional roles and identities of a 
civilian-led MoD on the one hand, and an army composed of a professional 
and politically sterile corps of professional soldiers on the other. According to 
these provisions, the ministry is responsible for instilling the relevant civilian 
expertise through its various support services, including the exercising of 
political authority. The armed forces are tasked with defending Namibia’s 
territorial integrity and national interest.
Civilian dominance is complicated by the fact that, between the years 
2000 and 2003, 61 per cent of the members of the National Assembly were 
either directly or indirectly members of the executive branch. This created 
a perception that the legislature is dominated by the executive. This has 
important implications for parliamentary oversight over public institutions in 
the security sector, as a cornerstone of good governance in the sector and for 
the transparency of security sector planning, management, and budgeting. 
While it is appropriate that some information about the security sector is 
confidential, most of it can be made public without fear of compromising 
state security. A lack of transparency invariably undermines a country’s 
long-term economic and political stability more than transparency damages 
its security. Namibia’s liberation tradition of secrecy and closed command 
conflicts with the open democratic system that is being created: these two 
approaches remain contradictory and a cause for concern.
One indicator of the national perceptions of security is found in the allocation 
of public resources to security agencies in relation to other public institutions 
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and functions. Table 1 provides outlines of such allocation in the 2004 budget 
to three agencies of state operating in the security sector: the NDF, the State 
Security Agency (SSA), and the Special Field Forces (SFF).
Average allocation to the security sector (defence, state security [intelligence], 
and the SFF [a kind of gendarmerie]) as a percentage of the country’s GDP 
since independence has been nearly 3 per cent, peaking at 4.5 per cent in 
1999. Increases in defence spending can be seen as running parallel to slight 
declines in health and education budget shares, despite improved state 
security conditions after the end of the civil war in Angola. 
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As % of 
national 
budget
1990 2,175.7 119 5.5 0 0 0 0 1.9
1991 2,897.5 188 6.5 0 0 15.4 0.5 2.8
1992 3,382.0 190 5.6 0 0 17.9 0.5 2.5
1993 3,386.3 180 5.3 0 0 14.6 0.4 2.0
1994 3,738.5 214 5.7 17.6 0.5 10.9 0.3 2.0
1995 4,380.0 275 6.3 19.5 0.5 18.0 0.4 2.4
1996 5,325.1 382 7.2 17.5 0.3 28.3 0.5 2.8
1997 5,778.3 414 7.2 25.9 0.5 48.2 0.8 2.8
1998 6,446.2 521 8.1 28.7 0.5 80.1 1.3 3.3
1999 8,009.3 789 9.9 22.1 0.3 150.0 1.9 4.5
2000 8,761.9 785 9.0 41.2 0.5 219.6 2.5 4.2
2001 10,492.0 905 8.6 38.6 0.4 233.0 2.2 4.3
2002 11,477.5 935 8.2 41.2 0.4 267.0 2.3 4.0
2003 12,256.7 879 7.2 46.6 0.4 193.8 1.6 3.2
Note: In the 2004 budget speech and documentation, these trends continued with slight declines in 
personnel countered by slight rises in spending (Ministry of Finance 2004). There were 16,091 funded 
positions in the NDF, while NAMPOL had 12,508. Defence spending totaled NAD 1,087,888,000, up 
by NAD 94 million on the year. The SFF had over 6,000 positions with more than NAD 265 million 
budgeted. National Intelligence received over NAD 45 million. No changes in existing trends were 
indicated, e.g. before the 1999 presidential election, thousands of new security sector jobs were cre-
ated largely through the establishment of the SFF.
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The NDF received on average 7.2 per cent of the national budget between 
1990 and 2003. The allocations rose gradually until 1999, when they peaked 
at close to 10 per cent. Overall, defence has been the fourth-largest spending 
vote after basic education and culture, health and social services, and 
finance (Sherbourne 2001: 1). Defence spending is also often favoured in 
the additional budgets midway through the fiscal year, when the allocations 
receive less attention.
Security institutions
The overall staff component of the MoD for the NDF in 2003 consisted of 
17,441 positions, of which only 15,834 were filled. This compares with the 
Namibian Police Force (NAMPOL), which was allocated almost the same 
number of positions in its establishment (17,034), of which only 11,656 were 
filled (Republic of Namibia n.d.: 18). As recently as 1998, the figures were 
half this number. The war in the DRC and an attempted secession in the 
Caprivi sparked a significant increase in military spending and presence in 
the country. The addition of expensive air and marine wings have also had 
budget implications. Older equipment will need future replacement and 
updating as well. 
Apart from its engagement in regional and international peacekeeping 
operations, the NDF has maintained an active peacetime role of comple men-
ting various efforts of civil authorities and communities alike. These included 
protection of the Namibian territorial waters in collaboration with the Ministry 
of Fisheries and Marine Resources, and undertaking joint operations with 
NAMPOL. It has also undertaken emergency and rescue missions, including 
the combating of bushfires, and most importantly de-mining operations in 
the northern regions of Kunene, Omusati, and Ohangwena, where hundreds 
of unexploded mines from the war were left scattered.
A company owned by the MoD, called August 26th, with a board comprising 
senior uniformed and civilian officials in the defence sector, has emerged 
in recent years as a significant new player. It has some important roles that 
are not yet clearly defined. In the investment portfolio of this company is 
the ownership of a diamond mining concession allocated to the Namibian 
government by the then government of the DRC, as compensation for the 
cost of Namibia’s efforts to save the regime at a critical moment. Although 
the costs of these military activities were born by the state revenue fund, the 
accruals from this venture filter to the coffers of a state enterprise owned by 
the MoD rather than to the general government revenue that bore the burden 
of the initial expense. The diamond mine issue has attracted questions in 
parliament by the opposition, but with little follow-up.
Namibia
136
Security and Democracy in Southern Africa
Although it remains difficult to establish the operations and structure of the 
National Intelligence Security Agency (located in the Office of the President) 
due to a dearth of reliable data on its operations, expenditure, and staff 
component, the lump sum allocations are reflected in the national budget 
documents. According to the figures provided in these documents, the 
allocations to the intelligence agency have never exceeded 0.5 per cent of 
the national budget, and from 2001 to the present they have been on a slight 
decline. The agency had a budget of NAD 46 million (USD 4.6 million) in 
2003. However, the taxpayers and the general public remain in the dark 
regarding the actual role of this agency and how the funds appropriated to 
it are being used and accounted for. Staff numbers probably range between 
200 and 400 if other ministries with similar budgets can be used as a measure. 
These are over and above the VIP security troops, who now outnumber the 
police involved in crime fighting! Allegations of the intelligence agency 
monitoring political figures surface from time to time (Windhoek Observer 
2003), but neither the Caprivi incident nor the Uniao Nacional para a 
Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) incursions from Angola in the 
north-east seem to have been anticipated in any effective way by any of the 
intelligence community. 
A final security structure to consider is the SFF, which was established as a 
division of NAMPOL just before the presidential elections in 1999. It was 
formed as one of the employment strategies that resulted from sustained 
public demonstrations and job protests by the war veterans. The SFF’s 
primary responsibilities are those of preventing crime and the maintenance 
of internal security and law and order and, more specifically, the suppression 
of illegal civil disturbance. It provided the personnel to saturate the north-east 
in response to the Caprivi incident and UNITA cross-border violence. It has 
come in for serious criticism for its lack of training and professionalism, and 
over the years several brutality charges have been laid against its members. 
The allegations are summarised in the annual reports of the Namibia Society 
for Human Rights, a controversial self-appointed watchdog NGO.
Civil society 
Creating a climate in which civil society can actively monitor the security 
sector and be consulted regularly on defence policy, resource allocation, and 
related issues is essential to the process of fostering common ground on what 
constitutes a threat to national security or how to go about the promotion of 
national interests. In Namibia the security sector, perhaps with the exception 
of NAMPOL, is largely detached from the scrutiny of civil society and the 
general public. 
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In fact, the relationship between the media and the NDF (and the MoD 
in particular) reached boiling point in 2001, when the defence bill was 
presented and debated by parliament. This resulted from three sections of 
the bill that were seen by media practitioners as having been designed to 
muzzle them. These sections codified restrictive measures that rendered the 
disclosure of unauthorised security information or information calculated or 
likely to endanger national security or the safety of the members of the NDF 
a punishable offence (MISA 2002: 77). 
namibia’s role in regional security 
Namibia at independence was well positioned to lend scope and provide 
guidance to achieving regional objectives made possible by the end of both 
apartheid and the Cold War. Indeed, the Statement on Defence Policy 
(Republic of Namibia 1993) reflects the state’s perception and approach to 
regional security by emphasising that
Namibia’s foreign and defence policy is founded on the 
principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation with other 
countries and in operation of international law. The day-to-day 
guarantee of security lies in the maintenance of international 
order and, in particular, in regional stability. Defence relations 
with neighbours and the international community as a whole 
are good, and the Ministry of Defence and Namibia Defence 
Force will extend military co-operation and links as far as is 
practicable. Prospects for regional stability and co-operation in 
the 1990s are encouraging, but despite this, and the assessment 
that the threat is low at present, defence policy must be based 
on the premise that Namibia may face a regional security threat 
in the future (Republic of Namibia 1993: 6). 
This statement is underpinned by constitutional principles that outline 
Namibia’s foreign relations. Article 96 of the Namibian constitution states 
that 
[the] State shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations it
	 •	 Adopts and maintains a policy of non-alignment;
	 •	 Promotes international co-operation, peace and security;
	 •	 Creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among 
nations;
	 •	 Fosters respect for international law and treaty obligations;
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The Namibian government has concluded various bilateral defence and 
security agreements with Southern African countries. It signed a Protocol 
of Understanding with its Botswana counterpart on defence and security 
in Windhoek on 26 July 1990 (Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime 
Minister 2000). Namibia also concluded a Joint Permanent Commission on 
Defence and Security with Angola, and a Joint Permanent Commission of 
Co-operation with Zambia (Du Pisani 2001/2: 18) and with Tanzania (Du 
Pisani 2000). It also signed an agreement with its South African counterpart 
on cross-border policing, aimed at combating drug and arms smuggling, and 
vehicle theft. Details of an agreement with the DRC on bilateral security co-
operation remain a closely guarded secret (Cilliers 1996). 
Namibia was also successful in peacefully settling its dispute with South 
Africa over Walvis Bay, the country’s principal port, and the Penguin Islands 
off the Namibian coast: at independence South Africa retained control over 
both of these. The 1999 ruling by the International Court of Justice that 
peacefully resolved the dispute between Namibia and Botswana over the 
Kasikili/Sidudu Island in the Chobe River is a positive sign for the prospects 
for peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region (Blaauw 1995). The attitude 
of the leaders and people in general with regard to the court’s ruling was, 
in the words of Anne Mutelo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘to agree 
to disagree, but this did not lead to the outbreak of conflict’.1 In fact, the 
two countries embarked on a mutual collaboration to demarcate the rest of 
their boundaries in a joint exercise, completed in late 2002 and ratified in the 
following year.
Namibia is also actively involved in the region’s security co-operation 
practices, and the NDF has participated in several joint regional exercises. 
The country’s concern with regional peace and security is further reflected 
in the active role it has played in UN peacekeeping efforts in Angola (Du 
Pisani 2000). During its tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, the country left its imprint on the international stage, with 
important initiatives and actions in respect of various international conflicts, 
such as those in Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone. In addition, Namibia drafted and piloted a resolution that 
acknowledged that aggression had been committed against the DRC by its 
neighbours (Rwanda and Uganda), and drew a distinction between invited 
and uninvited forces in the DRC. The country has furthermore insisted that 
human rights and humanitarian assistance be included in the mandate of the 
UN peacekeeping force in that country. 
Namibia played a similarly active role in advancing peace in Angola. In 1999, 
it was part of a panel of experts, under the leadership of Sweden, which was 
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tasked with the responsibility of tracking violations of sanctions that were 
imposed by the UN against UNITA (Du Pisani 2001/2: 18). Arguably, these 
achievements have contributed to enhancing the prestige of the country as 
an important role player in improving regional security. The country also 
ratified the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime, which deals 
in part with trafficking in people (Mail and Guardian 2003).
Since the end of the 1990s, Namibia’s regional security policies have been 
increasingly scrutinised for the controversial decisions that accompanied 
its decision to become militarily involved in both the Angolan and DRC 
conflicts. To Anne Mutelo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the protection 
and enhancement of national interest were the primary factors that motivated 
Namibia’s involvement in the DRC. She claims that
Namibia’s involvement in the DRC was indeed due to the 
protection of our national interests. Had Namibia not become 
involved together with its allies, the chaos brought about 
by the conflict in that country would have engulfed the 
whole Southern African region. Due to Namibia’s proximity 
to Angola, the conflict in the DRC would have resulted in 
refugees fleeing that conflict coming to Namibia, since Angola 
was also still in conflict. This would have meant stretching our 
national resources to the limit leading to social and economic 
problems.2 
Yet Namibia’s involvement in both Angola and the DRC received severe 
criticism. Such criticism stems in part from the fact that the issue of who 
the primary determinant of foreign policy is has not yet been resolved. In 
this regard, Du Pisani (2000: 299) posits: ‘In the case of new States such 
as Namibia, presidents and the executive often dominate aspects of their 
countries’ foreign policy.’ Yet, the controversy that Namibia’s involvement in 
the DRC evoked also serves as a reminder that ‘[t]here are, indeed, competing 
bureaucratic and personal interests involved in the making and conduct of 
foreign policy’ (Du Pisani 2000: 307). 
To Tsie (1998), it was the absence of a functioning SADC security structure 
that prompted Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to assist the Kabila 
government in the DRC. More poignantly, Du Pisani (2001/2: 17) reminds 
us that ‘[r]egional or sub-regional security regimes may help to keep non-
democratic governments in power and to protect fragile governments that 
might otherwise have imploded. The conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo … is a good illustration of this.’ It also demonstrates that the 
disposition of SADC member states remains important in determining the 
Namibia
140
Security and Democracy in Southern Africa
state and character of regional security. At the 2003 summit in Tanzania, 
SADC heads of state signed the Mutual Defence Pact, which commits 
member countries to act (in some fashion) in the event of external or internal 
aggression against a member state. It is hoped that this pact will provide the 
vehicle for SADC to link to the AU’s peace and security mechanism.
In the final analysis, what Namibia’s involvement in both Angola and the DRC 
demonstrates is that the military has become politically more influential. Yet 
Namibia has a functioning democratic system in which there is considerable 
public input. In this respect, the perceptions of the Namibian population that 
the threats to its security may be more related to social, health, and economic 
issues than military threats are being expressed. The question then becomes 
whether a political system so thoroughly dominated by one political party 
will listen to these concerns.
Political transition
The year 2004 may be known as the year of elections for Namibia. Three sets 
of successful elections were held: first, the local council elections in May, 
then parliamentary and presidential elections in mid-November and, finally, 
regional council elections in late November. In addition to the continuity 
of the election results, featuring huge SWAPO majorities with fragmented 
opposition parties still surviving, the most important change was the smooth 
succession process that unfolded. President Nujoma kept everyone guessing 
until the last moment concerning a possible fourth term, but successfully 
engineered a transition process, filled with drama, that guaranteed continuity 
of leadership and political stability. 
Newly inaugurated President Pohamba has generally pursued a policy of 
continuity, yet he has also attempted to heal the election wounds within 
SWAPO and established an anti-corruption emphasis to mark his distinct 
style as president. He has rotated some security sector leadership, but has 
not altered the basic policies in place thus far.
Conclusion
The attainment of independence by Namibia was an important development 
in fostering an environment for the promotion of regional peace and security. 
Both governmental and non-governmental actors in an independent Namibia 
have been expected to play an active role in the reduction of tension and the 
promotion of mutual security. Namibia has made an important contribution 
not only to the enhancement of its own safety, but also to the promotion of 
regional security. 
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As the scene of one of the most successful transitions to peace and democracy 
in Africa, the country could perhaps have done more in terms of reinforcing 
the regional processes for multilateral confidence building and balanced 
civil–military relations. A greater focus on human and common security is 
both a Namibian and a regional need. As a successful democratising country 
characterised by peace, stability, and development, Namibia should be both 
a role model for its neighbours and a catalyst for the spread of its success.
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Seychelles, one of the world’s smallest nations, comprises 115 islands, all of 
which were uninhabited until 1756, when French planters and their slaves 
settled. Possession of the islands alternated between France and Britain 
several times during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, until 
finally France ceded Seychelles to Britain in 1814 in the Treaty of Paris. Britain 
administered Seychelles as a dependency of Mauritius, from which the 
islands received little attention and few services, although they were gradually 
granted increasing administrative autonomy. In 1888 separate nominated 
administrative and executive councils were established for Mauritius and 
Seychelles, and in 1903 the islands became a crown colony separate from 
Mauritius. The involvement of Seychellois in their own political affairs began 
in 1948 after World War II, when Britain granted suffrage to approximately 
2,000 adult male property owners. 
In 1964 two parties emerged on the political scene: the Seychelles People’s 
United Party (SPUP) and the Democratic Party (DP). Both were determined 
to improve local conditions and to develop popularly based local politics, 
but they differed in substantive ways. The SPUP had a socialist ideology, 
favouring worker-oriented policies and pressing for complete independence 
from Britain and a non-aligned foreign policy, while the DP took a more 
capitalist approach, and wanted to continue the association with Britain and 
to allow British and US military bases on the islands. 
Continuous and mounting demands from the Seychellois for an increased 
share in running the colony’s affairs prompted Britain to enact a series 
of constitutions for Seychelles, each of which granted important new 
concessions. The first universal suffrage election took place in 1967. In 
1970 Britain set up a ministerial form of government and gave Seychellois 
the responsibility to administer all but external affairs, internal security, the 
civil service, and the government’s broadcasting service and newspaper. 
The opening of an international airport on the east coast of Mahé in 1971 
improved contact with the outside world. The end of the islands’ relative 
isolation led to an expansion of tourism and concomitant booms in foreign 
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capital investment and the domestic construction industry.
Finally, Britain granted the colony complete independence, and on 29 June 
1976 the Republic of Seychelles became a sovereign nation. 
Governance and democracy 
After independence in 1976, Seychelles was ruled for less than a year by 
Sir James Mancham as president. With the support of Tanzania’s Julius 
Nyerere, France-Albert René, the prime minister, led an armed coup in 
1977 that toppled Mancham and sent him into exile (Franda 1982). The 
new president, René, a Marxist, pressed ahead with quite radical socialist 
programmes, including state control over all sectors of the economy. In 
1978, the SPUP became the Seychelles People’s Progressive Front (SPPF). 
This was followed in 1979 by the institutionalisation of the one-party state 
system. A new constitution was adopted in that year, which provided for a 
strong executive headed by the president, and a legislature of 23 elected and 
two appointed members. The government proceeded with its programme to 
set minimum wage levels, raise government salaries, improve housing and 
health facilities, broaden educational opportunities, provide social security 
coverage, and generate employment in agriculture and fisheries. The socio-
economic indicators improved markedly. During the 1970s and 1980s several 
coup attempts were made, including one launched from South Africa in 1981, 
inducing the René government to become more autocratic. 
In 1989 René was elected (in a poll in which he gained 96 per cent of the 
votes cast) for a third five-year term. He was selected by his party as the 
sole candidate. His domestic position therefore appeared secure. However, 
external factors forced a change. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
meant that he lost his powerful Soviet protector. At the Commonwealth 
heads of government meeting in 1991 he came under considerable pressure 
from the British and other governments to introduce democratic reforms. 
The Government of France, a major aid donor, made it clear that it expected 
political changes – President Mitterand had visited Seychelles in 1990 as part 
of an Indian Ocean tour. It became clear that Seychelles would find itself 
increasingly isolated if it continued to pursue uncompromisingly socialist 
policies. As Bennett (1993) argues, other countries in Africa were dismantling 
one-party states in the face of the new winds of change blowing across the 
continent – a further incentive for the regime to modify and adapt its mode of 
governance. Finally, René could no longer ignore economic factors. In 1991 
Britain and France, the main donors, cut aid to a trickle. That year, for the 
first time since 1983, Seychelles registered a negative economic growth rate, 
largely due to the fall in tourist numbers during the Gulf crisis.
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In December 1991 René caused surprise when he called an extraordinary 
congress of the ruling SPPF. He announced a complete reappraisal of 
policy and the introduction of a pluralist political system, inviting all exiled 
Seychellois to return to play a responsible role in the affairs of the state.
There were three phases in instituting the new constitutional dispensation. 
The first involved the setting up of a constitutional commission; the second 
was the drafting of a constitution to be tested in a referendum; and the third, 
multi-party elections (Bennett 1993: 363; Hatchard 1993). A constitutional 
conference was convened, the composition of which was based on support 
obtained by popular vote. Seven newly established political parties partici-
pated in the process, and members of the public were also invited to provide 
their input. The first draft of the constitution failed to receive the required 
60 per cent majority in a referendum. The new and current constitution 
was approved by 73.9 per cent of the voters in a referendum held on 18 
June 1993 in a relatively smooth process. This was followed by the first 
democratic elections in July 1993. The SPPF gained 57 per cent of the vote, 
and 27 of the 33 seats in the National Assembly (Lodge, Kadima, and Pottie 
2002: 280).
The constitution limits the president to three five-year terms of office. And, in 
contrast to past practice, it now requires the president to make appointments 
to public offices from a list of candidates proposed by an Independent 
Constitutional Appointments Authority or from the existing civil service. With 
regard to membership of the National Assembly, nominated members were 
replaced with a system whereby elections are held on both a constituency 
basis and by proportional representation. A charter entrenches fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the 1993 constitution. This charter defines a democratic 
society as a pluralistic one in which there is tolerance, and proper regard for 
the fundamental human rights and freedoms and the rule of law, and where 
there is a balance of power among the executive, legislature, and judiciary 
(Hatchard 1993: 608). Regarding the declaration of a state of emergency, the 
1993 constitution imposes strict safeguards. 
As elsewhere, the development of multi-partyism in the Seychelles has seen 
the launch of competing newspapers (all in Victoria, the capital) – most new 
publications support one or the other opposition party. The 1993 constitution 
requires the state to ensure that the state-owned/controlled broadcasting 
service operates independently and affords ‘opportunities and facilities for 
the presentation of divergent views’. 
Having somewhat improved its image abroad, René’s administration relied 
on a robust economy, a relatively high standard of living, and a generous 
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welfare system to catapult itself and the ruling party to a landslide victory 
(67 per cent of the vote) in the March 1998 general elections. While partiality 
and intolerance contributed to the electoral landslide, a divided opposition 
without a clear strategy was no match for the SPPF, particularly with its 
dominant control over local administration facilities and the welfare budget, 
which may have played a decisive role in the outcome of the election. 
 
The electoral system makes provision for funding of political parties through 
the Political Parties (Registration and Regulation) Amendment Act of 1996. 
Funding is based on the percentage of votes obtained at the preceding general 
election. The SPPF thus obtained a significantly greater share of budgetary 
resources, which was coupled with its strength in access to district council 
ad minis tra tion facilities and local district SPPF administration support 
facilities. 
Early presidential elections were held in September 2001 and National 
Assembly elections in December 2002. In both instances the SPPF won, 
although the Seychelles National Party (SNP) candidate captured 44.95 
per cent of the 2001 presidential votes, as opposed to 54.19 for the SPPF 
presidential candidate, René. This was despite the latter’s ability to tap into 
the comprehensive SPPF party machinery and his access to greater budgetary 
resources. 
On 24 February 2004, during his state of the nation address, President René 
indicated his intention to resign the presidency. On 14 April 2004 he resigned, 
and nominated his appointed successor, James Alex Michel, formerly the vice 
president of Seychelles (since the introduction of the office of vice president 
in 1996). The presidential transition was peaceful, with discontent limited to 
the opposition SNP. The international community, by and large, applauded 
the peaceful leadership transition. René retains the influential position of 
president of the SPPF, and will attempt to breathe new life into declining 
party support and rejuvenate the party machinery. Immediately upon 
taking office, the new president set about establishing his own credentials. 
He began with a programme of consultation and dialogue, in an effort to 
re-establish the confidence of the business community. This was quickly 
followed by further liberalisation of the trading regime, removal of stringent 
import licensing controls, and the gradual reduction of the state monopoly 
on imports enjoyed by the government parastatal, the Seychelles Marketing 
Board (SMB). A review was conducted of government ministries, and these 
were effectively streamlined in an effort to reduce budgetary expansion 
and improve the level of service and efficiency. The consultation dialogue 
was widened to include grassroots communities, with meetings held in all 
districts in an effort to re-establish confidence within the community. This 
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community participation exercise has resulted in government becoming 
more aware of the grassroots concerns of the population at large, giving 
it sufficient time to make the necessary administrative and developmental 
changes before the 2006 elections.
In some senses, the ghost of Seychelles’s one-party past lingers on. According 
to observers from the Francophone Community and the Commonwealth, 
the 1998 elections were free and fair. However, they noted that the results 
could have been unduly influenced by the payment of social security benefits 
through accelerated means testing just before the election. Consequently, 
the group recommended a bipartisan review of the separation of state and 
party political functions. Furthermore, the president’s array of powers (head 
of state, head of government, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, 
appoints ministers, personally in charge of several ministerial portfolios, 
titular head of the ruling party) gave René uncontested influence in two of 
three branches of government. His victory in 1998 was also due in part to 
his overwhelming political advantage at the local level. All seats on the 23 
elected district councils – formerly SPPF district branch committees – were 
held by ruling party members. And indeed, the ruling SPPF continued to 
dominate the Seychelles political party landscape, as it has done during 
27 years of uninterrupted rule. Today, under a new president, the power 
arrangements remain. 
Democratisation or liberalisation?
Various factors impact on the political landscape of the Seychelles. The 
population comprises people of African, European, Indian, and Chinese origin. 
Racial identities, especially Chinese and Indian, play an important role in the 
formation of political alliances. While successful elections in Seychelles have 
become commonplace, it is a young democracy with significant centralising 
tendencies, and still faces many challenges of democratic institution building 
and the cross-fertilisation of the political roles of the judiciary, the legislature, 
and the still very strong executive. However, the single largest political 
issue facing Seychelles is the implementation of its economic liberalisation 
programme, as the government continues to control nearly 70 per cent of the 
economy, largely through the SMB. 
The fourth phase of Seychelles’ transition to a liberalised democracy began 
effectively in June 2003, with the introduction of the Macro-economic Reform 
Programme (MERP), which was launched during an SPPF extraordinary 
congress. The MERP is designed to tackle many of the issues that have 
marked much of the criticism levelled at the SPPF over the years since the 
introduction of multi-party politics. It has received the conditional support 
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of the IMF and the World Bank, and has been well received by Seychelles’ 
bilateral partners.
The thrust of the MERP is to correct the fundamental macro-economic 
imbalances in the economy, so as to provide a platform for economic recovery. 
It impacts on all economic players, with the emphasis on government 
budgetary and fiscal restraint in order to achieve budget surpluses from 2003, 
supported by a reduction of ministerial budgets of between 10 and 15 per 
cent over three years, the cessation of budgetary subventions to parastatal 
organisations, and a reduction in capital expenditure. Measures have been 
taken to remove excess liquidity in the system, with controls maintained over 
inflation and interest rates. 
The MERP has involved the introduction of a goods and services tax, coupled 
with a gradual reduction of trade import tariffs, in keeping with the call for 
a liberalised tariff-free trade regime promoted by the regional trading blocs, 
particularly COMESA and SADC. 
The MERP also includes a more liberalised trading regime with a gradual 
reduction in the SMB monopoly on imports of essential commodities, a 
review of the exchange rate mechanism, increased privatisation of state 
assets, a review of the existing social sectors, and a restructuring of the 
civil service. Seychelles representation abroad has been the first casualty of 
the restructuring process with the closure (or suspension) of embassies in 
London, Kuala Lumpur, and Pretoria.
The MERP has to date achieved a key objective, the mopping up of excess 
liquidity. However, the latest central bank report indicates that the budgetary 
containment has not been successful. Inflation has increased and the avail-
ability of essential commodities has decreased, largely due to unexpected 
impacts on the price of oil commodities on world markets and the disturbing 
impact of the tsunami of 26 December 2004, followed a few days later by 
torrential rain.
The projected economic performance for 2005 suggested a negative growth 
rate of 4 per cent. Tourist arrivals were expected to decline by 10 per cent in 
2005, while fishing and agriculture were also projected to decline. Inflationary 
pressures were expected to increase, with consumer prices rising by 12 per 
cent. The balance-of-payments gap in 2005 was projected at USD 45 million 
(7 per cent of GDP). Reserves were at about USD 33 million, or less than 
a month of imports, and were thus unable to absorb the negative current-
account shock. This was further compounded by the accumulation of arrears 
on external debt payments, at the rate of approximately USD 40 million a 
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year, over the previous two years. The vulnerability of the external position of 
the Seychelles highlights the need for grant financing to fill the gap. A Paris 
Club unconditional moratorium on debt payments for 2005, although useful 
in slowing the accumulation of arrears, was not expected to provide fresh 
resources to fill the gap. The external debt stood at an unsustainable 200 per 
cent of GDP in 2005. 
Crucially, the MERP is effecting a realignment of Seychelles representation 
in international organisations, with an emphasis on strengthening ties with 
those organisations from which Seychelles is likely to derive the greatest 
benefit. Seychelles ceased its membership of SADC in 2004, and has done 
the same with the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation. 
It is expected to strengthen its relationships with the World Bank and IMF, 
African French-speaking countries, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), 
and COMESA.
Security conceptions
In the period immediately after the 1977 coup, internal security concerns, as 
well as the wider Cold War climate and strategic Indian Ocean environment, 
dominated the political scene. As Franda (1982: 65) remarks: ‘Having come to 
power by force and with the assistance of Tanzania, René and his government 
were acutely aware of their own vulnerability.’ The ruling elite became 
obsessed with survival, and this led to a particular interpretation of security 
– further informed by the shape of the post-coup government: revolutionary, 
socialist, and one-party. Throughout the 1970s, rumours of counter-coup 
attempts persisted, and in 1981 a group of South African-led mercenaries 
was foiled in an attempt at overthrowing the government (Arnold 1995). In 
reaction, the René government instituted a series of controversial measures 
aimed at promoting public security. Press censorship, a lack of privacy in the 
mail, the curtailment of judicial freedoms, preventive detention, schools for 
enforcing discipline, forced exile of political opponents, and the creation of 
an armed militia produced an atmosphere of fear and suspicion.
Not surprisingly, the government rejected the notion that the army should be 
apolitical or politically neutral. Politicisation of the military meant that that 
‘our troops are trained to defend the interests of socialism’ (Franda 1982: 71). 
The government devised a number of ways to keep the military subservient 
to the government and the party, ranging from administrative to political 
party controls. 
The move away from the one-party socialist system resulted in changing 
understandings of security by government officials. 
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Security policymaking
Franda (1982: 69–72) notes that the 1977 coup in the Seychelles was 
‘particularly interesting’ because it was carried out in a country that did not 
have an army. In any event, the Seychelles People’s Liberation Army was 
established shortly after the coup. The core of that army was made up of 60 
Tanzanian-trained guerillas who had taken up arms against the Mancham 
government. Since the coup, Tanzanian and Indian officers have played 
a major role in training the army. The basic structure of the military was 
established in December 1980, with the enactment of two laws detailing a 
legal procedure for disciplining soldiers and providing for separate commands 
for the army, navy, and air force. The principal tasks of the navy and air force 
have been defined as maritime defence – i.e. detecting foreign vessels fishing 
or otherwise operating in the Seychelles economic maritime zone. The army 
is obviously intended to maintain domestic order. The first group of soldiers 
entirely trained by Seychellois officers was turned out in April 1981.
The bulk of Seychelles’ military expenditures were previously directed 
towards internal and presidential security. The army consisted of one infantry 
company and one supply unit. Of the 450 members of the armed forces, 300 
served in the Presidential Guard. The paramilitary forces included 250 active-
duty national guardsmen, of which 200 were assigned to the coastguard. 
Today, the security sector is made up of approximately 800 people: around 
400 in the Seychelles People’s Defence Force (SPDF), 300 in the police, and 
150 in the National Guard.1
Currently, the country’s defence and security functions are governed by the 
constitution and the Defence Act. The president is the commander-in-chief 
and minister of defence, and can choose to send soldiers into battle. If he/she 
is unable to exercise these duties or incapacitated, the vice president deputises. 
The chief of staff of the SPDF and police commissioner are the accountable 
officers and responsible for administrative affairs. The National Defence 
Council, comprising these persons, meets regularly (and often informally) 
to consider defence and security matters. It is unclear how the intelligence 
function currently operates. There is no department of defence. Parliament 
plays a small, and somewhat marginal, oversight role in defence and security 
matters, and the National Assembly annually considers the defence budget. 
A variety of parliamentary mechanisms now exist (including questions, 
motions, and ad hoc committees) to allow for a more robust engagement 
with defence and security matters. There is no evidence to suggest that civil 
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Understandings of security
During a training course for senior representatives from the security sector, 
including parliament, course participants identified Seychelles’ threats, as 
indicated in Table 1. 












• Oil washing from tankers
• Illegal poaching







•  Possibility of terrorist attacks against 
visiting US military personnel
Military
•  War in Iraq (external shocks such as high 
oil prices, drop in tourism)
The group identified a number of strategies to manage aspects of these 
threats, including enforcement measures (regarding illegal activities and 
immigrants), better training of officials, education on the effects of threats 
such as HIV/AIDS, adoption of appropriate legislation, and collaboration 
with regional partners and institutions.
Regarding civil–military relations, the course participants acknowledged 
the legacy of the one-party system and agreed that healthy relations were 
a continuous process that needed to be maintained. The group identified 
a number of steps that could be taken to achieve that objective, including 
a well-trained and -equipped SPDF public relations officer; a well-thought 
out media programme; more interaction with members of the National 
Assembly; an information campaign focusing on schools; more transparency 
in policy planning, implementation, and evaluation; and a clearer definition 
of the roles of the military and the police.2
Perceptions of regional security
The Indian Ocean region, in which Seychelles is located, is vast and features 
a range of widely differing security challenges. Most countries of the Indian 
Ocean are of developing status and face a common set of issues and problems 
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ranging from nation state building to human development and national 
security (Singh 1995). In a study of Indian Ocean security building, Mills 
(1998) identified non-traditional security issues to include resource scarcity 
(concern over the environment, including marine living resources, population 
growth, and migration); transnational crime and policing (drugs, narco-
terrorism, and light-weapons proliferation); and global economic challenges 
(globalisation, poverty, currency fluctuations, and weak implementing 
agencies). Traditional security concerns, according to Mills, include 
disarmament (particularly nuclear), the Indian–Pakistani dispute, increasing 
Chinese military power, involvement of non-Indian Ocean powers, security 
of oil supplies, religious tensions, and border disputes. More recently, one 
might add to this list the threat of local and global terrorism and the impact 
of unilateral US military interventions. 
In a discussion of new security threats in the Indian Ocean region, Lauseig 
(1999) argues that drugs, weapons proliferation, corruption, and crime 
syndicates are consequences of the weakness of the state and the worldwide 
expansion of criminalisation. He also identifies two additional factors that are 
as important as the state’s measure of weakness: the economic sub-stratum 
(banking system, internal market) and geographic influence (communication 
infrastructure, diversified transport networks). 
It is difficult to determine accurately the official Seychelles position or 
response to these concerns, partly because of a particular political culture 
and style of public-policy decision making, which does not allow for easy 
access from the outside. However, judged by the threat perceptions of senior 
security officials, one can conclude that the Seychelles government is well 
aware of the new security threats in the Indian Ocean region, and also has 
a sober realisation of the human and financial resource constraints that 
seemingly prevent the country from adopting more elaborate and ambitious 
foreign security policies. 
Seychelles has for the most part followed a policy of non-alignment in 
international affairs. It also supported an initiative to create a ‘zone of peace’ 
in the Indian Ocean. For example, it attempted to deny all naval vessels 
with nuclear weapons docking rights in Seychelles. However, realpolitik 
predominated and US and other navy vessels dock in Seychelles on a 
regular basis. The government of Seychelles relies on a ‘you don’t tell us, 
we won’t ask’ policy in relation to nuclear weaponry on board US, Russian 
Federation, and other visiting vessels. The United States used to have a 
satellite-tracking station on the island of Mahé, but, due to US spending 
cuts, it was removed in 1996. Seychelles has relied heavily on its relationship 
with France, although development assistance from the French government 
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has steadily declined over the years. As a result of its non-aligned policy, 
Seychelles was able to forge effective relationships with both sides during 
the Cold War. The ‘tracking’ facility was in fact linked to the global network 
of the US nuclear capability. The former Soviet Union, on the other hand, 
desired to maintain a close watch and a counterbalance to US interests in 
the Indian Ocean region. To a lesser degree, the Chinese, Libyan, Indian, 
and Cuban governments supported Soviet intervention in the region. The 
tracking station was ultimately closed because of the decline in the Cold War, 
the upgrading of technology within the US facility in Diego Garcia, and, as 
mentioned above, the tightening of US budgets.
As Ellis (1996) has argued, the Seychelles’ strategic location in terms of 
US–Soviet rivalry in the Indian Ocean, as well as South Africa’s regional 
policy of destabilisation during the 1980s, led to attempts to influence the 
island’s government by bribery and force. More-powerful governments and 
business interests as far afield as Italy also manipulated Seychelles’ status 
as a sovereign state ‘in order to perform various transactions of dubious 
legality’ (Ellis 1996: 166), and there is some evidence that the islands were 
used for financial transactions by arms dealers and as a staging post for drug 
trafficking. These past practices undoubtedly impacted on the quality of 
governance, and might still have lingering effects.
Not surprisingly, during its one-party socialist phase, the government of the 
Seychelles was quite vocal in its foreign relations. The end of the Cold War 
era saw the decline of the influence of the communist and socialist countries, 
and with it came Seychelles’ relative isolation. Unsure of where to turn, 
and maintaining a certain amount of revolutionary nostalgia, it reluctantly 
considered its regional options. Seychelles joined the most significant of the 
regional organisations, SADC, in 1997, only to withdraw in 1994 because 
of economic considerations. Seychelles is a member of the AU, but is not 
particularly active.3 It has remained in COMESA, which focuses more on 
trade than political issues. The strategic calculation, from the Seychelles 
perspective, is whether the benefits of regional co-operation outweigh the 
costs and duties associated with membership of these organisations. The 
mere fact that it finds membership fees a large burden is an indication of its 
limited resources and foreign policy reach. Consequently, it concentrates on 
areas of functional co-operation such as through the IOC. Given that tuna 
processing constitutes Seychelles’s only significant export, it has participated 
in the Western Indian Ocean Tuna Organisation, the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission, and the Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Co-operation Council. 
In 2001 it participated in an initiative to develop a memorandum of 
understanding on regional co-operation (with countries from East Africa) 
regarding the establishment of a regional search-and-rescue centre.
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Because of its small size, Seychelles’ security objectives can be achieved 
only in co-operation with others, and regionalism offers the country a way 
forward in this area (Bell 2003). At present there are serious deficiencies in 
the collective security arrangements of the Indian Ocean region, which are 
ad hoc and largely comprise bilateral, as opposed to regional, agreements 
on military co-operation, supported by bilateral joint training exercises and 
senior officer exchanges. 
In the Indian Ocean area, states can begin their own comprehensive regional 
security strategy by developing a framework that establishes a common 
definition of security, which was a stumbling block with the Indian Ocean 
Zone of Peace. They can then move towards establishing a regional forum 
with the specific aim of dealing with political and military issues.
In particular, practical co-operative measures to be explored include developing 
a conflict resolution capacity and an early warning system, and establishing 
a confidence-building agenda with greater transparency and understanding 
of strategic perceptions and defence planning. These can be expanded to 
include common issues such as maritime search and rescue, delimitation of 
boundaries, territorial surveillance, resource management, marine scientific 
research, safety of shipping, immigration, drug trafficking, piracy, poaching, 
illegal fishing, illegal arms, and natural disasters.
Over time, specific non-aggression pacts with common defence policies could 
be concluded, supported by practical measures such as unified operational 
procedures, training, and military curriculums to accomplish inter-operability, 
a military communications network for early warning, joint training exercises, 
personnel exchanges, and peacekeeping capacity (Bell 2003: 13).
Conclusion
Seychelles has taken its first bold steps in establishing itself within the inter-
national community as a state that recognises the fundamental importance of 
maintaining democratic institutions and good governance. Its current direction 
follows the path that many effective democratic states have successfully 
trodden. However, it must be understood that the country’s faltering economy 
is a consequence of both internal and external factors. The current economic 
reform phase, intended to correct years of unsustainable social policies, will 
involve some sacrifice and hardship to the Seychelles population. On the 
external front, the global security arena after the attacks in the United States of 11 
September 2001 has had severe consequences for the Seychelles: unavoidably, 
an economy dependent on upmarket tourism and one export product (tuna) 
was bound to be damaged by the global economic and security turmoil. 
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The 2003 war in Iraq had an even bigger impact on the Seychelles. As 
Baregu (2002) has commented, the implications of the American ‘war on 
terror’ are twofold: Africa is likely to experience intensified interference in 
its internal affairs, including direct efforts to monitor terrorism; and African 
governments will have to demonstrate that their defence policies are designed 
and organised in such a way as to enhance American strategic interests and 
national security goals. These implications are unavoidable for all of Africa, 
and small, developing island states have virtually no manoeuvring space. 
Seychelles is currently experiencing this tightening of the policy menu, and 
has to find a way of maintaining balanced relations with the key external 
players. It has to take into account the role of the IFIs, the tourist market, 
the commercially driven French presence in the Indian Ocean region, an 
assertive Indian presence in the same region, a growing commercial and 
political South Africa, and the unavoidable military dominance of the United 
States. 
Global turmoil has also impacted on the country’s relations with its more 
immediate environment, including SADC. There is a strong belief among 
senior government officials that SADC failed to provide the Seychelles 
with much benefit, relative to the financial and human resources required 
to remain a member. In that sense, a simple cost-benefit analysis pointed 
the way forward. What most officials fail to admit, however, was Seychelles’ 
reluctance to adopt SADC’s economic rules, particularly the requirements 
with regard to its free trade agreement. Until the adoption of the MERP, the 
country was simply not ready to liberalise its economy in order to harmonise 
with that agreement. Regarding security, it remains to be seen whether the 
Seychelles will be able to replace SADC’s embryonic security umbrella with 
arrangements closer to home. 
The survival of the SPPF government will depend on how effectively it 
manages these upheavals, particularly over the next three to four years. 
Traditionally, governments that have initiated the bold changes are not those 
that benefit politically, although Seychelles may prove to be an exception. 
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1 Interview, senior member of the SPDF staff, March 2003.
2 Based on a training course run by the Southern African Defence and Security Management 
Programme in 2003. 
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Even before South Africa joined SADC in 1994, the Southern African region 
had played an important role in the country’s national security considerations. 
During the apartheid era, the activities of the FLS and countries such as 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and others 
that provided the liberation movements with support were a primary concern 
of South Africa’s national security. The South African government’s regional 
destabilisation policy of the late 1970s and the larger part of the 1980s was a 
result of the perception of the apartheid government that the region posed 
a serious threat to the country. Destabilisation caused large-scale damage 
and loss of life to the states and people of Southern Africa, and together 
with South Africa’s economic dominance of the region, resulted in a large 
measure of insecurity and a lack of trust. 
These perceptions have not necessarily changed significantly since the end 
of apartheid (see, for example, IPA 2001: 31).1 South Africa’s membership of 
SADC resulted in the region remaining a priority for the country’s national 
security, though threat perceptions changed dramatically, as did the way in 
which the region is perceived by policymakers.
Whereas the 1970s and 1980s, the era of ‘Total Onslaught’, saw the militarisa-
tion of the South African state and society, the 1990s became an era not only 
of demilitarisation, but also of attempts to civilise the military. These initiatives 
were part of the transformation and democratisation process that reached its 
height during the Mandela presidency and included a fairly large civil society2 
input into new thinking on security that took place during the 1990s.
Structural support for democracy
A range of institutions were created after April 1994 to safeguard, support, 
and promote constitutional democracy, with the most prominent being 
the public protector, the South African Human Rights Commission, the 
Commission for Gender Equality, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(temporary), the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights (temporary), 
and the Constitutional Court.
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Within the realm of defence and security, the most prominent structure is the 
Defence Secretariat (DS), which, with the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF), falls under the minister of defence and the Department of 
Defence (DoD), with the SANDF concentrating on operational issues and the 
DS on strategic and general defence policy issues.3 The primary aim of the DS 
is to provide civilian oversight of the military, and in this capacity it serves as 
policy advisor to the minister of defence and as monitor of compliance of the 
SANDF as far as policies and directives issued by the minister are concerned. 
The establishment of the DS as a civilian oversight body is a direct result 
of the democratisation and demilitarisation process in South Africa. In its 
Strategic Business Plan, the DoD (Republic of South Africa. DoD 2003: vi) 
spells out the objectives of the DS as follows:
The Defence Secretariat, which is largely a civilian 
component, is responsible for formulating policy and 
strategic direction to ensure alignment between the DoD 
and Government policies, the financial administration of the 
DoD, and ensuring adherence to legislation, Government 
policies, instructions and regulations. Furthermore it is 
responsible for managing the acquisition of armaments for 
the SANDF.
South Africa in SADC 
In August 1992 the SADCC was transformed into SADC, not only as a 
response to a changing international environment and new demands on the 
region,4 but also and not least in preparation for the imminent membership 
of a post-apartheid South Africa. The addition of South Africa in August 1994 
radically changed the structure of SADC as a region, if not (immediately) of 
the organisation itself. From 1980 until 1994 Zimbabwe was the uncontested 
leader (though informally) of the regional formation, and together with 
Botswana it was economically and militarily the strongest state in the 
organisation (Angola was militarily powerful, but its forces were tied up in 
the war against UNITA rebels). South African membership changed these 
dynamics dramatically – there could be no doubt about the country’s military 
superiority; its economic giantism (it accounts for 75 per cent of SADC’s GDP); 
and its very high status, standing, and level of popularity internationally. In 
all spheres, South Africa eclipsed the region and in particular Zimbabwe, 
with Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe relegated to the sidelines as South 
Africa’s Mandela became the favourite in international circles.
Yet South Africa’s very strength soon proved to be its biggest challenge. 
The end of apartheid did not translate into an immediate sense of trust and 
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confidence in the new SADC member. Despite South African declarations 
of the priority of the region for the country’s security and foreign policies 
(see following section), it found it difficult, right from the start, to find its 
‘place’ within SADC. South Africa was careful not to impose itself as a ‘big 
brother’ on its neighbours. Its neighbours, on the one hand, continued to 
be suspicious of South African intentions, and on the other hand, accused 
the country of not playing a dominant enough role in regional affairs, but 
privileging relations with the First World, and in particular with Europe.
At a very practical level, South Africa, at the time of a democratically elected 
government coming to power, also faced a host of very practical problems 
that would impact on its security relations with the region. The country 
became a preferred destination for large numbers of migrants in the region 
(and further afield) who were looking for economic opportunities and better 
lives. An estimated 2–8 million illegal immigrants were in South Africa by the 
mid-1990s, placing a heavy burden on the country in terms of the provision 
of basic services and the cost of repatriation.5 At the same time, and in line 
with developments in the rest of the world, a much more open South Africa 
also became a preferred destination and operational base for drug trafficking 
and other forms of organised crime (including the illegal trade in light 
weapons), its fairly open borders contributing to its attraction.6 As is the case 
in many other countries, the new democracy has also become a target for ‘all 
sorts of dubious and nefarious enterprises, including intelligence infiltration’ 
(Khanyile 2003).
Conditions within South Africa have also influenced its security relations with 
the region. Two of the biggest challenges facing the country were (and still 
are) that of the eradication of widespread poverty and underdevelopment, 
together with the related objective of wealth creation. Within a context 
of balancing its internal obligations with regional obligations – finding 
the right balance between these separate yet related demands – South 
Africa also had to redefine its security concerns, including undergoing a 
conceptual transformation of its military. These redefinitions of security and 
transformation were not only based on the changing regional landscape 
and the demands of a ‘new’ South Africa, but were also influenced by 
international trends, including a new security paradigm (see, for example, 
Ayoob 1995; Buzan 1991; Job 1992) that gained ground in the aftermath of 
the end of the Cold War and a general downsizing of militaries and military 
spending worldwide.
By 1999 the defence budget had been cut by almost 57 per cent (SAIRR 
2003: 461): in 1989 defence accounted for 15.64 per cent of total government 
expenditure, but by 1999 it had fallen to 7 per cent. In the 2005/6 budget 
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announced in February 2005, only 5.8 per cent of total revenue was allocated 
to defence, and this was set to decline to 4.9 per cent by 2007/8 (SAIRR 2005: 
6). Although these declining figures may indicate the country’s move away 
from its militarised past, one cannot help but feel some concern when taking 
into account that 70 per cent of the defence budget is spent on personnel, 
whereas the international best practice is that this percentage should be in 
the range of 40 per cent (Beeld 2005b).
In 1994 the full-time component of the (then) SADF was 100,000 strong, 
and 36 000 liberation fighters had to be incorporated as part of the defence 
transformation process. By 1999 the SANDF had been downsized to 87,000; 
in February 2003 the figure was 75,300 (Beeld 2005b); and by 2004/05 it was 
73,000. The aim is that this figure will stabilise at 70,000. The composition of 
the SANDF is fairly representative of demographic realities in the country 
(see Table 1), though in gender terms the figures are still disproportionately 
high in favour of males: 85 per cent of SANDF members are male and 15 per 
cent female.7 






Source: GCIS (2005: 468)
As part of the movement towards greater civilian control over the military, 
the DS was created through national legislation and based on section 204 
of the constitution. The DS is, among other things, designed to enhance 
parliamentary oversight and civil control by the minister over the DoD. 
Drivers of democratisation
A number of internal and external factors contributed to the end of apartheid 
and the onset of democratisation in South Africa. These factors in many 
instances contributed to the demise of apartheid and not automatically to 
democratisation.8 The latter was the path chosen, partly through negotiations, 
by adversaries – the then National Party government, the various liberation 
movements and domestic resistance movements (such as the United Demo-
cratic Front [UDF]), and other stakeholders who eventually participated in the 
negotiated settlement. Although a distinction is drawn here between internal 
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and external factors for change, the distinction is not as clear-cut as implied: 
in some instances it is difficult to assign a specific driver to the categories 
‘internal’ and ‘external’, as will become evident in the following discussion.
Internal drivers of change 
The stark realities of numbers, with blacks outnumbering whites; the huge 
influx of blacks into supposedly ‘white’ cities; and the persistent deterioration 
of the ‘homelands’ and obvious failure of the policy of creating ‘national 
states’ for the various ethnic groups could not but have made the government 
of the 1980s aware of the fact that it would not in the long run be able to 
maintain apartheid. Already in the 1970s, the regime began a reform process 
(however limited and constrained) attempting, albeit largely within the 
confines of apartheid dogma, to initiate some reforms of the system, in effect 
and unwittingly opening up opportunities for increasingly radical demands 
from, and political action by, resistance movements within the country (the 
Wiehahn Commission on black trade unions, for example).
Within the business sector, awareness of the importance of such a potentially 
large black consumer class resulted (together with the ‘bite’ of economic 
sanctions) in pressure being put on the government for change. The economic 
recession of the 1980s, together with the lack of foreign direct investment 
and the sheer cost of continuing the extravagant apartheid system, also 
undoubtedly contributed to the demise of apartheid. To reap benefits from 
the emerging global economy, with its emphasis on post-industrial economic 
sectors, export-led growth, and value-added economic activities, demanded 
a restructuring of the economy, which in turn demanded external assistance 
in the form of technical know-how and investment – resources denied the 
apartheid government.
The heavy price the country was beginning to pay for apartheid (and its 
continued presence in Namibia and involvement in the Angolan civil war) 
from 1985 onwards led many South Africans to start to explore alternatives, 
and white academics, business people, the clergy, and even sports 
administrators started seeking contact and dialogue with the African National 
Congress (ANC). Interestingly enough, it was also in 1985 that the government 
tentatively initiated contact with the banned ANC (Louis le Grange, minister 
of law and order, met with the ANC in Zambia in 1985), and in the same year 
President P. W. Botha offered in parliament to free Mandela, provided he 
and the ANC renounced violence as a political instrument.
In large part, internal resistance to apartheid and to the National Party 
government, gaining strength after the Soweto riots of 1976, played a crucial 
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role in the fight to end apartheid. Of particular importance here were the roles 
of trade unions (particularly the Congress of South African Trade Unions and 
its affiliates) and the UDF, which gained in influence in the 1980s, especially 
after the constitutional reforms of the P. W. Botha government. Although 
aimed principally at the struggle against apartheid, these mass movements 
adopted and promoted democratic strategies right from their inception, and 
it is perhaps worthwhile to remember that the anti-apartheid struggle was 
as much for genuine democracy as it was against racism as embodied in the 
apartheid state and its policies.
A crucial driver of change was, of course, the ANC itself, which played a role 
both internally and externally. Its internal role was to some extent symbolic 
(it was, after all, a banned organisation, branded ‘terrorist’), but especially 
after the 1976 Soweto riots the organisation became increasingly prominent 
in domestic politics, influencing the trade union movement and the UDF, 
bringing together the components of the ‘national democratic revolution’, 
and conducting a sustained armed struggle within the country, even though 
the latter was also largely symbolic. 
During the period of negotiations (1990–94), the ANC retained and strengthened 
its role as a driver of change, keeping a wide range of popular organisations 
united and committed to a process of change that would not alienate the white 
community: in fact, the ANC, through the idea of the ‘rainbow nation’, managed 
to extend its nationalism to include and, importantly, attract sections of the 
white population who had not traditionally supported the organisation.9
External drivers of change 
The extent to which external sources influenced the process of democratisation, 
especially in terms of the demise of apartheid, remains debatable. However, 
there is general agreement that the international sanctions campaign did 
play an important role, as the state of the domestic economy (see above) was 
directly influenced, and negatively so, by economic sanctions (particularly 
in the form of ‘disinvestment’), and became an important driver for change. 
Raising international awareness on the need for using sanctions as a tool to 
force change in South Africa was perhaps one of the most important roles of 
the ANC in exile. It waged a highly sophisticated and successful campaign 
– especially in Western capitals – to increase pressure on the South African 
government, and by the end of the 1980s it had more diplomatic missions 
across the world than the government.
No matter, though, how successful sanctions had been, it would be wrong 
to view the South African example of the ‘success of sanctions’ as a possible 
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recipe for ‘encouraging’ other states to democratise. Sanctions worked in 
South Africa not only because of the extent to which and the way in which the 
country’s economy was integrated into and dependent on the world economy 
(a product of its level of economic development), but largely because of the 
racial bias in the political and economic inequality that characterised South 
African society during the apartheid era. An overview of the use of sanctions 
against African countries will show that sanctions are seldom successful and 
often have the opposite effect to what is intended.
Apart from economic sanctions, a number of other external drivers also pro-
pelled the country in the direction of democratisation, based on the principles 
of a market economy. These factors can be summarised as follows:
•	 South Africa’s perceived military defeats in Angola in the late 1980s, 
together with the financial burden of its involvement in Namibia and 
Angola, put an additional burden on an already strained fiscus and had 
important psychological effects.
•	 South Africa’s comprehensive international isolation across a spectrum 
of dimensions, including the cultural and sports dimensions, divided the 
country internally, and increasingly whites came to believe that the price 
to pay for the continuation of apartheid was just too high.
•	 The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the success of 
the Namibian peace process, and the general support for and recognition 
by the international community of the need for a settlement also played 
a role. This not only pushed the apartheid government towards change, 
but also the ANC – with the Soviet Union collapsing, it was losing an 
important source of power and support, and Western countries, after 
the Namibian settlement, were also beginning to put pressure on the 
liberation movements to move towards negotiations.
Character of democratic practice
Democratic practices in South Africa are formally framed within the 
country’s constitution, and the bill of rights (backed up by the Constitutional 
Court) provides mechanisms and protection for citizens to participate in 
public debate and in formal political processes, such as elections. Whereas 
the period 1990–94 was an ‘opening-up’ period, with a myriad of processes 
under way and a myriad of voices being heard, the post-1994 period has 
been characterised by a formalisation of democratic processes, with much 
of what had formerly come from civil society now being absorbed into the 
country’s legislature, with ‘hard-core’ discussion of pertinent issues often 
taking place in parliamentary portfolio committees. 
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These committees serve as a good example of the claim that democratic prac-
tices have increasingly been formalised. Parliamentary portfolio committees, 
and in this case more specifically the Portfolio Committee on Defence, 
provide an opportunity for civil society to participate to some extent in, at 
least influencing formal decision making, if only in the sense of being heard 
on certain issues. These committees often invite members of or groups from 
civil society, mostly the NGO sector, to address them on issues related to 
the mandates of the committees. Whether such inputs are necessarily taken 
into account when actual policy formulation takes place – and whether these 
committees necessarily influence policymaking – is less clear. However, the 
portfolio committees are arenas where decision makers and civil society meet 
and interact. As far as the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence is 
concerned, there seems to be a general feeling that this committee is more 
important and influential than the others. According to Brigadier-General 
Ntsiki Motumi, the portfolio and parliamentary committees do influence 
policy ‘in the sense that government administrators (Defence Secretariat) 
prepare draft policies, engage with parliamentarians and thereafter changes 
are made if necessary, before promulgation’. She cites the example of the 
NSF Special Pensions Act and the DoD 2010 Human Resources Strategy 
(Motumi 2003).10 
It is rather doubtful whether the Portfolio Committee on Defence originally 
had much influence. The committee’s former and long-serving chair, Thandi 
Modise, complained in 2003 (with reference to problems surrounding 
grievance procedures and protocols, and the ongoing transformation in the 
SANDF) that ‘[o]ur committee has been trying to get noticed for two years’ 
(Beeld, 2005c). At the same time, two unions representing SANDF members, 
as well as a member of the opposition Democratic Alliance party, complained 
that neither the portfolio committee nor the DoD had responded to requests 
for meetings in order to address problems related to transformation in the 
SANDF, and all parties alleged that they had been trying to arrange such 
meetings for longer than a year (Beeld, 2005c). However, under the new chair, 
Professor Kader Asmal, it would seem that things changed, and that the 
committee played a much more active role of oversight than used to be the 
case. According to a newspaper report in March 2005 (Beeld 2005a), Asmal 
was infuriated by the strategic business plan for the SANDF submitted to the 
committee and instructed the defence secretary to rewrite and re-submit it. 
Clearly, he planned a much more active role for the defence committee.
There is little if any indication of any move towards increased militarisation 
in South Africa or of an ‘excessive’ role for the military. In fact, relative to 
the size of its population and economy, South Africa now has the fourth-
smallest defence force on the continent. Problems seem to be located more 
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in the realm of politics, particularly party politics. It would seem that most 
of the problems currently associated with the SANDF have their origin in 
complaints about the downsizing of the institution (in terms of personnel 
and other resources). Moses Khanyile of the DS’s policy and planning 
division argues (2003) that in certain instances the portfolio committees on 
defence and public accounts are ‘very powerful’, and he cites the example of 
the country’s controversial arms deal. 
As far as the formalisation of democratic practices is concerned, one can 
detect a movement over the past years (since 1994) from participatory, to 
consultative, to what can perhaps be termed procedural democracy. If the era 
surrounding the formal negotiations leading up to 1994 and for some time 
after the inauguration of the first democratically elected government saw fairly 
large-scale participation in the processes leading up to a settlement (though 
the formal settlement was an elite pact in many respects), the Mandela era, in 
particular, was characterised by a measure of consultative democracy, if one 
takes into account the extent to which civil society was ‘roped in’ to provide 
advice on policy formulation. The Mbeki era, though, increasingly sees a 
move towards limited civil society participation, compared with the previous 
era. Participation is specialised and mostly of a technical nature, focused on 
the particular expertise of outsiders in cases where ‘inside’ expertise and 
capacity are not readily available. For example, Khanyile (2003) has pointed 
out that NGOs often have more ‘current’ information on the peace support 
environment, and therefore are of assistance to the DoD, especially ‘in the 
early stages of policy-formulation, because of their specialised knowledge 
and involvement in this environment’ (Khanyile 2003).
The above claims need to be unpacked briefly. When referring to the role of 
civil society, two broad functions can be identified. The first is the function 
of civil society (including the NGO sector, as this is an important element 
of civil society for the purpose of this overview) to interact with the state in 
order to influence government policy, usually for the purpose of benefitting 
the interest groups represented by the particular elements of civil society 
engaging with the state. Such interaction is not necessarily solicited by the 
state, but is normal practice in democratic societies. 
A second function of civil society is engagement with the state with a view to 
influencing state policy on issues that have a broader or ‘national’ character. 
Part of this kind of interaction is engagement solicited by the state where 
specific inputs are needed in cases where the state does not have expertise 
to deal with issues. Such inputs can also serve the purpose of engaging with 
civil society in order to legitimise policies and build support for government 
actions – in short, achieving ‘social consent’. This process has been very 
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evident in the various round-table discussions hosted by the Department 
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on a range of policies, including the 1998 white 
paper on peacekeeping and various aspects related to the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the establishment and development 
of the AU and its organs.
What is striking about the role of civil society in South Africa, with particular 
reference now to issues related to defence and security and, more broadly, 
foreign affairs (to the extent that foreign affairs often encompass aspects of 
defence and security policy, especially when it comes to regional and African 
policies) is that two types of civil society ‘actions’ can be identified. The 
first is a critical stance regarding government policy, coming mainly from 
the (white, English) media, which is mostly aimed at defence expenditure, 
and more particularly defence procurement package agreements, including 
both the nature and cost of the equipment, and subsequent indications of 
corruption or dishonesty involved in the granting of contracts. Particularly 
on questions pertaining to former Deputy President Jacob Zuma’s alleged 
benefits deriving from the various arms contracts, the procurement package 
received wide coverage in the media. Such criticism, though, has little to do 
with engagement between the state and civil society – in fact, government 
(and especially the Mbeki government) does not take kindly to criticism. 
It would seem that initially, in the period 1990–94, various forms of civil 
society participation in the transformation process were rife, and debates on 
a wide range of topics raged in the news media, including issues such as the 
transformation of the military and the nature of a post-apartheid security 
and defence. A host of NGOs were involved in policy issue areas, to the 
extent that policy was often developed without the appropriate oversight by 
and accountablility to parliament and the executive. 
After the 1994 elections, this vibrancy in society was gradually formalised 
and ‘the voice of the people’ was captured in the importance attached to 
parliamentary oversight and the various measures adopted to assure such 
oversight, e.g. the parliamentary portfolio committees. But this era (roughly 
1994–99, or the Mandela era, though one should be careful not to place too 
much importance on the person of the president in each era, as structural 
constraints and opportunities also go a long way in explaining differences) 
still saw a lot of civil society participation, with the military establishment and 
DFA often engaged in discussions with various groups in civil society on the 
formulation of policy and the development of legislation. The white papers 
on defence and on peacekeeping operations were fairly comprehensively 
‘workshopped’, as was the defence review. And in the post-1999, or post-
Mandela era, the Defence Act of 2001 was drawn up not only by experts from 
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the Departments of Defence and Justice and legal experts, but also by other 
‘experts’ from civil society.
A number of points should be made here. The first is that civil society 
participation has become increasingly confined to the services that research 
NGOs in particular can provide to government; in a way, therefore, civil 
society participation is largely narrowed down to engagement with the NGO 
sector and to some extent academic institutions with strong research capacity. 
An early explanation for this is offered by Jakkie Cilliers of the Institute of 
Security Studies (ISS): 
We can look at every sector of South African society, including 
the areas that we engage in [security], where government has 
been so weak and has been so mistrustful of its own people 
and particularly of the old guard that government almost laid 
itself bare to policy influence on anything from land reform to 
security issues (quoted in Le Pere and Vickers 2001: 68). 
But the new government grew in confidence and capacity, and increasingly 
it seems, civil society inputs have become of a technical nature rather than, 
first and foremost, offered by or solicited from an ethos of idealistic views of 
‘people’s participation’. In the words of Motumi (2003), ‘the Mandela era 
appeared more consultative because it was characterised by the development 
of policy frameworks. During the Mbeki era the challenges are around policy 
implementation and service delivery.’
Mbeki’s integrated governance system has meant a huge increase in the 
size of the presidency, concentrating technical expertise in the office of the 
president and providing a lesser role for skilled civil society (read NGO) 
inputs. As part of the Integrated Governance and Planning Framework for 
Government adopted by the cabinet lekgotlas (informal meetings) of July 
2001 and January 2002, five clusters comprising the directors-general of 
the relevant government departments were established to provide strategic 
policy direction and ‘monitor performance’ (Motumi 2003) in all areas of 
governance, including the identification of gaps and critical challenges, and 
the pulling together of cross-cutting issues. The SANDF is represented in the 
justice, crime prevention, and security cluster, as well as in the international 
relations, peace, and security cluster (with the latter also including, among 
others, the DFA, the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee, and 
the South African Secret Service).
Furthermore, under Mbeki, one also sees the end of the period during which 
large-scale (new) policy formulation was needed to reflect the character of 
South Africa
166
Security and Democracy in Southern Africa
the ‘new’ South Africa, and the move has been increasingly towards delivery 
and implementation, partly explaining the diminished role of civil society 
(Motumi 2003). A last point to be made is that research-oriented NGOs and 
academic institutions (in the realm of security and defence issues) continue 
to play a prominent role in articulating positions and opinions on these 
matters, and to participate in debates and contribute their skills. The Africa 
Institute, for instance, is very active in the promotion of NEPAD, at times 
also in the critiquing of the NEPAD process (though maybe inadvertently 
so), and the ISS in the development of viewpoints and recommendations 
regarding the AU and its various organs and protocols. Discussions hosted 
by these institutes are frequently well attended by officials from the DFA, 
the DoD, and other relevant government bodies. Very often, though, these 
officials are from middle-management level and not necessarily the real 
decision makers, but rather the people who need to implement decisions 
and who need expert advice and ideas on the practicalities of policy. 
Civil society, in its critique of the continental process or of security policy 
and developments within the Southern African region can, of course, play 
a useful role, articulating what the government can perhaps for reasons of 
political sensitivity not say. However, and when all is said and done, civil 
society participation is to a very large measure supportive of government 
policy, and is aimed at contributing to the building of a democratic South 
Africa and of the necessary capacity, skills, and knowledge for the country 
to realise its domestic and international objectives. A good example is also 
the fact that the DoD solicits civil society inputs through the various advisory 
boards it has established, among these the Equal Opportunity Board, Military 
Veterans Board, and Military Arbitration Board (Motumi 2003).
national security concept
There is a clear distinction between national security at the domestic level, 
which is largely the responsibility of the South African Police Service, and 
that of regional (and external) national security, which is mainly the task of 
the SANDF.
South Africa’s orientation to its external national security has changed 
from an explicitly offensive strategy (as characterised by the ‘Total Strategy’ 
approach of the 1970s and 1980s) to that of a defensive approach. According 
to the 1996 white paper on national defence,11 the ‘objectives of security 
policy include the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of the South African state and the promotion of regional 
security in Southern Africa’ (Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 65).
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Security is defined in broad terms, in line with current international 
thinking. In a document entitled ‘Ready to govern: ANC policy guidelines 
for a democratic South Africa’, adopted at its national conference in 1992, 
the ANC identified lack of security in terms of underdevelopment, poverty, 
and an absence of democratic values as promoting conflict within and 
between states. Therefore, ‘national and regional security should not be 
restricted to military, police and intelligence matters, but as having political, 
economic, social and environmental dimensions’ (Hough and Du Plessis 
2000: 16–17).
The Southern African region forms an important focus of South Africa’s 
national security doctrine, policy, and thinking. In an input into the National 
Growth and Development Strategy (1996), the DFA argued, with reference 
to the country’s national external security strategy, that ‘the emphasis should 
be on the security and long-term economic and political stability of the entire 
sub-continent, since South Africa’s national security cannot be sustained in 
an unstable and insecure region’ (Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 69).
External national security is based on advancing the principles of collective 
security, non-aggression, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, while 
some of the transnational threats identified are the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, international terrorism and extremism, organised crime 
and narcotics trafficking, and issues related to environmental degradation.12 
The defence white paper of 1996 implies the recognition or perception of 
a number of threats that are related to the economic, political, and societal 
dimensions of a broad definition of security:
•	 the spread of disease;
•	 the burden of refugees;
•	 civil war in some SADC member countries;
•	 regional instability; and
•	 chronic underdevelopment.
The above threats could result in inter-state disputes, tensions, and conflict in 
the region, with the possibility of extra-regional interference and intervention 
that might make it ‘necessary to deploy the SANDF in multi-national peace 
support operations’ (Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 79–80). Significantly, the 
white paper also refers to the possibility that inter-state disputes could arise 
in relation to trade, foreign investment, natural resources, and previously 
suppressed territorial claims. 
The crux of South Africa’s orientation in terms of its regional security 
perceptions and relations is captured in the 1996 white paper as follows:
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South Africa has a common destiny with Southern Africa. 
Domestic peace and stability will not be achieved in a context 
of regional instability and poverty. It is therefore in South 
Africa’s long-term security interests to pursue mutually 
beneficial relations with other SADC states and to promote 
reconstruction and development throughout the region 
(Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 80).
The basic premise, according to the 1998 South African defence review, is 
that ‘Southern Africa is a region of allies’ and that South Africa as a member 
of SADC participates in common security arrangements under the auspices 
of this organisation and its various organs and committees (Hough and Du 
Plessis 2000: 82). Another aspect of South Africa’s approach to regional 
security that needs mentioning at this point is to be found in its assertion 
in the 1998 white paper on international peace missions that ‘participation 
in international peace missions is a secondary function of the armed forces’ 
(Hough and Du Plessis 2000: 111). 
Who makes security policy?
There is no doubt that civil society – or, more specifically, research-oriented 
NGOs and academic institutions – does (still) to a greater or lesser extent 
influence security policy, but this does not mean that one can assume direct 
causality between the inputs of these groups (through seminars, workshops, 
conferences, and publications) and the actual making of security policy. 
Foreign affairs and security policy have always and in most countries been 
a realm in which heads of state or government play a large role (the role of 
Tony Blair and George Bush during the Iraq war of 2003 is a case in point). 
In apartheid South Africa in the 1970s, P. W. Botha combined the portfolio 
of defence with his role of prime minister, and up to the mid-1950s South 
Africa did not have a minister of foreign affairs – this portfolio was part and 
parcel of the prime minister’s duties and functions. 
Under Mbeki, who is a technocrat, an integrated system of governance has 
been developed, giving the president a bird’s eye view of foreign policy, 
and security and defence issues, and his governance and management style 
leads one to believe that he is definitely in charge of security policy, though 
perhaps not to the extent to which he participates in and is responsible for 
foreign policymaking. Although defence policy is made by the DoD, with 
the DS also playing an important role, there is still political control at the 
highest level (the Office of the President). The DFA, because of the nature of 
peacekeeping operations, also contributes to the making of defence policy.
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Regional security co-operation 
From the start of its membership of SADC, South Africa has indicated a 
willingness to participate fully in and assist in the development of security 
co-operation practices in the region, particularly through the building of 
security structures. 
The SANDF has participated in several training exercises with fellow SADC 
member countries. The official version of South Africa’s involvement in 
Lesotho in 1998 is that it was a joint SADC operation, and the SANDF has 
provided humanitarian and disaster relief to a number of its SADC neighbours 
and to countries further afield, including:
•	 shipments and airlifts of food and medicines to Rwandan refugees;
•	 assistance to flood victims in Mozambique and Tanzania;
•	 assistance during the ferry disaster on Lake Victoria in 1999;
•	 assistance to Lesotho during an exceptionally cold spell in the winter of 
1999; and
•	 de-mining operations in Angola and Mozambique.
It would be difficult to ascribe South Africa’s participation in regional security 
co-operation practices as directly or even necessarily related to democratisation 
and democratic practices. Many SADC members, not all of them democracies, 
participate in these exercises or assist neighbours during times of crisis. 
However, South Africa’s participation is obviously directly attributable to the 
end of apartheid and its commitment to regional co-operation, security, and 
integration. 
South Africa also participates actively in the security institutions of SADC, 
not least in terms of institution- and capacity-building. South Africa is deeply 
involved in the activities of the ISDSC and SARPCCO, which are regulated 
through the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation.
An area in which South Africa does play a very active role is that of conflict 
resolution in the region. This role is directly related to the country’s perception 
of itself as a democracy in which human rights are of paramount importance, 
and can perhaps be traced to the nature of its own transition to democracy – a 
peaceful one. The idea that conflicts can be solved through negotiation is one 
strongly adhered to by South African policymakers, and much time, energy, 
and resources have been spent on conflict resolution efforts in the DRC and 
Burundi in particular, including the contribution of troops to peacekeeping 
operations in both countries.
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However, in terms of regional security institutions and arrangements all is 
not plain sailing. From 1996, with the inception of the SADC OPDSC, until 
2001, no agreement could be reached on its operationalisation, particularly 
given the stance of Zimbabwe, its first chair. However, the stalemate was 
broken and a Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation was 
signed during the Blantyre summit of August 2001. Mozambique became 
the new chair and handed over responsibility for the OPDSC to Lesotho in 
2003, to be followed by a term for South Africa. The Mutual Defence Pact 
was signed at the 2003 SADC summit, though by the end of 2004 only four 
countries had ratified the pact, perhaps pointing to the difficulties in finding 
common ground in the face of divergent approaches to security, ranging 
from ‘hard-core’ political–military security preoccupations to member states 
privileging human security. Although the pact is in a way a watered-down 
version of the original, which would have obliged states legally to come to 
the aid of a member suffering a military attack by internal or external forces,13 
it does, in the words of Ngoma (2003), reflect ‘an unmistakable intention by 
its members to establish a security community’.
Nevertheless, the pact could widen existing rifts, and its impact on regional 
co-operation and good relations (at the very least) should be carefully 
monitored. One of its biggest dangers might be its reorientation of SADC’s 
initial ‘new security’ approach, which de-emphasised military–political 
security and any form of violence as a solution to conflicts, towards a more 
traditional approach in which state security, military–political issues, and 
external (military) threats are given priority. South Africa’s deputy foreign 
minister, Aziz Pahad, was quick, though, to point out that the pact would 
not demand ‘immediate response’ from member countries in the case of an 
attack on a fellow SADC country, but that it allowed for states to respond 
‘according to their possibilities’ (Mail & Guardian Online 2003). It would 
seem that South Africa’s decision to enter into the pact has more to do with 
promoting good relations in the region than with a firm belief that it will 
actually have much practical impact. The pact is a symbol of the belief that 
with the (albeit still early and tentative) end of civil wars in Angola and the 
DRC, the region might, at long last, be moving towards an era of peace and 
stability.
Conclusion
Is there a clear link between democracy and the type of security paradigm 
in which South Africa operates internally and regionally? A firm conclusion 
can probably only be reached once the country has been compared to its 
neighbours. Comparing contemporary South Africa to apartheid South 
Africa, the answer would be that since the early 1990s the role of the security 
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establishment in South Africa, in particular the role of the defence force, has 
changed dramatically. One reason is that the country has been democratised, a 
process that opened up space for politicians, political society, and civil society 
to debate and determine the nature of security, and the structure and role of 
the security system. Whether the system thus created is delivering the results 
initially envisaged is not clear. The events in America of 11 September 2001 
have brought military security approaches to the fore again, while under the 
influence of economic globalisation and the drive for ‘investment efficiency’, 
the SANDF, like many other modern defence forces, has been forced to scale 
down significantly. The two are not necessarily compatible, and an ‘open’ 
security policy and structure that allow for genuinely regularised inputs from 
civil society may not be viable in an environment determined largely by 
capacity level (i.e. the capacity available to transform theory into practice).
EnDnoTES
1 However, in written comments received from Brigadier-General Motumi of the SANDF (2003), 
she expressed the opinion that South Africa is no longer viewed as ‘Big Brother’ by its SADC 
neighbours because it has ‘played ball by strengthening its relations with other countries through 
the signing of defence pacts, trade, tariffs etc.’
2 This is a somewhat sweeping statement and will be refined in a later section.
3 I would like to credit the input received from Moses Khanyile from the policy and planning 
division of the DS (interview with the author, 8 September 2003), though any factual mistakes 
are mine, as are interpretations and analysis.
4 The SADC Treaty is a good example.
5 For an overview of the problems related to illegal immigration, see Solomon (1998). It should be 
noted, however, that there is little agreement on the numbers of illegal immigrants in the country. 
The South Africa Survey 2001/2002 (SAIRR 2002: 142) quotes the Bureau of Market Research’s 
report stating that ‘claims of the number of illegal immigrants ranging between 2m and 8m [are] 
unsubstantiated and exaggerated’.
6 As in the case of illegal immigration, there is a burgeoning literature on these issues. Some 
indications of the magnitude of the problems are to be found in Rotberg and Mills (1998). 
7 Figures taken from a parliamentary briefing statement by the (then) minister of defence, J. Modise 
(1999); additional information from South Africa Yearbook 2004/5 (GCIS 2005: 468). 
8 For an early, but good analysis or explanation of the reasons behind the demise of apartheid, see 
Geldenhuys (1991).
9 The ‘rainbow nation’ concept did not indicate a new direction within the ANC – non-racialism 
has always been an important principle of the organisation – but it has served to give a practical 
and visible content to the idea and ideal of non-racialism.
10 Also the opinion expressed in the author’s interview with Moses Khanyile of the DS, 8 September 
2003.
11 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from official documents (e.g. white papers or the South 
African constitution) are taken from Hough and Du Plessis (2000).
12 National External Security Strategy input, Hough and Du Plessis (2000: 71).
13 The adopted version of the pact only obliges member countries to participate in ‘such collective 







Swaziland has been described as the last country with an absolute monarch 
in Africa. The notion of absolute monarchism can be traced to early European 
thought that held that the universe was a grand empire, founded upon 
principles of divine logos (Harding 1976). Judeo–Christian beliefs underscored 
the centrality of royal authority and the notion of the divine appointment 
and nature of kings. Royal absolutism, therefore, implied that kings were 
God’s representatives among nations, commanding unsurpassed authority. 
In Europe today such notions are no longer tenable. On the other hand, 
it should be recalled that when European powers colonised Africa, one of 
their priorities was to weaken traditional forms of governance by locating the 
locus of power and social control somewhere in Europe. Traditional forms of 
governance were thus secondary. 
The eventual ‘death’ of African traditional authority suited the colonial 
masters. When Africa’s people began to call for democracy around the 
middle of the twentieth century, the primary question was, with what should 
colonial governance be replaced? The idea of reverting to the glorious past 
of African kingdoms and chiefdoms as edifices of power was not an option, 
because the colonial masters still wanted to perpetuate their interests in 
Africa. British Africa was thus channelled to adopt the Westminster model of 
parliamentary democracy, while in French Africa, colonialism was effectively 
continued. Neither worked for much longer.
This study will locate the problems of democratisation Swaziland has faced 
since 1968 in the context of a monarchical political regime. Swazi kingship is 
not absolute in the sense that Western thought holds, but has a rigid structure 
of checks and balances, although these are meant to consolidate power in 
the monarch. It is this conceptualisation of the centrality of the monarch that 
explains the nature and fundamental function of security in Swaziland.
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Triumph of tradition
Swaziland’s dominant cultural text is characterised by an ideology of tradition-
alism (Mzizi 2002), which is the cornerstone of the attempts to consolidate the 
modern superstructure. This ideology, according to Macmillan (1985), started 
to emerge in the 1920s and 1930s as Swazis were trying to come to terms with 
the social dislocation created by colonialism. Traditionalism as an ideology 
seeks to recover symbols of the past in the economy of legitimating modern 
systems in the socio-cultural and political community. While in agreement 
with Macmillan that, like culture, traditionalism – which is culture’s functional 
expression – is dynamic in both form and content, Mzizi (2002: 168) argues 
as follows:
This [dynamism] is a natural phenomenon true of all social 
facts, but the uniqueness of the Swazi scenario lies in the fact 
that the Swazi cultural reality falls into the trap of being used 
by the dominant group to legitimate the status quo. The most 
dangerous scenario is when the gullible masses are unaware 
that what they have always held to be culture and tradition 
are being used to subjugate them in whatever form. In this 
scenario, traditionalism falls into the trap of social class, 
serving the whims of the dominant class in their agenda of 
power wielding and self-preservation.
Swazi kingship survived through the hardships of colonialism owing to 
formidable and gallant attempts first displayed by Queen Regent Labotsibeni 
Mdluli, and later King Sobhuza II, her grandson. The queen regent, while 
sensitive to the inevitable processes of change, asserted a strong regency 
that prepared the new king, Sobhuza II, to fit into both the old and the new 
worlds with an agenda to either strike a balance between the two or employ 
elements of the old to dominate the new. 
The colonial government had recognised Swaziland as a chiefdom under a 
paramount chief, as was common throughout British Africa. Sobhuza was 
thus allowed by British colonial practice to be in charge of all traditional 
institutions, except for matters that fell within the jurisdiction of the resident 
commissioner, the British crown’s representative. Sobhuza II used this 
leverage to consolidate his power base, fighting off all colonial tendencies 
that threatened traditional institutions. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the 
struggle for political independence led to tension between the new emerging 
ideology of party politics favoured by the British and the traditional ideology 
(Mzizi 1995: 172). Sobhuza had warned in 1959 that if the British were 
championing a constitutional dispensation that would undermine traditional 
authority, a constitutional crisis would result (Van Wyk 1965: 16). 
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It was the element of one-person-one-vote that Sobhuza saw as a threat to 
traditional authority. His attempts to win independence on the sole ticket 
of the monarchy failed, hence he was pushed to establish a royal political 
party, the Imbokodvo National Movement, in 1964. The power base of this 
movement was the monarchy, and its institutions were represented in the 
charismatic personality of Sobhuza himself, who commanded unquestioned 
allegiance from the entire population. He contested power at the 
independence elections and emerged with a sweeping victory, as if to prove 
a point to the colonial detractors that kings in Africa had inherent powers. 
To the British, kingship was to be constitutionally entrenched, but not to 
be politically contested, and to be confined to the traditional superstructure. 
To Sobhuza, kingdoms could not be half republics and half kingdoms. The 
authority of the king could in no way be compromised. This view was to have 
far-reaching consequences.
Political parties, especially the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress 
(NNLC), led by a medical doctor, Ambrose Zwane, espoused a pan-
African ideology. Its appeal to the working class threatened the dominance 
of the king’s party in the 1972 elections. However, it won a meagre three 
parliamentary seats, signalling the end of multi-partyism in Swaziland, 
and the beginning of a long-drawn-out process of constitution making. 
Seeing that the independence constitution had admitted political pluralism, 
and that this scenario could in the long run jeopardise the dominance of 
the monarchy, Sobhuza banned political parties on 12 April 1973. By using 
extra-legal traditional powers, he thus succeeded in asserting himself in the 
position of political as well as traditional leader (Wanda 1990). In a well-
prepared proclamation, he reasoned as follows:
•	 the constitution has indeed failed to provide the machinery of good 
governance and for the maintenance of peace and order; 
•	 the constitution is indeed the cause of growing unrest, insecurity, 
dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in our country and an impediment 
to free and progressive development in all spheres of life;
•	 the constitution has permitted the importation into our country of 
highly undesirable political practices alien to, and incompatible with 
the way of life in our society and designed to disrupt and destroy our 
peaceful and constructive and essentially democratic methods of political 
activity. Increasingly this element engenders hostility, bitterness and 
unrest in our peaceful society (Kingdom of Swaziland 1973a: secs. 2(a), 
(b), and (c)).
The constitutional crisis that Sobhuza had predicted in 1959 had indeed 
come to pass. To him, full freedom and independence could not be realised 
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until a home-grown constitution that would guarantee peace, order, good 
governance, happiness, and the welfare of the Swazi nation was crafted. 
It has been argued that actually Sobhuza II had the best of intentions in 1973. 
Kuper (1978: 336–37), his official biographer, sees the 1973 events as a turn 
from 
nominal political independence into a full sovereignty under 
a leader who had proven his wisdom and moral courage over 
the years, a man ready to listen to all sides before making 
a decision, a King who was not a tyrant, a King inspired by 
ideals of the best in a traditional African monarchy in which 
there was the interplay of councils and the King [was] the 
mouthpiece of the people. 
Kuper’s highly positive remarks are based on the traditional role of Swazi 
kings that had no concept of absolute authority (Booth 1983; Hlatshwayo 
1994), since various councils (emabandla) were put in place to check and 
balance the powers and decisions of a king. These councils were established 
on the principle that they were representative. Hence selection into their 
membership was not arbitrary. 
But in 1973 the king assumed supreme powers that made him both the 
centre and circumference of the entire political machinery. Clearly he had 
taken charge of every facet of Swaziland’s political life, both in the traditional 
domain and in the modern governance sector. He assumed all executive 
powers previously granted to the prime minister and cabinet. He could 
act now at his own discretion, consulting whomsoever he wished without 
being bound by law. He gave himself power to detain without charge for 
a renewable 60 days any person he deemed was a threat to the peace, and 
the courts had no jurisdiction to listen to cases of detention. Meetings of 
a political nature, including processions and demonstrations, were to be 
controlled by the commissioner of police (Mzizi 1995: 176). 
Sobhuza recreated himself into an absolute monarch who, until 1978, ruled 
the country with a council of ministers that, according to the legislative 
procedure order of 13 April 1973, had no final say on any legal bill, but were 
limited to drafting it and handing it to the king to pass as a king’s-order-in-
council (Mzizi 1995: 177). 
The Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force (UDF) was formed during the 
turbulent 1973 crisis with the sole mandate of defending the institution of 
kingship against internal challenges. Umbutfo is a siSwati word for ‘regiment’, 
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and by tradition regiments are established and named by a king for the 
purpose of protecting kingship. Regiments in the traditional sense must 
undergo a period of royal training that involves painstaking discipline, a ritual 
from which they graduate with an insignia of special beads called simohlwana. 
While undergoing the initiation process, they must demonstrate unflinching 
love for and loyalty to the king and country. The expression they use after 
graduation is, tsine sigane iNkhosi (we are married to the king). Thus it was 
the case that the first 600 recruits into the UDF were drawn from strong, 
able-bodied young and middle-aged men who had passed the traditional 
initiation at different times. They were now ready to defend the king, not with 
the traditional shield and battle-axe, but with rifles and modern artillery.
Towards a homegrown constitutional dispensation
In the aftermath of the 1973 events, Sobhuza II set up the Royal Constitutional 
Review Commission. Membership and the terms of reference were wholly 
determined by him. The terms, which were never gazetted, included a 
provision to inquire into the broad parameters upon which Swaziland’s 
constitution should be based (Kuper 1978: 338). The report of that commission, 
including its modus operandi, was never made public. But a logical assumption 
is that King’s-Order-in-Council 23/1978, which established a parliament, 
was a consequence of that royal commission. The order not only established 
the procedure for election, but also retained the powers of the king to make 
laws by decree and cemented the 1973 proclamation as the supreme law of 
Swaziland, subject only to amendments or repeal by the king after a ‘new 
Constitution for the Kingdom of Swaziland has been accepted by the King 
and the people of Swaziland and brought into force and effect’ (Kingdom of 
Swaziland 1978). 
Making educated observations on the tensions Swaziland has experienced 
since 1973, Khumalo (1996) says: 
One reason for the escalation in the nature of the 
constitutional tensions arising from the dual system operating 
in Swaziland … has been the manner in which this system 
attempts to consolidate traditional authority structures 
within a predominantly modern system of government. 
Prior to the repeal of the constitution in 1973, the traditional 
structures were given recognition, but at a separate level of 
the administration. In this way, although some tensions were 
inevitable, they were much more confined than they have 
been since 1978. The question which arises, therefore, is how 
can we address the tensions in view of the fact that there 
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will always be some interaction between the traditional and 
modern sectors?
The search for a truly Swazi philosophical framework was itself a plausible 
idea, but it was how to go about the project that seemed to complicate the 
exercise, and perhaps derail its focus. The male-dominated commission 
was made up of staunch royalists. It would appear that the motive behind 
such a selection was to put together a team that would carry out an already 
predetermined mandate. The commission did not entertain the issue of 
multi-party politics, but instead focused on laying the groundwork for an 
electoral system that would be controlled and superintended by chiefdoms, 
and ultimately by the king, through royally appointed committees. When the 
Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland order (Kingdom of Swaziland 
1978) came into force, it was apparent that elections were to be conducted 
for the purpose of establishing an electoral college, which was the body that 
elected members of parliament. Nominations for parliament were made in 
secret. Quite clearly, this was a way of ensuring that parliament comprised 
candidates who would enhance the power and prestige of the monarchy. 
Although Sobhuza II had indicated that the 1978 reforms were still an 
experiment, the executors of the experiment believed otherwise, i.e. that it was 
a permanent arrangement to be safeguarded by hook or by crook. There was 
much national consternation on the unrepresentative nature of parliament 
and the seemingly unsophisticated methods of selecting candidates for the 
electoral college. Members of the electoral college, for instance, were voted 
for by the public in tinkhundla centres through an open single-file method, in 
the manner of cows bound for a dipping tank. Defenders of the experiment 
held that it was the most traditional way of doing things. But one thing 
was certain: the power of the monarch over the modern political process 
remained intact. This was considered the primary motif that would hold the 
nation together and ward off so-called foreign ideologies.
Sobhuza died in 1982 during the first phase of the experiment that was 
already showing signs of political corruption and abuse in the name of the 
king. The Liqoqo, or Royal Council, was announced as the supreme council 
of state soon after Sobhuza’s demise. It started by amending the Sedition 
Act of 1938, coming up with the 1983 Sedition and Subversive Activities 
Amendment Act. Opposition to the Liqoqo was considered a seditious act 
and carried a maximum prison term of 20 years. The regency left by Sobhuza 
was thrown into turmoil, as the Liqoqo wielded unbridled power in creating 
self-serving legislation.
The final showcase of the Liqoqo was the dethronement of the queen 
regent for failure to accede to some of the fast-lane innovations. But internal 
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power struggles weakened members’ resolve, and by 1986 the Liqoqo had 
disintegrated. 
Mswati III, Sobhuza’s successor, has made three major attempts at reform. 
The methodology he employs, for good or bad, hinges on the doctrine of 
consolidating royal power. Instead of taking a neutral position and letting 
Swazis debate the nature of the monarchy they desire, the king has been 
in control of all the efforts in the same manner as his father was. Mswati III 
set up the first commission in 1990 as an outgrowth of his traditional kraal 
meetings, dubbed ‘the peoples’ parliament’ by the media. A senior prince who 
had served in Sobhuza’s cabinet was appointed to guide the commission’s 
activities. This commission had a loose structure and an informal mandate, 
hence its report was only verbally presented at the royal kraal without the 
expected setting of officialdom and circumstance. The king must have learned 
his lesson from this loose structure, as people talked about anything under 
the sun, and the media were there to report on every public meeting. For 
that reason, he set up the Tinkhundla Review Commission (TRC) by Decree 
1/1992, but more to focus on the electoral system, and not the constitutional 
question as such.
Once again the normative factor was injected in section 3(b)(iv) of the terms 
of reference. The commission’s mandate was to receive views regarding 
the way in which Customary Institutions in the Kingdom 
of Swaziland should and/or could be accommodated in the 
political system of the Kingdom of Swaziland in view of their 
important constitutional and social role in terms of Swazi Law 
and Custom (Kingdom of Swaziland 1992). 
Khumalo (1996: 9) remarks as follows on the limitations imposed on the 
commission:
First, the investigation into the structural arrangement of 
the constitution was necessarily limited. The monarchy, for 
instance, and its role in the constitution was presumed to be 
beyond question …. Second, the initial presumption appears 
to be that the customary institutions must be accommodated 
in any future constitution. 
According to Khumalo (1996), the question of monarchical support should 
have been put to the public litmus test. Had this route been followed, different 
opinions would have emerged and a fresh conceptualisation of the monarchy 
would have been possible in a new constitutional dispensation. Secondly, the 
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reference to customary practices was a clear mandate to expand and refine 
the tinkhundla philosophy of 1978. 
The commission reported that Swazis had rejected the return to party politics 
(Kingdom of Swaziland 1992b). Executive authority was to be vested in 
the king, who should continue to appoint a prime minister and a cabinet 
in consultation with the prime minister. Two innovative elements were 
recommended on electoral procedure: that election to parliament should be 
direct, and elections should be by secret ballot. These two elements were 
incorporated in the Establishment of Parliament Order, 1992 (Kingdom 
of Swaziland 1992c). But again the supremacy of the monarchy over the 
executive and everything else was spelt out in section 55, as follows:
The King may require the Prime Minister and other Ministers 
to consult with him on any matter relating to the Government 
of Swaziland, and the Prime Minister shall keep the King fully 
informed concerning the general conduct of the government 
of Swaziland and shall furnish him with such information as 
he may request in respect of any particular matter relating to 
the government of Swaziland.
In addition, section 51(2) stipulates that the king may remove the prime 
minister or any other minister from office at any time, and is not obliged 
to give reasons for his actions. The king’s decision cannot be challenged in 
a court of law. Although the TRC report (Swaziland 1992b) recommended 
that Swaziland must craft a constitution with a bill of rights, four years were 
to pass before a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) would be set up. 
Like all previous commissions, the CRC was directly stage-managed by the 
king through a prince.
There was an attempt, as had been the case in the 1992 effort, to appoint a 
broad-based commission. But the non-representative clause in the terms of 
reference fuelled obvious suspicions to the extent that, and in addition to 
other precipitating factors, it led some progressive and enlightened 
commissioners to abandon the exercise. The subsequent 1996 commission 
was very large in size, composed mainly of a cocktail of individuals perceived 
to be supporters of the monarchy, but with no knowledge of the task before 
them. Many of the commissioners, while taking glory in the fact that they 
had been royally appointed, saw their new task largely as an employment 
opportunity. 
Deviating from its original mandate to produce a draft constitution within 
two years, the commission managed only to come up with a shoddy report 
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three years after the deadline, in 2001. On the role of the king, the CRC 
(Kingdom of Swaziland 2001: 77, 82) states:
 
All powers of governing (ruling) and reigning over the 
Kingdom must remain entrenched in the Ngwenyama, 
according to Swazi law and custom and existing laws; if the 
King is not there, in the Ndlovukazi, and if both are not 
there, in the Authorized Person ... The nation further insists 
that the King’s Office must be established, be autonomous, 
be strong and be a microcosm of the various government 
ministries, departments and sections ... Parliament must work 
to perpetuate the Tinkhundla System of Government.
As was the case with the 1992 TRC, the CRC made a comment on the 
question of multi-party politics: 
An overwhelming majority of the nation recommends that 
political parties must remain banned. They do not want 
political parties in the kingdom. There is an insignificant 
minority which recommends that political parties must be 
unbanned. The recommendation is that political parties must 
remain banned in the Kingdom. The existing laws regarding 
this position must be enforced (Kingdom of Swaziland  
2001: 95).
The CRC report was subsequently presented to the constitution-drafting 
committee as an important reference document that contained the views 
of the nation on some highly contentious issues. The new constitution of 
Swaziland, which was assented to by the king on 26 July 2005 and was due 
to come into force in January 2006, has been viewed correctly as centralising 
power in the monarchy and underscoring the pervasiveness of tradition over 
modernity. Both the TRC and CRC reports favoured an executive monarch 
with far-reaching powers, which is the spirit of the 1973 King’s Proclamation 
to the Nation. The constitution has captured these sentiments and enshrined 
them variously throughout the document. The dual legal system is recognised 
by the constitution, and all matters that are subject to Swazi law and custom 
are prohibited from being adjudicated under common law. The constitution 
does contain a bill of rights, albeit with the usual claw-back clauses. But the 
freedoms of assembly and association that purport to open up the political 
space for political pluralism are limited by the imposition of the tinkhundla 
system, which was declared democratic and inclusive. Below are the relevant 
sections that illustrate the material contradictions on this point (Kingdom of 
Swaziland 2005):
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Section 58(1): Swaziland shall be a democratic country 
dedicated to principles which empower and encourage the 
active participation of all citizens at all levels in their own 
governance.
Section 58(6): The State shall promote among the people of 
Swaziland, the culture of political tolerance and all organs 
of State and people of Swaziland shall work towards the 
promotion of national unity, peace and stability.
These provisions should be contrasted with the following:
Section 79: The system of government for Swaziland 
is a democratic, participatory, tinkhundla-based system 
which emphasises devolution of state power from central 
government to tinkhundla areas and individual merit as a basis 
for election or appointment to public office. 
Section 80(3) The tinkhundla units or areas, inspired by a 
policy of decentralisation of state power, are the engines of 
development and the central pillars underpinning the political 
organisation and economic infrastructure of the country 
through which social services to the different parts of the 
Swazi society are facilitated and delivered.
Although the constitution appears to favour political liberalisation, there is a 
strong bias towards maintaining the status quo insofar as political agitation 
and organisation are concerned. If political parties are to make any impact 
on matters of governance, they must needs conform to the philosophy of 
tinkhundla. This is, of course, a far-fetched, ambitious expectation, especially 
for the NNLC, which espouses a pan-African ideology, and the People’s 
United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO), which upholds a socialist 
democratic model of governance. 
Finally, the new constitution of Swaziland was eventually signed by the 
monarch after all the clauses he had a particular interest in were changed to 
conform to his whims and tastes. The direct influence of the Swazi National 
Council Standing Committee could not be discounted as the debates gained 
momentum. While this was not in contradiction with the terms of reference 
of either the CRC or TRC, many observers felt that the king’s interventions 
towards the close of the exercise could be seen more as political interference 
than meaningful dialogue with the nation. The future of the constitution of 
Swaziland is yet to be judged. 
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That being said, the reality remains that Mswati III’s attempts at reform have 
been marred by a litany of problems. Internal pressure, although officially 
ignored, continues to be disruptive of the royal agenda for how change 
should be managed. The dissenting voices are heard far and wide, thanks to 
the international media and access to the internet. Faced with these realities, 
the king has landed himself in further trouble by assigning to himself the 
prerogative to manage change virtually on his own terms. This modus 
operandi creates problems of legitimacy, because of the inherent vested 
interest in the outcome of the process. Holding unequivocally to the strategy 
and philosophy of his late father, Mswati III desires to see a constitutional 
dispensation that will endorse him as an unbridled superintendent of all the 
modern and traditional socio-cultural and political institutions. 
His commissions, because of their chronic failure to demonstrate objectively 
how they aggregate public opinion, can be seen as tools for repeating at 
best what they perceive he wants to hear, or at worst what he tells them 
in the closed regular consultative meetings. The normative factor, namely, 
the immanence of traditionalism, receives reasoned configurations and, with 
little regard for the complexities of the implications, imposes the traditional 
factor on every facet of Swazi life. This has caused problems in governance 
and the rule of law. On the question of individual liberties and fundamental 
freedom, the CRC reported:
The nation recommends that rights and freedom which we 
accept must not conflict with our customs and traditions 
as the Swazi nation. Agreements with other states and 
international organisations which deal with rights and 
freedoms must be submitted to the nation (at Tinkhundla) 
before such agreements become law in the Kingdom 
(Kingdom of Swaziland 2001: 83). 
The state of the opposition
The banning of political parties in 1973 in effect meant that any organised 
opposition to the operation or processes of government was circumscribed, 
killing the ethos and spirit of opposition politics so vital for emerging 
democracies and good governance. Dr Ambrose Zwane, leader of the NNLC, 
was detained and harassed, eventually seeking refuge in Tanzania. Zwane’s 
escape did not please Sobhuza, who still wanted to be viewed as a nationalist 
supporter of Africa’s liberation. Besides, Zwane’s ancestors and other close 
relatives were traditionally connected to royalty, playing very significant 
leadership roles and functions. The king therefore reverted to diplomacy to 
secure Zwane’s return on condition that he would not again be disruptive of 
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the status quo, while Sobhuza himself made an undertaking never again to 
detain him. Zwane returned to the kingdom already a sickly and frail man. 
The ordeal had taken its toll on him, and Sobhuza’s resolve to kill off the 
NNLC had been achieved.
During the Liqoqo era, PUDEMO was launched by a group of university 
students who were responding to the widespread violation of human rights 
in general, and the deposition of the queen regent in particular. PUDEMO’s 
programme expanded from these primary concerns to address the core of 
the problem, namely, the absence of an official opposition. The law was 
invoked to deal with PUDEMO malcontents, but their voices were heard far 
and wide because their concerns resonated with popular public sentiment. 
A 1994 letter to the king (Mzizi 1995: 188–89) clearly spells out PUDEMO’s 
demands:
•	 The 1973 State of Emergency and all other representative laws should be 
repealed;
•	 The unconditional return and indemnification of all political exiles should 
be gazetted;
•	 An interim government to administer the process of democratic change 
should be established;
•	 The Tinkhundla government is squandering public funds and further 
fails to properly manage the country’s economy … [It is a] government 
that is not democratic, transparent and accountable to the masses but 
is controlled and directed by secret cabals. A government where those 
government officials who were found guilty of corruption and treasonable 
acts are rewarded with promotions. A government which does not listen 
to the voices of the toiling masses.
Apart from issuing statements and organising marches, PUDEMO has not 
embarked on an aggressive strategy that would force government to the 
negotiation table. Police torture and harassment, including the relocation and 
demise of the original leadership, succeeded in killing the initial enthusiasm. 
Through its youth wing, the Swaziland Youth Congress, PUDEMO has 
continued to exert pressure by appealing to external forces to join in the call 
for the democratisation of Swaziland. The Swaziland Solidarity Network, 
operating from Johannesburg, South Africa, is one such effort that continues 
to make periodic attacks on the Swazi government. 
Alongside PUDEMO, the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) 
has also made calls for democratisation, using both internal and external 
mechanisms. The SFTU’s policy document indicates a resolve to fight for 
citizens’ rights; human rights; and political, cultural, and economic rights. 
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The SFTU has exploited its status in the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) by comparing oppressive laws in Swaziland with corresponding ILO 
conventions. Police harassment of the SFTU and other workers is carefully 
documented to support the charges. As a result of the SFTU’s sustained 
complaints, the ILO has deployed three missions since 1998 to review 
the situation in Swaziland. As this is usually very embarrassing for the 
government, the SFTU has been charged with advancing a secret agenda to 
overthrow the state (Mzizi 2002: 210–13). However, this strategy has kept the 
Swazi government on its toes, as the repercussions of losing export benefits 
through the Generalised System of Preferences and other import/export 
privileges are too great to countenance. Swaziland’s textile industry and the 
sugar export trade can only be sustainable if these trade benefits exist. 
Other formations that have been calling for democratisation include the 
Council of Swaziland Churches through its Peace and Justice Department, 
the Human Rights Association of Swaziland, Lawyers for Human Rights, 
and the Swaziland Democratic Alliance. Each of these formations has 
made its voice heard at various stages, but they have all been systematically 
ignored by the establishment. However, a landmark process first mooted 
in the late 1980s by government finally saw the light of day in 1997, when 
various stakeholders were assembled by government to craft a 2025 vision 
statement for Swaziland. The result was the National Development Strategy 
(NDS) (Kingdom of Swaziland 1997).
Chapter 8 of the NDS is entitled ‘Governance and public sector management’. 
The opening paragraph underscores the progressive notion that good 
governance is a collective responsibility of the entire society. Making direct 
reference to the effect of the 1973 events, the NDS states: 
The separation of powers between the three arms of 
government, particularly the role of the judiciary was 
compromised. The lack of a participatory process, specifically 
in the political sphere, led to the progressive erosion of a 
national set of values and vision around which the citizens 
could be mobilised (Kingdom of Swaziland 1997). 
Although appearing after the CRC had been set up, the NDS suggested 
some strategic objectives that would make the envisaged constitution widely 
acceptable. According to the NDS, a constitution
will be the supreme law of the land, ensuring the separation 
of powers of the three arms of government (the executive, 
legislature and judiciary), defining the universally accepted tenets 
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such as a Bill of Rights guaranteeing freedom of association 
and speech; rule of law; freedom of the press; protection of 
disadvantaged groups; equality and protection against all forms 
of discrimination (Kingdom of Swaziland 1997: 66).
The NDS recognised that a viable constitution-making process should take 
place in an enabling environment where free political expression is guaranteed 
and mechanisms for wider representation are respected. It recommended 
the establishment of ‘structures for promoting broad participation in the 
politics of the land to ensure full participation of all social formations in the 
formulation of a constitution or set of national conventions’ (Kingdom of 
Swaziland 1997). 
When the king launched the NDS in 1999, the government had been 
pressured to doctor the original document by removing all references to the 
political question. The explanation given was that the CRC was working 
on those matters. The legal ramifications were perhaps exaggerated, for no 
national strategy or development plan carries any force of law. 
A series of blunders that have compromised the judiciary since the late 
1990s have resulted in yet another formation: the Swaziland Coalition of 
Concerned Civic Organisations (SCCCO). Launched on 2 January 2003, the 
SCCCO comprises the Federation of Swaziland Employers, the Swaziland 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Association of Swaziland Business 
Community, the SFTU, the Swaziland Federation of Labour, the various 
churches, the Law Society, the Co-ordinating Assembly of NGOs, and the 
Swaziland National Association of Teachers.
Repeating the sentiments of earlier formations and calls made over the past 
two decades, the SCCCO is
concerned with the disastrous state of affairs prevailing 
in the country, breakdown in the rule of law, deepening 
bad governance, deteriorating economic environment and 
growing threat to the country’s trade privileges i.e. GSP 
and AGOA and absence of convincing political direction, 
attendant fear and uncertainty to the social and business 
environment (Swazi Observer 2003).
It is increasingly becoming clear that the ideology of traditionalism is under 
severe threat. Unless adjustments are made in both the traditional and 
modern political structures, the winds of change might shake the foundations 
of kingship and compromise the (false) peace and stability that Swaziland has 
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been known for since independence. The trend is that basic tenets of modern 
governance should supersede the traditional notions that have only succeeded 
in silencing dissenting voices and providing fertile ground for corruption and 
political failure. To the traditionalists, Sobhuza II’s understanding of the dual 
role of the kings of Africa who ruled and reigned needs to be preserved and 
entrenched. The competing view is that such a combined role is dangerous 
for the continued existence of the monarchy itself, hence it is imperative to 
respond to modern democratic processes.
As the tensions rage between the old and the new, matters of national security 
cannot be ignored. The preservation of the old, as indicated above, affected 
the military in Swaziland in 1973. What has been emerging ever since is 
an amorphous re-creation that pretends to respond, reluctantly, to modern 
democratic ideals that could be easily subsumed into a skewed cultural 
colouring. The major players in the process of selecting and adaptating what 
can be subsumed are the ruling elite who, as has been argued above, use their 
individuated understanding of tradition as a yardstick both in the selection 
process and the adaptation agenda. When attempts are made to establish 
national consensus on fundamental issues, the dominant group uses its 
power to edit the final product so that it confirms and conforms to its own 
values and aspirations. In Swaziland, one is not overstating the case to say 
that the people were colonised at two levels: the external, by a foreign power 
that lasted effectively until 1968; and then the internal, by the colonising 
forces that predated European colonialism and aimed to perpetuate the 
Dlamini aristocracy beyond independence from Britain. The intention may 
be to work for the common good and stability of the nation, but the lack of 
honest openness perpetuates allegations of dictatorship.
Conceptions of security: the apartheid challenge
Two regional liberation struggles affected Swaziland in historical terms: 
that led by the ANC against apartheid South Africa, and that of SWAPO in 
Namibia. The context of these struggles was the express intention of Southern 
African countries to devise ways of isolating South Africa by minimising 
economic dependence on that country. Swaziland’s position geographically 
is vulnerable indeed: land-locked, bordering on South Africa, and with close 
economic ties to that country. For that reason, the Swazi state could not sever 
quasi-diplomatic ties with apartheid South Africa, mutually masquerading 
as trade missions. Whereas it remained a historical fact that the Swazi royalty 
had supported the formation of the ANC in 1912, and the incumbent king 
had maintained his membership of the ANC, by nature royal politics was 
conservative. Thus, in one sense, any gain of momentum by the ANC was 
seen as a potential threat to Swazi royal politics and hegemony.
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This led the Swazi state to refuse to give open support to the regional 
liberation struggles, especially where South Africa was involved or had a 
direct interest. Lack of support meant practically preventing such movements 
from operating within the borders of Swaziland. Cordial relations also 
existed between the Swazi regime and the Portuguese colonial government 
in Mozambique. While over 90 per cent of Swaziland’s imports came from 
South Africa and most exports had to be sent outside the region, the SADCC 
and the Commonwealth, as well the UN, approved of aid only on the Lomé 
Convention principle that any bilateral links with Pretoria would disqualify 
the country concerned from receiving such aid. Meanwhile, South Africa 
created a lucrative deal that would tempt its immediate neighbours: the 
establishment of the South African Customs Union. Commenting on the 
predicament Swaziland found itself in during that period, Davies et al. (1985: 
72–73) remarks: 
The Swazi regime further appears aware of the inevitable 
domestic political risks of being seen by its own population 
to be closely identified with the apartheid regime. At the 
regional level, the actions of the SADCC countries and 
Frontline States have some restraining impact on the Swazi 
regime’s stance in the region. Finally, there have been 
intangible ideological factors whose effect is difficult either to 
assess or predict. The most important here was the express 
reluctance of King Sobhuza to act openly against the ANC, for 
the apparent reason that the Swazi monarchy was involved 
in its formation in 1912 and retained some sentimental 
attachment to the organisation.
However one looks at these factors, they suggest a confused policy on 
crucial regional issues that Swaziland had to grapple with. This confusion 
was evidenced by especially the following positions. In 1969, one year after 
independence, Swaziland signed the Lusaka Manifesto binding all African 
states to ostracise South Africa, save only when the issue of power transfer to 
the majority in South Africa was on the table. In 1970, Swaziland abstained 
from voting for an OAU resolution condemning the ‘dialogue offensive’ tactics 
of the apartheid regime. But Swaziland supported all the UN resolutions that 
sought to nullify South Africa’s occupation of Namibia. Meanwhile, and with 
meticulous care and diplomacy, Swaziland accepted South African refugees. 
The latter was to become the most irritating practice for the apartheid regime, 
hence pressure was put on the Swazi state to restrict its generosity in this area 
or face the wrath of Pretoria. At this time, the apartheid regime was hell-bent 
on fostering a willingness among its neighbours to be ‘police agents’ against 
any possible guerrilla attack on South Africa (see Geldenhuys 1981).
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To enforce the creation of the South African-proposed Constellation of 
Southern African States, South Africa offered bribes that ranged from cash to 
capital projects. Meanwhile the ANC guerrilla agents desperately wanted to 
make Swaziland a ‘second front’, something that Pretoria caught on to, and 
it embarked on offensive campaigns against ANC operatives in the country. 
The most lucrative offers Pretoria dangled were the construction of the 
Komatipoort–Richards Bay railway line via Swaziland, which would ensure 
access to the sea; and the offer to return the KaNgwane Bantustan and the 
Ngwavuma area near KwaZulu to Swaziland, as both were initially part of 
Swazi territory. Sobhuza II could not resist these offers, and in February 1982, 
in the twilight months of his long reign, he signed a secret non-aggression 
pact with Pretoria. The pact bound Swaziland and South Africa to combat 
terrorism, insurgency, and subversion within the two territories, and also 
provided that joint forces would be detailed to deal with such threats.
The result of this pact was the selling out of ANC activists to the South African 
forces. A number of ANC guerrillas were murdered within the boundaries of 
Swaziland, following police co-operation at the highest level. Most of the 
atrocities committed in Swaziland were revealed for the first time during the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s hearings, headed by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Evidence led pointed at one apartheid operative, 
Eugene de Kock, as having been especially commissioned to deal with 
possible insurgents in Swaziland. It was the open signing of the Nkomati 
Accord between Mozambique and South Africa that cemented Swaziland’s 
relationship with Pretoria. In May 1984 the prime minister of Swaziland led 
a huge government delegation on a state visit to South Africa, ostensibly 
to formalise the establishment of diplomatic relations. Sobhuza had died in 
1982, and domestic instabilities were mounting and threatening the Swazi 
interim regime. Perhaps that was the reason for the paradigm shift from being 
secretive with Pretoria to being open, creating further hostilities between the 
Swazi regime and the ANC. 
The liberation of South Africa in 1994 meant that there had to be shifts once 
again on the part of the Southern African states to include South Africa as a 
major economic role player. Matters of defence and security also had to take 
on a fresh dimension. Swaziland has been keenly involved in the creation of 
the SADC ISDSC and has prepared its soldiers for regional commitments 
by training them in peacekeeping, which has been undertaken with great 
enthusiasm. Peacekeeping is now part of the training curriculum for every 
soldier, while senior personnel have been sent for additional training at the 
Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare.
A sterling contribution to the resolution of a simmering dispute between 
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Angola and Zambia was made by Swaziland’s former minister of foreign 
affairs and trade, Albert Shabangu. Swaziland was chairing the ISDSC when 
Angola accused Zambia of harbouring rebels for diamonds as payment 
in kind. Shabangu successfully mediated between the two countries. This 
showed that Swaziland had the potential of contributing positively to regional 
peace and stability, despite its tainted past.
national security revisited 
Nevertheless, as indicated in this study, civil discontent indicates that national 
security is strongly contested. The powers that be, depending on the pressures 
of the moment, do try to make concessions, however inadequate and clumsy, 
for the sake of maintaining the (false) peace and the make-believe view that 
change in Swaziland is by national consensus. This study has indicated that in 
practice, national dialogue is more idealistic, and therefore ideological, than 
empirical. National policy on matters of security thus hinges on the ideology 
of domination first coined by Sobhuza II, who philosophised that he had 
no enemies because he believed in dialogue. This has become Swaziland’s 
quasi-national policy in matters of conflict resolution. Yet in reality, as an 
anonymous interviewee indicated, ‘this is seldom the intention in Swaziland. 
Dialogue to us means monologue ... for when issues are of a political nature, 
the monarchy resorts to heavy-handed tactics in order to deter dissenting 
opinion and deflate militant malcontents’.
Another anonymous interviewee reasoned thus:
[T]he national conception of security in Swaziland centres 
around the conservative ruling elite whose philosophy is to 
safeguard the king’s authority and the attendant rituals like 
the Incwala, king’s birthdays, and independence celebrations. 
All these and other ceremonies are for the ritualisation 
of kingship, which is the centre and axis of Swazi socio-
political and religious life. Active security measures are taken 
to protect these ceremonies that extol the head of state as 
custodian of Swazi ethos.
Swaziland does not have a written security policy. It is assumed that every 
soldier will know what it is he must protect the minute a gun is thrust into his 
hands. Internal security policy is determined on a case-by-case basis, largely 
influenced by personal considerations. 
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The head of state determines the approach to be 
taken whenever there is an internal security issue. The 
antagonising forces are identified in terms of leadership 
and then appropriately targeted. As such, it not the issues 
these leaders raise that matter, but themselves as frontline 
players. Therefore, policy directives are engaged based on 
personalities rather than the issues at hand.
The processes followed in deciding security policy are as follows: firstly, 
the commissioner of police identifies a problem and gathers intelligence 
information to support his case. He then takes the matter to the king with 
all the facts he has obtained. The king then summons the heads of the 
army and prisons, who naturally cannot hold opinions contrary to that of 
the commissioner of police. The king then takes the matter to his various 
advisory bodies, most, if not all, of which have no expertise on matters of 
security. The resultant action is taken based on the advice given by these 
advisory bodies. But it must be underscored that as commander-in-chief, the 
king takes charge of all operations where the army is involved. The Defence 
Council exists only in name, according to most of the key people interviewed 
for this study. The rules of procedure for the council are neither here nor 
there. An anonymous senior Swazi soldier responded to the question on 
intelligence as follows:
Most national security-related actions taken in this country 
are more reactive than proactive. This has largely been 
influenced by members’ fears of being the harbinger of bad 
news. The system has an in-built tendency to shoot the 
messenger rather than address the issue. Therefore people 
[are] loathe to offer proactive advice. In addition to this, such 
offer[s] may show a relatively advanced knowledge of security 
matters, which in turn may be interpreted as a threat by the 
powers that be.
The study could not establish if Swaziland actually has an external security 
policy. However, the country has participated actively in the ISDSC and in 
drafting the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, and in other regional initiatives. 
Regarding Swaziland’s external policy, the case of the actions of the former 
foreign minister, Albert Shabangu, in his mediation of the Zambian–Angolan 
crisis is enthusiastically quoted as an example of a success story. Apart from 
that, the UDF has participated in peacekeeping exercises and continues to 




Swaziland’s uniqueness in the SADC region, and indeed in Africa, is that it 
is a kingdom that has vested all executive authority in the monarchy. This 
clearly is an imposition by the monarchy itself, playing on the notion that 
tradition does not recognise power contests. In the Swazi context, this has 
occurred while there are growing voices calling for the redefinition and 
reconceptualisation of kingship and traditional authority. If kingship elects 
to remain in the mainstream body politic, how far can it accommodate 
dissenting voices? 
Swaziland needs to solve the fundamental issues raised in this study, namely, 
the functional role of tradition, from being an ideology of domination to a 
shared value system in a transitory situation dictated by modern imperatives 
of the ideal society. Khumalo (1996) argues that a meaningful strategy in 
the goal of creating a constitutional dispensation is to determine the nature 
of the interconnections in a single unit between traditional and modern 
structures. Once the interlinkages have been carefully identified, the tensions 
caused by the competing elements between modernity and traditionalism 
might be minimised. Khumalo’s suggestions have been raised by several 
other commentators, although agreement on the way forward has not been 
found. But voices calling for meaningful democratic change are growing 
louder, and the attention and role of the international community cannot 
be ignored. Swaziland might be in danger of being isolated internationally. 
The diplomatic interventions by some SADC heads of state, in addition to 
the demands expected from states that participate in trade initiatives such 
as NEPAD, are indicators that if Swaziland continues to be intransigent and 
deceptive in the project of democratisation, it might itself become a security 







Tanzania has experienced substantial political transformation since 
independence in 1961. The country adopted a new constitution in 1962, 
which emphasised consolidating its independence. In 1964 Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar formed the United Republic of Tanzania, which soon moved from 
a multi-party to a one-party political system. In 1967, the country proclaimed 
the Arusha Declaration, which aimed at ujamaa, or socialism and self-
reliance. Socialism focused on turning Tanzania into an egalitarian society, 
while self-reliance aimed at reducing the country’s dependence on foreign 
resources for its social and economic development.
The 1964 union produced complex political structures. Zanzibar maintained 
its autonomy and all the important institutions of state – executive, legislature, 
and judiciary. Its government, headed by an executive president, consists of 
all ministries except those of foreign affairs, home affairs, and defence, which 
are shared between the two entities that make up the union. The former 
Tanganyika, however, surrendered its autonomy to the union. Therefore, 
instead of having three governments, there are only two: one for Zanzibar 
and the other for the union.
The 1964 merger was not extended to the ruling parties: the Tanzania 
(formerly Tanganyika) African National Union (TANU) for the mainland, and 
the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) for Zanzibar. Thus by 1965 Tanzania became a 
peculiar ‘one-party’ state with one ‘sovereignty’, two governments and two 
political parties. This unconventional structure made it difficult to determine 
whether Tanzania was a unitary state, a federation, or a confederation, and 
whether the country was a one-party or multi-party state. This was changed 
in 1977, when the two political parties merged to form Chama cha Mapinduzi 
(Party of the Revolution – CCM). In the same year a permanent constitution 
replaced the 1965 interim constitution. 
The mid-1980s witnessed more political changes. The 1977 constitution was 
amended in 1984, leading to the separation of the presidential post from the 
chairmanship of the ruling party and limiting presidential terms to two of five 
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years each. In 1985 the presidency changed hands from Julius Nyerere to Ali 
Hassan Mwinyi, following Nyerere’s voluntary retirement. President Mwinyi 
served the last ten years of the one-party political system. He was replaced 
by President Benjamin William Mkapa, who was elected in 1995 through a 
re-introduced multi-party political system. President Mkapa was re-elected 
in 2000 to serve his last term. The 2005 general elections produced a new 
president, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete.
Democratic transition
Tanzania’s democratic transition began in 1992, when legislation was 
introduced for a multi-party democratic system (Maundi 2002c: 42–47). The 
drivers of the process were civil society and the ruling party, the CCM. The 
last two years of the 1980s witnessed a robust civil society lobby pressing 
for democratic reforms. The lobby drew its inspiration from neighbouring 
Zambia, Kenya, and Burundi, and also capitalised on the favourable 
regional and international political environment, which encouraged political 
reforms.
Amid this pressure from civic organisations, former President Nyerere en-
couraged a national dialogue on political transformation. Nyerere’s initiative 
demonstrated his foresightedness in interpreting correctly the changing 
domestic, regional, and international situations. Domestically, there was 
economic liberalisation that needed to be complemented with political 
transformation. Regionally, many African regimes were losing their legitimacy 
due to political and economic mismanagement. At the international level, the 
donor community was applying pressure to African governments to liberalise. 
Also, the collapse of the Soviet Union encouraged the democratisation of 
Eastern Europe and Africa. With the demise of socialist solidarity, Tanzania 
had to come up with its own formula for a democratic transition. 
Conditions for the democratic transition in Tanzania were set by the ruling party, 
the CCM, and its governments. A presidential commission was established 
in March 1991 – the Nyalali Commission – which recommended a transition 
to a multi-party political system. In January 1992 the National Executive 
Committee of the CCM endorsed the commission’s recommendations, and 
in May the National Assembly enacted a multi-party law, which became 
effective in July 1992. By 2005 there were 18 registered political parties.
In 1995 Tanzania held its first multi-party elections both on the mainland 
and in Zanzibar. Some 13 political parties presented 1,338 candidates for 
the 232 parliamentary seats. Only four political parties put up candidates for 
the presidency. The elections were monitored by local and foreign observers. 
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While the elections were declared free and fair for the mainland, the situation 
was different in Zanzibar, where the process was not only considered not 
free and fair, but its outcome was contested by the major opposition party.
The holding of the second multi-party elections in the year 2000 was a demon-
stra tion that Tanzania’s democratic process was maturing. This time only 701 
candidates competed for the same number of seats as in the 1995 elections. 
The decrease could have been the result of streamlining within the political 
parties. As in 1995, only four parties put up candidates for the presidency.
These elections were considered free and fair, but again, only for the 
mainland. In Zanzibar the major opposition party, the Civic United Front 
(CUF), refused to accept the results and to recognise the government, just as 
in 1995. This created a political impasse, which reached a climax on 27 January 
2001 when the CUF decided to demonstrate in order to press for a repeat 
of the elections, the rewriting of the union and Zanzibar constitutions, and 
the reconstitution of the mainland’s and Zanzibar’s electoral commissions. 
The demonstrations resulted in more than 20 deaths and the first crop of 
Tanzanian political refugees.
The controversies of the 1995 and 2000 elections in Zanzibar had their 
genesis in the islands’ historical, racial, political, and regional divide. 
Controversies date back to the pre-independence elections of 1957, 1961, 
and 1963, which paved the way for independence in 1963 (Maliyamkono 
2000). Pre-independence elections demonstrated that the islands were 
deeply divided along ethnic lines. While the ASP largely represented the 
interests of the Zanzibari Africans, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party catered for 
the Arabs’ interests. The Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party, which broke 
away from the ASP after the 1957 elections, demonstrated the regional 
dimensions of Zanzibari politics (Kaiser 2003: 104). The dominance of the 
CCM in Unguja and the CUF in Pemba is a replay of the old political legacy. 
Unlike in Zanzibar, the character of politics on the mainland has never been 
predominantly ethnic. 
Resolving conflicts 
Tanzania has demonstrated the ability to deal with conflicts arising from its 
democratic process. The political impasse resulting from the 2000 elections 
and the subsequent events of January 2001 obviously tarnished the country’s 
pride and image.
The leaders of the major political parties, the CCM and CUF, acknowledged 
that the impasse was a threat to political stability. They also recognised that 
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durable political stability could only be guaranteed by sustained efforts to 
resolve their political differences through dialogue and reconciliation rather 
than through confrontation, by giving priority to national and not sectarian 
interests. It was through this conciliatory thinking that the CCM and CUF 
initiated direct talks in February 2001 to find a solution to the political crisis. 
The talks culminated in a reconciliation agreement, Mwafaka, which was 
signed in October 2001. 
Much ground has been covered in the implementation of Mwafaka. Many of 
the instruments for its implementation have been established, including the 
Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission and an independent commission 
of inquiry to investigate the events of 27 January 2001. Other steps taken 
are the release of CUF members accused of treason and the nullification of 
court cases against individuals arising from the 27 January 2001 events. The 
Zanzibar constitution and the Electoral Law of 1984 have been reviewed in 
order to meet multi-party requirements.
One of the most important steps taken so far is the establishment of the 
independent Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC). Its first test was during 
the by-elections in 17 constituencies in Pemba that took place in May 2003. 
Sixteen of the constituencies fell vacant following the expulsion of CUF 
parliamentarians from the National Assembly for contravening the house 
regulations, including absenting themselves from its sessions. Apart from 
a few technical shortcomings, the by-elections were well organised and 
the participating political parties and local and international observers 
characterised them as free and fair. They also expressed the view that the 
new ZEC had performed better than its predecessor (Commonwealth Expert 
Team 2003; TEMCO 2003). 
Prospects for democratic consolidation
It can generally be concluded that Tanzania’s democratic transition has 
been relatively smooth and positive. However, much needs to be done 
to consolidate these gains. The first issues that need addressing are the 
strengthening of political parties, the electoral process, and the electoral 
institutions. With the exception of the CCM, many of the political parties are 
weak and plagued by infighting. 
Another challenge is to build internal democracy within the political parties, 
whose absence has been a source of infighting. There has been a discouraging 
trend towards political apathy in general and regarding popular participation 
in the democratic process. This is a result of the weakness of the opposition 
parties and the limited scope of civic education.
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A democratic process cannot be sustained without an appropriate body of 
democratic knowledge, which guarantees effective popular participation. 
For the majority of the people, democratic knowledge is acquired through 
civic education and through taking part in the actual political process. The 
little civic education that has been provided has always been in the urban 
areas. The country needs to address these shortcomings in order to be able 
to consolidate its democracy.
Participation of women 
Mainstreaming gender has been part of Tanzania’s political tradition. Women 
have been politically active since the time of independence struggles. After 
independence there was a deliberate policy to bring women into the political 
and socio-economic mainstream. This was based on a conviction that gender 
equality is a developmental imperative.
In order to attain gender equality, the empowerment of women was necessary. 
Tanzania has been striving to achieve this through advocacy and affirmative 
action. During the one-party system, special seats were reserved for women 
in all the decision-making bodies of the party and in parliament. This was 
maintained when the country reverted to a multi-party system. Prior to the first 
multi-party elections in 1995, constitutional provision was made for at least 
15 per cent of MPs to be women. At least 25 per cent of the local government 
seats were also reserved for women. The 1995 elections brought 45 women 
into the parliament, constituting 16.4 per cent of the total seats. The number 
included eight who were directly elected, with the remainder coming through 
affirmative action. The affirmative action seats are allocated proportionally to 
the number of seats parties held in parliament (Kassim 2003: 167).
The 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development set a minimum 
target of 30 per cent women’s representation in politics and decision-making 
positions by the year 2005. In Tanzania, the 15 per cent minimal female 
representation in parliament was, therefore, increased to 20 per cent for 
the 2000 elections. It is not clear why the figure was set below the regional 
target. This decision, however, increased the number of women MPs to 63, 
constituting 21.4 per cent of the total seats. Had it not been for affirmative 
action, women’s representation in parliament would have been marginal. 
The Tanzanian constitution gives the president the power to nominate ten 
MPs, but by 2003, out of the nine President Mkapa had nominated during 
his second term, only one was a woman. 
Key positions in parliament continue to be occupied by men, including those 
of speaker, deputy speaker, clerk of the National Assembly, and chairs of 
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the parliamentary standing committees. Other areas dominated by men 
included the cabinet, which by June 2003 had only four women out of 27 
ministers and four women deputy ministers out of 17. The situation is no 
different in the leadership of all the political parties, where men dominate 
key decision-making positions (Guardian 30 June 2003). 
Despite affirmative action, women are not sensitised enough to take the 
challenge to stand for elections. While a total of 67 women contested seats 
in the 1995 elections, the figure for the 2000 elections was 70. In the Pemba 
by-elections of May 2003, only three out of 56 contestants for 17 seats 
were women. It seems that popular political participation in Tanzania is 
still inhibited by socio-cultural norms, particularly the patriarchal political 
system. Affirmative action therefore needs to be complemented by vigorous 
advocacy.
However, compared to other SADC countries, Tanzania is not doing badly. 
By 2003, among the 14 SADC member states, Tanzania ranked third, with a 
22.5 per cent proportion of women in parliament (Guardian 25 August 2003). 
Given the socio-cultural inhibitions that prevent women from standing for 
election, it is obvious that Tanzania may not reach the regional target of 
30 per cent of women’s representation in parliament unless this target is 
provided for in the constitution or the electoral law. 
Democratic governance and security
Before analysing the extent to which the democratic process and practice 
have influenced Tanzania’s perception of national and regional security, it is 
important to see how national and regional security were perceived previously. 
Tanzania’s perceptions of national and regional security have been evolving, 
and can be categorised into three periods. The first is from 1961, when the 
country became independent under the Westminster constitutional model, 
to 1965, when it became a one-party state. The second is from 1965 to 1992, 
when the country was under the one-party political system. The last is from 
1992, when the country reverted to a multi-party system, to the present.
 
The multi-party system of 1961–65 needs explaining. Following independence 
in December 1961, Tanzania’s experiment with the Westminster model was 
brief. It was actually a colonial legacy. The country moved to independence 
with two nationalist parties, the popular TANU and the African National 
Congress,1 and an inherited colonial legislature.
Although there were two political parties, all the members of the legislature, 
except one independent candidate, were from TANU. Therefore, the situation 
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was uncharacteristic of a true Westminster model. While formally there was a 
political opposition, it was not so in the legislature. This is why some analysts 
argue that in Tanzania political opposition died a natural death, and that the 
country was a de facto one-party state even before 1965 (Omari 2001).
Security perceptions, 1961–65
In the first two years of its independence, Tanzania did not formulate any 
clear foreign, defence, or national security policies (Baregu 1993: 45). With 
the emergence from colonialism, matters of consolidating independence and 
the provision of basic needs needed immediate attention rather than foreign 
policy, defence, and national security.
However, the focus on the consolidation of statehood did not mean national 
security was ignored. There was a national conception of security at this 
stage, although it was not consensual. There were two opposing views on 
security: internalist and externalist (Bienen 1978: 140). The two differed in 
their perception of threats to independence. The ‘internalists’ perceived 
threats to security purely in domestic terms. In consonance with what is 
now the human security approach, the proponents of this view identified 
three enemies that threatened independence and national security: poverty, 
ignorance, and disease (Nyerere 1966: 115). In order to guarantee security, 
efforts were to be directed towards the eradication of these three enemies. 
The ‘externalists’ perceived threat to national security in more conventional 
terms, as something emanating from outside the country. The internalist 
group was constituted by government leaders, especially President Nyerere, 
while the externalist group was formed mainly by MPs (Baregu 1993: 97).
The opposing views impacted on how the government addressed the question 
of national defence. The issue that pitted the two groups against each other 
was the necessity of having a national army – its objectives, size, and the mode 
of its organisation (Baregu 1993: 48). Although they did not oppose the idea 
of having a national army, the internalists preferred a modest one, trained 
and deployed to fight the three national enemies that they had identified. 
In a view informed by the events in the Congo, the army was perceived as 
potentially subversive, particularly in newly independent countries. The 
externalists preferred a large and strong army that could secure the country’s 
borders.
The lack of clear foreign and defence policies within the first two years of 
Tanzania’s independence had an impact on the country’s perception of 
regional security. Guided by the internalist perspective, the leadership did 
not have a wider vision of security beyond the country’s borders. Even the 
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country’s early commitment to eradicating colonialism was not seen as one 
in which its national interests were directly threatened (Baregu 1993: 42). 
Lacking regional threats, Tanzania had no perception of regional collective 
defence or common security at this stage.
However, at the beginning of 1963, the externalist perspective gained ground. 
The shift in perception was triggered by a number of factors, including the 
events in the Congo and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba; a coup 
in Togo; support for the liberation struggles in Southern Africa; growing 
Tanzanian opposition to international injustice and international racist 
exploitation; and the country’s pursuance of a policy of non-alignment. The 
events in the Congo and the coup in Togo influenced the internalist group to 
change its perception, because both were thought to be externally instigated 
and serve foreign interests; while support for liberation struggles brought 
Tanzania on to a collision course with the racist regimes in Mozambique, 
what was then Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa.
Nyerere was uncompromising with the racist regimes. He expressed this to 
TANU’s national conference, saying, among other things, that with those 
countries Africa can never negotiate until they abandon their rejection of the 
basic principle of human intercourse – the equality of humans (Nyerere 1967: 
4). Linking Tanzania’s freedom to that of Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, 
and South Africa and stressing the threat of white supremacy to peace, 
Nyerere was emphatic regarding the country’s support for armed liberation 
struggles (Nyerere, 1967: 9–10). This uncompromising stance catalysed 
antagonism from the racist regimes. 
Tanzania’s staunch position created enemies beyond the region. There were 
also serious political and economic disagreements at the international level, 
as Tanzania challenged the world economic order and the international 
politics of the Cold War. 
The new perception of security was both reactive and proactive. It was reactive 
because it responded to domestic, regional, and international realities. 
Likewise, it was proactive because the country took bold practical measures. 
This is what Nyerere termed ‘the second scramble for Africa’ (Nyerere 1966: 
37). The practical measures began with the creation of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Defence in March 1963, bringing the two under one ministry, 
on the understanding that diplomacy is the first line of defence. The new 
ministry catered for the country’s national security, because foreign policy 
and defence policy fall under the ambit of the security sector. Thus the new 
ministry was responsible for the country’s activist foreign policy.
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The principles of the new foreign policy included safeguarding national 
sovereignty and security, pursuing non-alignment, respecting the UN Charter, 
working for African unity, and supporting the liberation struggles (Nyerere 
1966: 3). Defence policy focused on building a force capable of defending 
these principles and participating in efforts towards national development.
The creation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence was followed by 
a threat to re-consider Commonwealth membership if Britain failed to grant 
majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. Following the Rhodesian unilateral 
declaration of independence in 1965, Tanzania broke off diplomatic relations 
with Britain in line with an OAU resolution (Nyerere 1967: 11). Other 
practical measures included the provision of diplomatic, moral, and material 
support, and sanctuary to the Southern African liberation movements. From 
1964, Tanzania hosted the OAU’s liberation committee in Dar es Salaam, 
and it continued to do so for the next 30 years.
Security perceptions: 1965–92
Less than a year after new foreign and security policies were put in place, 
the inherited colonial army, the Tanganyika Rifles, mutinied in January 
1964. The government asked for British assistance in putting down the 
mutiny. The army was disbanded and a new one, composed of members 
of the TANU youth wing, was created. From then until 1992, all members 
of the armed forces were required to be members of the party. The mutiny 
and the new army were part of the process that hastened the movement 
towards a one-party system in 1965 (Omari 2001). From 1965, the armed 
forces were politicised and the party was central in guiding policy on defence 
and security. From 1971, the army had a parallel party structure, its officers 
were appointed to the party and other bureaucracies, and the Tanzanian 
administration system increasingly came to look like a civilian–military 
coalition (Omari 2001).
Tanzania started developing a view of regional security from 1963. Its early 
thinking started within the East African sub-region. This was a result more of 
geographical proximity, colonial history, the policy of good neighbourliness, 
and the imperatives of regional co-operation than of actual threats within the 
sub-region. Policies of good neighbourliness and regional co-operation were 
emphasised (Nyerere 1966: 16–17). In April 1963 Tanzania negotiated with 
Uganda the possibility of co-ordinating future defence policy in the context 
of an East African federation. Given a lack of a common enemy or a common 
security threat, the negotiations were never sustained. Ironically, Tanzania’s 
relationship with Uganda deteriorated following the coup that brought 
Idi Amin Dada to power. The climax of the strained relationship was the 
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1978–79 war between the two neighbouring countries. The war undermined 
the possibility of Tanzania’s immediate participation in common security 
initiatives within the East African region.
Tanzania’s real desire for common security lay in Southern Africa, however. As 
many of the Southern African countries were still under colonialism, the main 
actors Tanzania could co-operate with in collective defence against a common 
enemy were the liberation movements. The first expression of common security 
was in the form of a ‘defence alliance’ (Breytenbach 1995), i.e. the FLS, initially 
formed by Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana. The liberation of Mozambique 
and Angola in 1975 and that of Zimbabwe in 1980 were triumphs not only for 
the liberation movements, but also for Tanzania, which supported them. Their 
victories were a sign that the scales were tipping in favour of the liberation 
alliance (Breytenbach 1995). Having contributed to the liberation of some of 
the members of the FLS, Tanzania felt proud to continue co-operating with 
them in a defence alliance against colonialism and apartheid.
Following destabilisation, which was part of South Africa’s ‘Total Strategy’, 
the FLS were forced to change their tactics. Instead of continuing with 
confrontation, they allowed Mozambique to sign a non-aggression pact 
with South Africa in 1984 (the Nkomati Accord), and then Angola did so 
too in 1988 (the New York Accord). The New York Accord paved the way for 
Namibia’s independence in 1990. After that, the liberation struggle had only 
apartheid South Africa to deal with. 
Security perceptions after 1992
Since 1992 Tanzania has been in a changed security environment domestically, 
regionally, and internationally. Domestically, the country had reverted to a 
multi-party system after 28 years. While its democratic transition has been 
relatively smooth, the country has experienced real and potential domestic 
conflicts and insecurity. The Zanzibar political impasse, for example, has 
threatened Tanzania’s political stability and peace.
The country has experienced isolated and low-intensity conflicts. These 
are disputes over land between farmers and pastoralists, and over natural 
resources, mainly in the mining areas; and clan rivalries. There have also 
been religious disputes between Roman Catholics and the Lutheran church, 
and among various Muslim groups. Although low-scale and isolated, if steps 
are not taken to address them, they have the potential to intensify.
At the regional level, Tanzania’s major security concerns are within Southern 
Africa and the Great Lakes Region. With the end of colonialism and apartheid, 
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and the advent of democracy in Southern Africa, Tanzania no longer feels 
threatened from this region. Since 1992, however, it has been made insecure 
by conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, especially through the 
resulting refugee influxes. By 2002 Tanzania was hosting 800,000 refugees, 
constituting 5 per cent of the world total and 20 per cent of Africa’s total 
refugee population.
At the international level, Tanzania has been a victim of international 
terrorism. The US embassy in Dar es Salaam was bombed in August 1998, 
causing the deaths of innocent Tanzanians. There have also been scares of 
terrorist attacks on Zanzibar, prompting the United States to issue travel 
alerts discouraging its citizens from visiting the island (Guardian, 13 May 
2003). While the country has domestically taken steps to support international 
anti-terrorism efforts, this has had some negative effects. The passing of an 
anti-terrorism law in 2003 raised hackles in the Muslim community, as some 
members argued that the law targeted them as a group. Other Tanzanians 
felt that the law served US interests more than national interests. The war 
against terrorism has also affected Tanzania’s economy, negatively impacting 
on tourism and foreign investment flows (Guardian 24 June 2003).
The democratic process has influenced changes in foreign, defence, and 
security policies and in their implementation. There thus seems to be a causal 
relationship between democratisation and perceptions of national security, 
although current perceptions of national security have been partly influenced 
by real and potential local conflicts, conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, and 
international terrorism.
A new foreign policy was prepared in 2001 in the context of changed domestic, 
regional, and international circumstances. While the achievements of the 
old foreign policy in the political and diplomatic spheres were appreciated, 
the focus shifted towards economic diplomacy, which is aimed at building 
a strong economy. Defence and foreign policies are an integral component 
of the greater national security and economic development strategy. Thus 
foreign, defence, and security policies are seen as complementary.
In practice, the formulation and implementation of foreign, defence, and 
security policies have been influenced by the democratic process. The most 
significant change is that, given the new multi-party environment, the ruling 
party is no longer the major actor in setting the agenda and formulating 
security policy. These roles are now played by many stakeholders, although 
largely co-ordinated by the National Security Council. 
One is tempted at this juncture to pose a hypothetical question: What would 
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happen, in terms of political stability and security posture, if the CCM were 
to lose a general election? Would the defence and security institutions accept 
such an outcome?
As the question is hypothetical, its response must also be so. Tanzania is 
one of the very few countries in Africa that has enjoyed political stability 
since independence. While the CCM and its predecessor, TANU, as well 
as its leadership, have been instrumental in inculcating a culture of peace 
and political stability, the people themselves have contributed a lot to this 
culture. They are also the greatest beneficiaries. Whether the CCM continues 
to govern or not, one would venture to predict that Tanzanians would 
continue to maintain a culture of peace and political stability. With the 
added component of democratic governance, one hopes that the defence 
and security agencies will respect the will of the people. 
Common security in Southern Africa
Collective security regimes are relevant so long as they can operate beyond 
their two inherent weaknesses. The first of these is that, both in theory 
and practice, they are based on the old model of security thinking, their 
preoccupation being the preservation of the state’s sovereignty against 
external threats. This thinking is statist and anachronistic. The second is their 
perception of the use of force as the rational and logical solution to the security 
threats. Thus their major focus becomes militaristic. Given the local and 
national nature of current insecurity, it is doubtful whether the emphasis on 
power-based mechanisms (military power) will be an appropriate instrument 
to address the situations of both national and regional insecurity.
From the cultural, historical, and political standpoint, Tanzania is organically 
linked to the Southern African region. That is why the country played a 
leading role in the creation of appropriate mechanisms to deal with threats 
during the era of colonialism and apartheid. This was done through the 
OAU’s Liberation Committee at the continental level and through the FLS 
at the regional level.
Following the end of colonialism and apartheid, Tanzania has been part of 
the shift from the traditional to the wider security concept that incorporates 
human and other dimensions. The country does not feel externally threatened 
in the traditional sense. It feels a sense of a common bond and destiny with 
the other regional partners rather than a sense of fear and enmity. Beyond 
the historical factors, this perception has been influenced by internal and 
regional democratic processes and practices. Tanzania has been part of the 
emerging common democratic culture in the region. 
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The country’s involvement in regional security co-operation is demonstrated 
through the ratification of both the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on Politics, 
Defence, and Security Co-operation, and its participation in all the functional 
and technical committees. This has included the ISDSC, the SARPCCO, 
cross-border crime prevention, joint planning for peace missions, military 
training exchanges, and the operationalisation of the Protocol on Politics, 
Defence, and Security Co-operation. The Southern African Defence and 
Security Management Network is another means of regional co-operation.
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how Tanzania’s democratic processes and practice 
have influenced the country’s perceptions of national and regional security. 
Adopting a historical perspective, the analysis has been carried out through 
three major phases: from 1961 to 1965, from 1965 to 1992, and from 1992 to 
the present.
The survey has established that during the first phase the country had 
conflicting internalist and externalist perceptions of national security. The 
two views differed on their perception of threat. Whereas the internalists 
perceived threats to national security in domestic terms, the externalist 
view perceived such threats as emanating from outside. Regarding regional 
security, Tanzania had no perception of regional collective defence or 
common security during this period.
During the second phase there was a growing consensus on an externalist 
perception of national security. This shift was attributed to a number of 
factors, including the country’s commitment to the liberation struggles in the 
region where collective defence arrangements were made with the liberation 
movements and independent Southern African countries under the umbrella 
of the FLS.
During the last phase, Tanzania has been operating within changed domestic, 
regional, and international environments. At the domestic level, the country 
has a multi-party political system through which its democratic process 
and practice have gained mixed results. That process has to some degree 
influenced the country’s national and regional security perceptions.
At a time when the country is seriously committed to collaborative security 
as an important framework for addressing its security interests, Tanzania 
is faced by a number of challenges. The main challenge is how to balance 
its economic and security interests in the regional groupings of which it is 
a member. Tanzania is currently a member not only of SADC, but also of 
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the East African Community (EAC) and Indian Ocean Rim Association for 
Regional Co-operation .
One of the difficult decisions it had to make on regional groupings was to 
withdraw from COMESA, but it still has a ‘straddling dilemma’ through its 
membership of the EAC, which has provisions for security co-operation. 
While both regions (Southern Africa and East Africa) and their organisations 
are crucial to Tanzania, the challenge is how the country is going to balance 
its participation in both without negatively affecting either organisation in its 
efforts towards regional co-operation and integration.
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Zambia, a landlocked country, is bordered by Angola, the DRC, Tanzania, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia. This situation 
has shaped the character and practices of Zambia’s overall politics over 
time.
Zambia’s post-colonial political history is divided into three periods: the First 
Republic, 1964–72; the Second Republic, 1973–90; and the Third Republic, 
which began in 1990. The country became independent on 24 October 1964 
as a unitary state with a multi-party system, headed by Kenneth Kaunda. 
In 1973 the country became a one-party participatory democracy, with 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP) as the sole political party 
permitted by the constitution (Republic of Zambia 1973: art. 4[1]).
After 17 years of one-party rule, in December 1990 Zambia reverted to multi-
party politics, thereby ending the Second Republic. In October 1991 the first 
general elections were held after the ending of one-party rule. The elections 
were celebrated as a return to democracy and a victory for the people of 
Zambia, who generally perceived it as a step towards good or democratic 
governance. Despite regular elections during the one-party-state era, there 
was a feeling that the Second Republic had increasingly become dictatorial 
and was no longer observing human rights and the rule of law.
From one-party rule to democracy 
It is important to go back to the time of independence and examine how 
Zambia’s geopolitical situation impacted upon its national security concerns. 
In 1964, four of the country’s neighbours – Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and 
Mozambique – were still under colonial rule, while South Africa was under 
apartheid. Immediately after independence, the Zambian leadership decided 
to assist its neighbours in their fight for freedom.
Zambia openly supported the people from countries under racist and 
colonial rule, and hosted thousands of refugees and freedom fighters under 
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the umbrella of the OAU. This decision shaped the country’s national 
and regional security concerns: the government argued that as long as its 
neighbours remained under colonialism, Zambia would never feel safe. There 
is a sense in which Zambia’s national security concerns were directly linked 
to regional security. This, indeed, was the main argument for the introduction 
of one-party rule: the administration headed by President Kenneth Kaunda 
believed that multi-party politics would greatly compromise both national 
and regional security. In 1973 Zambia was declared a one-party state under 
UNIP, and all other political parties, such as the African National Congress 
(ANC),1 went into voluntary liquidation. Article 4 of the constitution made 
UNIP supreme over all other institutions (including parliament).
The changing political situation in the region, coupled with the fatigue of 
one-party rule, compelled Zambians to demand a return to multi-party 
politics. Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia were independent 
(though the first two were both undergoing civil wars). The situation in South 
Africa was changing fast. Clearly, there was little justification left for UNIP 
to perpetuate a one-party regime under the banner of national and regional 
security concerns.
Before the 1990s, Zambia’s economy was performing poorly. The parastatals 
created during the 1965 economic reforms were no longer doing well, and 
there was no serious intention by the UNIP government to review the 
economic situation. Instead, the government blamed the IFIs for the failure 
of the economy – it was ‘conditionality’ and the structural adjustment 
programmes that were to blame. In response, Zambia tried to cut ties with 
the IFIs, which only made the situation worse. 
From the mid-1980s, deteriorating economic conditions created a fertile 
atmosphere for Zambians to press for liberalisation in both the political and 
economic spheres. Food riots in the Copper Belt, generally believed to be the 
hub of Zambian politics, soon engulfed the whole country. Some members of 
the army saw this as an opportunity to overthrow the Kaunda regime. Thus at 
the height of demands for political change, Lieutenant Mwamba Luchembe 
tried to take over the government (Chisala 1991). The attempt failed, but it 
galvanised the entire nation into a frenzy of multi-party politics. 
International developments also helped to push democratisation to the fore. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the main ally of the one-party state in Africa, 
signified the ideological triumph of the neo-liberal capitalist paradigm over the 
Marxist model. After the Cold War, the IFIs adopted what they considered to 
be ‘a new conception of democracy and good governance, in a bid to foster the 
relationship between economic growth and democracy’ (Salih 2001: 12). For 
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the first time, the World Bank report linked aid flows to ‘governance’, which it 
defined as the ‘exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs’ (World 
Bank 1989: 60–61). Initially, good governance was not directly connected with 
multi-party systems. Yet the implications of the pronouncements indicated 
the desirability of freedom of speech, transparency, and open political debate. 
The West argued that good governance involved more than just elections. 
More importantly, democratic governance was recognised to be an integral 
part of peace building and conflict resolution (Mulikita 1999: 3).
Arguably, therefore, Zambia’s reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1990 
was an endorsement of the global view that democratic governance entailed 
plural politics in which opposition parties played a key role. That a coalition 
of NGOs under the rubric of civil society rose against Kaunda’s one-party 
regime reaffirmed the belief that multi-partyism was a means towards peace 
building and conflict resolution.
Interestingly, the first ten years of the Third Republic produced a character 
of democratic practice that was not dissimilar to that of the Second Republic. 
The 1991 elections secured the removal of Kaunda, but produced a National 
Assembly that was overwhelmingly dominated by the Movement for Multi-
party Democracy (MMD). In effect, by voting in the MMD so overwhelmingly, 
Zambians contributed to producing de facto one-party rule. Within three 
years of taking power, some leading members of the MMD felt that the party 
was no longer adhering to the ideals of good governance, transparency, and 
the creation of an enabling economic and political environment. Thus, in 
early 1993, some key ministers resigned and founded a new political party, 
the National Party, with a view to removing the Frederick Chiluba-led MMD 
government (Mulikita 2002).
Meanwhile, civil society organisations joined those seeking a return to the 
original mandate and vision of democratic governance that saw the birth 
of the MMD in 1990. The most outspoken of these were the Zambian 
Independent Monitoring Team, the Forum for Democratic Process, and 
the Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development. Another 
civil society organisation born during the Third Republic concerned with 
issues of security and good governance was the Southern African Centre for 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes. These civic organisations continued to 
play a significant role in the democratisation process and also in challenging 
the government to adhere to good governance. 
Ongoing conflicts in Angola and the DRC created insecurity on Zambia’s 
borders, which threatened the country’s democratisation process. The 
Zambian government was concerned about these developments, prompting 
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it to issue a statement in 2000 that both Angolan government soldiers and 
UNITA rebels were involved in military incursions into the North-Western 
and Western Provinces of Zambia (Times of Zambia 2000). These events 
shaped, to some degree, the nature and character of Zambia’s regional and 
national security perceptions in the post-1990 period.
The role of defence and security forces in the transition to democracy also 
became a major issue in Zambian politics, although a consensus and normative 
framework emerged as to the most important issues, which are summarised 
below. Prior to 1990, Zambia experienced several failed coup attempts in 
a geopolitical environment characterised by armed liberation struggles in 
neighbouring countries. Arguably, therefore, because of the changing political 
environment in the country and the region, the political leadership believed 
that in the new political dispensation it was important to reorient the role of 
the armed forces regarding their obligations in a democracy. It was in this 
respect that emphasis was squarely placed on the need to depoliticise the 
Zambia Defence Forces and create a professional defence force.
 
Defence and security forces in a democracy 
The armed forces are part of the executive power of the democratic state. They 
must acknowledge the primacy of democratic and legitimate politics. The 
loyalty of the armed forces lies with the government of the day, parliament, 
the constitution, and the law, of which they should have a detailed and 
comprehensive knowledge. As is the case with all other institutions of the 
executive power, the mission, role, and performance of the armed forces 
should be strictly defined and controlled by the constitution and relevant 
parliamentary institutions.
Security policy and its military implications demand the consensus and co-
operation of the majority of the citizens. However, the very nature of military 
forces makes this a complicated subject. Additionally, some form of tension 
exists in a democratic state, and has to be reconciled in one way or another. 
Among the areas of tension are the following:
•	 the power concentration that the military asserts and that makes a defence 
force efficient, versus the restriction of power required by democratic 
control; and
•	 the freedom of the individual based on the human and democratic rights 
of the citizen, versus the requirements of authoritarian military discipline 
and order.
This tension is better reconciled by integrating the armed forces into society: 
there should be no attempt to separate the defenders of the state from democ-
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racy. Clearly, therefore, the armed forces in a democracy require a far more 
precise legitimacy than those organisations in other political and social systems. 
A balance, however, is required between the interest of the security of the state 
and the rights of the public. It is imperative to balance rights and duties in such 
a way that freedom can exist without threatening the very structure that has to 
defend these democratic rights. The principle of mutual loyalty between the 
state and its military servants is the cornerstone of this principle.
In the execution of national duties and tasks after the re-establishment of 
democratic rule, both the political leadership and the armed forces must bear 
in mind the following:
•	Survival: The re-established democracy must survive and military discipline 
is essential.
•	Growth: The re-established democracy and good governance must grow 
and the country must develop politically, economically, socially, techno-
logically, and militarily. 
The goals of governance must be achieved with minimum interference from 
external or internal enemies. The military must occupy a position of political 
neutrality above the play of partisan politics. The military must be a national 
institution, recruited on a national basis and without biases. Recruitment 
procedures should be seen to be public, equitable, and transparent, and both 
civilian and military leaders should make a public commitment to the goal of 
national representation in the armed forces.
In a democratic political order, the military should be brought under the control 
of the civil authority. The armed forces must enjoy professional autonomy 
to ensure greater effectiveness and conformity with the constitution. At the 
same time, political authorities and civil society have obligations towards 
the armed forces. These include not asking the armed forces to take on 
inappropriate or impossible tasks contrary to the constitution.
Defence forces in democratic transitions 
The transition from authoritarian to democratic rule poses complex problems 
for armed forces. It involves three distinct stages:
•	Disengagement from the existing authoritarian system: This is helped by good 
governance and nation building, in which the armed forces share the same 
understanding with civilians. Disengagement in Zambia was symbolised 
by the discontinuation of politicisation ‘in the barracks’ six months before 
the November 1991 multi-party elections.
•	Encouraging neutrality in the transition process: This can cause greater strains 
in the armed forces, especially if the new leaders threaten the existence of 
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these establishments in the new government. The reaction of the defence 
and security forces to such developments can range from the case of Mali, 
where the army played the principal role in setting up and supervising the 
elections, to the Zambian experience, where the civil service took charge 
and limited the defence and security forces to the role of transporting 
ballot boxes to and from the remote districts. 
•	Establishment of new relationships among the armed forces, political authorities, 
and civil society: The general feeling of the armed forces is that politicians 
should not underestimate the nervousness with which military officers 
may approach relations with the new authorities. This apprehension may 
arise out of concern for what the civil authorities may do to the military 
as an institution, and also fears of personal retribution, particularly if 
elections bring to power a political party that had denounced the defence 
and security forces’ complicity with the previous regime.
Relations with civil society should not be left entirely to chance. Active sensiti-
sation programmes should be undertaken within both the armed forces and 
civil society. Civil authorities should educate the civilians about the military’s 
rights and their own responsibilities towards the military, just as the military 
should be instructed about its responsibilities towards civil society.
It is necessary for the new government to ensure that the military functions 
within the constitutional and legal framework. The state must be committed 
to care for its soldiers and not to abuse their willingness to serve. The 
soldier should also be protected from command abuse by well-defined legal 
parameters. Such obligations and protection should also prevent soldiers 
from acting beyond the law. If soldiers’ rights are violated, for instance by 
wrongful deployment or intolerable conditions of service, they cannot be 
counted on to respect the rights of others. Clearly, therefore, the defence and 
security forces continue to play a crucial role in the democratisation process 
in Zambia, as they did especially during the brief transition period.
Parliamentary oversight of defence and military expenditure
During the Second Republic, as a result of Zambia’s support for the liberation 
struggles, there was apprehension in the government that if defence and 
intelli gence budgetary allocations were exposed through debates in parlia-
ment, the country’s enemies would assess and undermine the country’s 
defence capa bili ties, thus compromising the government’s ability to preserve 
and defend the sovereignty of Zambia. The executive then argued that it was 
not in a position to define clear limits to transparency in relation to defence 
and intelligence functions. Through the president, it maintained the colonial 
policy of government directly allocating money for defence and intelligence 
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services secretly, without subjecting it to parliamentary oversight. The 
govern ment justified this by arguing that security organs were forged by the 
exigencies of war – both hot and cold.
After 1993, all MPs belonged to one party, UNIP, and this made it difficult 
for parliament to debate defence expenditure. At the same time, despite 
the fact that parliament passed several laws related to defence, intelligence, 
and emergency powers, the lack of a parliamentary committee responsible 
for national security or defence made the house ineffective in scrutinising 
the increased governmental defence responsibilities. The complexity of 
laws related to defence did not allow every member to examine these bills 
satisfactorily within the tight parliamentary timetable.
One result of the lack of parliamentary surveillance of the operations of 
defence personnel was that most Zambian national service camps operated 
with inadequate facilities due to insufficient funding. For example, this 
culminated in the outbreak of typhoid at the women’s Luamfumu Camp 
in Mansa in 1980–81. The investigation carried out on the causes of the 
outbreak found that drinking water in the camp was not treated, and that it 
was important to quarantine the recruits for 21 days. The investigating team 
then recommended that the camp be closed. Consequently, the government 
was forced to suspend and later completely stop the compulsory national 
service programme. The abandonment of the programme demonstrated the 
need for parliamentary oversight.
Internationally, the late 1980s marked the end of the Cold War, and of 
apartheid and the one-party state system in Zambia. The Zambian parliament 
repealed article 4 of the constitution, thereby facilitating the reintroduction 
of the multi-party system. Since the country’s sovereignty was no longer 
externally and internally threatened, it became unnecessary for the executive 
to keep defence and intelligence budgets secret.
In addition, with the lifting of the state of emergency in Zambia in February 
1992, it was no longer necessary to maintain a large army. A programme 
was introduced for early retirement and retrenchment in both the defence 
and intelligence services. While these processes were being implemented, 
parlia ment also regained its control functions over defence expenditure, and 
was now allowed to debate and approve defence allocations in the annual 
budget. Furthermore, since 1992, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of 
the parliament has been considering reports through the auditor-general on 
defence expenditure. 
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The first report of the PAC on defence expenditure was based on a special 
report of the auditor-general on the procurement of goods and services in the 
army and air force from 1992 to 1998. The committee’s report revealed some 
irregularities in the way the MoD expended approved funds. The report also 
exposed the procurement of a presidential aircraft, and other irregularities 
in the supply of aircraft refurbishment and training services for the defence 
forces.
The PAC deplored the practice by which the army command considered itself 
to be above the law and therefore not obliged to adhere to financial regulations. 
The committee called for the cessation of malpractices and directed that service 
commands should comply with all established procedures and regulations. It 
also directed the defence forces to strengthen the ministerial tender committee 
through which all purchases should be channelled for appropriate scrutiny 
and advice. The committee observed that the above parliamentary directives 
were necessary to avoid the negligence and loss of public resources that were 
documented in the auditor-general’s report. It further directed that all funds 
paid to suppliers should be recovered, especially where goods or services had 
not been received. 
The committee recommended disciplinary action against officers from the 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning who connived with defence 
personnel in making irregular payments of public funds. It concluded by 
recommending control over the financial operations of the services. It also 
recommended that the Defence Act be amended to provide for a clear chain 
of authority in the handling of public funds in the services.
The PAC has effectively taken on the responsibility of scrutinising how 
money it approves is expended by the MoD. That this is being carried out is 
a clear indication that the democratic process initiated in 1990 has reshaped 
Zambia’s perception of national security. The process was further informed 
by the changing regional security situation.
To complement the role of the PAC in providing checks and balances to the 
executive in general, and the MoD in particular, parliament also empowered 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs to institute oversight on policy matters 
in 1999. This committee changed its name to the Committee on National 
Security and Foreign Affairs (CNSFA).
The speaker of parliament annually appoints members of the CNSFA for one 
session. The duties of the committee are determined by the speaker or any 
other orders of the house to oversee the Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, 
and Foreign Affairs, and include the following:
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•	 to study, report on, and make recommendations to the government on 
the mandate, management, and operations of the relevant ministries;
•	 to scrutinise activities being undertaken by these ministries;
•	 to make recommendations to the government on the need to review 
certain policies or laws;
•	 to consider bills; and
•	 to undertake tours of selected projects and security institutions to examine 
their operations.
Not every MP is eligible to be appointed to the committee. Appointment takes 
into consideration the constitutional obligation to ensure the representation 
of all parties; gender sensitivity in terms of balance and representation; and 
members’ adequate qualifications, experiences, and preferences.
As stated earlier, the CNSFA provides checks and balances on policy matters 
through oversight. When it comes across financial irregularities in the MoD, 
it refers them to the PAC for further scrutiny. Its mandate is to examine 
the accounts showing the appropriation of sums granted by the National 
Assembly to meet public expenditure. It also scrutinises the report of the 
auditor-general on the national accounts, and exercises the powers conferred 
on it under article 103(5) of the constitution. Among the topics considered by 
the CNSFA have been the status of Zambia’s international boundaries with 
its neighbours, Zambian troops serving on UN peacekeeping operations, 
Zambia’s security concerns and their impact on the country’s foreign policy, 
and the welfare of defence personnel.
However, despite the CNSFA and PAC providing checks and balances on 
defence policy and expenditure, the two have never been involved in defence 
pre-budget consultations, which is an important component in budget 
formulation. Even when the defence budget is presented to parliament 
for scrutiny and approval, it is never referred to the two committees for 
comments and input.
The two committees have no powers to scrutinise the operations of the defence 
service, as such scrutiny is considered a threat to national security. They have 
also had no mandate to scrutinise the operation of the intelligence services 
since independence, and this has led to a popular perception that the services 
abuse their mandate. There is, therefore, a need for these services to be kept 
in check by the two committees in order to restore the trust of the citizenry. 
It is in this light that parliament welcomed the government’s announcement 
of January 2003 that directed the director of public prosecutions to proceed 
with the prosecution of all those named in the 16 PAC reports approved 
by parliament for misappropriation of public funds (Saturday Post 2003). 
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Evidently, Zambia’s conception of national security in the post-1990 period 
has been informed and shaped by the democratisation process, which was 
also enhanced by the changing regional geopolitical environment, as well as 
by globalisation.
Zambia’s approach to national security
Zambia’s conception of national security is defined by the constitution, 
which established the legality of the Zambian Defence Forces. The 1964 
independence constitution’s article 100 provided for the establishment of an 
armed force. This was to be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, 
professional, disciplined, productive, and subordinate to civil authority. The 
1964 Defence Act provided for the creation and maintenance of a defence 
force. This constitutional provision was reaffirmed in the Constitution of 
Zambia (Amendment) Act of 1996 (part VII, sec. 100). 
Since Zambia became independent at a time when most countries around it 
were still under colonialism, the conception of national security was largely 
informed by this fact. Between 1964 and 1973 the Zambian parliament passed 
laws that assisted the executive in fulfilling its responsibility of ensuring the 
maintenance of peace and security (Haantobolo 2002).
Although Zambia was a multi-party democracy between 1964 and 1972, 
there is little evidence that the national conception of security was contested. 
Both the ruling UNIP and the opposition ANC were products of the struggle 
against colonial rule. Both shared the view that the major threat to newly won 
independence was the colonial and white minority regimes in the region. 
Both UNIP and ANC viewed national security concerns from the point of 
view of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa.
The transformation from multi-party democracy to one-party rule in 1973 
was easily achieved, because it was perceived as a way in which Zambia 
would guard against insecurity. In 1972 the UNIP government had begun 
to feel uncomfortable with opposition parties, especially the ANC, which 
was gaining political ground. Opposition parties were suspected of working 
with the white regimes in the region and thus of undermining the country’s 
security. That UNIP easily used the question of national security as one of the 
main reasons for abandoning multi-party politics in 1972 suggests that the 
question of national security in Zambia was consensual. Arguably, therefore, 
the establishment of one-party rule can be seen as a process designed 
to manage national security concerns and conflict in a volatile political 
environment for a recently independent nation. 
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During the Second Republic, Zambia witnessed a systematic process of 
politicisation of the defence force along socialist lines. This was a clear 
departure from the practice of the First Republic. The UNIP government 
formed party branches in army barracks and facilitated the training of 
members of the defence force in political education both in the country and 
in other socialist countries. This was because during the Second Republic, 
Zambia’s conception of national security was also inward-looking.
However, with the inception of the Third Republic in 1990, there was a 
change in the conception of national security in Zambia. The reintroduction 
of multi-party politics meant that the management of, and conception of, 
national security became a matter for all political parties, especially those 
that were represented in parliament. This was reflected by the composition 
of the membership of the CNSFA, which was drawn from all political parties 
represented in parliament. In fact, in the 1992 and 1994 sessions, the committee 
was chaired by members of opposition political parties. Thus it can be safely 
argued that the depoliticisation of the defence forces was achieved through 
this process. Arguably, therefore, the conception of national security in the 
Third Republic is considered to be a matter for all citizens in the country. It is 
in this context that citizens and civil society organisations are invited to give 
evidence at sittings of the CNSFA. This is possible because since 1990 the 
government has conceptualised national security as not being a preserve of 
members of the ruling party or of citizens in uniform.
As discussed above, the end of colonialism and white minority rule, coupled 
with the end of the Cold War, led to a much less threatening security context, 
and Zambia felt able to restore multi-party democracy and adopt a much more 
open approach to the conception of both national and regional security. 
Who makes security policy in Zambia? 
To answer this question, it is important to understand the nature, character, 
and role of civil control of the Zambian Defence Forces. The role of civil 
control is enshrined in the constitution, in the first instance in the powers 
conferred upon the president, who is the commander-in-chief. These include 
the power to determine the operational use of the armed forces, to appoint 
members of the armed forces, to make appointments or promotion to any 
office in the armed forces, and to dismiss any member of the armed forces 
(Republic of Zambia 1964: chap. 1, sec. 54(2)). 
Civil control is ensured by parliament, which regulates the exercise of the 
powers conferred upon the president. The roles of parliament are policy 
formulation and monitoring on matters of defence and security through the 
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CNSFA. Members of the committee are all civilians, because, according to 
the constitution, no serving member of the defence forces is permitted to 
stand for election for a parliamentary seat until he/she has retired.
The president plays a dual role, that of chief executive of the elected civilian 
government and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Civil control of the 
defence forces is meant to guard against military subversion, while ensuring 
that military strategy remains a tool of national political goals under the civil 
authority. The executive plays a significant role in maintaining civil control 
of the defence forces, while the legislature maintains a strong influence in 
military affairs under the parliamentary committee that deals with defence 
and security. Simultaneously, the defence forces are expected to protect and 
defend the democracy as it evolves, and the democratic institutions associated 
with it. All this is achieved through the principle of separation of powers – an 
essential element in democratic governance. 
Policy formation 
The responsibility of making policy on national security is the responsibility 
of the Defence Council, composed of the ministers of defence (chairperson), 
home affairs, legal affairs, and finance; the attorney-general; and the 
commanders of the army, air force, and national service. Other members 
are the inspector-general of police and the director of intelligence services 
(secretary of the council). Although political parties are not members, 
depending on the issues at hand, a representative of the ruling MMD attends 
some meetings. Permanent secretaries of the Ministries of Defence, Home 
Affairs, and Foreign Affairs are also in attendance.
As stated, the minister of defence ordinarily chairs meetings. However, when 
it is believed that matters to be discussed require the attention of the president 
in his capacity as commander-in-chief, he/she will chair the council. These 
occasions include deployment of troops in war areas along the borders, and 
declaration of war. Clearly, the composition of the council signifies civil 
control of the defence forces. This aspect also demonstrates the major role 
played by civil authority in making policy on security and foreign affairs in 
Zambia. However, matters of military operations are the preserve of the 
military command and are, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of civil control. 
There is a clear line between policy formulation and policy execution.
During 2002 the Defence Council embarked on a process of reviewing 
policy on security. The exercise involved a reformation of both policy and 
practice. In the past, the document dealing with the defence policy was 
generally classified. However, in 2002 the president instructed the council 
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that once the defence policy document was finalised and adopted, it was 
to be circulated widely within the MoD and other ministries to ensure its 
proper implementation.2 This decision followed observations that in the 
past it was difficult to execute the defence policy because civilians working 
in the Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, who were 
expected to implement the policy, were not given access to the document, 
which placed unnecessary hurdles in the way of implementation. 
Approach to regional security
Zambia’s perception of regional (i.e. SADC) security is historically determined. 
From the time of independence in 1964, the country’s security concerns were 
shaped by the liberation wars in Southern Africa. Although Zambia openly 
supported the liberation movements, it avoided direct involvement in the 
fighting despite numerous violations by the white regimes in the name of 
‘hot pursuit’ of the guerrilla fighters who were based in Zambia. After 1994, 
following South Africa’s democratisation, Zambia’s security perception was 
informed by the desire firstly to strengthen the democratic dispensation 
within and outside Zambia, and secondly to urge other countries in the 
region to democratise. In this respect, Zambia strongly supported SADC’s 
decision not to support undemocratic changes of government.
To this effect, Zambia’s second president, Frederick T. J. Chiluba, was 
emphatic in his address to the OAU in 1996, requesting other leaders not to 
support undemocratic changes of government in Africa. The message was 
the same for the SADC region. Zambia believes that democratisation and 
the strengthening of democratic institutions are the main guarantees for 
both national and regional security. Zambia is therefore a strong believer in 
the idea that regional security integration can only be achieved once SADC 
member states democratise their political institutions.
Pitso (1999) observes that ‘the first efforts to establish interstate security co-
operation in Southern Africa dates back to 1974, when Tanzania and Zambia 
formed the Front Line States ... to co-ordinate their efforts for the liberation 
of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe’. The FLS generally functioned 
on an informal basis. Their policies were implemented by the ISDSC. As a 
founder member, Zambia’s involvement in the region’s security co-operation 
practices has been stable and firm.
Zambia is also a founding member of SADC and its Parliamentary Forum. 
Zambia co-operates fully with the AU in all its efforts aimed at resolving 
conflicts in the sub-region. Since 1992, the country has pursued a policy 
of peacemaking with respect to continued conflict in Angola. This led to 
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the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord, which aimed at ending hostilities 
between UNITA and the Angolan government, although the accord collapsed 
because of continued fighting by UNITA. Peace only came when UNITA 
leader, Jonas Savimbi, was killed in February 2001. 
Another effort by Zambia in the process of peace-building in the region 
was through the 1998 Lusaka Peace Accord over the civil war in the DRC. 
Although the accord did not initially sustain peace, it provided opportunities 
for some cease-fire agreements between the warring parties. Zambia is an 
active member of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-
operation and supports the objectives of the SADC Parliamentary Forum 
and its attempts to manage conflicts in the region.
Zambia has not been drawn into battle with forces fighting in the neighbouring 
countries. It did not send troops to the DRC when Namibia, Angola, and 
Zimbabwe sent their forces to protect the Kabila regime in 1998. Zambia did 
not want to import the conflict, which would have had serious implications 
for the democratic process. Instead, it opted to play a mediation role and 
hosted several meetings to try and end the conflict.
Nevertheless, Zambia attracted some mistrust from both Angola and the 
DRC. This was because certain key individuals in government were accused of 
supplying arms to UNITA in Angola and some rebel groups in the DRC. A UN 
report implicated the director-general of Zambia’s Intelligence and Security 
Services, Xavier Chungu, in dealings with the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi. 
The report further suggested that in August 1999 Zambian authorities were 
forced to impound a Ukrainian plane at Lusaka International Airport after 
receiving consistent reports that Angola would attack Zambia in pursuit of 
UNITA rebels. Zambia evidently was in a difficult position regarding UNITA 
(Monitor 2000), because for ten years, during Chiluba’s rule, the Zambian 
government had tolerated trade between UNITA and Zambian business 
people in arms and fuel supplies. 
Regarding dealings with the DRC, Zambia started off as a neutral country, 
whose interest was to see peace and the rule of law return to the troubled 
country. However, the DRC began to question Zambia’s sincerity and 
commitment, and accused it of supporting some rebel movements. In 
particular, the Chiluba administration’s dealings with Raphael Soriano, 
alias Katebe Katoto, raised suspicions (Mwanawasa 2002). There is no 
doubt, therefore, that Zambia’s national and regional security concerns were 
compromised by these dealings during the Chiluba administration.
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Peacekeeping 
Apart from its involvement in regional security arrangements, Zambia has 
been involved in international peacekeeping missions. The Zambia Police 
Service, for example, has been actively involved in missions abroad, notably 
in Kosovo. A total of 25 officers returned from Kosovo in April 2003, ending 
their one-and-a-half years of peacekeeping. The remaining group of seven 
completed their tour of duty at the end of 2003. Another group of 37 left to 
replace the 25 before the end of April 2003. Furthermore, another six officers 
were sent for peacekeeping duties to East Timor in 2003, giving a total of 57 
officers in the UN peacekeeping missions by mid-2003, including some who 
were involved in peacekeeping missions in several African countries.
Conclusion
The chapter has examined the extent to which the process of democratisation 
and democracy in Zambia has influenced the state’s perception and practice of 
national security in the context of regional security threats and arrangements. 
It has been shown that Zambia’s approaches to both national and regional 
security were influenced by its history and the geopolitical situation. It is 
also important to note that Zambia’s security relations with its neighbours, 
particularly Angola and the DRC, have been fragile because of clandestine 
activities of some top-ranking officials during the Chiluba administration. 
The democratic dispensation seems to have checked such dealings during 
President Mwanawasa’s administration. 
EnDnoTES
1 Throughout this chapter, this party should not be confused with the more widely known South 
African party of the same name.





Issues of democracy, good governance, human rights, and security manage-
ment are topical among social analysts, and the international community is 
currently embroiled in debates over such issues. As Swartz (1998: 26) puts it 
so succinctly, ‘the notion of governance has only quite recently, perhaps no 
more than a few years ago, entered the lexicon of public debates’. The world 
has changed since the fall of the socialist bloc in the closing years of the 
1980s. The question of human rights and democratic governance has never 
been more relevant and urgent than in our times. All over the world, every 
country’s human rights record is under the microscope.
Zimbabwe is no exception. It may be the only country in Southern Africa that 
is presently receiving the attention of the whole international community on 
issues of good governance, human rights, and democracy. There are reasons 
behind this unusual attention.
The historical setting
Zimbabwe, like its Southern African neighbours Angola, Mozambique, 
Namibia, and South Africa, traces its independence to the armed struggles of 
the 1960s and 1970s. These struggles liberated most of the Southern African 
countries that were under white minority colonial rule. Previously, the African 
majorities in these countries were denied the most basic human rights, such 
as the right to participate in the selection of a government of their choice. 
They also had no say over many other issues that affected their daily lives. 
The wars of liberation were therefore fought in order to give Africans the 
franchise and a meaningful input into decisions and laws that affected their 
daily lives. The question, therefore, is: Has the post-liberation government 
of Zimbabwe been able to deliver on the issues the Zimbabwe liberation 
movement went to war for? There are certain broad parameters and stages 
in the history of post-colonial Zimbabwe that should be looked at in order 
to come up with a meaningful analysis of the situation as it exists at present 
in the country. The conduct of the war of liberation, as with most wars of 
liberation, demanded the suspension of normal day-to-day human rights. 
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The individual’s rights and democracy were normally suspended. This is 
what Krige (1995: 5–8) has referred to as ‘guerrilla coercion’. Manungo (1991) 
has argued that in order to win the war against the colonisers, individual 
interests had to give way to what was perceived as the will of the majority. 
The leaders of the struggle had to mobilise all available resources for the 
cause. Did these leaders evolve into new political leaders after independence 
who knew that their new roles required periodic mandates from the people 
if they were to continue in power? The Zimbabwean experience shows that 
there was a gradual change over the years regarding the interpretation of 
legitimacy and the right to rule the country.
Political evolution: 1980–90
The liberation war in Zimbabwe ended with the Lancaster House talks in 
London, which produced the Lancaster House Agreement in November 
1979. That agreement called for general elections based on adult suffrage: 
the African majority could at last participate in the selection of a government 
of their choice. Nine parties contested the 1980 parliamentary elections. 
The constitution guaranteed whites 20 seats, which were contested by the 
Rhodesian Front (RF) of Ian Smith and other white minority parties. The 
RF won all 20 entrenched seats. The Zimbabwe African National Union 
(Patriotic Front) (ZANU [PF]), led by Robert Gabriel Mugabe, won a majority 
of the seats (64 per cent) in the National Assembly and formed the first 
African majority government. Even though ZANU (PF) had a parliamentary 
majority, it invited its wartime partner, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
(ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, to take up some cabinet positions in the new 
government. The alliance was, however, short-lived, as it was rocked by the 
1981–82 rift between the former Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Army (ZIPRA), which was the ZAPU armed wing in the liberation war, and 
the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, the armed wing of ZANU 
(PF).
But even if the incoming government had been more genuinely committed 
to transforming colonial power relations – e.g. through a democratic land 
redistribution process and economic development strategy based on the 
needs of the majority of the people – it had inherited several kinds of debts. 
Among the most serious was the legacy of colonial development funded by 
foreign loans, and the capacity of the World Bank and IMF to set the agenda 
for post-colonial development (Bond and Manyanya 2002: 9). 
The February 1981 clashes were soon followed by a more serious war in 
Matebeleland and the Midlands from 1982 to 1987 (Alao 1995: 111–15). 
The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace produced a report on that 
223
war (CCJP 1997) cataloguing the attempts by the Zimbabwe National 
Army (ZNA) to suppress ZIPRA dissidents and stating that atrocities were 
committed by the various arms of the security forces in the course of their 
duties. But it went on to state that atrocities were committed not only by the 
security forces, but also by the dissidents (CCJP 1997: xi).
The war in Matebeleland has left a dark shadow on the history of post-
colonial Zimbabwe. There are those who feel that the government has not 
been sufficiently open on the atrocities allegedly committed by the security 
forces in suppressing the dissidents in that region and the Midlands. The 
government set up a commission to investigate reports coming from 
Matebeleland civilians in the early 1990s. The findings have not yet been 
made public. There are those on the government side who have argued that 
the country would be better off if it put what happened in Matebeleland 
behind it and concentrated on the new challenges. They argue that reopening 
the ‘wounds’ from that experience would divide the country rather than 
unite it. Others have suggested that the experience of South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission could be used as an example to introduce 
such a process in Zimbabwe. And some believe that if there were a change of 
government in Zimbabwe, many witnesses might come forward to tell what 
happened during those turbulent years of the dissident era. The activities 
of the ZNA Fifth Brigade, which were central to winning the war against 
the dissidents, were largely the source of civilian complaints (CCJP 1997). A 
truth and reconciliation commission would give both sides an opportunity to 
be heard and perhaps that would start the process of healing.
The ZNA was also waging another war between 1982 and 1992, in 
Mozambique against RENAMO (also called the MNR, the Mozambique 
National Resistance). This movement had been set up by the Rhodesians and 
apartheid South Africa to destabilise the new governments of Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe needed the port of Beira in Mozambique for its exports 
and imports, and decided to attack RENAMO. The wars in Matebeleland and 
Mozambique strained the economic development programmes planned in 
this period. Many people were displaced in Matebeleland and north-eastern 
Zimbabwe, while many ended up as refugees in Botswana and South Africa. 
This period can therefore be characterised as one that presented security 
problems for Zimbabwe, both internally and regionally. It is believed that 
some former Rhodesian whites took advantage of these refugees, training 
them and sending them back to fight the ZNA in Matebeleland and the 
Midlands. These same former Rhodesian agents assisted RENAMO in 
fighting against the Mozambican and Zimbabwean armies. While this 
period seems to have been plagued by turmoil and insecurity, the crisis in 
Matebeleland was resolved when ZAPU and ZANU recommitted themselves 
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to a second alliance by signing the Unity Accord in December 1987 (CCJP 
1997: xi), and the intervention in Mozambique came to an end in 1992, when 
RENAMO and FRELIMO signed the Rome Peace Accord. The Zimbabwean 
alliance was strongly criticised by some in Matebeleland, who accused Joshua 
Nkomo of selling out the Ndebele people by agreeing to merge ZAPU with 
ZANU (PF) in terms of the Unity Accord. The Zimbabwean government, 
on the other hand, accused apartheid South Africa of sponsoring both the 
dissidents in Matebeleland and RENAMO in Mozambique. Through all this, 
the question of good governance seemed not to be an issue, although some 
NGOs were already criticising the Zimbabwean government for the way it 
was conducting the war, especially the issue of civilian victims who were 
reported to be suffering at the hands of the security forces. 
Regional security and shared resources
Zimbabwe’s past has been tied to those of Zambia, Malawi, and South Africa. 
Zimbabwe and Zambia share a common border, and historically these two 
countries had been intertwined in the British imperial plans that Cecil John 
Rhodes tried to implement in Central Africa in the nineteenth century, which 
still affected the region in the twentieth century. The Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland shared resources, albeit unequally, for ten years, from 1953 
to 1963. Zambia (known as Northern Rhodesia at the time) was on the 
losing end in the resource sharing during the federation period. The Kariba 
hydropower scheme, for instance, was supposed to be a shared resource, 
but the infrastructure was designed to favour Zimbabwe (Rhodesia at the 
time), as all the turbines and controls were placed on the Zimbabwean side. 
Zambia was also adversely affected by the Zimbabwean war of liberation 
because of its support for Zimbabwean guerrillas. Rhodesian soldiers attacked 
Zambian infrastructure as a way of punishing the Zambian government. 
Many Zambian civilians were killed when the Rhodesian security forces 
claimed they were in hot pursuit of guerrillas who were using Zambia as a 
base to attack Rhodesia. The situation changed after 1980 when Zimbabwe 
achieved independence. The two countries worked together as members 
of the FLS, helping the South African liberation movements in their fight 
against apartheid South Africa.
Difficulties, however, continue to exist. The Victoria Falls, on the Zambezi 
River that forms the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe, and one of the 
‘seven wonders of the world’, has not brought co-operation between the 
two countries, but has of late become a source of competition for tourists 
between the two countries. The Zambezi River has also been a site of conflict 
as poachers cross from Zambia into Zimbabwe in search of ivory and rhino 
horn. Zimbabwean National Parks security agents have actually declared war 
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on Zambian poachers over the years. The situation has improved recently as 
the new Zambian government of President Mwanawasa is co-operating with 
the Zimbabwean government in combating poaching in the Zambezi valley. 
Another Zimbabwean neighbour, Malawi, has had to cope with problems 
arising out of the return of its citizens following the closure of many mines in 
Zimbabwe where the Malawians had been employed. Malawi has supplied 
South Africa and Zimbabwe with migrant labour for many years. Similarly the 
plight of former farm workers in Zimbabwe, who were largely of Malawian 
descent, has caused tensions between the countries. The land reform process 
in Zimbabwe has not fully addressed the plight of these former migrant 
workers (Manungo 1997).
Relations between Zimbabwe and its southern neighbours, South Africa 
and Botswana, have not been smooth either, as a result of an influx of 
Zimbabwean economic refugees. There is no consensus on the causes of the 
Zimbabwean economic decline that have led to this situation. Some critics 
point to land redistribution in Zimbabwe, whereby land that once was used 
by a minority of white farmers has been repossessed by government and 
redistributed to black small-scale farmers and new black commercial farmers. 
The distribution process has been criticised, as the government is accused of 
taking land from former white farmers and then giving it to senior ZANU 
(PF) people. This criticism has not been without foundation. In an attempt to 
respond to its critics, the government has recently instituted a department, 
led by a senior cabinet minister, to take stock of the distribution process and 
take farms away from those who are found to have been allocated more than 
one.
The political tensions between the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) and the ruling ZANU (PF) have also contributed significantly 
to the economic decline that has led many people to flee into Botswana and 
South Africa in search of a better life. This is perhaps the one major conflict that 
has contributed to the declining economic fortunes in Zimbabwe, particularly 
as the political contestation between the two parties was accompanied by 
mutual violence and the limitation of rights and freedoms. Some critics of 
the government have blamed this on the media laws passed during Jonathan 
Moyo’s tenure as information minister which, they argue, directly contributed 
to a lack of democratic space in the country. Most Western countries have 
imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe because of the political impasse between 
the MDC and ZANU (PF). The AU and SADC have tried to mediate in the 
conflict, but so far there have been no meaningful results. The Zimbabwean 
government accuses the MDC of being a front for the British government, 
the former colonial power. 
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The 1991 Framework for Economic Reform, better known as the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), was introduced by Finance 
Minister Bernard Chidzero and a small number of technocrats. The key 
documents were prepared by the World Bank and then revised to secure 
the support of cabinet. In retrospect, ESAP did not deliver on many of its 
strategic targets by 1995. For example, GDP growth reached 5 per cent only 
in one year, 1994, and averaged just 1.2 per cent from 1991 to 1995. Inflation 
averaged more than 30 per cent during the same period, and never dropped 
to anywhere near the 10 per cent target. The budget deficit was more than 
10 per cent of GDP during the ESAP era, double the 5 per cent target, and 
reached a high of 13 per cent in 1994–95 as a consequence of a crippling 
drought (Bond and Manyanya 2002: 32).
Elections and democracy
The parliamentary elections of 1985, 1990, and 1995 were won by ZANU (PF) 
by very wide margins. It must be pointed out that voter turnout decreased with 
each election, and some pundits say that this was as a result of voter apathy. 
Those sympathetic to the government say voters stayed home because they 
were satisfied with the way the government was running the affairs of the 
state. It does seem as though there is a third dimension or interpretation of 
this decreased voter turnout, however. The voters may have been staying 
away from the polls (and they still do) because they realised they could 
not make any meaningful changes to the political arena, especially as the 
candidates presented had to be endorsed by the party hierarchy, not by the 
people at the grass-roots level. In addition, there were no real opposition 
parties to speak of before the emergence of the MDC. Table 1 shows that 
voter turnout decreased significantly over the years.
Table 1: Voter turnout in parliamentary elections, 1980–2000







2000 (February) Referendum 33%
2000 (June) Parliament 48.3% 
Source: Zimbabwe Election Support Network, http://www.zesn.org.zw
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If the 49.3% voter turnout for the presidential elections of March 2002 is 
included, the same trend is observed. This time the opposition performed 
much better than other opposition parties had done in the past. There must 
be reasons why this should have been so for the first time in the history 
of elections in Zimbabwe, and those reasons cannot be ignored or brushed 
aside by the ruling party. The ruling party, however, performed much better 
in the 2005 parliamentary elections, ceding only 41 of the 120 contested 
seats to the opposition. The opposition challenged the results of some of the 
constituencies in the courts, without success.
Economic issues and democracy, 1993–98
The early part of the period 1993–98 has been described by Innocent Matshe 
of the Department of Economics at the University of Zimbabwe as one of 
quasi-democracy.1 He argues that most government institutions, such as the 
parastatals, the civil service, and security agencies, were run on professional 
lines, albeit with some government intervention here and there. However, in 
the latter part of this period some of the institutions began to be headed by 
former military personnel, becoming as a result very undemocratic. Critics 
would argue that the appointments were based on political patronage and 
not on professional grounds. The operations and decisions of such institutions 
as the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 
(NOCZIM), and others had a tremendous impact on the daily lives of 
the people. The foreign exchange control measures introduced impacted 
negatively on society, although the government would argue otherwise – 
there are issues of the effects of uncontrolled foreign exchange on the prices 
of commodities, especially on basic goods. NOCZIM’s monopoly on the 
acquisition and distribution of fuel plunged the country into an economic 
crisis that persists to this day. The government did, however, liberalise the 
acquisition of fuel even to the extent of allowing consumers to purchase it 
with hard currency. Khapoya (1994: 213) states that ‘centralised economies 
and one-party states failed to deliver [the] prosperity and democracy which 
African people fought for and their leaders promised them’.
The intervention of the IMF and the World Bank with its ESAP did not turn 
the economy around. The introduction of price controls on basic commodities 
and a lack of foreign currency worsened the economic situation. Human 
security was and is further eroded by HIV/AIDS. The pandemic has not 
spared Zimbabwe, and has compounded the problems of an already declining 
economy. The most affected groups are women, children, and men in their 
prime, a situation that deprives the country of the very people who should 
be the leaders of tomorrow. The resources that should go into developmental 
projects are being diverted to assisting the victims of HIV/AIDS. Zimbabwe 
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is one of the few countries in the world to have levied a tax on the working 
population in order to raise funds for victims of the pandemic, but the 
distribution of these funds has been criticised for lacking transparency. 
national security perception and its impact on regional security
Zimbabwe has a National Security Council (NSC) that is composed of the 
president, all cabinet ministers, the secretary to the president and cabinet, 
the commander of the defence forces, the director-general of the Central 
Intelligence Organisation, the commissioner of police, and the commissioner 
of prisons. The president chairs the council. Under it is the Defence Council 
(DC). The president also chairs this, as it is a committee of the NSC. The 
other members of the DC are the ministers of foreign affairs, defence, state 
and national security, finance, home affairs, information and publicity, 
justice, and parliamentary affairs; the commanders of the defence forces, 
the ZNA, and the air force; the secretary of defence; and the secretary to 
the president and cabinet. Then there is a Defence Committee, made up 
of the minister of defence (in the chair), the commanders of the defence 
forces, the commissioners of police and prisons, the secretary for defence, 
and the deputy secretary for policy in the MoD.2 The NSC and the DC drive 
security policy in Zimbabwe; there is no input from civil society as such. 
Parliament would have been the representative of civil society, but where 
the ruling party has a dominant majority in parliament, it leaves very little 
room for other parties to provide input into national security policies. It is 
against this background of the composition of the national security councils 
and committees that one has to examine some of the decisions affecting the 
region and internal politics.
The intervention in the DRC in 1998 is a case in point. The ZNA and the 
air force went into the DRC amid controversy, as some argued that the 
intervention had not been authorised by the regional organs. The Zimbabwean 
government has argued otherwise. It is obvious that the Zimbabwean 
security councils had taken the decision to go to the assistance of the DRC, 
which they perceived as being threatened by external forces. That decision 
and the intervention that followed did not entirely enhance regional security. 
Instead, tensions arose, particularly between South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
The intervention was viewed as a selfish move by the political leadership 
and army brass, who were said to be personally benefitting from the troops’ 
intervention. The leaders of the intervention were described as ‘modern day 
carpet-baggers’ (EDC News 2002) – a reference to the American business 
people from the northern states who profited from the American South after 
the Civil War of 1861–65.
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The major criticism was about the amount of money the government was 
spending in the DRC when the country’s economy could not meet other 
needs, such as assistance to AIDS victims. The Financial Gazette (1999) 
reported that Zimbabwe was spending close to USD 1 million a month on 
the war in the DRC. The government argued otherwise, and defended the 
intervention as a response to a sister country’s call for help after it had been 
invaded by its neighbours, Rwanda and Uganda. What cannot be denied is 
that the intervention used up huge amounts of resources that could have 
been used at home. The relations that emerged between DRC and Zimbabwe 
have been criticised, as it is alleged that the links benefitted individuals, and 
not the country. The UN and some Western countries have accused the 
Zimbabwean army top brass of exploiting the DRC’s resources.
The emergence of the MDC as a strong opposition party has presented 
problems for the government internally. There had been no strong opposition 
party since 1980; most parties had not presented a serious challenge to the 
government. When the MDC was formed in September 1999 and began 
to prepare for the parliamentary elections of June 2000, the political arena 
changed. The ZANU (PF) government was not used to facing a challenge 
such as that presented by the new opposition party. There was a lot of 
violence during the campaign period leading up to the elections. Internal 
security was threatened as both parties exchanged accusations as to who 
was initiating the violence. Regional security was also affected, as refugees 
left Zimbabwe for Botswana and South Africa, stating that they were fleeing 
from the violence between ZANU (PF) and MDC supporters. There was no 
red-carpet reception for the refugees from either the governments or the 
ordinary people of Botswana and South Africa. The governments accused 
the new arrivals of criminal activities; the people accused them of taking 
jobs meant for the countries’ nationals. The same tensions spilled over into 
2002, when the Zimbabwean presidential elections were conducted. Both 
sides continued to hurl accusations at one another. There was more violence 
between ZANU (PF) and the opposition during the 2000 and 2002 elections 
than there had been in all the previous post-independence elections 
combined. The discrepancy in the urban and rural support for the two sides 
puzzled some observers. The explanation is found in the fact that the rural 
areas were where most of the war of liberation was fought, and therefore the 
majority of the rural people have remained firm supporters of ZANU (PF). 
Some rural people have even said that the urban dwellers have no idea what 
the war was all about and that is why they are engaging in ‘battles’ with 
ZANU (PF).3 There are those who also point out that the drought relief food 
distribution programme in rural areas has been used as a weapon to garner 
support for the ruling party. The ruling party has denied these accusations.
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The referendum on the proposed new draft constitution once again proved 
to the ruling party that the new opposition party had considerable support. 
There was a 55 per cent ‘no’ vote and 44 per cent ‘yes’. Did this rejection of the 
constitution, however, mean a vote for the opposition? It does not necessarily 
seem that way if one realises that only 1,313,038 voters, or 22 per cent of the 
electorate, voted (Helen Suzman Foundation 2000: 1). Nevertheless, this was 
the first time the ruling party had been challenged by the electorate. 
Greg Linnington, a lawyer and lecturer in the Department of Politics and 
Administration at the University of Zimbabwe, stated that one did not have 
to be an MDC supporter to see the problems with the present constitution 
of Zimbabwe. The issue of the executive presidency was being questioned, 
especially the president’s power to nominate 20 non-constituent MPs in a 
parliament of 150 members. In addition to the 20 nominated members, ten 
traditional chiefs become MPs after being selected by the council of chiefs. 
These ten are also indirectly appointees of the president as, according to the 
constitution, the president appoints chiefs.4 Linnington went on to state that 
clearly there was no democracy unless all the National Assembly members 
were elected by the electorate. The powers of the executive president have 
been criticised by many who see the presidential powers as having no check. 
This is a weakness of the constitution that needs addressing. In addition, 
the independence of the judiciary has been questioned by many observers. 
The pre-independence judges, for example, were viewed by the government 
after independence as sympathetic to the former white settlers and their 
interests. In a bid to ‘correct’ that colonial legacy, the post-independence 
government tried to appoint judges who had the ‘correct’ orientation.5 This 
induced criticism, as the executive was viewed as interfering in the one arm 
of government that should normally be left to do its duties independently. 
The 2003 arrest of a judge for what the executive saw as interference in the 
course of justice attracted wide condemnation.
The present government views Zimbabwe as a nation under siege. This has 
affected its formulation and implementation of national security policy. The 
government has presented the opposition as the enemy of the state and the 
people of Zimbabwe. The criticism is not entirely without foundation, as the 
opposition has not done enough to distance itself from the former colonial 
masters.
For its part, the opposition has accused the government of human rights 
violations and documented them. Pictures of tortured people have appeared 
in the private press. The government of Zimbabwe has denied these charges, 
but has to accept that the security forces sometimes go beyond legal bounds 
in trying to deal with the opposition. Individuals seeking asylum in the United 
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Kingdom have alleged torture, and some have told graphic stories of torture. 
It is even alleged that asylum seekers sell each other pictures of the alleged 
tortures in order to persuade British officials to allow them to stay in the 
United Kingdom. Some would argue that the true picture of human rights 
violations might become clearer if a truth and reconciliation commission 
were to be set up, as it was in South Africa.
Conclusion
Zimbabwe went through a liberation war in order to bring democracy to the 
majority of Zimbabweans. The party that led the liberation war and most of 
the leaders of the revolution have been in power since independence. This 
has contributed to the way the country’s problems are perceived. The lack 
of meaningful opposition parties for most of the period since independence 
has meant that the ruling party has only been challenged recently. This 
development has earned the opposition the label of ‘the enemy of the 
people’ from the government. Mistakes have been made by the Government 
of Zimbabwe, but one of the points of interest is that the world has suddenly 
woken up and discovered violations of civil rights in Zimbabwe. It would 
seem as if that world, especially the West, hardly knew that problems in 
Zimbabwe existed until the land invasions of 2000. George Shire, a Zimbabwe 
government sympathiser, said: 
According to the British government and the mainstream 
press, you would be forgiven for thinking that Zimbabwe’s 
[post-]independence history consists of only two periods: 
before the ‘land-grab’ and after the ‘land-grab’. Before the 
‘land-grab’ Zimbabwe was a model African state with a 
progressive leader, after the ‘land-grab’ it has become a 
disaster zone with a ‘madman’ in charge! (Shire 2003). 
This view sums up the government side. Dr Stan Mudenge, the minister of 
foreign affairs, has pointed out that an IMF report of 1996 labelled Zimbabwe 
one of the best African economies.6
There is no doubt that the international community has suddenly awakened 
to the cry of good governance and democracy, and that regional security 
has been severely affected by what is going on in Zimbabwe. The economic 
refugees from Zimbabwe have brought problems to South Africa and 
Botswana, thereby creating tensions among SADC partners. Have civil society 
organisations been helpful in working with the government in mapping out 
the problems facing the country? Not at all, and government has seen most 
such organisations as plotting against it and working for its downfall.
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There is no national perception of security in Zimbabwe. The government 
sets the agenda for the country’s security. The intervention by Zimbabwe 
in the DRC, though now over, did not go down well with the opposition in 
Zimbabwe and with some SADC countries. It is anyone’s guess, however, 
who will finally take credit for the peace that is now apparent in the DRC.
There is a need for SADC to go back to the drawing board, to determine what 
needs to be included in its OPDSC. At present, countries such as Zimbabwe 
and South Africa will always act in the best interests of their nations. It is 
important that the declaration in the treaty that ‘provides for strengthening 
regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region 
to live and work together in peace and harmony’ be adhered to (Malan and 
Cilliers 1997: 1). There is no doubt that the situation in Zimbabwe today 
needs to be turned around. The economy is collapsing, and one hopes that 
moves by the governor of the Reserve Bank will achieve the turnaround. 
Recently, very high-ranking party officials have been arrested on fraud 
charges, and certain prominent business executives have fled the country 
after realising that the law was closing in on them – although it puzzles many 
people that these executives have sought asylum in the United Kingdom 
and the United States, countries that are the most critical of Zimbabwe. One 
hopes the government will keep the pressure on so that any other culprits 
may be held accountable.
Council elections and parliamentary by-elections have shown that the 
ordinary Zimbabwean, urban or rural, is becoming less and less interested 
in politics and more focused on surviving economic hardship. Statistics show 
that with each election fewer people are turning out to vote. It has been 
suggested that the country needs more voter education so that the people 
can participate fully in the election processes. Voter education and the 
appointment of an independent electoral commission would go a long way 
in assisting the processes of democracy in Zimbabwe. There is also a need to 
revisit the Lancaster House constitution so as to come up with a nationally 
accepted new constitution. Many areas in the present constitution need to be 
addressed. Zimbabwe as a country within SADC is a vital cog in the wheel of 
economic success for the region.
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Gavin Cawthra, Khabele Matlosa, and  
Anthoni van nieuwkerk 
At the heart of this study is the investigation of the interface between security 
at both the national and regional levels, on the one hand, and democracy and 
democratisation on the other. The assumption that security and democratic 
governance are inextricably intertwined and mutually reinforcing underpins 
all the country studies. This approach is neither novel nor new, given that 
various previous studies have pointed to this important linkage. For instance, 
Chris Landsberg (2003: 1) aptly observes that ‘in the conventional view, peace-
building has largely been accomplished once the formal peace agreements 
have been signed. However, building sustainable peace is, in fact, a long-
term and multi-dimensional process, which ultimately requires accountable 
and democratic governance’. For Robin Luckham (2003: 3), ‘national security 
and public order depend upon a democratic (and thus legitimate) framework 
of public authority’. 
What is not always clear, however, is exactly how democratic governance 
impacts on national security perceptions and practices, and how, in turn, 
this translates into national approaches to the collaborative security project 
in Southern Africa. In some cases – in some of the country studies – it has 
been possible to answer this question in this book. In others, the relationship 
appears to be less clear, while at the multinational level, this issue has been 
addressed only at a fairly high level of generality. 
Understanding democracy, democratisation, and security 
Some broad observations can be made. This study has demonstrated that, 
much as progress has been registered in respect of the democratisation 
process in the region, critical policy and capacity challenges still remain 
for democracy to be firmly entrenched as a value, a process, and a political 
practice.
Democratisation has been uneven and partial, and in some states has barely 
begun, while in others there are signs of democratic reversals. Furthermore, 
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the process of democratisation itself has been accompanied in some cases 
by violent conflict, most notably in the DRC. This supports the more general 
findings of Cawthra and Luckham (2003) and others: that transitions to 
democracy are seldom linear, often fail, and are accompanied by new 
insecurities. There is some evidence in the region, in the form of Botswana, 
Mauritius, and Seychelles, and perhaps also post-apartheid South Africa, to 
support the ‘democratic peace’ thesis – that democracies do not go to war 
with other democracies, and by extension that they are less prone to internal 
conflict (although the context of this needs to be closely interrogated). 
However, the process of democratisation itself appears to be associated 
at least in some cases with conflict and insecurity. This would support the 
findings of, for example, Mansfield and Snyder (1995).
If one accepts Larry Diamond’s typology of democracies (see Du Pisani in 
this volume) – i.e. electoral democracies, liberal democracies, and pseudo-
democracies – and add, as Du Pisani suggests, social or developmental 
democracies, then how can one characterise the countries in this study? 
With the possible exception of Seychelles, none can be considered to be 
social democracies. Some, such as Swaziland, can hardly be considered 
to be democracies at all. Others, perhaps the majority of countries in the 
region, would qualify as liberal democracies, but there are clearly some 
cases where democratic political systems and processes are so stressed or 
weak that they would best be described as pseudo-democracies or shell 
democracies. In other words, there is a mixed bag, and this could put limits 
on the evolution of common security (of which more later). The situation 
is compounded by the fact that it is not clear in what direction some of the 
countries in the region are heading: is Zimbabwe, for example, transiting 
from what was effectively a one-party state to a multi-party democracy (a 
process accompanied by conflict and insecurity), or is it on a trajectory that 
will lead to greater authoritarianism? Southall (2003) is not alone in arguing 
that ‘there are deeply worrying indications that the democratic wave which 
broke upon the region’s shores in the 1990s is now moving into reverse’. 
This would be too bold a statement in our view, but nevertheless, there have 
definitely been stalls and reverses in the processes, and democracy remains 
fragile in many countries. 
The debate on the security architecture in the SADC region is as robust as the 
democracy and governance discourse (see Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Vale 
2003). Some of this debate revolves around different conceptions of security: 
In particular, a distinction is made between ‘narrow’ security (the concerns of 
the ‘security sector’, i.e. the police, defence force, and intelligence agencies), 
and ‘widened’ security in which issues such as economics, the environment, 
and society are regarded as having security dimensions. In general in this 
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study the authors have adopted a wider definition of security, although 
without losing a focus on the traditional security sector itself, which remains 
at the core of our concerns. The debate between the ‘wideners’ and the 
‘traditionalists’ has in turn spawned the concept of human security, which 
is often seen in opposition to state security. This is really the application of 
‘widened’ security to the referent level of the individual, or society, or social 
formations, depending on who is using the term. 
While the concept of human security is useful (and it is embedded in the 
policy discourse on security in many SADC countries, especially South Africa), 
it remains contested (see, for example, the discussion by several scholars 
referred to in Burgess and Owen 2004). On the whole, when this study talks 
about security, it has tended to focus on the state in the first instance, in the 
belief that the traditional security task of the maintenance of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and of law and order, cannot simply be taken for granted 
in Southern Africa; but within that sovereignty, human security issues should 
be paramount. However, this debate tends to impact on security architecture 
by dividing analysts and practitioners alike into two camps: those who want 
to concentrate on state security, and those who argue that human beings 
or collectivities are more important. Perhaps quite naturally, government 
officials tend to favour the former and civil society the latter. Later in this 
chapter, a way in which this matter can be approached will be suggested by 
determining the roles and functions of different structures within SADC. 
In virtually all the country studies (although the Indian Ocean island members 
of SADC are an exception), security interdependence was identified as being 
a key issue driving the collaborative security project. Political instability and 
violent conflicts in one SADC member is as much a matter for concern for the 
larger collective of member states as it is for that member state. This reality 
helps in part to explain why states have entered into security collaboration. 
But Southern Africa is not completely a ‘security complex’ in Buzan’s (1991) 
sense, where the security (or insecurity) of one state is dependent on that 
of the others. The link between (in)security in say, Namibia, and that in 
Mozambique, for example, is now fairly tenuous. 
Nevertheless, even where they might not be directly threatened by spillovers 
of insecurity, the countries of the region share a history of struggle against 
colonialism and apartheid that is an important ideological gel: solidarity is a key 
value, and ranks are often closed, for example in support of the Zimbabwean 
government, which has faced international disapproval and sanctions. 
This solidarity is driven primarily by the political elite and, to a considerable 
degree, so are security perceptions and practices. Furthermore, it is also 
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evident that many of the concerns regarding security are propelled by state 
or regime, rather than human security, imperatives. This returns us to the 
debate on the character of democracy in the region. As Du Pisani argues, 
human security is a necessary condition for human development, which can 
arguably best be achieved by social as opposed to liberal democracy. But 
as Cawthra (in this volume) concludes, regional security co-operation in 
the developing countries in general ‘is clearly aimed at stability and regime 
security’ rather than human security. In this scheme of things, the state tends 
to be the only agent of security, to the exclusion of other critical actors in 
society. Zacharias (1999: 153) reminds us that 
the state is not and it should not be the only agent of security. 
It has limited initiative and resources. It does not constitute 
the totality of social life. There are other agents equally 
important for security that complement the activities of the 
state, and it is their empowerment that is likely to make a 
difference in security. These include societal organisations 
such as civic, charity and various other interests, groups 
normally referred to as ‘civil society’. 
It must be noted, however, and this is borne out in some of the studies in this 
book, that civil society in itself is not a vehicle for democratisation: it is also 
in many cases elite-driven. 
The history of regional integration or co-operation in Southern Africa 
suggests that, as in many other parts of the globe, SADC states initially came 
together in 1980 in the form of the then SADCC, and some of them even 
before that in the FLS alliance, mainly because of a perceived common 
external threat, basically in the form of apartheid South Africa (see Omari 
and Macaringue in this volume). Although the co-operation arrangement 
was first and foremost a political response to South Africa’s regional 
destabilisation strategy, and thus linked strongly to the FLS arrangement, 
SADC concentrated on economic co-operation, focusing on reducing the 
economic dependence of member states upon South Africa. The situation 
changed dramatically following the political transformation in South Africa 
in 1994. When South Africa was subsequently admitted into the newly 
reformulated SADC, economic integration and political and security co-
operation were pursued in tandem, and this remains the reality today. 
However, how to combine the political/security agenda with the economic 
one was a strongly contested issue, as Omari and Macaringue have 
highlighted in this book. Following a protracted conflict and tension over 
the exact role and position of the OPDSC within the SADC structures, some 
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consensus has emerged that the best way to proceed is to integrate this 
security co-operation mechanism into the SADC summit rather than have 
it as an autonomous entity, as was the case with the FLS (Van Nieuwkerk 
1999; Matlosa 2001). This dilemma – the relationship between security and 
economic co-operation, and which takes precedence – is common to many 
regional and sub-regional organisations, as Cawthra has argued earlier. There 
is some evidence to support the thesis that although economic co-operation 
may be the formal expression of the project, it is driven by shared security 
threat perceptions – but as time goes on, interactions develop their own 
logic, and economic, political, and security co-operation become intertwined 
and synergetic. 
 
Global dynamics influencing national security perceptions
Regional integration is in part both a response to and a localised expression 
of accelerated globalisation. Efforts towards regional integration in different 
parts of the globe have been motivated in part by an aim to minimise the 
adverse effects of globalisation, such as marginalisation, fragmentation, and 
disintegration (Nabudere 2000; Cheru 2002; Zeleza 2003). 
A plausible argument can be canvassed, too, that the new wave of globalisation 
has provided impetus for regional organisations to move beyond the economic 
realm of inter-state co-operation towards political and security co-operation. 
However, as recent studies suggest (SAPES/UNDP/SADC 2000; Mandaza 
and Nabudere 2002), more progress has been registered in the economic 
than the political field in Southern Africa. SADC has agreed to more than ten 
protocols aimed at deepening regional economic integration, yet member 
states have been sharply divided on strategies for security co-operation 
through the OPDSC, and have only recently agreed on key protocols and 
structures. This distinction is reflected also in the SADC Secretariat, where 
the vast majority of staff are engaged on economic issues rather than political 
and security ones. 
Globalisation has been made even more profound and urgent by the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001 (Ellis and Killingray 2002), which have thrown 
into sharp relief questions about what the major internal and external threats 
to security are, and how states should best protect and ensure their security in 
the new world order. It should be noted, however, that in few of the countries 
studied in this volume is terrorism seen as a major security issue (Tanzania 
being a major exception), although many states feel obliged to realign their 
policies and practices with the exigencies of the United States-driven ‘war 
on terror’. It is too early to determine exactly what effect this might have 
on common security in the region. On the one hand, US unilateralism may 
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propel SADC and other regional bodies to adopt even more multilateralist 
strategies and to seek to develop some balance in the international system 
by cementing global alliances; on the other, states may opportunistically seek 
to ally themselves with the United States and its agenda, thus potentially 
undermining regional solidarity. 
As shown in many of the country studies, globalisation is thus an important 
driver of regional integration. But at the same time it tends to weaken 
already weak states, which in turn might undermine regional integration. 
This is because weak states might cling to what little sovereignty they retain, 
particularly in the security field. It is understandable that states such as 
Malawi or Zambia, which have lost virtually all control over their national 
finances due to chronic indebtedness and the interventions of IFIs, cling to 
sovereignty in the political and security domain. It must also be remembered 
that most of the countries in Southern Africa are fairly new states, and that 
many of them engaged in protracted liberation struggles to assert their 
sovereignty; they are thus naturally reticent to cede it, particularly if this is 
seen as surrendering to global agendas driven by former colonial powers. 
It is debatable how fast SADC’s integration has been, and the results have 
been mixed: intra-regional trade has increased significantly, but on an 
asymmetric basis in favour of South Africa; barriers to intra-regional trade in 
the form of bureaucracy, tariffs, and transport deficiencies remain high; and 
SADC has certainly not yet turned the corner in breaking dependence on 
primary export products, donor assistance, and debt. 
However, security perceptions and practices in the region are not only shaped 
by external or exogenous dynamics: internal or endogenous dynamics are 
also at play. The next section interrogates possible implications for security 
of the democratisation process in the SADC region. 
Democratisation in SADC 
It is now common cause that the Southern African region has undergone a 
profound political transition from authoritarian governance towards a multi-
party political dispensation.1 The transition has been marked in the main by a 
wholesale embrace of party-competitive political systems and the jettisoning 
of one-party regimes. But questions must be asked – as this volume has 
done – about the nature and depth of democratisation within this political 
liberalisation. Put somewhat differently, does this political change amount to 
simply formal rather than substantive democracy, or to pseudo-democracy? 
Researchers are divided on this subject. While some argue that the process 
that has taken place is simply tantamount to political liberalisation devoid of 
239
democratic content, others argue that the recent political changes, although 
limited, amount to a democratic transition (Baker 1999). 
And how does democratisation impact upon security perceptions? How does 
democratisation influence internal security policy and external (specifically 
regional) security policy? Has the process of democratisation since the early 
1990s had a clear-cut or indirect bearing on regional security co-operation in 
the SADC region? 
Andreas Schedler (2001: 91) reminds us that ‘sustaining democracy is 
often a task as difficult as establishing it. In the immediate aftermath of ... 
democratic transitions, pressing concerns have quickly arisen about how to 
strengthen and stabilize these new regimes’. Critical challenges still remain 
for the SADC region to experience sustainable democratic consolidation. In 
his chapter in this volume, Du Pisani cites Linz and Stepan, who propose five 
key prerequisites for democratic consolidation, namely a vibrant and robust 
civil society, an active and autonomous political society, observance of the rule 
of law, an effective and efficient state bureaucracy, and an institutionalised 
economic society.
According to Lodge (1999: 1)
starting democracy is easier than keeping it. This contention 
is especially relevant to the early history of post-colonial 
Africa. Between 1960 and 1970, about fifty states acquired 
independence as well as various kinds of liberal constitutional 
arrangements; by the end of the decade all but a fraction were 
either governed by military dictatorships or one party systems 
with at best limited democratic pretensions. 
Can this scenario repeat itself? 
The country studies in this volume show that the democratic transition in the 
SADC region is still an unfinished business beset with complex endogenous 
and exogenous challenges. They also demonstrate that democratisation has 
had little positive impact on socio-economic development. Indeed, most 
countries of the region have slipped down on the UNDP HDI since the onset 
of democratisation in the 1990s. Although a significant factor in the decline 
in human development must be HIV/AIDS (which can hardly be blamed 
on democracy), it is nevertheless abundantly evident that there is little or 
no correlation between democratisation and human development, at least 
in the short to medium term. The cases of Botswana and Mauritius, which 
are the richest countries per capita in SADC, however, might suggest that 
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over a longer term a ‘virtuous circle’ is possible where democracy reinforces 
economic growth and that same growth sustains democracy, but this is not 
yet evident in the states undergoing democratisation.
It can indeed be argued that a majority of the SADC states, in adopting 
liberal democracy, often of a fairly superficial nature, may have foregone 
the possibility of socio-economic redistributional change through social or 
developmental democracy. The kind of governance evolving in the SADC 
region is described by some scholars as ‘exclusionary democracy’ (Mhone 
and Edigheji 2003; Edigheji 2004) wherein the political, especially the ruling, 
elite dominate the political space to the exclusion of other key actors such 
as civil society. According to this argument, political ruling elites have been 
able to stamp their hegemony over the whole democracy agenda and the 
crafting of both national and regional security projects. Our studies support 
this only partially: politics seems to remain an elite process in many states, 
but in other countries there is, for example, a high level of involvement in 
national elections and an active civil society (although, of course, civil society 
itself can be elitist). Southern Africa seems to be no worse off in this respect 
than the majority of developing countries, and in many respects democracy 
seems to be considerably deeper than in other parts of the world where post-
Cold War democratic transitions have taken place, for example Eastern and 
Central Europe or South-East and Central Asia. 
Democracy–security interface
In most of the country studies, it has not been possible to determine 
precisely and comprehensively how democratisation has impacted on 
national security and on security co-operation, although in some cases the 
changes in approach are explicit (South Africa, for example). Even greater 
difficulty was experienced in forming an aggregate picture. However, it can 
be observed that the nature of the interface between democracy and security 
perceptions and practices of states seems to differ from one SADC country 
to the other depending on the stability of each country, the nature of its 
democratic transition (or lack of it), and the degree of institutionalisation of 
its democratic governance. With regard to countries very recently emerging 
from war (i.e. Angola and the DRC), the conceptual approach the studies 
adopted has proved inappropriate and they were therefore not included in 
this analysis. 
The table below attempts to classify the countries studied in terms of their 
democratic transitions and the implications thereof for security. Of course, 
many of the countries underwent earlier transitions, mostly in the form of 
liberation struggles against colonialism, apartheid, and settler minority rule. 
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This study has, however, focused on the transitions that have taken place 
since the end of the Cold War.













Swaziland Botswana Namibia Lesotho Tanzania
Mauritius South Africa Zambia
Zimbabwe (previously 






Swaziland has not yet undergone a democratic transition and continues to be 
ruled in an authoritarian manner, although with some checks and balances 
and some signs of change (Mzizi in this volume). In such situations, the 
security perceptions and calculations of the ruling elite are not only driven 
by regime security concerns, but even simple political opposition or criticism 
of policy postures of the government may be considered a security threat. 
This lends some support to the argument of Regan and Henderson (2002: 
119–36) that the level of threat faced by a regime is strongly associated with 
political repression, especially in semi-democracies – Zimbabwe is a case in 
kind. 
Botswana and Mauritius are the longest-enduring liberal democracies in the 
SADC region, although the character of their democracies is very different, 
and Botswana has yet to experience a change of governing party (Molomo et 
al., and Cawthra in this volume). These countries have experienced relatively 
stable democratic governance since the 1960s. In both countries, the key 
drivers for democracy and security policy formulation are the ruling elites, 
with minimal involvement of civil society organisations. However, given 
their strong economies, both these countries potentially have the capacity 
to complement state security with human security, given the right policy 
mix, and have arguably done so to some extent. It is notable that these two 
democracies are not only just about the richest countries in the region in per 
capita terms, but have also been the most stable and peaceful, giving some 
support to the ‘democratic peace’ thesis. 
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Namibia (Lindeke, Kaapama, and Blaauw in this volume) and South Africa 
(Schoeman) exhibit some common features, given that both experienced 
extreme forms of racial segregation and domination from which they 
managed to extricate themselves in the early 1990s, following armed liberation 
struggles. In both, the liberation struggles did not result in outright military 
victory by the liberation movements, but led to a negotiated settlement 
leading to democratic governance. Both countries have made tremendous 
strides towards institutionalising democracy. However, in both cases, the 
former liberation movement holds sway in the political process and has 
entrenched its hegemony to the extent that opposition parties exhibit little 
political wherewithal to become an alternative government. The dominant 
party syndrome seems destined to endure under conditions of fragmented 
and enfeebled opposition parties, and there is not much the dominant party 
can (or arguably should) do about this. While there are positive aspects 
to a dominant-party system, most notably in terms of nation building, 
reconciliation, and stability, both case studies have identified emerging 
problems in terms of the governance and management of national security.
The political culture of military rule has not generally been a feature of the 
political systems of Southern Africa, compared to the rest of Africa. The 
reasons for this have not been fully explored in this study, except for the legacy 
of the liberation struggles, which is probably an important element in this 
regard. During often-protracted armed struggles the military dimension was 
generally suborned to politics, while most revolutionaries regarded themselves 
to greater or lesser extents as both soldiers and civilians, thus cementing a 
form of revolutionary civil–military relations that was carried through into 
the new states. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Southern 
African countries that have experienced the greatest degree of military threat 
to governance through attempted coups (Lesotho, Zambia, and Tanzania) 
were those in which armed liberation struggles did not take place. It was 
only in Lesotho, however, that the military came to power, as Matlosa has 
documented in this study. The military relinquished state power and retired to 
the barracks in the early 1990s. This process ushered in the new era of a fragile 
democracy in Lesotho – fragile because various forms of conflicts between 
and among key institutions have generated considerable instability. 
The final, and largest, category is that of states that have experienced a transition 
from one-party to multi-party systems of governance. These include Tanzania 
(Maundi in this volume), Zambia (Phiri), Zimbabwe (Manungo), Malawi 
(Phiri), Seychelles (Van Nieuwkerk and Bell), and Mozambique (Lalá). Within 
this category there are a wide range of differences, but also some similarities. 
A majority of states in this category adopted some form of African socialism 
and one-partyism2 shortly after independence, including Tanzania, Zambia, 
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Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Seychelles. Socialism had more content in 
some cases (Mozambique, Tanzania, and Seychelles) than in others, where 
it was an ideological shell within which capitalist systems operated on the 
basis of neo-patrimonialism (Zambia and Zimbabwe). Whatever the case, 
the ideology of socialism in part propelled the institutionalisation of one-
party regimes, although in the case of Zimbabwe this was never formalised. 
Since the end of the Cold War, most of these countries have basically 
abandoned socialist ideology and have formally embraced liberal democracy, 
holding regular multi-party elections. This feature of the liberal democratic 
model has not only ensured that the political marketplace is relatively open 
for competition among various parties, but in many cases has shaken the 
hegemonic hold of the ruling parties. Although mostly still dominant, the 
ruling parties in these countries now have to contend with opposition forces 
that continuously threaten their hold on power (and indeed, the historic 
ruling parties in Zambia and Malawi have lost office). 
Zimbabwe is more complex. It is fairly clear that before the monumental 
changes that marked the end of the Cold War and of apartheid, Zimbabwe 
was becoming a de facto one-party state. It began on the trajectory of 
economic liberalisation and multi-partyism at the same time as many other 
states in the region, but the ruling ZANU(PF) party has fiercely resisted 
political opposition and has reversed many of the economic liberalisms, 
which, coupled with a land reform programme and human rights violations, 
has resulted in an economic and political crisis. It is uncertain whether the 
Zimbabwe that emerges from this crisis will be a more authoritarian state or 
a more genuine multi-party democracy: yet again, this is an example of the 
unpredictable and uneven processes associated with economic and political 
liberalisation. 
There are, of course, many other differences among the countries in this 
category. Malawi, for example, did not go the route of African socialism, 
but that of one-person autocracy under Kamudzu Banda. But the winds of 
change swept the authoritarian Banda regime to the wayside, opening up 
the system to multi-party competition. Seychelles, on the other hand, was a 
stable one-party welfare state, and it was elite and external pressure rather 
than mass disaffection that led to the introduction of multi-partyism.
The state and character of security co-operation
As elsewhere in the world, the Southern African region has embraced 
regional integration since the end of the Cold War in a much more forceful 
and purposive manner than had hitherto been the case. Since 1992 when 
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the Windhoek Treaty established SADC, the region’s states have committed 
themselves to deeper integration than mere economic co-ordination, 
which was the raison d’etre of SADCC. SADC has taken up a triple mantle 
of economic, political, and security co-operation. On all the three fronts, 
especially the economic plane, considerable progress has been made, 
signified by the signing of a number of protocols.
Would this have been possible without democratisation? Countries of the 
region co-operated quite closely through the FLS during the 1970s and 
1980s, and none of the FLS member states, at least until 1980, was a multi-
party democracy. However, the nature of this was secretive, informal (there 
was no treaty), and carried out almost entirely at executive level. It is unlikely 
that SADC as it is currently constituted, including the OPDSC, would have 
been possible without democratisation. 
In terms of institutional co-operation, one could argue that regional co-
operation on security issues has evolved from an intergovernmental forum 
where defence, security, and foreign policy issues were discussed, to a 
more institutionalised arrangement. As the ‘new institutionalism’ literature 
suggests (Smith 2004), such an evolution went through various phases, 
and in the case of the SADCC and SADC, it experienced intensified goal-
oriented communication, which led to the demand for greater structure. The 
establishment of a permanent organisation to administer this policy domain 
represents an additional degree of institutionalisation. 
The theoretical literature suggests that such formal organisations can change 
the nature of co-operation. At the very least, organisations can provide 
some institutional memory concerning previous decisions. At most, the 
organisation itself can become an autonomous actor with policy influence. 
But what is the impact of SADC and the OPDSC on security co-operation? 
At the very least, it allows the states of the region to pursue their security 
and defence interests in an organised fashion. As Table 2 indicates, the 
organisation plays a significant policy co-ordination role. 
Table 2:  Institutionalisation of defence and security co-operation in 
Southern Africa
Level of institutionalisation Southern African structures
Informal intergovernmental forum for dialogue on 
defence and security issues
FLS, 1977 
(ISDSC)
Information sharing: mainly policy co-ordination; 
sometimes specific co-operative policy actions
SADCC, 1980–92
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Norm creation and codification: establishing 
norms, rules, laws
SADCC, and SADC since 1992
The establishment of a permanent organisation to 
administer policy
SADC, especially after 
restructuring in 2001, including 
the OPDSC and its ISDSC and 
ISPDC
Governance: the authority to make, implement, and 
enforce rules in a specific domain
?
As discussed previously, early regional co-operation, mainly via the FLS 
and later the SADCC, was motivated largely by a shared regime-threat 
perception, prompted by the violent policies of regional destabilisation of 
the apartheid regime. SADC’s current key objectives and its vision, as a 
whole, resonate both with state and human security agendas. In the analysis 
of the UN Commission on Human Security (2003), key areas requiring policy 
intervention for human security include violent conflict, the movement of 
people, post-conflict peace building, poverty, health, and education. 
In short, there has been a move towards a human, rather than a state or 
regime, security approach, at least on the official policy level. Numerous 
references are made throughout SADC documents to what is in effect human 
security, even if the term itself is not actually used. At the same time, the 
mandate of the OPDSC is restricted largely to state security, and the focus is 
on the traditional security sector – the military, police, and intelligence. This 
need not be a problem, as the mandate of SADC as a whole is both state 
and human security. As the UN Security Council, for example, deals with 
narrowly defined security issues (‘threats to and breaches of the peace’), while 
other UN institutions, such as UNDP, deal with wider human security issues, 
so too can a division of labour with regard to security be established within 
SADC structures. The real test, however, comes when SADC – through the 
OPDSC, the summit, or whatever other structure – is obliged to make hard 
choices between state and human security, for example, when confronting 
human rights abuses in a member state. The track record in this regard is 
not promising, as SADC institutions have seldom, if ever, criticised member 
states, even when human rights abuses have been manifest. 
We noted earlier that SADC has been mostly a state-centric exercise. 
Nevertheless, SADC increasingly appears to follow the trends of ‘new 
regionalism’ (see Cawthra in this volume) in which multidimensional co-
operation involves the state, market-oriented actors, and civil society actors, 
and covers economic, cultural, political, security, and environmental aspects, 
and regionalism grows organically or spontaneously, emerging in part ‘from 
below’ through popular movements and from within the regions themselves. 
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The growing tendency of NGOs in the region to place the term ‘Southern 
African’ before their names is just one indication of this. 
The reformed SADC therefore seems to be pursuing multiple security 
objectives: in the first place through various forms and levels of co-operation, 
including economic and trade integration, and secondly via the Protocol on 
Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation. This protocol makes provision 
for the promotion of state security, but also includes the promotion of common 
political values (article 2 of the protocol). Although too early to judge, SADC 
has a mixed intervention record. At the time when its security structures were 
under debate, various SADC member states intervened militarily in other 
member states, although at the invitation of the governments concerned: 
Lesotho hosted the armies of South Africa and Botswana; and the DRC those 
of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Earlier, in the mid-1990s, Lesotho and 
Mozambique benefited from SADC leaders’ mediation efforts, as the DRC 
later did. However, there is no firm record by SADC as a whole of successful 
conflict resolution of crises in member states (Angola, the DRC, Tanzania 
with regard to Zanzibar, Zimbabwe, Swaziland), between member states 
(Angola–Zambia, Namibia–Botswana), or on its periphery (the Great Lakes 
Region, Central African Republic and Republic of Congo, Sudan, Uganda, 
Madagascar, or the Comores). Instead, SADC has tended to establish 
task groups of two, three, or more countries to deal with crises, and some 
successes have been notched up, notably in the DRC and Lesotho. 
Does SADC therefore represent a common security, collective security, or 
collective defence regime? Historically, security co-operation was driven 
by regime survival. The post-apartheid SADC chose to focus on economic 
integration and mask or downplay disagreements over security co-
operation. The restructured SADC seems committed to pursuing collective 
(or collaborative) security via the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security 
Co-operation, and has signed the Mutual Defence Pact. If by common 
security is meant a high level of institutionalisation (see Table 1) – i.e. that 
multidimensional arrangements are put in place to mediate relations among 
members states and govern their internal security processes3 – then SADC 
appears not to have gained the critical mass of shared values to cross into the 
common security terrain. In fact, some observers see a contest in the region 
over the future direction SADC ought to take: the first vision is a militaristic 
and traditional one; the second is a wider, human security-based vision 
based on the governance goals of the AU and its developmental programme, 
NEPAD; including democracy, human rights, justice, negotiation, and other 
forms of peaceful dispute settlement.
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Regional integration in all the three planes, namely economic co-operation, 
political co-operation, and security co-operation, has been hampered by 
the individual regional states tenaciously clinging to rather than ‘pooling’ 
sovereignty. As was pointed out earlier, it is to be expected that weak states, 
and states that are relatively newly independent, will hang onto what 
remains of their sovereignty in this globalised world, and that political and 
especially security functions (and within security, probably intelligence) will 
be the last to be ceded. However, as Cawthra has argued earlier, without 
some pooling of sovereignty, further substantive progress towards a common 
security regime will be impossible. How this is managed – e.g. through 
confidence- and security-building measures, by restraining the hegemon, by 
constructing win-win scenarios, by ensuring that benefits outweigh costs, 
and by respecting national sensitivities – will be critical to the success of the 
common security project. 
Controversy still surrounds the desirability of a regional hegemon for the 
achievement of stated goals and objectives of regional integration, and 
the question is whether or not it is desirable for South Africa to play this 
role. The country studies in this project have not demonstrated any strong 
resistance to South African hegemony. In reality, with its overwhelming 
economic strength (even if this is not always translated into military and 
political preponderance), South Africa can make or break SADC. By building 
confidence and common values and sharing sovereignty, the hegemon can be 
‘checked’ or locked into policy processes, as has happened in other regions, 
but its dominance cannot be wished away. In any case, true hegemonism, at 
least in its original Gramscian sense, involves not the use of brutal force but 
of ‘soft power’, and is most successful when it is built on consensus rather 
than coercion. 
The way forward
Progressively institutionalised co-operation in the area of defence and 
security is needed if SADC is to move beyond low levels of co-operation, 
and to graduate from organisational and normative co-operation to common 
security. To do this, resources are key: without appropriate contributions from 
member states (not just donors), sub-regional organisations cannot evolve 
beyond limited functional co-operation. On the downside, a continued 
narrow focus on regime security constrains the promotion of human security. 
Evolutionary progress towards common security will boost the human 
security agenda and provide more evidence for the thesis that democratic 
governance will assist peace and stability, which in turn will enable economic 
growth and development – a thesis upon which the continent’s hopes are 
currently pinned through NEPAD.
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Throughout the SADC region, the trend is that the political elite and the state 
are the main agents driving the actual process of democratisation and the 
formulation of security policy, thereby emphasising the state-centric nature 
of these projects. Some of the exclusionary tendencies of liberal democracy 
in the region are traceable, in part, from the tradition of one-party rule of 
yesteryear. Some may be directly attributed to the proliferation of neo-liberal 
economics that has accompanied democratisation. And the political culture 
of several SADC states is marked by the dominant-party syndrome. This 
further explains, in part, why the dominant interest and concerns around 
security policy focus mainly on state/regime security rather than human 
security. The challenge that this situation clearly poses is that the SADC 
region still has to entrench democratic practice and culture that embraces 
broad participation of various actors. This is why it is so important that civil 
society organisations are allowed space to make meaningful contributions to 
both democracy and security projects in the region. 
However, this study does not seek to counterpose state security and human 
security, as is so common, especially and unsurprisingly in the analysis 
emerging from civil society organisations. It is normally weak, not strong, 
states that revert to repression and human rights abuses – or at least states 
that are weak in the sense that they lack coherence and legitimacy and thus 
feel profoundly threatened. Human security and human development clearly 
requires state action: in developing contexts such as Southern Africa it is, 
after all, the state that is primarily responsible for providing education, clean 
water, health, and so on. There are certainly many cases where states can 
become instruments of insecurity rather than security for their citizens, or 
at least for significant sections of the citizenry. There are also trade-offs that 
have to be made, e.g. in making decisions about budget allocations (‘guns or 
butter’). But, in general, policymakers should seek to enhance the legitimate 
democratic functions of states, including the governance and management 
of security, in order to promote human security and human development. 
The states of the region, with some exceptions, are weak and have been 
further weakened by globalisation, and in some cases (although this will 
hopefully be temporary) by democratisation. Their ability to manage 
security, both nationally and multilaterally, needs to be strengthened in 
ways that reinforce rather than undermine the rather fragile democratic 
values, processes, and practices that have taken root in the region. Security 
co-operation, and beyond this, a common security regime, should be seen 
in terms of ways of underpinning the state system, although it will require 
a pooling of sovereignty, thus gradually transferring key executive (and 
eventually judicial and legislative) functions to the collective from individual 
states. At the same time, civil society co-operation within the region also 
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needs to be strengthened, so that an emerging SADC security community 
can be constructed on the basis of shared democratic values (this project itself 
is a very small example of the way individuals and institutions in the region 
can collaborate). The challenge – at both national and multilateral levels – is 
to deepen and consolidate democracy, prevent democratic reversals, and 
address the social and economic dimensions of democracy, without which it 
will not be sustainable in Southern Africa. 
 
EnDnoTES
1 Multi-partyism does not, of course, necessarily mean democracy: it is quite possible, albeit 
unusual, for authoritarian systems to accommodate other political parties (e.g. the former 
German Democratic Republic), and proponents of one-party systems have often held that they 
can be democratic (e.g. President Museveni’s claims for the Ugandan system), but in the current 
Southern African context, and in this book, multi-partyism is regarded as indispensable for 
democracy.
2 While there is no necessary relationship between socialism and one-partyism, there is certainly a 
contingent one. 
3 In its original sense, e.g. the Palme Commission, institutionalisation was not necessary for 
common security, but it has come to take this form, e.g. the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe. 
Conclusion
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Appendix 1
Research Briefing: Democratic Governance 
and Common Security in Southern Africa
Multi-party democracy, once an exception in Southern Africa, is now 
the official practice of virtually all countries of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). At the same time, SADC has 
embarked on an ambitious economic, political and security co-operation 
project. But this has been slow to develop and there have been many 
crises, not least over responses to conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo.
To assist in understanding the challenges that have accompanied the 
regional security co-operation project, the Centre for Defence and 
Security Management at the Graduate School of Public Development 
Management, University of the Witwatersrand, commissioned a research 
project to examine the relationship between national security, the 
regional security project, and the nature of democratic transitions and 
the practice of democracy in Southern Africa.
The findings of the study can be summarised in two parts: findings 
related to the state and character of democratisation and democracy in 
the region; and findings related to regional security co-operation and its 
links with democratisation. 
Democratisation and democracy
The study concludes that democratisation has been uneven and partial 
in Southern Africa. With the possible exception of Seychelles (which has 
now withdrawn from SADC) none of the 14 countries studied can be 
considered to be social democracies. One (Swaziland) has yet to embark 
on a democratic transition, while two others (Angola and DRC) have 
only recently emerged from protracted and widespread civil conflict, 
with all the negative effects such conflict tends to have on democratic 
governance. Namibia and South Africa are still dealing with the legacies 
of decades of apartheid and white minority rule. The majority of states, 
however, are essentially in transition from one-party or authoritarian 
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rule (although in some cases one-party rule was a consequence of a 
dominant party rather than a constitutional provision).
These transitions are still in progress and beset with many problems. 
Some analysts have dismissed democracy in Southern Africa as 
exclusionary or elitist in nature, but this study only partly supports this, 
pointing out that in many countries there are high levels of popular 
participation in electoral politics and active civil societies.
A major concern for the consolidation and sustainability of democracy 
in this region is that it appears not to have met expectations of socio-
economic progress. Indeed, most countries have slipped down the UN 
Human Development Index, although HIV/Aids has played a significant 
part in this.
Botswana and Mauritius, the two longest-established democracies in 
Southern Africa, demonstrate through their sustained economic growth 
and social development that in the long term there may be a virtuous 
relationship between democracy and socio-economic progress.
Nevertheless, democratic transitions are risky and at least some of the 
insecurity and violent conflict in the region may be associated with 
such transitions: the DRC is the most obvious case. Nor is the result of 
transition predictable. Authoritarian rule remains a possibility.
It is notable that only one country in Southern Africa, Lesotho, is 
transiting from military rule. Civil-military relations in the region 
remain fairly stable, and the study attributes this in part to the legacy of 
liberation struggles where ‘politics ruled the gun’.
Regional security co-operation
In most cases, the study was unable to determine exactly how democratic 
transitions have impacted on regional security co-operation, as they 
appear to have many contradictory effects. It concludes that regional 
political and security co-operation is driven by:
•	 Globalisation, which tends to weaken marginalized states, obliging 
them to club together, and engenders transnational security threats 
requiring multinational responses, as well as economic imperatives to 
co-operate.
•	 Solidarity forged in the liberation struggles, which remains an 
important ideological gel.
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•	 Security interdependence where conflicts in one country are seen as 
impacting on the others. 
But these powerful motives also have opposite effects. Globalisation 
has undermined state sovereignty in the economic sphere so that 
states understandably cling to what freedom of action remains in the 
political and security terrains. Solidarity may be a virtue but it tends to 
restrict critical engagement on issues such as citizen rights. And security 
interdependence can also lead to interference in the internal affairs of 
neighbouring states, on the principle that ‘the enemy of my enemy is 
my friend’.
The study concludes that security co-operation in SADC remains 
fairly rudimentary, and has yet to significantly affect domestic policy 
formation. One reason for this is that there are strong counter-impulses, 
mostly springing from the insecurity of states. Security co-operation 
is primarily a state-centric process, driven by political elites, although 
there are signs of growing co-operation between civil societies and 
business interests. SADC is nevertheless pursuing an ambitious agenda, 
including developing a collective defence capability and UN-type 
principles of collective security.
At the same time, SADC is also aiming at ‘wider’ security: economic, 
social and environmental security. Like many of its member states, it 
often describes this as ‘human security’, although properly speaking 
human security is not merely wider, it is directed at the citizen rather 
than the state. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the study did not reveal much concern about 
the role of South Africa as a potential hegemon in the region. Rather, it 
was expected that it should exercise greater leadership.
Policy recommendations
The study did not focus on strategic or tactical issues, but a series of 
broad policy proposals arose from the workshops which considered the 
findings, drawing on the expertise of both academics and practitioners. 
These can be summarised as follows:
•	 It is fashionable to argue that ‘human security’ should take precedence 
over ‘state security’. While states can become instruments of insecurity 
for citizens, usually when they adopt repressive actions, one of the 
key problems with the consolidation of democracy in the region is the 
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weakness of states. The security of states is an essential condition for 
human security, and policy-makers should seek policy options that 
simultaneously enhance both state and human security.
•	 At the same time, efforts should be made to involve civil society more 
widely in order to deepen political and security co-operation.
•	 Consolidation of democratic governance will tend to promote peace 
and stability, which in turn should enable economic growth and 
development. This will require broadening the involvement of a wide 
range of organisations, as well as implementation of SADC protocols 
providing for the development of democratic institutions and the 
entrenchment of human rights. It is essential that the social and 
economic dimensions of democracy, not just the formal criteria, are 
taken forward.
•	 Building a common security regime in Southern Africa will require 
moving beyond solidarity between states and regimes in power. 
SADC protocols now make it the duty of other states to intervene in 
‘internal affairs’ in cases of gross human rights abuses, violent conflict 
and other extreme conditions, yet on the whole SADC has been very 
reluctant to criticise states on human rights and governance grounds. 
Practices for dealing with such issues need to be developed.
•	 SADC states have already ‘pooled’ some functions that were previously 
strictly the preserve of individual states. Further pooling of formerly 
sovereign functions will be necessary for the benefits of shared 
security to be felt, eventually transferring some executive, judicial and 
legislative functions from the individual state to the collective, but 
without weakening state capacities.
•	 In particular, progress will mean building the multinational institutions 
of SADC and integrating the Southern African project with that of 
the African Union.
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Appendix 2
The Southern African Defence and Security 
Management network
The SADSEM network seeks to contribute to peace and security in 
Southern Africa by strengthening the democratic management of 
its defence forces and other security organs. It does so primarily by 
offering specialised training programmes to police and military officers 
and others involved in managing security in the region.
It also undertakes research on security issues, and helps governments 
in the region to develop defence policy.
The SADSEM network comprises ten tertiary partner institutions, 
which implement the programme in the 14 member countries of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).
It is managed by the Centre for Defence and Security Management 
(CDSM) in the Graduate School of Public and Development 
Management of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, 
South Africa.
The SADSEM network is primarily funded by the Danish government. 
It is also attracting growing support from other institutions as well as 
governments in the region.
overview of activities
The SADSEM network offers a range of services and activities, 
including: 
•	 Training courses offered in all SADC countries, based on common 
curricula, but utilising teaching methods that are responsive to local 
requirements.
•	 Research and policy analysis, largely undertaken by network 
partners for SADC governments.
•	 An internship programme for students from SADC member states 




•	 Higher degree scholarships for all staff members of SADSEM 
network partners.
Aims and objectives
The vision of the SADSEM network is to contribute to the effective 
democratic management of defence and security functions in southern 
Africa, and to strengthen peace and common security in the region. It 
seeks to do this by:
– providing training and education for defence and security 
management and planning, civil-military relations, peace-building, 
and the management of peace missions;
– building scholarly capacity and developing a regional network of 
institutions to provide education, training, policy, and technical 
support and research output in these areas. 
Background
Following the end of apartheid rule, South Africa’s defence and 
security sector underwent a transformation process in which civil-
military relations were normalised and the role of defence in a 
democracy was re-established. The Graduate School for Public and 
Development Management of the University of the Witwatersrand set 
up a defence management programme to assist with these challenging 
tasks. It assisted with transformation and helped to enhance the 
management skills of senior military officers and defence officials.
Countries in southern Africa simultaneously faced the challenge of 
managing complex security problems, and what started as a purely 
South African project was quickly widened to cover the whole SADC 
region.
At the end of 1999 the defence management programme was 
upgraded to include a Centre for Defence and Security Management 
(based at P&DM), as well as a regional network of programmes and 
centres for defence management. The network also maintains links 
with the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). 
Since then, the SADSEM network has played an important role in 
promoting peace and security in southern Africa, and developing a 
basis for common security in the region. It has done so by developing 
the capacity of governments in the region to:
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•	 manage their defence forces and other security organs in a 
democratic manner;
•	 participate in regional security initiatives; and
•	 co-operate with multinational conflict resolution and peace 
missions.
Its targeted training programmes have benefited some 3 000 senior 
government officials, military officers and civil society leaders in all 14 
SADC member states.
It has also made an important contribution to building sustainable 
local research and policy capacity, and promoted the involvement of 
civil society in these activities.
Management
The SADSEM network is co-ordinated the Centre for Defence and 
Security Management (CDSM) at the Graduate School of Public and 
Development Management of the University of the Witwatersrand. 
CDSM provides the network with management and administrative 
support.
Network activities are overseen by a steering committee comprising 
representatives of all network partners, which meets four times a year. 
Oversight is provided by an advisory board comprising representatives 
of all SADC governments, which meets annually.
SADSEM network partners
The SADSEM network comprises ten tertiary partner institutions 
which implement the programme in the 14 SADC member states. 
These network partners are described below.
Angola
Centro de Estudos Estratégicos de Angola 
CEEA is an independent, non-profit research institute based in Luanda. 
Established in 2001, it studies issues surrounding peace and security, 
social development and human rights, particularly in Southern and 
Central Africa.
It has developed a good working relationship with government 
institutions as well as non-state actors in Angola, particularly in respect 
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of consultancy work on the electoral process. Among other things, 
CEEA is providing the state with a new system for voter registration.
Botswana
Centre for Strategic Studies, Department of Political and 
Administrative Studies, University of Botswana
The Centre for Strategic Studies was established in 2001 to participate 
in the SADSEM network and to present appropriate courses. It is 
attached to the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at 
the University of Botswana, which has a long track record of dealing 
with security and related issues. The centre has delivered a number of 
executive courses in defence and security management as well as the 
management of peace missions.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Southern African Defence and Security Management Project, 
Chaire UNESCO, University of Kinshasa
UNESCO established the Chaire UNESCO pour la culture de la 
paix, le reglement des conflicts, les droits humains, la democratie et la 
bonne gouvernance (UNESCO Chair in Peace, Security and Good 
Governance) at the University of Kinshasa in November 2000 with 
the aim of improving the participation of Congolese academics and 
policy-makers in peace processes in SADC and Central Africa. It has 
involved several academics in the DRC in research, policy analysis, and 
teaching related to peace and security, and has hosted and facilitated 
numerous workshops and conferences on these topics as well as 
SADSEM executive sourses. The staff of the Chair have an extensive 
network of contacts in Central and Southern Africa. The Chair also has 
a subcentre at the University of Bukavu in eastern DRC. 
Malawi
Defence and Security Management Project, Centre for Security 
Studies, Mzuzu University, Malawi
The Centre was established in response to the need for well-educated 
and informed personnel in the Malawi Defence Force as well as 
other security organs in the country. It seeks to contribute to peace 
and security in the country by building the capacity of policy-makers, 
security personnel, and civil society leaders. In particular, it seeks to 
produce excellent officers for the defence force. Mzuzu University 
currently offers short courses in security management, but intends to 
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develop longer academic programmes as well. Its membership of the 
SADSEM network is helping it to achieve this goal, and the university 
has presented a number of SADSEM courses.
Mozambique
Defence and Security Management Project, Centre for African 
Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University, Mozambique
The Project has developed and delivered several executive courses, 
including one on managing peace missions; researched a number of 
key security issues in Mozambique; produced several publications, 
including a thematic issue of CEA’s journal Estudos Moçambicanos 
on the Mozambican peace process; and helped to develop the 
Mozambique white paper on defence and other key policy documents.
 
Namibia
Defence and Security Management Project, Department of 
Political and Administrative Studies, University of Namibia
The Department of Political and Administrative Studies has developed 
capacity for research and training in defence issues especially through 
its participation in the SADSEM network, for which purpose it has 
established a Defence and Security Management Project. It has 
sought to integrate its work on defence and security with its wider 
public management programmes, and has developed a programme of 
research on these issues. 
The university has good technical facilities for organising and hosting 
training courses. The department also has good relations with key 
domestic actors in defence and security. The project has delivered 
several executive courses on defence and security management, 
including ones specifically tailored for parliamentarians and NGO 
personnel.
South Africa
Centre for Defence and Security Management (CDSM), 
University of the Witwatersrand
CDSM co-ordinates the SADSEM network, and provides it with 
management and administrative support. Headed by the Chair of 
Defence and Security Management of the Graduate School of Public 
and Development Management (P&DM) of the University of the 
Witwatersrand, the Centre has more than ten years of experience in 
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training for defence and security governance and management, and is 
a leader in its field.
CDSM has provided the South African government with extensive 
policy support, notably by helping to develop its White Paper on 
Defence, the Defence Review, the White Paper on Peace Missions, 
and the White Paper on Defence-Related Industries. It has also 
contributed to broader policy analysis via papers delivered at SADC 
and international conferences. Given its relatively small staff, it has an 
impressive research and publications record.
Tanzania
Defence and Security Management Subcentre, Centre for Foreign 
Relations, Tanzania
The Centre for Foreign Relations (CFR) has made a sustained 
contribution to peace and security studies in southern Africa. It was 
established in 1978 by the governments of Tanzania and Mozambique 
to provide training and research in international relations and 
diplomacy. It is still nominally owned by both countries, but for all 
practical purposes it is a Tanzanian institute. Its main activity is still the 
training of Tanzania’s foreign affairs officials, but it has expanded its 
training programme, and offers courses to the public as well.
The CFR is very well-connected, and has strong links with key 
ministries and other stakeholders in the country. It has run several 
SADSEM executive courses, including some specifically tailored for the 
National Parks security environment, and has developed a programme 
of research as well as providing other training and policy support. The 
defence and security activities are run by a subcentre that has high-
level representation from the defence and security services.
Zambia
Defence and Security Project, Department of History, University 
of Zambia 
Since 2000, the Project has presented several executive SADSEM 
courses, some in association with the Centre for Foreign Relations 
in Tanzania. The University of Zambia became a full member of the 
SADSEM network in December 2003.
The Project enjoys the support of the university administration as well 
as the Ministry of Defence. The latter are the key stakeholders, since 
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the executive courses presented thus far have been aimed at equipping 
officials in the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, and Foreign Affairs 
with skills and knowledge in the area of defence and security. The 
Project now has enough resources to manage executive courses with a 
minimum of regional support.
Zimbabwe
Centre for Defence Studies, Department of History, University of 
Zimbabwe
The University of Zimbabwe has achieved a high level of expertise 
in the academic teaching of security studies, and has links with the 
national defence force as well as other government departments, 
which provide many of its students. The Centre’s War and Strategic 
Studies Unit provides education in this field at four levels: a diploma, a 
batchelor’s degree, a master’s degree, and a doctorate. More than 200 
people have obtained one of these qualifications. 
Courses
The SADSEM network offers two types of courses in four subjects, 
organised in partnership with SADC governments. The four subjects 
are:
•	 Defence and Security Management
•	 Management of Multinational Peace Missions 
•	 Security Sector Governance
•	 Parliamentary Oversight of Defence and Security 
The two types of courses are: 
Certificate courses, leading to a certificate of competence. These run 
for three to five weeks. These courses are presented in Johannesburg, 
and participants are drawn from all over the region. Participants are 
assessed on the basis of group presentations, individual assignments, 
and written examinations.
Executive courses of two to ten days, presented in all SADC member 
states. Participants are not assessed.
The network is also developing a series of masters degrees in security 
sector management, to be offered by network partners.
An interactive and participatory approach to teaching and learning 
is followed. Extensive use is made of case studies and simulations. 
Participants work in groups, which enable them to share experiences 
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and deal with real management problems. The learning process is 
structured to enable participants to become more confident about 
expressing and exploring their own ideas, and draw upon their own 
experiences. 
Lecturers include academics from network partners, African and 
international experts, and practitioners of defence and security 
governance and management. 
Research and policy support
SADSEM network partners are involved in a number of multinational 
research projects, focusing on democratic governance and the 
management of security in the SADC region. Current and previous 
research partners include the Canadian International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC), the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
(FES), the British Department for International Development (DFID), 
the Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), 
the Norwegian C Michelsen Institute (CMI), the Swiss-based Centre 
for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, and various other 
institutions.
SADSEM has a twinning arrangement with the Danish Institute of 
International Affairs, which involves collaborative research, exchanges, 
and other forms of co-operation.
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